Bonnie Dove v. Matthew Freer

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
BONNIE DOVE,
Appellant,
v.
MATTHEW FREER,
Appellee.
No. 4D2024-2686
[January 21, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
Okeechobee 	County; 	Laurie 	E. 	Buchanan, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No.
472023DR000284.
Melody 	Ridgley 	Fortunato 	of 	Fortunato 	& 	Associates, 	P.A, 	Fort
Lauderdale, for appellant.
Matthew Freer, Okeechobee, pro se.
SHAW , J.
Bonnie Dove (the “Wife”) appeals several aspects of a Final Judgment
on Dissolution of Marriage (the “Final Judgment”). More specifically, Wife
contends the circuit court erred in three ways: (1) by miscalculating
Matthew 	Freer’s 	(the 	“Husband”) 	ability 	to 	pay 	alimony; 	(2) 	by 	not
classifying Wife’s credit card debt as a marital liability; and (3) by not
classifying Husband’s sick, vacation, holiday and compensatory leave as a
marital asset subject to equitable distribution. For the reasons discussed
more fully below, we reverse and remand to the circuit court.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Wife and Husband were married on September 13, 2013. On March 1,
2023, the parties separated, though they did not enter into a formal
separation agreement. 	On August 7, 	2023, Wife filed a 	Petition for
Dissolution of Marriage and Other Relief without Dependent or Minor
Children 	(the 	“Petition”). 	Husband 	filed 	an 	Answer 	and 	Affirmative
Defenses, and Wife subsequently replied. 	On September 20, 2024, the
circuit court held a final hearing regarding these matters.

2
On September 24, 2024, the circuit court issued the Final Judgment.
As relevant to this appeal, the Final Judgment contained the following
findings 	and 	conclusions: 	(1) 	Wife’s 	monthly 	need 	for 	alimony 	was
$618.07, but Husband’s monthly surplus was $465.56; (2) the parties had
no marital debt when they separated on March 1, 2023; and (3) Husband’s
accumulated sick, vacation, holiday and compensatory leave (collectively,
the “Leave”) was not a marital asset subject to equitable distribution.
II. 	STANDARDS OF REVIEW
On appeal, we review an award of alimony for an abuse of discretion.
See Bardowell v. Bardowell, 975 So. 2d 628, 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
(citing Ondrejack v. Ondrejack, 839 So. 2d 867, 870 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).
Mathematical errors are reviewed de novo. 	See Henry v. Henry, 191 So.
3d 995, 997 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (citing Kareff v. Kareff, 943 So. 2d 890,
892 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)).
The standard of review of a trial court’s determination of equitable
distribution also is abuse of discretion. 	See Whittaker v. Whittaker, 331
So. 3d 719, 720–21 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). 	“However, ‘[a] trial court’s legal
conclusion that an asset is marital or nonmarital is subject to de novo
review.’” 	Id. at 721 (citation and internal quotation omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
We address each issue in turn below.
A. The Circuit Court Erred in Calculating Husband’s Ability to Pay
Alimony
In the Final Judgment, the circuit court found that Wife successfully
rebutted the presumption against alimony to the extent that she has a
monthly need of $618.07. Relying upon Husband’s financial affidavit, the
circuit court found that Husband has a monthly surplus of $465.56.
Accordingly, the circuit court ordered Husband to pay monthly alimony of
$456.56.1
However, a mathematical error in Husband’s financial affidavit led to
the circuit court’s determination that Husband had a monthly surplus of
$465.56. Specifically, in one section of his affidavit, Husband listed “other
monthly expenses not listed above” as totaling $776.00, but this was
1 This appears to be a scrivener’s error.

3
incorrect. 	When the listed expenses are added up, the total is only
$326.00. 	Therefore, we reverse and remand for the circuit court to
calculate 	correctly 	Husband’s 	ability 	to 	pay 	alimony 	and 	modify 	the
alimony award accordingly.
B. The Circuit Court Erred in Classifying Wife’s Credit Card Debt as
Nonmarital
The circuit court found that the parties had no marital debt when they
separated on March 1, 2023. 	Wife, however, presented evidence at the
final hearing that she had incurred $35,570.06 in credit card debt (the
“Debt”) after the parties’ separation, but before she filed the Petition. Wife
argued that the Debt, which she incurred by paying housing and living
expenses after her separation, should have been classified as a marital
liability. 	She is correct.
The circuit court erred in failing to include the Debt as a marital
liability. 	Under section 61.075(7), Florida Statutes (2024), the date for
determining the marital classification of liabilities “is the earliest of the
date the parties enter into a valid separation agreement, such other date
as may be expressly established by such agreement, or the date of the
filing of a petition for dissolution of marriage.” 	Here, Husband and Wife
did not enter into a valid separation agreement, nor expressly establish
another 	date 	by 	any 	agreement. 	Accordingly, 	the 	cut-off 	date 	for
determining marital liabilities should have been the date of the Petition.
See § 61.075(7), Fla. Stat. (2024). 	The Debt, which was incurred by Wife
after the date of separation but before filing the Petition, should have been
classified as a marital liability.
We reverse the portion of the Final Judgment on this issue and remand
with instructions for the circuit court to classify the Debt as a marital
liability and adjust the equitable distribution scheme accordingly. 	See
Rao-Nagineni v. Rao, 895 So. 2d 1160, 1161 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Gayer v.
Nicita, 368 So. 3d 533, 536 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023).
C. The Circuit Court Erred in Not Classifying Husband’s Leave as a
Marital Asset
At the final hearing, Wife argued that Husband’s Leave was a marital
asset and sought half of its value. 	Wife entered into evidence Husband’s
collective bargaining agreement with his employer, Husband’s pay stub
from the date of the marriage, and Husband’s pay stub from the date of
the filing of the Petition. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement,
Husband will be paid for any unused sick leave, vacation leave, holiday

