Dantzler v. State of Florida

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2023-2400
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A NGELA R IGGINS DANTZLER ,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA ,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.
Shonna Young Gay, Judge.
March 11, 2026
R OWE , J.
Angela Riggins 	Dantzler appeals from her judgment 	and
sentence for first-degree murder. She argues that the trial court
reversibly erred when it: (1) found the State did not commit a
discovery violation; (2) ruled that Dantzler was competent to
proceed without making an independent determination of her
competency; 	and 	(3) 	made 	a 	nunc 	pro 	tunc 	determination 	of
Dantzler’s 	competency 	without 	holding 	a 	second 	competency
hearing. We affirm on the first issue without further discussion,
and write only to address the second and third issues.

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Facts
Before trial, Dantzler’s counsel filed a notice of suggestion of
incompetency. Counsel attested that, during her conversations
with Dantzler both on the phone and in person, Dantzler showed
“severe difficulties retaining information, problems understanding
the 	legal 	proceedings 	and 	steps 	involved 	therein, 	as 	well 	as
difficulties to adapt to her surroundings.” Counsel explained that,
based on these difficulties, she was uncomfortable with Dantzler’s
ability to “assist in her defense.” In response, the trial court
entered an order appointing a mental health expert to determine
whether Dantzler was competent to proceed. The court stated only
that it had “reasonable grounds to believe the defendant may be
incompetent to proceed.”
An appointed expert then evaluated Dantzler and filed a
report finding Dantzler competent to proceed. After receiving the
expert’s report, the trial court held a competency hearing where
both parties stipulated to the expert’s report. The trial court
responded by stating, “based on the stipulation between the State
and 	the 	defense, 	the 	court 	will 	adopt 	the 	findings 	of 	that
evaluation.” The case proceeded to trial. During the trial, Dantzler
exhibited no signs that she was not competent to assist in her
defense. 	Rather, 	she 	conducted 	herself 	appropriately 	and
presented detailed testimony. The jury found Dantzler guilty of
first-degree murder.
Dantzler appealed, arguing that the trial court fundamentally
erred when it found her competent to proceed without making an
independent 	determination 	of 	her 	competency. 	Based 	on 	our
conclusion 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	failed 	to 	make 	the 	required
competency determination, this court exercised its authority under
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.600(b) to permit the trial
court 	to 	proceed 	with 	the 	specifically 	stated 	matters 	of 	(1)
determining whether a nunc pro tunc determination of Dantzler’s
competency was possible and (2) making an independent nunc pro
tunc determination of Dantzler’s competency, if it was indeed
possible. The trial court entered a written order where it made an
independent 	nunc 	pro 	tunc 	determination 	that 	Dantzler 	was
competent to proceed at the time of trial.

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Dantzler moved for rehearing, arguing that she was entitled
to a new nunc pro tunc competency hearing, not just a nunc pro
tunc determination of her competency. The trial court denied
Dantzler’s motion.
A supplemental record was then filed in this appeal. And this
court 	permitted 	supplemental 	briefing 	on 	the 	issue. 	Dantzler
repeated her argument that the trial court was required to conduct
a second hearing on competency. We disagree. Finding that the
trial 	court 	corrected 	the 	deficiency 	in 	the 	initial 	competency
proceedings by making its independent nunc pro tunc competency
determination, we affirm and write to explain why.
Independent Determination of Competency
Dantzler initially argued that the trial court fundamentally
erred 	when 	it 	found 	her 	competent 	to 	proceed 	without
independently evaluating her competency. “Under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a defendant may not be
tried and convicted of a crime if he is not competent to stand trial.”
Huggins v. State, 161 So. 3d 335, 344 (Fla. 2014); Amend. XIV, § 1,
U.S. Const. “To protect a defendant’s right to not be tried while
incompetent, the United States Supreme Court explained that
states must provide adequate procedures to safeguard the right.”
Awolowo v. State, 389 So. 3d 788, 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (citing
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386–87 (1966)). To meet this
charge, 	the 	Florida 	Supreme 	Court 	adopted 	Florida 	Rule 	of
Criminal Procedure 3.210. See Lane v. State, 388 So. 2d 1022, 1025
(Fla. 	1980). 	Under 	rule 	3.210, 	whenever 	a 	trial 	court 	has
reasonable 	grounds 	to 	believe 	that 	a 	defendant 	may 	be
incompetent, the court must hold a hearing, make an independent
finding 	on 	whether 	the 	defendant 	is 	competent, 	and 	enter 	a
written order stating its finding. See Awolowo, 389 So. 3d at 793–
96.
Here, the trial court followed the required procedures under
the 	rule 	up 	until 	the 	time 	came 	for 	the 	court 	to 	make 	an
independent 	determination 	of 	Dantzler’s 	competency. 	After
receiving defense counsel’s notice of suggestion of incompetency
under rule 3.210, the trial court correctly found that reasonable
grounds 	existed 	to 	question 	Dantzler’s 	competency 	and,

