Publix Super Markets, Inc., Normandy Insurance Company, et al v. Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers Compensation, et al

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2023-0941
_____________________________
P UBLIX SUPER M ARKETS, I NC .,
NORMANDY I NSURANCE C OMPANY ,
Z ENITH INSURANCE C OMPANY ,
B RIDGEFIELD E MPLOYERS
I NSURANCE C OMPANY ,
B RIDGEFIELD C ASUALTY
I NSURANCE C OMPANY ,
B USINESSFIRST INSURANCE
C OMPANY , and R ETAIL FIRST
I NSURANCE C OMPANY ,
Appellants,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL
SERVICES, DIVISION OF
W ORKERS’ C OMPENSATION ,
PRESCRIPTION PARTNERS, LLC;
FLORIDA M EDICAL A SSOCIATION ;
FLORIDA OSTEOPATHIC MEDICAL
A SSOCIATION ; and FLORIDA
ORTHOPAEDIC SOCIETY ,
Appellees.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Division of Administrative Hearings.
Darren A. Schwartz, Administrative Law Judge.
February 25, 2026

2
NORDBY, J.
Under 	a 	longstanding 	provision 	of 	Florida’s 	Workers’
Compensation Law, an injured employee has a “free, full, and
absolute choice” of which “pharmacy or pharmacist” fills and
dispenses 	any 	required 	prescriptions 	under 	Chapter 	440. 	To
resolve this case, we must decide whether a physician authorized
to dispense medication under section 465.0276, Florida Statutes,
is considered a pharmacist within the meaning of this “absolute
choice” provision in section 440.13, Florida Statutes.
The 	underlying 	proceeding 	arose 	in 	2023, 	when 	the
Department 	of 	Financial 	Services, 	through 	its 	Division 	of
Workers’ 	Compensation, 	issued 	proposed 	rules 	interpreting
section 440.13’s “absolute choice” language to include healthcare
practitioners who are authorized to dispense drugs directly to
their patients. The proposed rules prohibit workers’ compensation
insurance carriers from denying authorization or reimbursement
for 	prescription 	medication 	solely 	because 	a 	“dispensing
practitioner” dispenses the medication.
Appellants, a group of companies affected by the proposed
rules, filed an administrative petition challenging the proposals
as invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. Ultimately,
after a hearing, the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH)
issued a final order rejecting Appellants’ claims and dismissing
the petition. Because we find that the proposed rules improperly
enlarge, modify, or contravene the “absolute choice” provision in
section 440.13(3)(j), Florida Statutes (2022), we set aside that
final order.
I.
We begin with some basic background. Florida’s workers’
compensation system is set out in Chapter 440 of the Florida
Statutes. The Legislature based this statutory no-fault system “on
a mutual renunciation of common-law rights and defenses by
employers and employees alike” and designed the regime to be
“self-executing.” 	§ 	440.015, 	Fla. 	Stat. 	The 	law 	generally
immunizes employers from suits by employees for injuries arising
out of and in the course of employment; in exchange, the employer

3
must pay the employee indemnity benefits related to lost work
and 	provide 	the 	employee 	medically 	necessary 	remedial
treatment, care, and attendance for the injury. § 440.13(2)(a), Fla.
Stat. 	This 	includes 	any 	medically 	necessary 	prescription
medication.
To receive payment under Chapter 440, a medical provider
who renders non-emergency services must receive authorization
from the employer’s workers’ 	compensation insurance 	carrier
before 	providing 	treatment. 	§ 	440.13(13)(a), 	Fla. 	Stat. 	With
limited exceptions, the carrier selects and authorizes the provider
who will provide treatment to the injured employee. After the
injured employee receives the authorized treatment, the provider
bills the carrier directly, and the carrier pays.
One significant exception to the typical carrier authorization
structure is prescription medication. Before 1994, carriers had
sole control over where injured employees could go to have their
prescription medications dispensed. But that changed. In a 1993
special session, the Legislature amended Chapter 440 to allow
injured employees the “free, full, and absolute choice” to select any
pharmacy or pharmacist to dispense medications. See Laws of Fla.
93-415 at 103 (codified as § 440.13(3)(j), Fla. Stat. (1994)). Since
then, the Legislature has made no substantive changes to this
“absolute choice” provision:
Notwithstanding 	anything 	in 	this 	chapter 	to 	the
contrary, a sick or injured employee shall be entitled, at
all times, to free, full, and absolute choice in the selection
of the pharmacy or pharmacist dispensing and filling
prescriptions for medicines required under this chapter.
It 	is 	expressly 	forbidden 	for 	the 	department, 	an
employer, or a carrier, or any agent or representative of
the department, an employer, or a carrier, to select the
pharmacy 	or 	pharmacist 	which 	the 	sick 	or 	injured
employee must use; condition coverage or payment on
the basis of the pharmacy or pharmacist utilized; or to
otherwise interfere in the selection by the sick or injured
employee of a pharmacy or pharmacist.
§ 440.13(3)(j), Fla. Stat.

