James Peter Cooksey v. Town of Ocean Ridge

OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT

JAMES PETER COOKSEY,
Appellant,

Vv.

TOWN OF OCEAN RIDGE,
Appellee.

No. 4D2024-2428
[December 17, 2025]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Luis Delgado, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2023-CA-012066-
XXXX-MB.

Jennifer S. Carroll of the Law Offices of Jennifer S. Carroll, P.A.,
Jupiter, for appellant.

James R. Jimenez and Lyman H. Reynolds, Jr., of Roberts, Reynolds,
Bedard & Tuzzio, PLLC, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

FORST, J.

Appellant James Cooksey appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his
second amended complaint with prejudice. Cooksey argues the court
should have denied the dismissal motion or at least permitted him to
amend his complaint to state his claim more artfully. For the reasons set
forth below, we agree and reverse.

Background

“When confronted with a motion to dismiss, the court must take the
allegations of the complaint as true and decide only questions of law.”
Elmore v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 760 So. 2d 968, 971 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
Accordingly, we recount the facts as alleged in Cooksey’s complaint.

Cooksey owns a property in the Town of Ocean Ridge (Appellee, “the
Town”). In August 2022, a Town official cited Cooksey’s property for a
violation of local ordinance Section 67-174: Maintenance and Appearance
Standards (“Section 67”). A hearing was set for October 4. After

communicating with the official, Cooksey had the lawn and vegetation
trimmed. The official told Cooksey he was satisfied and would cancel the
October 4 hearing.

Without Cooksey’s knowledge, the hearing was not canceled but
instead reset for November 1, 2022. Cooksey did not receive the October
4 order resetting the hearing and was never informed of the new hearing
date. On November 1, an order was issued finding a violation, assessing
fines of $150 per day, and imposing a lien on the property. However,
Cooksey never received that order, either.

In June 2023, Cooksey learned about the November 2022 order and
the lien for the first time through a computer search of his property. He
filed the operative second amended complaint in January 2024, seeking a
declaratory judgment that his “rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution and the laws of the United States, as well as his rights
under Article 1, Sections 2 and 9, of the Florida Constitution, are violated
by Town’s enforcement” of Section 67. Cooksey’s complaint further stated
that “Cooksey was unaware of [the November 2022] hearing and unaware
that [the Town] still deemed the property in violation of the code,” that
Cooksey “never received a copy of the [November 2022] Order,” and
requests a declaration that Section 67 “is unconstitutional as applied to
Cooksey because it violates Cooksey’s rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment” and “that any and all sanctions|,] fines,
and liens by Town against Cooksey pursuant to Code Section 67-174 are
null and void.” The main thrust of Cooksey’s complaint was that Section
67 was unconstitutionally vague both facially and as applied to him.

The Town moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.
Cooksey did not file a written response. At the hearing on the dismissal
motion, the Town argued that Cooksey could not challenge the November
2022 order because he had failed to file a timely direct appeal of that order.
The trial court interjected:

Let me stop you right there. Having reviewed the motion, I
can tell you I’m inclined to grant the motion to dismiss on, you
know, as far as the facial challenge. As far as the as-applied,
[counsel for Town], if he’s asserting lack of notice, don’t I need
an evidentiary hearing on that?

The Town’s counsel replied that an evidentiary hearing was
unnecessary because Cooksey’s complaint did not allege a procedural due
process claim. Cooksey responded he had stated in his complaint that he
had not received notice of the November 2022 hearing or order. The trial

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court orally granted the Town’s dismissal motion with prejudice:

It’s a short complaint; I looked it over. I think that [the Town]
is right, the relief that’s sought and what was pled in the
complaint is—just from looking at it. All right. Counsel,
dismiss with prejudice. I think it goes without—please send
me an order.

The trial court followed up with a written order dismissing Cooksey’s
complaint with prejudice “for the reasons stated on the record.” Cooksey
filed a motion for rehearing that more directly asserted his argument that
the Town’s fines without adequate notice violated his procedural due
process rights. The motion for rehearing further argued that the trial court
should have permitted Cooksey to amend his complaint to express his
procedural due process claim more clearly instead of dismissing with
prejudice. Three months later, the trial court entered an order denying
Cooksey’s motion for rehearing without explanation. This appeal follows.

Analysis

The standard of review of an order granting a motion to dismiss is de
novo. Kidwell Grp., LLC v. SafePoint Ins. Co., 376 So. 3d 48, 50 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2023). “Procedural due process requires both reasonable notice and
a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Spencer v. Kelner, 357 So. 3d 166,
168 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (quoting Yue Yan v. Byers, 88 So. 3d 392, 394
(Fla. 4th DCA 2012)).

While Cooksey’s complaint did not raise his lack-of-notice procedural
due process claim in the most articulate manner, his multiple references
to procedural due process and his purported nonreceipt of adequate notice
were nonetheless sufficient to alert the trial court to that argument.
Cooksey raised the lack-of-notice issue again at the dismissal hearing and
then most directly and forcefully in his motion for rehearing, which the
trial court should have granted.

Dismissing Cooksey’s complaint with prejudice was clear error. “It is
well settled that a dismissal with prejudice for failure to state a cause of
action should not be ordered without giving the party offering the defective
pleading an opportunity to amend, unless it is apparent that the pleading
cannot be amended so as to state a cause of action.” Nev. Interstate Props.
Corp. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 747 So. 2d 447, 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
We have further held that dismissal with prejudice is inappropriate when
a court is “unable to determine with certainty that [the plaintiff] cannot
amend his initial complaint to state a cause of action.” Balcar v. Ramos,

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595 So. 2d 308, 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Here, at the very least, we
cannot say with certainty that Cooksey’s complaint could not be amended
to state a cause of action.

Conclusion
The trial court erred in dismissing Cooksey’s complaint with prejudice.
On remand, the trial court shall permit him to amend his complaint to
state his claim more artfully. See Enstrom v. Dixon, 354 So. 2d 1251, 1251
(Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (“Although the amended complaint could have been
more artfully drafted, we agree that Plaintiff should have been allowed
another opportunity to amend so as to attempt to state a cause of action.”).

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

GROSS and SHEPHERD, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.