Rosalyn D. Marvin v. Carl Jones

OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT

ROSALYN D. MARVIN,
Appellant,

Vv.

CARL JONES,
Appellee.

No. 4D2025-0414
[March 25, 2026]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; David Alan Haimes, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE23-
020163.

Mark Francis Booth of Rogers, Morris & Ziegler LLP, Fort Lauderdale,
for appellant.

Ron Renzy of Sunshine Appeals, P.A., Coral Springs, for appellee.
SHAW, J.

The dispute in this case arose after Appellant Rosalyn D. Marvin
(“Marvin”) conveyed real property to her nephew, Appellee Carl Jones
(“Jones”), through a quitclaim deed. Marvin continued living on the
property and sent monthly checks to Jones. However, over four years
later, Jones filed an eviction action in county court. The parties settled
the eviction action, and the case was dismissed. The parties’ stipulation
settling the case included one line (the “General Release”): “Each party
does hereby release the other by a General Release as if set out herein in
full.”

Four months after the eviction action was dismissed, Marvin filed a
complaint in circuit court seeking declaratory relief, imposition of a
constructive trust, quiet title, and damages. The complaint alleged that
Marvin had conveyed the property to Jones based on Jones’s fraudulent
misrepresentation that Jones would give her a $55,000 loan to satisfy her
mortgage if she then transferred the property to him as security for the

loan.! Upon Marvin’s repayment of the loan, Jones would convey the
property back to Marvin. Marvin repaid the loan and requested Jones
transfer the property to her, but Jones refused to do so. Jones disputed
these allegations and asserted various affirmative defenses.

Jones moved for summary judgment. Ultimately, the circuit court
granted summary judgment in Jones’ favor, finding that the General
Release from the eviction action barred Marvin’s claims against Jones in
the circuit court.

This appeal followed. For the reasons discussed more fully below, we
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the circuit court for further
proceedings.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo. Serrano v.
Dickinson, 363 So. 3d 162, 165 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).

II. DISCUSSION

We divide our discussion into two parts. First, we discuss why genuine
issues of material fact remain regarding the General Release. Second, we
explain that summary judgment nevertheless is appropriate regarding
Marvin’s quiet title claim (Count 2) because Marvin cannot establish an
essential element of that claim.

“The [summary judgment] standard requires us to determine whether
‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Black v. Cable News Network, Inc., 423 So. 3d 2, 7
(Fla. 4th DCA 2025) (quoting In re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.510,
317 So. 3d 72, 75 (Fla. 2021)). In a summary judgment proceeding, “the
inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ... must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting United
States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).

A. The General Release

“(W]hen the terms of a written instrument are disputed and rationally
susceptible to more than one construction, an issue of fact is presented

1 At the time, Marvin was facing foreclosure on the property by the owner and
holder of the mortgage deed.

which cannot properly be resolved by summary judgment.” Soncoast
Cmty. Church of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Travis Boating Ctr. of Fla., Inc., 981 So.
2d 654, 655 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (quoting Chhabra v. Morales, 906 So. 2d
1261, 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)).

Here, the eighteen-word General Release was ambiguous and not
sufficiently clear. Unlike the general releases discussed in the cases relied
upon by Jones, the General Release here failed to clearly define which
claims would be barred under the release, nor did it include a temporal
limitation on any subsequent claims. The stipulation confined the General
Release to one eighteen-word sentence and did not include any kind of
separate exhibit containing additional or clarifying information on the
scope of the release. See Bd. of Trs. of Fla. Atl. Univ. v. Bowman, 853 So.
2d 507, 508-09 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (discussing a general release that was
sufficiently clear and unambiguous). The stipulation appears to reference
a specific “General Release,” but no such “General Release” was attached.
Ultimately, the eighteen words in the stipulation in the eviction action are
not sufficiently clear to constitute a release of all claims of ownership over
the property, including equitable ownership by constructive trust or
fraudulent misrepresentation/inducement claims. ?

Therefore, viewing the underlying facts in the light most favorable to
Marvin, we hold that genuine issues of material fact exist which preclude
Jones from judgment as a matter of law. See McKee v. Crestline Hotels &
Resorts, LLC, 376 So. 3d 758, 762-63 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). The circuit
court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of the General
Release.

B. Claim of Quiet Title (Count 2)

“To prevail on a quiet title action, the plaintiff must show (1) it has legal
title to the property and (2) another entity has an invalid claim to the title
that (3) is a cloud on the plaintiff's title.” U.S. Bancorp v. Taharra Assets
5545, Inc., 378 So. 3d 630, 633 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (citations omitted).
“By force of logic, statute, and case law, however, a party must have title
to a property to bring an action to quiet title. With no title, there is nothing
to be quieted.” Barclay v. Robert C. Malt & Co., 985 So. 2d 53, 54 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2008) (citation omitted).

2 A county court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over title to real
property, so the county court approving the settlement in the eviction action
could not have made any determination as to the ownership of the property. See
§ 26.012(2)(g), Fla. Stat. (2021).

Under the tipsy coachman doctrine, an appellate court may affirm a
trial court’s decision that was correct in result, but based on the wrong
reason, if record evidence of any theory or principle of law would support
the order. See Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002). Here,
the circuit court erroneously concluded Jones was entitled to final
summary judgment on the quiet title claim because of the General Release.
However, during the pendency of the circuit court action, Marvin provided
no evidence that she held title to the property, a required element of a quiet
title claim. See Barclay, 985 So. 2d at 54; see also U.S. Bancorp, 378 So.
3d at 633. It was undisputed that Marvin executed a quitclaim deed to
Jones, and the property was never deeded back to her. Accordingly,
summary judgment is proper as to the quiet title claim (Count 2) because
no genuine issue of material fact exists, and Jones is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. See McKee, 376 So. 3d at 762-63.

III. CONCLUSION

The circuit court erred in granting summary judgment after concluding
the General Release barred Marvin’s claims. However, summary judgment
was proper on the claim for quiet title (Count 2) because it was undisputed
that Marvin did not hold legal title to the property. Therefore, we reverse
summary judgment on declaratory relief (Count 1), constructive trust
(Count 3), and damages (Count 4), affirm summary judgment on quiet title
(Count 2), and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
LEVINE and CONNER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.