4
time, and compensatory time when he ceases working for his employer.
Vacation time, holiday time, and compensatory time are paid out at
Husband’s 	hourly 	rate. 	Sick 	leave 	is 	paid 	out 	differently—Husband
receives payment for the first 480 hours of sick leave which he has
remaining at the time he ceases work, but after that, he receives 50 percent
of 	the 	remaining 	hours, 	not 	to 	exceed 	1,200 	hours. 	Using 	this
methodology 	and 	applying 	Husband’s 	current 	hourly 	pay 	rate, 	Wife
calculated the value of Husband’s Leave accumulated from the time of the
marriage to the date of Wife’s filing the Petition. 	This evidence was
uncontroverted.
In the Final Judgment, the circuit court rejected Wife’s position that
the court must divide Husband’s Leave as a marital asset. 	In so doing,
the circuit court found that the cases cited by Wife, Dye v. Dye, 17 So. 3d
1278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), and Guillen v. Guillen, 751 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2000), were distinguishable and unpersuasive. 	The circuit court
noted that Guillen did not consider the trial court’s monetization and
inclusion of the leave in the distribution of marital assets because the
appellant had failed to preserve the issue. 	The circuit court read Dye to
say it was discretionary for the trial court to monetize and include leave
balances in the distribution of marital assets.2 	Additionally, the circuit
court noted that both Guillen and Dye involved long marriages where the
majority, if not all, of the included leave amounts accrued during the
course 	of 	the 	marriages.3 	Thus, 	the circuit 	court 	held 	it 	would 	be
“erroneous and inequitable” to include Husband’s Leave in the distribution
scheme and declined to do so. 	This was error.
Section 	61.075, 	Florida 	Statutes 	(2024), 	governs 	the 	equitable
distribution 	of 	marital 	assets 	and 	liabilities. 	Under 	section
61.075(6)(a)1.a., “[m]arital assets” include “[a]ssets acquired … during the
marriage, individually by either spouse[.]” “Asset” has been defined as “an
item that is owned and has value.” 	Asset, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th
ed. 2024).
2 The circuit court misreads Dye. 	In Dye, neither party disputed that the
husband’s accrued vacation leave and sick leave were assets. Rather, the parties
argued for different valuations of those assets. 	The Dye court found the trial
court had discretion in how to equitably distribute those assets. Here, whether
the vacation and sick leave was an asset at all is a question of law that was not
at issue in Dye.
3 This is immaterial to the threshold determination of whether Husband’s Leave
was an asset under section 61.075.

5
Here, Husband’s Leave meets the definition of an asset under section
61.075. 	Pursuant 	to 	the 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement, 	Husband
accrues leave during the course of his employment, and he will be paid for
the value of that leave remaining at the time he leaves the employer. 	The
monetary value of the leave can be calculated pursuant to the methodology
set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. 	Accordingly, any sick
leave, vacation leave, holiday time, and compensatory time accrued by
Husband from the date of the marriage to the date of the filing of the
Petition is a marital asset. See Dye, 17 So. 3d at 1281 (“[W]here, as in this
case, there is such a contractual payout provision, the cash value of
unused sick leave and vacation time is a marital asset subject to equitable
distribution.”) (citing King v. King, 719 So. 2d 920, 922–23 (Fla. 5th DCA
1998)); see also Purpura v. Kelly, 913 So. 2d 110, 110 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)
(“The trial court erred in failing to treat the entire amount of the appellee’s
accrued leave hours as a marital asset subject to distribution.”).
Thus, the circuit court erred in holding Husband’s Leave was not a
marital asset subject to the equitable distribution scheme. We remand for
the circuit court to include Husband’s Leave as a marital asset in the
equitable distribution scheme. 	We leave to the circuit court’s discretion
the valuation and payment date of this asset. 	See Guillen, 751 So. 2d at
1272; Purpura, 913 So. 2d at 111 (Kahn, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The 	circuit 	court 	erred 	in 	three 	respects 	by: 	(1) 	miscalculating
Husband’s 	ability 	to 	pay 	alimony, 	due 	to 	a 	mathematical 	error 	in
Husband’s financial affidavit; (2) using the wrong date when determining
marital liabilities; and (3) failing to recognize that Husband’s Leave was a
marital asset. 	For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand with
instructions.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
KUNTZ , C.J., and C IKLIN, J., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.