Troy Lee Jackson v. State of Florida

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2025-0468
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T ROY LEE JACKSON
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Dixie County.
Frederick L. Koberlein, Jr., Judge.
February 25, 2026
O STERHAUS, C.J.
Troy Lee Jackson challenges the trial court’s finding that he
violated the terms of his probation by driving a vehicle. We agree
with 	his 	argument 	and 	reverse 	the 	trial 	court’s 	finding 	of 	a
probation violation and modification of probation.
After the trial court adjudicated Appellant guilty of fleeing
and eluding a police officer at high speed, it withheld sentence and
placed Appellant on ten years of probation with a one-year driver’s
license suspension. About six months later, Jackson was arrested
for violating his probation by driving a vehicle. At a subsequent
hearing, the trial court found that Jackson knowingly violated the
terms of his probation by driving a vehicle.
A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a
person 	has 	willfully 	and 	substantially 	violated 	his 	probation.

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White v. State, 170 So. 3d 144, 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). But
findings supporting that determination must be supported by
competent, substantial evidence. Id. We review a trial court’s
revocation decision of whether a willful and substantial violation
of probation took place for abuse of discretion. Staples v. State, 202
So. 3d 28, 32 (Fla. 2016).
Here, the problem with the violation of probation finding is
that, 	although 	Appellant’s 	license 	had 	been 	ordered 	to 	be
suspended as a special condition of his probation, the court did not
communicate the effective date on which the suspension would
start, either orally or in writing. In fact, the trial court’s written
probation order stated only that Appellant’s “Driver’s License
privilege will be suspended for a period of one year.” (Emphasis
added.) 	Furthermore, 	Appellant’s 	license 	had 	not 	yet 	been
suspended 	by 	the 	Department 	of 	Highway 	Safety 	and 	Motor
Vehicles at the time of his subsequent arrest. Appellant still
possessed a valid Florida driver’s license on that date. Although
Appellant acknowledged the various conditions of his probation at
the initial hearing, there is no evidence that he knew his license or
driving privileges had been immediately suspended by the court.
See Marzendorfer v. State, 976 So. 2d 596, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
(holding that absent a clearly specified beginning or end date,
probationers 	cannot 	be 	charged 	with 	violating 	a 	required
probationary condition until the remaining period of probation was
too short to perform the condition); cf. Mathis v. State, __ So. 3d __,
2025 WL 3466454 at *1 (Fla. 4th DCA Dec. 3, 2025) (“A trial court
errs in finding a violation of probation for failing to complete
required community service where a probation order contains no
formally 	imposed 	deadline 	to complete the service 	hours and
sufficient time remains in the probationary period to complete the
service hours.”). And so, under these circumstances, Appellant
should not have been considered to have violated his probation.
Accordingly, 	we 	R EVERSE 	the 	trial 	court’s 	finding 	that
Appellant violated probation, and REMAND for restoration of the
original term of Appellant’s probation.
ROBERTS and B ILBREY , JJ., concur.

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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Flor Diaz-Wayt, Assistant
Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, 	Attorney General, 	and Ryan Roy, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.