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accordingly, appointed an expert to evaluate Dantzler. The trial
court then, once it received the expert’s report, correctly decided to
hold a hearing on Dantzler’s competency.
But 	at 	the 	hearing, 	rather 	than 	making 	an 	independent
determination of Dantzler’s competency as it was required to, the
trial court determined that Dantzler was competent “based on the
stipulation between the State and the defense.” Because Dantzler’s
rule 3.210 notice recited specific facts and circumstances that
provided 	reasonable 	grounds 	for 	the 	trial 	court 	to 	doubt 	her
competency, 	the 	trial 	court 	erred 	when 	it 	failed 	to 	make 	an
independent determination of Dantzler’s competency. Cf. id. at 796
(finding no error where the rule 3.210 motion included no factual
allegations to support the request); Davis v. State, 394 So. 3d 801,
802–03 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (finding no error where the rule 3.210
motion included only boilerplate language alleging that counsel
had 	“reasonable 	grounds 	to 	believe” 	the 	defendant 	was
incompetent “based upon the content of conversations between the
undersigned and defendant”). And because a trial court must make
an 	independent 	determination 	of 	competency 	when 	there 	are
reasonable grounds to doubt the defendant’s competency, the trial
court fundamentally erred in failing to make that determination.
See Awolowo, 389 So. 3d at 793–96.
Procedure for Making a Nunc Pro Tunc
Competency Determination
From here, the question became how to best address that
deficiency. In the past, this court has reversed and remanded the
judgment and sentence for a nunc pro tunc determination of
whether the defendant was competent to proceed at the time of
trial. See, e.g., Zern v. State, 191 So. 3d 962, 965 (Fla. 1st DCA
2016). But this approach is problematic—to remand for a nunc pro
tunc determination while reversing the judgment means that the
judgment 	has 	been 	vacated. 	See 	Fla. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	1.540(b)(5)
(discussing what may happen when a judgment is “reversed or
otherwise vacated” (emphasis supplied)). And, if a judgment is
vacated, this court loses jurisdiction over the matter until a new
judgment is entered and appealed or our jurisdiction is otherwise
invoked in a new appellate proceeding. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla.
Const. (“District courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction to hear

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appeals . . . from final judgments or orders of trial courts. . . .”).
This means that a defendant who disagrees with the trial court’s
nunc pro tunc determination of competency and the resulting
judgment and sentence must file another direct appeal and await
briefing and a ruling by the appellate court.
A second approach, first employed by the Second District, is
to relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court to allow the trial court
to make a nunc pro tunc determination of competency. Cramer v.
State, 213 So. 3d 1028, 1029 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). In support of this
approach, the Second District cited the Florida Supreme Court’s
1971 decision Fowler v. State, 255 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1971). Cramer,
213 	So. 	3d 	at 	1029. 	There, 	the 	supreme 	court 	“temporarily
remanded” 	for 	the 	trial 	court 	to 	make 	a 	nunc 	pro 	tunc
determination 	of 	sanity 	under 	what 	was 	then 	Criminal 	Rule
1.210(a). See Fowler, 255 So. 2d at 515. Even so, the supreme court
did “not require vacation of the judgment and sentence entered
against defendant at this time.” Id. The supreme court directed
that if the trial court could not determine that the defendant was
sane, the trial court should vacate the conviction. Id. But if the
trial court could make the nunc pro tunc sanity determination, the
case was to be returned to the supreme court. Id.
We decline to follow the relinquishment approach taken by
the Second District. It is unclear that district courts have authority
to relinquish our jurisdiction in this way. Fowler does not label the
act of temporarily remanding as a relinquishment of an appellate
court’s jurisdiction, and the Florida Rules of Court Procedure
authorize appellate courts to relinquish jurisdiction only in certain
circumstances. 	For 	example, 	the 	Florida 	Rules 	of 	Appellate
Procedure allow an appellate court to “relinquish jurisdiction for a
specified period for entry of an appropriate order” when parties to
a 	settlement 	in 	a 	workers’ 	compensation 	case 	move 	for
“relinquishment 	of 	jurisdiction 	to 	the 	lower 	tribunal 	for 	any
necessary approval of the settlement.” Fla. R. App. P. 9.180(c)(3);
see also, e.g., Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530(f) (directing the appellate court
to relinquish its jurisdiction to the trial court for entry of an order
specifying the grounds for granting a new trial where the trial
court has granted a new trial without stating the specific grounds);
Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.530(g) (same as civil procedure rule 1.530(f),
but expanding it to orders granting a rehearing).

