Avivit Cohen v. Yossi Alkobi

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
AVIVIT COHEN,
Appellant,
v.
YOSSI ALKOBI,
Appellee.
No. 4D2025-1056
[December 17, 2025]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Kristin R. Kanner, Judge; L.T. Case No. FMCE-20-
004206.
Daniel Saltzman of Nizahon Law, P.A., Sunrise, for appellant.
David Scott of Law Office of David Scott, P.A., Weston, for appellee.
PER CURIAM .
The former wife appeals a trial court order that vacated a general
magistrate’s recommended temporary attorney’s fees order and set aside
the magistrate’s $200,000 present-income determination for temporary
relief. The former wife argues the trial court failed to limit its review to
confirming competent, substantial evidence and using correct standards.
We agree and reverse.
• 	The Facts
In this dissolution of marriage case, the trial court referred temporary
relief 	issues 	to 	a 	general 	magistrate. 	The 	referral 	and 	hearings
encompassed the former wife’s motion to impute income to the former
husband and her renewed motion for temporary attorney’s fees and costs.
The general magistrate granted the former wife’s motion to impute
income to the former husband without prejudice. 	The general magistrate
rejected the former husband’s self-reported $50,000 income, and found
“that imputation of $200,000 annually is appropriate based upon the 2023

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business 	earnings 	given 	the 	severe 	co-mingling 	of 	his 	business 	and
personal finances and his failure to provide testimony or evidence of
reasonable business expenses.” The general magistrate recommended
$18,300 	in 	temporary 	attorney’s 	fees 	and 	$15,820 	in 	costs 	with 	an
itemized budget and payment schedule.
The 	general 	magistrate 	did 	not 	include 	findings 	of 	voluntary
unemployment 	or 	underemployment 	necessary 	for 	statutory 	income
imputation 	under 	section 	61.30(2)(b), 	Florida 	Statutes 	(2020). 	See
Silberman v. Silberman, 670 So. 2d 1109, 1110 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996);
Bromson v. Dep’t of Revenue, 710 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
The 	trial 	court 	initially 	entered 	an 	order 	ratifying 	the 	general
magistrate’s recommended order. 	The former husband moved to vacate
the trial court’s order. 	The trial court granted the motion, finding:
• 	no 	competent, 	substantial 	evidence 	of 	commingling 	because
bank records were not admitted;
• 	the magistrate had imputed income without a finding that the
husband was underemployed or that such underemployment
was voluntary;
• 	the imputation of income was based on business revenue, not
income, and a five-year-old tax return; and
• 	insufficient direction regarding fees and costs.
A subsequent trial court order clarified, vacated, and nullified the first
order, but again granted the motion to vacate and withdrew the temporary
attorney’s fees and cost award on the same basis.
From this last order, the former wife now appeals.
• 	The Analysis
The former wife argues the trial court erred in vacating the order
ratifying 	the 	general 	magistrate’s 	recommendations 	because 	bank
statements were introduced at the evidentiary hearing. 	She suggests the
documents speak for themselves and support her position.
The former husband responds that he “did not admit any documents”
at the hearing and the findings were based on testimony, credibility, and

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the lack of expense proof. 	He further responds that the bank statements
were not admitted, instead pointing to a Financial Affidavit, a 2018 tax
return, and counsel’s litigation budget that were admitted.
When reviewing a general magistrate’s report, a trial court acts as an
appellate tribunal. 	Middleton v. Hager, 179 So. 3d 529, 533 (Fla. 3d DCA
2015). 	The trial court’s role is limited to determining whether the general
magistrate’s factual findings are supported by competent, substantial
evidence 	and 	whether 	the 	magistrate 	applied 	the 	correct 	standards.
Allison v. Allison, 363 So. 3d 1129, 1133-34 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023). The trial
court is not permitted to reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for
supported findings.
We have de novo review of whether the trial court properly applied that
standard of review. Id. at 1133-34; Middleton, 179 So. 3d at 533. We also
have de novo review of legal questions, and any remedial decision is
evaluated for abuse of discretion within the appropriate framework. Id.
Here, the general magistrate set income at $200,000 for temporary
relief 	based 	on 	2023 	revenue 	testimony, 	credibility 	findings, 	historic
earnings for corroboration, and the lack of expense proof. 	The trial court
vacated 	that 	figure 	on 	imputation 	grounds 	and 	because 	the 	general
magistrate had relied on stale revenue and a five-year-old tax return.
Florida law distinguishes present income under section 61.30(2)(a)
from imputation under section 61.30(2)(b). 	A trier of fact may find that a
party earns more than claimed based on testimony and credibility; that is
a 	present-income 	finding, 	even 	if 	the 	order 	uses 	the 	word 	“impute.”
Newman v. Newman, 221 So. 3d 642, 644-45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). 	Here,
the 	general 	magistrate’s 	income 	determination 	aligns 	with 	section
61.30(2)(a). 	By relabeling the general magistrate’s income determination
as imputation of income and setting it aside, the trial court exceeded its
review authority under Florida Family Rule of Procedure 12.490.
Competent, substantial evidence need not be documentary. 	For self-
employed payors, testimony, credibility, and historical context can support
an income figure when proof of expenses is missing. Ugarte v. Ugarte, 608
So. 2d 838, 840 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). 	Here, the general magistrate’s
recommended order reflected such an analysis. 	The former husband’s
arguments mainly challenged the weight and labeling of the evidence and
findings, which the trial court could not revisit.
We therefore reverse the trial court order vacating the $200,000 income
figure on imputation grounds, and remand to the trial court for explicit

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section 61.16(1) findings and workable directions consistent with the
magistrate’s present-income determination.
Reversed and remanded.
GERBER and C ONNER , JJ., concur.
MAY , J., dissents with opinion.
MAY , J., dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority and therefore dissent from its
opinion. 	The wife moved to impute income to the husband. 	The general
magistrate did just that―“imputed” income to the husband. However, the
general magistrate did so without making the required statutory findings.
I don’t disagree with the majority’s premise that a court can overstep
its bounds when it supplants its findings with that of a general magistrate.
However, a careful reading of the trial court’s order reveals that the trial
court did precisely what it is legally required to do: it reviewed the general
magistrate’s order, which “imputed” income to the former husband, for
competent substantial evidence. 	See Allison, 363 So. 3d at 1133–34. 	It
found that evidence lacking.
The general magistrate had relied on the husband’s five-year-old, pre-
pandemic 	business 	revenue 	(not 	income) 	and 	a 	five-year-old, 	pre-
pandemic tax return. 	The trial court found that no bank records were
admitted into evidence. 	The trial court also found the general magistrate
failed 	to 	make 	the 	requisite 	finding 	that 	the 	husband 	was
underemployed―or that such underemployment was voluntary, pursuant
to section 61.30(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2020)―warranting the imputation of
income.
In my opinion, the trial court neither reweighed the evidence nor
exercised discretion beyond what is allowed. 	I would affirm.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.