2024-2312•Dortch v. State of Florida
Gesamter Gesetzestext
FIRST DISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D2024-2312 _____________________________ J OHN S EBASTIAN D ORTCH , Appellant, v. S TATE OF F LORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the County Court for Escambia County. Kristina Lightel, Judge. December 23, 2025 P ER C URIAM. A FFIRMED. K ELSEY and L ONG, JJ., concur; T ANENBAUM, J., dissents with opinion. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________
2 T ANENBAUM, J., dissenting. The appellant did not receive the assistance of appointed appellate counsel to which he constitutionally is entitled. There also is no rendered judgment for us to review. Still, the majority proceeds with a per-curiam affirmance without further comment. In the trial court, the appellant appears to have pleaded no contest to misdemeanors under a plea agreement. The plea agreement in turn reserved for the appellant the ability to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress following an evidentiary hearing at which the arresting officer testified and his dashcam video played. What the appellant received in the way of representation was a one-page recitation of the facts and one page of legal argument. The legal argument simply noted a Fifth District opinion that says only the trial court can determine the credibility of testifying witnesses. The U.S. Supreme Court requires that “if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw”; but counsel must include with that request “a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.” Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We then must decide, after conducting our own full examination of the proceedings, “whether the case is wholly frivolous.” Id. If we do, then we can grant counsel’s request. But if we do not—because we “find[] any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous)”—we “must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.” Id. Like it or not, the supreme court requires us to go further: When an Anders brief is filed, we are to “assume[] the responsibility of conducting a full and independent review of the record to discover any arguable issues apparent on the face of the record.” In re Anders Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149, 151 (Fla. 1991). To ensure that the reviewing court itself does not become the appellant’s advocate, however, initial responsibility rests with appointed counsel—not us—to master the record and point us to anything that “arguably support[s] the appeal.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. That is, the brief must give the court comfort that
3 appointed counsel has provided the appellant the constitutionally mandated assistance; in essence, the brief should demonstrate that counsel has done the necessary work. The Anders brief falls short here in two respects, and we should be ordering counsel to submit a better one—not just affirming. First, there was a dashcam video played at the suppression hearing in connection with the arresting officer’s testimony. One could review that video and conclude that the testimony stood in direct contradiction to what the video showed. See Wiggins v. Fla. Dep’t of High. Saf. & Motor Veh., 209 So. 3d 1165, 1172 (Fla. 2017). As the court explained in Wiggins: We respect the authority and expertise of law enforcement officers, and thus rely on an officer’s memory when necessary. But we would be remiss if we failed to acknowledge that at times, an officer’s human recollection and report may be contrary to that which actually happened as evinced in the real time video. This is the reality of human imperfection; we cannot expect officers to retain information as if he or she were a computer. Therefore, a judge who has the benefit of reviewing objective and neutral video evidence along with officer testimony cannot be expected to ignore that video evidence simply because it totally contradicts the officer’s recollection. Such a standard would produce an absurd result. Id. The Anders brief does state that the “[v]ideo was shown at the hearing,” and that it did “not show the violations testified to by Officer Bell, nor any other traffic violations.” Counsel, however, does not follow this up with an explanation why an argument under Wiggins was not viable. Indeed, the brief does not cite Wiggins at all. This is not to say Wiggins wins the day here, but the argument plainly is not frivolous. Second, there is no final judgment of conviction signed by the judge—so there is no conclusive exercise of judicial power to be reviewed. Reproduced below is what we have in the record on appeal, purporting to be the “judgment and sentence”:
4 The first page reflects the clerk’s minutes of the proceeding. It is not a final “order,” because a judge cannot render an order via minutes. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(f) (defining “order” as a “decision, order, judgment, decree, or rule of a lower tribunal, excluding minutes and minute book entries” (emphasis supplied)). And there cannot be rendition without an “order” that is signed by
5 the judge. See id. (h). There is further evidence that we have no judgment here. The first page in no way resembles the following form judgment that must be used by all courts in every criminal case:
6 True, the form may be used with “variations” allowed. Fair to say, though, that using the clerk’s minutes we have here as a substitute is significantly beyond what could be considered a “variation.” The next reproduced page purports to be a cost order, not a sentencing order. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.700(a) (defining a “sentence” as the penalty imposed). Though the judge did sign this next page, the two pages are not integrated—they do not reference each other—so they cannot be considered as a single order. Moreover, a judgment and a sentence are two separate orders. Cf. Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(3) (requiring that a notice of appeal be filed “at any time between rendition of a “final judgment and 30 days following rendition of a written order imposing sentence”). The appellant purports to have appealed his judgment of conviction. Before the court affirms an exercise of judicial power, it should first confirm that there is a proper exercise of that power; or at least have counsel address the issue rather than accept a barebones Anders brief. Appointed counsel is not limited to sure-winners or slam dunks. To provide the proper appellate assistance, counsel must identify issues that are arguable. When counsel clearly has not done this, rather than let counsel off the hook anyway, we are duty bound to strike the brief and require more from counsel. I have identified two obvious issues. The bare constitutional minimum has not been done in this appeal, and we should not be affirming until that happens. _____________________________ Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Lori A Willner, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA No. 1D2024-2312 JOHN SEBASTIAN DORTCH, Appellant, Vv. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. On appeal from the County Court for Escambia County. Kristina Lightel, Judge. December 23, 2025 PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. KELSEY and LONG, JJ., concur; TANENBAUM, J., dissents with opinion. Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. TANENBAUM, J., dissenting. The appellant did not receive the assistance of appointed appellate counsel to which he constitutionally is entitled. There also is no rendered judgment for us to review. Still, the majority proceeds with a per-curiam affirmance without further comment. In the trial court, the appellant appears to have pleaded no contest to misdemeanors under a plea agreement. The plea agreement in turn reserved for the appellant the ability to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress following an evidentiary hearing at which the arresting officer testified and his dashcam video played. What the appellant received in the way of representation was a one-page recitation of the facts and one page of legal argument. The legal argument simply noted a Fifth District opinion that says only the trial court can determine the credibility of testifying witnesses. The U.S. Supreme Court requires that “if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw’; but counsel must include with that request “a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.” Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We then must decide, after conducting our own full examination of the proceedings, “whether the case is wholly frivolous.” Jd. If we do, then we can grant counsel’s request. But if we do not—because we “find[] any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous)’—we “must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.” Id. Like it or not, the supreme court requires us to go further: When an Anders brief is filed, we are to “assume[] the responsibility of conducting a full and independent review of the record to discover any arguable issues apparent on the face of the record.” Jn re Anders Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149, 151 (Fla. 1991). To ensure that the reviewing court itself does not become the appellant’s advocate, however, initial responsibility rests with appointed counsel—not us—to master the record and point us to anything that “arguably support[s] the appeal.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. That is, the brief must give the court comfort that appointed counsel has provided the appellant the constitutionally mandated assistance; in essence, the brief should demonstrate that counsel has done the necessary work. The Anders brief falls short here in two respects, and we should be ordering counsel to submit a better one—not just affirming. First, there was a dashcam video played at the suppression hearing in connection with the arresting officer’s testimony. One could review that video and conclude that the testimony stood in direct contradiction to what the video showed. See Wiggins v. Fla. Dep't of High. Saf. & Motor Veh., 209 So. 3d 1165, 1172 (Fla. 2017). As the court explained in Wiggins: We respect the authority and expertise of law enforcement officers, and thus rely on an officer’s memory when necessary. But we would be remiss if we failed to acknowledge that at times, an officer's human recollection and report may be contrary to that which actually happened as evinced in the real time video. This is the