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A third approach, taken by the Fourth District, is to fully
adopt the procedure described in Fowler: temporarily remanding a
case, without affirming or reversing, to allow the trial court to
make a nunc pro tunc determination of competency under rule
3.210. See Machin v. State, 267 So. 3d 1098, 1101 (Fla. 4th DCA
2019) (“In cases where the circuit court finds reasonable grounds
to question a defendant’s competency and does not subsequently
hold a hearing or make a written finding of competency, see Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.210(b), we will temporarily remand the case to the
circuit court with specific instructions.”).
We decline to follow this approach also, because we cannot
find 	a 	basis 	for 	it 	in 	any 	applicable 	constitutional 	provision,
statute, or rule. The Fourth District simply states that it is “bound”
to apply Fowler. See Machin, 267 So. 3d at 1101. But nothing in
Fowler suggests that the supreme court intended to make the
approach exercised therein binding on appellate courts. As to the
basis for the approach, Fowler simply cites two other cases that
employed the same approach. See Fowler, 255 So. 2d at 515. One
of the cases is a federal appellate court case, which justified the
approach using federal law. See United States v. Walker, 301 F.2d
211 (6th Cir. 1962). And the other is a Third District case, which
justified the approach by citing Walker. See Knight v. State, 164
So. 2d 229, 230–31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (citing Walker, 301 F.2d at
215).
But a fourth approach exists under the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure. In general, a lower tribunal’s jurisdiction
over a case is “divested by an appeal from a final order.” See Fla.
R. App. P. 9.600(b). But under rule 9.600(b), an appellate court “by
order may permit the lower tribunal to proceed with specifically
stated matters during the pendency of the appeal.” Id. Logically,
this includes permitting a trial court during the pendency of an
appeal to proceed with (1) determining whether it can make a nunc
pro tunc determination of the defendant’s competency and (2)
making the nunc pro tunc determination if it finds that it can do
so. And when an appellate court grants such permission, the
appellate court may impose a time limit on when the trial court
must 	make 	its 	determination 	by, 	which 	helps 	to 	avoid 	the
unnecessary 	delay 	that 	would 	be 	caused 	by 	reversing 	and
remanding 	the 	judgment 	and 	sentence. 	And 	unlike 	a

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relinquishment 	of 	jurisdiction, 	this 	procedure 	appears 	to 	be
authorized under the appellate rules. *
Based on these considerations, after concluding that the trial
court erred by failing to make an independent determination of
Dantzler’s competency, we entered an order under rule 9.600(b)
permitting the trial court to, if possible, make a nunc pro tunc
determination of whether Dantzler was competent to proceed at
the time of her trial. In compliance with this court’s order, the trial
court entered a written order where it made an independent nunc
pro tunc determination that Dantzler was competent.
Motion for Rehearing and Supplemental Briefing
After the trial court entered its written order, Dantzler moved
for rehearing, arguing that the trial court’s independent nunc pro
tunc determination was insufficient to cure the deficiency in the
initial competency proceedings. According to Dantzler, the trial
court’s initial failure to make an independent determination of
competency 	entitled 	her 	to 	a 	new 	nunc 	pro 	tunc 	competency
hearing. She raises this same argument in her supplemental brief.
Finding no merit in her argument, we affirm.
* We acknowledge that this court has previously characterized
the 	authorization 	under 	Florida 	Rule 	of 	Appellate 	Procedure
9.600(b) 	for 	a 	trial 	court 	“to 	proceed 	with 	specifically 	stated
matters” as a “relinquishment” of jurisdiction. See Lurie v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 605 So. 2d 1023, 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (citing
Fla. 	R. 	App. 	P. 	9.600(b)). 	But 	that 	characterization 	of 	the
procedure 	authorized 	under 	the 	rule 	was 	incorrect. 	While
subsection (a) of rule 9.600 authorizes a trial court to exercise
“concurrent 	jurisdiction” 	with 	an 	appellate 	court, 	section 	(b)
speaks only in terms of authorizing appellate courts to “permit”
lower tribunals “to proceed with specifically stated matters during
the pendency of the appeal.” Nothing in the rule suggests that the
procedure under subsection (b) is relinquishment of an appellate
court’s jurisdiction over an appeal. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.600(b).

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Dantzler 	cites 	several 	court 	decisions 	in 	support 	of 	her
argument that a new competency hearing was required. But in
each case, the initial competency hearing itself was inadequate or
was not held at all. See Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672 (Fla.
2014); Zern, 191 So. 3d at 962; Machin, 267 So. 3d at 1098. Here,
Dantzler received a competency hearing and did not challenge its
adequacy. The only challenge Dantzler raised is that the trial court
did not make an independent determination of her competency,
which is a separate issue. See Awolowo, 389 So. 3d at 793–96
(explaining that a trial court must do three things whenever it has
reasonable 	grounds 	to 	believe 	that 	a 	defendant 	may 	be
incompetent: 	(1) 	hold 	a 	hearing, 	(2) 	make 	an 	independent
determination of whether the defendant is competent, and (3)
enter a written order stating its determination). The trial court
held a hearing, made the independent determination of Dantzler’s
competency nunc pro tunc, and entered a written order explaining
its determination. Because the trial court has fulfilled its duty to
make a written and independent determination of competency, we
AFFIRM Dantzler’s judgment and sentence.
LEWIS and W INOKUR , JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
Michael 	Ufferman 	of 	Michael 	Ufferman 	Law 	Firm, 	P.A.,
Tallahassee, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, 	Attorney General, 	and Julian E. Markham,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.