4
Outside of Chapter 440, in a separate statutory provision, the
Legislature has approved certain healthcare providers to dispense
drugs to their patients in the regular course of practice. Enacted
in 	1986, 	section 	465.0276, 	Florida 	Statutes, 	governs 	these
dispensing practitioners: “[a] person may not dispense medicinal
drugs unless licensed as a pharmacist or otherwise authorized
under this chapter to do so, except that a practitioner authorized
by law to prescribe drugs may dispense such drugs to her or his
patients . . . in compliance with this section.” § 465.0276(1)(a),
Fla. Stat.
Historically, the Department interpreted the “free, full, and
absolute choice in the selection of the pharmacy or pharmacist”
language 	of 	section 	440.13(3)(j) 	to 	exclude 	dispensing
practitioners. 	Yet, 	in 	2020, 	the 	Department 	reversed 	course.
Contrary 	to 	its 	previous 	interpretation, 	the 	Department
concluded that dispensing practitioners were to be considered
pharmacists under the “absolute choice” provision. Accordingly,
the Department issued an information bulletin that explained:
failure to authorize and/or reimburse for prescription
medications solely because the medication is or will be
dispensed by a licensed Florida dispensing physician
instead of a pharmacist, interferes with the full, free and
absolute choice of the sick or injured employee and,
therefore, is contrary to law.
Florida Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Informational Bull. DWC-01-
2020, 	(Mar. 	31, 	2020), 	https://www.myfloridacfo.com/docs-
sf/workers-compensation-libraries/workers-comp-
documents/bulletins/DWC-01-2020.pdf.
Appellants (excluding Publix Super Markets, Inc.) filed a
petition with DOAH challenging the Department’s authority to
issue the bulletin. Eventually, the parties entered a settlement
stipulation under which Appellants dismissed their petition and
the Department rescinded its bulletin. As part of the settlement,
the 	Department 	replaced 	the 	bulletin 	with 	a 	Notice 	of 	Rule
Development. Soon after, the rulemaking process began.

5
After workshopping the rules, the Department published the
two proposals challenged here. Proposed Rule 69L-7.730 added
the following language to an existing rule addressing the medical
billing and reporting responsibilities of healthcare providers:
Physicians 	(including 	oral 	surgeons), 	physician
assistants, 	ARNPs, 	and 	any 	other 	recognized
practitioners 	registered 	to 	dispense 	medications
pursuant 	to 	section 	465.0276, 	F.S., 	may 	dispense
medications 	to 	the 	injured 	worker. 	Medication 	is
treatment and must be authorized prior to dispensing,
pursuant 	to 	section 	440.13(3)(a), 	F.S., 	and 	must 	be
medically necessary to treat the compensable injury.
Dispensing such medication may not be denied, absent a
contrary contractual provision, and reimbursement may
not be disallowed or adjusted for the sole reason that the
injured worker has chosen to receive such medication
from a practitioner registered to dispense medications
under Chapter 465, F.S. All requests for authorization of
medications to be dispensed must specify drug name,
dosage, and strength, must be documented in the injured
worker’s file, and must be sent in a manner prescribed
by the carrier pursuant to section 440.13(3)(e), F.S. A
carrier’s failure to timely respond to a written request
for 	authorization 	shall 	be 	governed 	by 	section
440.13(3)(d), F.S.
48 Fla. Admin. Reg. 5153–54 (Dec. 29, 2022).
Likewise, the accompanying Proposed Rule 69L-7.740 added
the following language to the existing rule governing insurer
authorization and medical bill review responsibilities:
Medication is treatment. When physicians (including
oral surgeons), physician assistants, ARNPs, and any
other 	recognized 	practitioners 	registered 	to 	dispense
medications pursuant to section 465.0276, F.S., submit
a 	medical 	bill 	for 	reimbursement 	of 	dispensed
medication, the insurer, claim administrator, or entity
acting on behalf of the insurer may disallow payment for
dispensed medication if the medication is not authorized