reality of human imperfection; we cannot expect officers to retain information as if he or she were a computer. Therefore, a judge who has the benefit of reviewing objective and neutral video evidence along with officer testimony cannot be expected to ignore that video evidence simply because it totally contradicts the officer’s recollection. Such a standard would produce an absurd result. Id. The Anders brief does state that the “[v]ideo was shown at the hearing,” and that it did “not show the violations testified to by Officer Bell, nor any other traffic violations.” Counsel, however, does not follow this up with an explanation why an argument under Wiggins was not viable. Indeed, the brief does not cite Wiggins at all. This is not to say Wiggins wins the day here, but the argument plainly is not frivolous. Second, there is no final judgment of conviction signed by the judge—so there is no conclusive exercise of judicial power to be reviewed. Reproduced below is what we have in the record on appeal, purporting to be the “judgment and sentence”: JOHN SEBASTIAN DORTCH vs. STATE OF FLORIDA LT. CASE NO: 2024 MM 001728 A HT. CASE NO: 1D24-2312 COURT WORKSHEET AND ORDER DATE: 9/06/2024 JUDGE: KRISTINA DENISE LIGHTEL DEFENDANT: DORTCH, JOHN SEBASTIAN STATE ATTORNEY: S. PARKER CASE: 2024 mm 001728A PD APPT. DEFATTY: S. SPIEGEL, APD DCP () DCA ( ) DPA9 DA () VP () INTER PLEA Plea Agreement ( Straight up Guilty No Contest 1,2 As Charged 1 DUW 201 State Amends Information / Lesser Included Offense: (2) False A. M KLEO Downward Departure SENTENCING No Pros Nolle Proget 3 Adjudication Withheld Ct 2 Adjudicated Guilty >C+1 Designated/Sentenced as a Pursuant to FS County Jail Time Served State Prison Credit Comm Ctrl Probation Concurrent / Consecutive Cost of Supervision: $26 / $52 / $55 / Waived Pay $1 .00 to Circuit One First Step per month SS Monthly if less than face to face reporting SPECIAL CONDITIONS CSW hours at a minimum of hours per month, begin within /over 1" Days / Months of Supervision May buy out community service work at a rate of Restitution / Court Reserves Jurisdiction / To be Determined Pay 1ª / J & S w/Co-defendant / into Registry Lien State to file amount w/in days, Deft has days to object or set hearing if no objection / hearing amount stands EVAL: Sub Abuse / Mental Health Sign-up / Enroll / Complete within Successfully complete / follow through with recommended treatment / counseling Live In Person Course/Treatment COURSE: Anger Management / Anti- Theft / DVIP / Parenting Sign-up / Enroll / Complete within May not possess/consume: Alcohol / Illegal Drugs / Controlled Substances w/out a valid RX / not validly prescribed by Physician Random urinalysis / breath testing at defendant's own expense Do not be in the presence of anyone using possessing illegal drugs / alcohol Take prescriptions in prescribed dosages / Provide Probation with prescriptions w/in and w/in of new RX No violent contact with victim, victim's family / witnesses / co-defendant(s) / direct / indirect / 3rd party / social media Stay away from Testify truthfully regarding Co-Defi Seek/Maintain steady full-time employment and/or full-time student/school at least 12 hours per term or a combination of both OR perform Job Searches / Apps per / each week if working less than hrs wkly until hired / or proof of Disability Begin w/in Days / Months of supervision Complete Hours CSW per Mo if not employed FT or enrolled in Sch FT Enroll / Complete w/in Vehicle Impounded: 10/ 30/ 90 days / Waived Drunk Driver / Victim Impact Panel Sign-up w/in Complete w/in Driver's License: DL suspended / revoked BPO if Qualified / Court has no objection _Obtain Valid / Clear Driver's License V Advised of Habitual Traffic Offender May apply / automatic / early termination / if all conditions satisfied and no violations after Report to Probation by Other Terms Defense Reserves Right to Appeal Courts Denial of the After to suppress 23 JOHN SEBASTIAN DORTCH vs. STATE OF FLORIDA LT. CASE NO: 2024 MM 001728 A HT. CASE NO. 1D04-2312 The Defendant shall pay the following Court Costs: $518 Mandatory Felony Court Costs F.S. 938.01. 938.03, 938.05. 938.06, 938.15, 938.19, 938.27, 939.185. 775.083(2). Escambia County Ord 34-7, 34-9, and 34-11) 5273 Mandatory Misdemeanor Court Costs (F.S. 938.01. 938.03, 938.05. 938.06, 938.15, 938.19. 938.27. 939.185, 775.083(2). Escambia County Ord 34-7, 34-9 and 34-11) $686 Felony DUI Court Costs (F.S. 938.01. 938.03(1), 938.05. 938.07, 938.13, 938.15. 938.19, 938.27, 939.185. 775.083, 318.18(17), 318.18(13Ka)(1), Escambia County Ord 34-6, 34-7, 34-9, 34-10 and 34-11) $653 Felony BUI Ceuit Costs (F.S. 938.01. 938.03. 938.05. 938.06, 938.07, 938.13. 938.15, 938.19, 938.27, 939.185. 775.083(2), Escambia County Ord 34-7 and 34-9) 5456 Misdemeanor DUI Court Costs (F.S. 938.01, 938.03(1), 938.05, 938.07, 938.13. 938.15, 938.19, 938.27, 939,185, 775.083. 318.18(17), 318.18(13)a)( 1), Escambia County Ord 34-6. 34-7, 34-9. 34-10 and 34-11) $423 Misdemeanor BUI Court Cous (F.S. 938.01. 938.03. 938.05. 938.06. 938.07. 938.13. 938.15.938.19, 938.27. 939.185. 775.083(2), Escambia County Ord 34-7 and 34-9) $201 Domestic Violence Trust Fund (F.S. 938.05) 5153 Rape Crisis Trust Fund (F.S. 938.085) $151 Crimes against Minors (F.5. 