Jonathan A. Branch v. State of Florida

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2024-2165
_____________________________
J ONATHAN A. B RANCH,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA ,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Dixie County.
Mark E. Feagle, Judge.
March 18, 2026
P ER C URIAM.
Following his conviction and 25-year sentence for burglary of
a dwelling with damage in excess of $1,000 in violation of section
810.02(2)(c)2., Florida Statutes (2023), Appellant challenges the
denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. 	Appellant claims
that 	the 	evidence 	at 	trial 	showed 	only 	that 	he 	remained
underneath the elevated home while a codefendant went upstairs
and entered the living area. 	Appellant argues that there was
insufficient evidence to show he was a principal to the crime
committed by the codefendant.
The boilerplate motion for judgment of acquittal made by
Appellant’s trial counsel was insufficient to preserve the argument
now made by appellate counsel. 	See Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d

2
879, 895 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.380(b)) (a motion
for judgment of acquittal “must fully set forth the grounds on
which it is based”). Even if preserved, Appellant’s argument here
would be meritless. The jury had evidence that Appellant entered
the “dwelling” as defined by section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes.
Entering the area underneath a home can qualify as the necessary
entry to meet that element of a burglary. See Tindall v. State, 997
So. 2d 1260, 1261 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (affirming conviction of
burglary 	when 	the 	perpetrator 	entered 	the 	crawl 	space
underneath 	a 	house 	and 	removed 	copper 	pipe 	because 	the
perpetrator 	“penetrated 	the 	invisible, 	vertical 	plane 	into 	the
airspace 	of 	house”). 	The 	video 	and 	photographs 	of 	the 	area
underneath the home, admitted at trial, showed that the area
functioned 	both 	as 	an 	attached 	porch, 	part 	of 	the 	statutory
definition of a dwelling in section 810.011(2), and as a carport,
which has been held to meet the definition of a dwelling. 	See
Medrano v. State, 199 So. 3d 413, 416 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); Ferrara
v. State, 19 So. 3d 1033, 1035 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); State v. Burston,
693 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
A FFIRMED.
OSTERHAUS, C.J., and BILBREY and WINOKUR , JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
Ryan Edward McFarland of Kent & McFarland, Jacksonville, for
Appellant.
James 	Uthmeier, 	Attorney 	General, 	and 	Adam 	B. 	Wilson,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.