6
prior to dispensing, pursuant to section 440.13(3)(a),
F.S., 	and 	is 	not 	medically 	necessary 	to 	treat 	the
compensable injury. Dispensing such medications may
not be denied, absent a contrary contractual provision,
and reimbursement may not be disallowed or adjusted
for the sole reason that the injured worker chooses to
receive such medications from a practitioner registered
to dispense medications under chapter 465, F.S. Any
response 	to 	a 	request 	for 	authorization 	must 	be
communicated 	electronically 	or 	by 	telephone 	to 	the
health care provider and must be documented in the
claims administration system. Failure to timely respond
to 	the 	written 	request 	for 	authorization 	shall 	be
governed by section 440.13(3)(d), F.S.
Id. at 5154.
Appellants 	quickly 	challenged 	the 	validity 	of 	the 	two
proposed 	rules. 	The 	Department 	was 	joined 	by 	the 	other
Appellees—various 	intervening 	professional 	physician
associations and a medication claims processing company—in
defending the proposed rules. The administrative rule challenge
proceeded to a final hearing before an administrative law judge
(ALJ) at DOAH. The parties offered several exhibits into evidence,
but only Brittany O’Neil, the designated representative of the
Department, testified as a witness. O’Neil testified by deposition,
which was admitted into evidence, and live at the hearing. O’Neil
stated that it was the Department’s position that, when it came
to filling prescriptions, the statute allows for a “free and full choice
by the injured worker, which will include getting their medication
from a physician registered to dispense.” When asked which
statute provides injured employees this “free and full choice,”
O’Neil cited only section 440.13(3)(j).
DOAH entered its final order dismissing Appellants’ petition.
In it, the ALJ concluded that (1) the Department did not exceed
its grant of rulemaking authority, (2) the proposed rules did not
enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific provisions of the law
implemented, and (3) the proposed rules were not vague, and did
not fail to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, nor
did they vest unbridled discretion in the agency. The ALJ found

7
that 	dispensing 	practitioners 	are 	engaged 	in 	the 	practice 	of
pharmacy, because like pharmacists, dispensing practitioners are
permitted to “dispense” medicinal drugs. The ALJ concluded that
“[r]egistration of a dispensing practitioner under the Pharmacy
Act enables the practitioner to engage in the practice of pharmacy
and requires them to ‘comply with and be subject to all laws and
rules applicable to pharmacists and pharmacies, including, but
not limited to, [Chapter 465].’” We now review that order.
II.
We 	review 	an 	ALJ’s 	factual 	findings 	for 	competent,
substantial evidence. MB Doral, LLC v. Dep’t of Bus. & Pro.
Regul., Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 295 So. 3d 850, 853
(Fla. 	1st 	DCA 	2020). 	Whether 	an 	agency 	has 	exceeded 	its
rulemaking authority or enlarged the specific provisions of the
law purportedly implemented are issues of law that we review de
novo. S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla. v. Ag. for Health Care Admin., 270
So. 3d 488, 500 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). We afford no deference to the
agency’s interpretation of statutes. Art. V, § 21, Fla. Const.
In the administrative arena, the agency bears the burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed rule
is 	not 	an 	invalid 	exercise 	of 	delegated 	legislative 	authority.
§ 120.56(2)(a), Fla. Stat.; S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., 270 So. 3d at
500. And proposed rules are afforded no presumption of validity
or invalidity. § 120.56(2)(c), Fla. Stat.
A.
Appellants argue that each of the proposed rules is an invalid
exercise 	of 	delegated 	legislative 	authority 	under 	section
120.52(8)(c) because it “enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the
specific provisions of law implemented.”* We agree that both rules
* We note that Appellants also argue in their initial brief that
the proposed rules are invalid under section 120.58(e) because
they are arbitrary and capricious. But under the parties’ earlier
stipulation, Appellants had agreed not to challenge the rules on
this basis at DOAH, so it was never raised or presented to the