938.10) $15 Misdemeanor Crimes Involving Drugs/Alcohol (F.S. 938.13) 55,000 Prostitution (F.S. 796.07(6)) $65 Reckless Driving / Racing on Highway (F.S. 318.18(20)) $30 State Facility Surcharge (F.S. 318.18, Escambia County Ord 34-6) 53 State Radio (F.S. 318.18(17)) 55 EMS Trust Fund (F.S. 316.192/316.061) 5 County Drug Abuse Trust Fund (F.5. 938.21) 5 Additional Cost of Prosecution (F.S. 938.27) $50 Public Defender Application (F.S. 27.52) $ 50 for legal assistance (F.S. 938.29) S100 FDLE (F.S. 938.055) S Cost of Transportation to S Cost of Investigation to (F.S. 938.27) 5% Surcharge on all fines (F.S. 938.04) Court Costs and Fines shall be paid as follows: Pay all Court Costs and Fines during Probation May perform CSW at 5 per hour Reduce all monetary to Lien / D6 Pay Court Costs/Fines or enter into a Payment Plan within / by 10/09/2024 of Sentencing of Release from Custody Jor Reduce to Lien 2år D6 Pay Coun Costs/Fines in minimum equal monthly installments to begin within |" The above sentence was imposed in open court in Escambia County, Florida CASE: 2024 mm 001728A DEFENDANT. Dortch, John S. 19/4/24 County / Circuit Judge Date _Advised of Right to Appeal The first page reflects the clerk's minutes of the proceeding. It is not a final "order," because a judge cannot render an order via minutes. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(f) (defining "order" as a "decision, order, judgment, decree, or rule of a lower tribunal, excluding minutes and minute book entries" (emphasis supplied)). And there cannot be rendition without an "order" that is signed by 4 Without written consent DUI |"/ Multiple / Advanced Defensive Driving School Interlock w/BPO _Weekly UA 13 weeks. Random thereafter REMANDED TO CUSTODY _Under Same Terms and Conditions LIVD/CR Fine the judge. See id. (h). There is further evidence that we have no judgment here. The first page in no way resembles the following form judgment that must be used by all courts in every criminal case: RULE 3.986. FORMS RELATED TO JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE (a) Sufficiency of Forms. The forms as set forth below, or computer generated formats that duplicate these forms, shall be used by all courts. Variations from these forma do not void a judgment, sentence, order, ce fingerprints that are otherwise sufficient (b) Form for Judgment. Probation Violator Community Control Violator Retrial Resentence In the Circuit Court, Judicial Circuit, in and County, Florida Division Case Number State of Florida v. Defendant JUDGMENT The defendant, being personally before this court represented by , the attorney of record, and the state represented by and having Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure November 26, 2025 395 been tried and found guilty by jury/by court of the following crime(s) - entered a plea of guilty to the following crime[a] entered a plea of nolo contendere to the following crime(s) Degree Count Crime Offense Statute Number(s] Crime Case Number OBTS Number and no cause being shown why the defendant should not be adjudicated guilty, IT IS ORDERED THAT the defendant is hereby ADJUDICATED GUILTY of the above crimela). - and being a qualified offender pursuant to section 943.325, Florida Statutes, the defendant shall be required to submit DNA samples as required by law. - and good cause being shown; IT IS ORDERED THAT ADJUDICATION OF GUILT BE WITHHELD. DONE AND ORDERED in open court in Florida, on ..... |date) ...... County, Judge Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure November 26, 2025 396 5 True, the form may be used with “variations” allowed. Fair to say, though, that using the clerk’s minutes we have here as a substitute is significantly beyond what could be considered a “variation.” The next reproduced page purports to be a cost order, not a sentencing order. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.700(a) (defining a “sentence” as the penalty imposed). Though the judge did sign this next page, the two pages are not integrated—they do not reference each other—so they cannot be considered as a single order. Moreover, a judgment and a sentence are two separate orders. Cf. Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(3) (requiring that a notice of appeal be filed “at any time between rendition of a “final judgment and 30 days following rendition of a written order imposing sentence”). The appellant purports to have appealed his judgment of conviction. Before the court affirms an exercise of judicial power, it should first confirm that there is a proper exercise of that power; or at least have counsel address the issue rather than accept a barebones Anders brief. Appointed counsel is not limited to sure-winners or slam dunks. To provide the proper appellate assistance, counsel must identify issues that are arguable. When counsel clearly has not done this, rather than let counsel off the hook anyway, we are duty bound to strike the brief and require more from counsel. I have identified two obvious issues. The bare constitutional minimum has not been done in this appeal, and we should not be affirming until that happens. Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Lori A Willner, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
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