Gary Steinberg v. Eva Cudak, et al.

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
GARY STEINBERG, derivatively on behalf of
FIESTA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
a Florida non-profit corporation,
Appellant,
v.
EVA CUDAK and FIESTA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
a Florida non-profit corporation,
Appellees.
No. 4D2025-3061
[February 11, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward
County; Jeffrey R. Levenson, Judge; L.T. Case No. 062025CA010862AXXXCE.
Gary Steinberg, Margate, pro se.
No brief filed for appellees.
PER CURIAM .
The plaintiff appeals an order declaring him a vexatious litigant under section
68.093, Florida Statutes (2025), and imposing sanctions, both pursuant to the
statute and under the inherent authority of the court. 	We reverse in part
because the trial court erred in imposing the non-statutory sanction of no longer
accepting the plaintiff’s pro se filings without first issuing an order to show
cause. 	We otherwise affirm.
• 	Facts
The plaintiff filed the underlying action seeking declaratory relief and alleging
breach 	of 	fiduciary 	duty 	in 	connection 	with 	assessments 	charged 	by 	the
homeowners’ association in the community where he lives. 	The plaintiff has
previously filed actions seeking the same or similar relief that were dismissed
and affirmed on appeal.
Pursuant to the trial court’s request, the defendants moved to deem the
plaintiff a vexatious litigant and requested an order requiring him to post
security under Florida’s Vexatious Litigant Law. 	See § 68.093(3)(a), Fla. Stat.

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(2025) (allowing a party to move for an order requiring a vexatious litigant to
furnish 	security 	to 	cover 	payment 	of 	the 	movant’s 	anticipated 	expenses,
including attorney fees and costs). The motion also asked the trial court to refer
this matter to the chief judge for consideration of a prefiling order prohibiting the
plaintiff from further pro se filing without leave of court or unless signed by a
Florida Bar member.
The plaintiff filed a response, and after a hearing, the trial court orally granted
the defendants’ motion. 	Later that day, the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal. 	Days later, the trial court rendered the order on appeal imposing
sanctions, both pursuant to the statute and the trial court’s inherent authority.
The order provides:
1. 	The CLERK OF COURT is hereby DIRECTED to reject any future
filings by [the plaintiff] unless such filings are executed by a
member in good standing with The Florida Bar.
2. 	[The plaintiff] shall post security in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($50,000.00), which shall be posted within twenty (20)
days of the September 24, 2025, hearing on the Motions.
3. 	This Order pertains to any and all actions presently pending
before this Court in which [the plaintiff] is a party. 	All such
matters are hereby STAYED until [the plaintiff] furnishes the
above security to the Association.
The trial court limited the stay and security requirements to cases before this
judge only and did not apply the stay and security requirements to the plaintiff’s
cases pending before other judges. 	From this order, the plaintiff now appeals.1
• 	Analysis
A trial court has the inherent authority to bar a litigant from appearing pro
se 	when 	the 	litigant’s 	“‘frivolous 	or 	excessive 	filings 	interfere 	with 	timely
administration of justice.’” 	Clark v. Baney, 355 So. 3d 976, 978 (Fla. 1st DCA
2023) (quoting Ardis v. Pensacola State Coll., 128 So. 3d 260, 264 (Fla. 1st DCA
2013)). This ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Ashe v. State, 106
So. 3d 956, 957 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (reviewing the sanction in a criminal case).
Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. See Haas Automation, Inc. v. Fox, 243
So. 3d 1017, 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).
1 The sanctions order is a final order on a collateral issue. See, e.g., Knezevich v. Serv.
Fin. Co., LLC, 375 So. 3d 941, 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023); Clark v. Baney, 355 So. 3d 976,
978 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023); Prater v. McDonough, 947 So. 2d 538, 538 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

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We reject the plaintiff’s argument that the trial court lost jurisdiction to enter
the sanctions order because the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal
before 	the 	trial 	court 	rendered 	its 	written 	order. 	The 	defendants’ 	motion
requesting the court to impose sanctions was pending, and the trial court,
therefore, retained jurisdiction despite the voluntary dismissal. 	Knezevich v.
Serv. Fin. Co., LLC, 375 So. 3d 941, 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023); see also Pino v.
Bank of New York, 121 So. 3d 23, 41 (Fla. 2013) (holding that, where a sanctions
motion has been filed, “[a] notice of voluntary dismissal does not divest a trial
court of jurisdiction to award sanctions . . . even after a voluntary dismissal is
taken.”).
While the defendant’s motion requested sanctions, pursuant only to the
Florida Vexatious Litigant law, the trial court also imposed the sanction of no
longer accepting the plaintiff’s pro se filings, pursuant to its own inherent
authority. 	And it did so without first issuing an order to show cause.
It is well-settled that a trial court must provide notice and an opportunity to
be heard by issuing an order to show cause before prohibiting pro se filing. 	See
Amatulah v. Palmier, 417 So. 3d 495, 496 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025); Humes v. Solanki,
305 So. 3d 334, 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020); Testa v. Testa, 171 So. 3d 244, 244–45
(Fla. 4th DCA 2015); Bolton v. SE Prop. Holdings, LLC, 127 So. 3d 746, 747–48
(Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Jackson v. Parkhouse, 826 So. 2d 478, 480 (Fla. 1st DCA
2002); Delgado v. Hearn, 805 So. 2d 1017, 1018 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). These cases
recognize the order to show cause requirement of State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d
47, 48–49 (Fla. 1999), applies to civil cases.
As in Jackson, the defendants’ sanction motion did not provide sufficient
notice because the motion did not directly ask the court to prohibit the plaintiff’s
further pro se filing. 	Jackson, 826 So. 2d at 480. 	The defendants’ motion
requested only for the trial court to refer the matter for consideration by the chief
judge. Accordingly, the portion of the order prohibiting the plaintiff from further
pro se filing is reversed. 	On remand, the trial court may consider re-imposing
this sanction after issuing an order to show cause and providing the plaintiff
with reasonable time to respond. 	Bolton, 127 So. 3d at 748.
The plaintiff also challenges the security requirement that the court imposed
under section 68.093(3)(a) of the Vexatious Litigant Law. 	The plaintiff contends
the court did not address the merits of his current action and the defendants did
not show he is not likely to prevail. § 68.093(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2025). The plaintiff,
however, voluntarily dismissed his action, which moots the security requirement
and waives any error on this point.2
2 His argument that the security requirement impacts his other pending cases has no
merit. The trial court clearly limited the security requirement to cases before this judge,
not to the plaintiff’s cases before other judges.

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Finally, we find no error in the trial court declaring the plaintiff a vexatious
litigant. 	Although the plaintiff challenges whether he had sufficient prior cases
to qualify under section 68.093(2)(c)(1), the trial court did not err in concluding
the plaintiff qualifies under sections 68.093(2)(c)(3) and (4). 	The record shows
the plaintiff repeatedly relitigated issues after his first action was dismissed and
affirmed on appeal, and he engaged in frivolous litigation tactics.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
M AY , GERBER and SHEPHERD, JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.