Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al. v. Rio Poco Homeowners' Association, Inc.

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
WELLS FARGO, BANK, N.A., as Trustee, on Behalf of the Holders of the
HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST MORTGAGE LOAN
PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-12,
Appellant,
v.
RIO POCO HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Appellee.
No. 4D2024-3029
[May 6, 2026]
Appeal from the County Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach 	County; 	Reginald 	Roy 	Corlew, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No.
502024CC002169XXXASB.
Steven Brian Greenfield of Greenfield Law Group, P.A., Boca Raton, for
appellant.
Ronald E. D’Anna of D’Anna Legal, PLLC, Boca Raton, for appellee.
P ER CURIAM .
Wells Fargo appeals from a final order vacating a default and dismissing
its complaint. 	The crux of the lawsuit underlying this appeal involves a
dispute over the amounts which the appellee (“Association”) represented
as due from the appellant (“Wells Fargo”) in an estoppel certificate, and the
Association’s 	denial 	of 	access 	to 	the 	property 	after 	Wells 	Fargo 	had
acquired title to the property pursuant to foreclosure proceedings. 	We
agree with Wells Fargo that the trial court considered matters outside the
four corners of the complaint in granting the motion for dismissal, and we
reverse the portion of the order dismissing the complaint.
Wells Fargo alleged in its complaint that it had sent a demand for
presuit mediation to the Association pursuant to section 720.311, Florida
Statutes (2024). 	Wells Fargo further alleged that all conditions precedent
to filing suit “have been performed, waived, or have occurred.”

2
After the trial court entered a default judgment against the Association.
the Association moved to vacate the default based on numerous grounds
not relevant here. The Association also sought dismissal of the complaint.
The dismissal request was based on Wells Fargo’s purported failure to
comply 	with 	section 	720.311(2)’s 	presuit 	mediation 	requirements,
specifically the statute’s provisions for method of service and address for
service. At the same time, the Association filed a responsive pleading that
raised, as an affirmative defense, Wells Fargo’s purported failure to comply
with the presuit mediation requirements.
The trial court vacated the default and dismissed the suit, finding that
Wells Fargo did not serve the demand on the Association at its address
and by certified mail. 	The court cited to the presuit mediation demand
exhibit attached to the complaint, but also cited to exhibits not attached
to the complaint: 	the Association’s response to the presuit mediation
demand and emails between the parties.
Dismissal was improper. “The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test
the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not to determine factual issues.”
Haratz v. Dental Team of Atlantis, LLC, 372 So. 3d 282, 285 (Fla. 4th DCA
2023) (quoting Cousins v. Post-Newsweek Stations Fla., Inc., 275 So. 3d
674, 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)). 	“When ruling on a motion to dismiss, ‘[a]
court may not go beyond the four corners of the complaint and exhibits
attached thereto.’” 	Schneiderman v. Baer, 334 So. 3d 326, 330 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2022) (quoting Kohl v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 988 So.
2d 654, 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)).
“In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent, it
is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been
performed or have occurred.” 	Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.120(c). 	“[A] plaintiff is
likewise permitted to generally allege waiver of . . . conditions [precedent]
under the rule.” 	Haratz, 372 So. 3d at 285. 	Failure to plead compliance
with or waiver of a statutory condition precedent requires dismissal of the
complaint. 	See Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Lindberg, 571 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla.
1990) (recognizing that a complaint that failed to allege compliance with
statutory prerequisites was subject to dismissal); City of Coconut Creek v.
City 	of 	Deerfield 	Beach, 	840 	So. 	2d 	389, 	393 	(Fla. 	4th 	DCA 	2003)
(recognizing that “failure to comply with a statutory condition precedent,
absent waiver or estoppel, requires dismissal”). But “[t]o the extent factual
issues remain as to compliance with conditions precedent, those matters
are premature and are unsuitable for resolution on a motion to dismiss.”
Haratz, 372 So. 3d at 286 (quoting Cousins, 275 So. 3d at 680).

3
Here, 	Wells 	Fargo 	alleged 	satisfaction 	or 	waiver 	of 	all 	conditions
precedent. 	The parties dispute whether an exhibit to the complaint
establishes 	that 	Wells 	Fargo’s 	demand 	did 	not 	comply 	with 	section
720.311’s service requirements, but we do not need to wade into this
debate. That is because Wells Fargo also alleged waiver of performance of
all conditions precedent, and nothing in the complaint or its exhibits
negates that allegation. 	Under these circumstances, the factual issue of
waiver precluded dismissal.
Wells Fargo raises other issues on appeal, but we decline to consider
those issues, which were either not raised in the initial brief or not
adequately briefed.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
MAY , CIKLIN, JJ., and BELL, CAROLYN RUTH , Associate Judge, concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.