Nixon Jean Pierre v. SBL Freightliner LLC d/b/a Lou Bachrodt Freightliner of Broward County

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
NIXON JEAN PIERRE,
Appellant,
v.
SBL FREIGHTLINER LLC d/b/a
LOU BACHRODT FREIGHTLINER OF BROWARD COUNTY,
Appellee.
No. 4D2024-3187
[March 25, 2026]
Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Allison Gilman, Judge; L.T. Case No. COSO23003786.
James 	Gerald 	Jean-Francois 	of 	the 	Law 	Offices 	of 	James 	Jean-
Francois, P.A., Hollywood, for appellant.
Jeffrey William Hurcomb of Roberts, Reynolds, Bedard & Tuzzio, PLLC,
West Palm Beach, and Eric Jay Stockel of Schouest, Bambas, Soshea &
Benmaier, PLLC, Boca Raton, for appellee.
KLINGENSMITH, J.
Appellant Nixon Jean Pierre appeals the trial court’s order dismissing
with 	prejudice 	his 	first 	amended 	complaint 	against 	Appellee 	SBL
Freightliner, LLC. 	Appellant argues the trial court should have denied
Appellee’s dismissal motion or, alternatively, granted Appellant leave to
amend his complaint to plead additional facts supporting his claims. 	We
affirm the dismissal of the first amended complaint without discussion,
but reverse because that dismissal should not have been with prejudice.
The 	dispute 	between 	these 	parties 	relates 	to 	Appellee’s 	alleged
unsatisfactory 	repairs 	to 	Appellant’s 	leased 	commercial 	vehicle.
Appellant’s initial complaint pled one count for breach of contract. 	The
trial court dismissed the complaint but granted Appellant leave to amend.
Appellant’s 	amended 	complaint 	was 	still 	based 	on 	Appellee’s 	alleged
unsatisfactory repairs, but instead pled counts for negligence and violation
of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. 	Appellee again
moved to dismiss the complaint.

2
At 	the 	hearing 	on 	Appellee’s 	second 	dismissal 	motion, 	Appellee’s
attorney stated he had no problem with the trial court giving Appellant
another opportunity to amend the complaint, and acknowledged that
Appellant 	could 	remedy 	certain 	defects 	in 	the 	complaint 	with 	an
amendment. Despite this, the trial court stated that it was dismissing the
first amended complaint with prejudice because the proceedings had been
pending for a year and a half.
We review the dismissal of a complaint with prejudice de novo. 	Barr v.
MS Int’l, Inc. of Cal., 410 So. 3d 1219, 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025) (citing
Preudhomme v. Bailey, 211 So. 3d 127, 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)). 	The
denial of an opportunity to amend is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Id. (citing Preudhomme, 211 So. 3d at 131). 	Generally, “refusal to allow
amendment constitutes an abuse of discretion unless it clearly appears
that allowing the amendment would prejudice the opposing party, the
privilege to amend has been abused, or amendment would be futile.”
Preudhomme, 211 So. 3d at 131 (quoting Yun Enters., Ltd. v. Graziani, 840
So. 2d 420, 423 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)).
Here, 	the 	trial 	court’s 	reasoning—that 	the 	proceedings 	had 	been
pending for a year and a half—does not justify the dismissal of Appellant’s
amended complaint with prejudice. Nor does the record clearly show that
this case meets any of the criteria set forth above to justify dismissal with
finality. 	See id.
First, nothing indicates that further amendment of the complaint would
prejudice Appellee. Quite the contrary. Not only did Appellee never argue
that it would be prejudiced by another amendment to the complaint, but
Appellee also never objected to Appellant receiving another opportunity to
state 	a 	viable 	cause 	of 	action 	or 	to 	clarify 	and 	resolve 	any 	alleged
contradictions or deficiencies inherent in the first amended pleading and
its attachments.
Second, Appellant has only amended his complaint twice, and two prior
attempts to amend without more do not necessarily demonstrate an abuse
of the privilege to amend. 	See Pangea Produce Distribs., Inc. v. Franco’s
Produce, Inc., 	275 	So. 	3d 	240, 	242 	(Fla. 	3d 	DCA 	2019) 	(concluding
dismissal with prejudice was not appropriate where the plaintiff had only
amended the complaint twice before). 	Appellee argues Appellant abused
the privilege to amend by willfully disobeying certain directions from the
trial court’s first order of dismissal. 	However, the trial court’s order
dismissing the initial complaint simply required Appellant to amend his
complaint within twenty days, which Appellant did.

3
Finally, the record does not demonstrate with certainty that Appellant
could not amend his complaint to state a cause of action. 	See Cooksey v.
Town of Ocean Ridge, 426 So. 3d 897, 899 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025) (reversing
dismissal of second amended complaint because the Court could not say
with certainty that the appellant could not amend his complaint to state a
cause of action); Hess v. PMG-S2 Sunny Isles, LLC, 349 So. 3d 547, 549
(Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (explaining that amendment is not futile unless there
is a deficiency in the complaint that cannot be cured by amendment).
Further, the trial court did not find that another amendment to the
complaint would be futile.
We therefore reverse the dismissal order and remand with instructions
to allow Appellant an opportunity to amend the complaint.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
FORST and S HEPHERD , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.