8
are invalid, as neither can be squared with the plain language of
the “absolute choice” provision in section 440.13(3)(j).
We start in Florida’s Administrative Procedure Act. Agency
rulemaking 	begins 	with 	two 	key 	ingredients: 	(1) 	rulemaking
authority, and (2) a specific law to be implemented. § 120.536(1),
Fla. Stat. “Rulemaking authority” is statutory language that
explicitly 	authorizes 	or 	requires 	an 	agency 	to 	adopt 	rules.
§ 120.52(17), 	Fla. 	Stat. 	While 	the 	“law 	implemented” 	is 	the
“language of the enabling statute being carried out or interpreted
by an agency through rulemaking,” § 120.52(9), Fla. Stat., both
components work together to ground the rulemaking process in
clear authority with a specific scope. See § 120.52(8), Fla. Stat.
(“An agency may adopt only rules that implement or interpret the
specific powers and duties granted by the enabling statute. . . .
Statutory language granting rulemaking authority or generally
describing 	the 	powers 	and 	functions 	of 	an 	agency 	shall 	be
construed to extend no further than implementing or interpreting
the 	specific 	powers 	and 	duties 	conferred 	by 	the 	enabling
statute.”).
Given this, a rule may be challenged as an invalid exercise of
delegated legislative authority where it “goes beyond the powers,
functions, and duties delegated by the Legislature.” § 120.52(8),
Fla. Stat. One way an agency can violate this is by putting forth
a 	rule 	that 	“enlarges, 	modifies, 	or 	contravenes 	the 	specific
provisions 	of 	law 	implemented.” 	§ 120.52(8)(c), 	Fla. 	Stat. 	In
assessing 	whether 	a 	rule 	exceeds 	the 	boundaries 	of 	its
implementing statute, “[i]t is not enough that the . . . rule is
‘reasonably related’ 	to the 	Legislature’s purpose or 	statutory
provisions.” G.B. v. Ag. for Pers. with Disab., 143 So. 3d 454, 457
(Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (quoting § 120.536(1), Fla. Stat.). Rather, the
ALJ. We will not consider this newly raised and unpreserved
argument for the first time on appeal. Dep’t of Bus. & Pro. Regul.,
Const. Indus. Lic. Bd. v. Harden, 10 So. 3d 647, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA
2009) (“It is well-established that for an issue to be preserved for
appeal, it must be raised in the administrative proceeding of the
alleged error.”).

9
rule 	and 	interpretation 	advanced 	by 	the 	agency 	must 	fully
comport with the specific statute being implemented. Id.
In defending the proposed rules, the Department identified a
host of 	statutory provisions 	as 	authority for 	its actions. For
example, the Department’s rulemaking authority to adopt rules
to implement the provisions of Chapter 440 comes from section
440.591, Florida Statutes. The Department also cited sections
440.09, 440.13(2)(a), (3), (4), (6), (11), (12), (14), (16), 440.15(3)(b),
(d), (5), 440.185(5), (9), 440.20(6), 440.525(2), and 440.593, Florida
Statutes, as the enabling statutes for its proposed rules. A review
of these provisions, though, reveals that only section 440.13(3)(j)
speaks to the Department’s ability to regulate on where an injured
employee’s medication can be dispensed. The remaining statutes
cited are mostly unrelated substantive workers’ compensation
provisions. 	Some 	touch 	upon 	the 	Department’s 	rulemaking
authority 	in 	other 	contexts, 	and 	one 	governs 	carriers’ 	pre-
treatment authorization control and reimbursement rates. They
in no way address where medication can be dispensed.
We also note that the Department’s representative, Brittany
O’Neil, 	stated 	that 	the 	Department’s 	rule 	was 	based 	on 	its
interpretation of section 440.13(3)(j). And in briefing and at oral
argument, Appellees failed to direct this Court to any other
statute that speaks to the Department’s power to promulgate
regulations on where medication for injured employees can be
dispensed. Given all this, we look to section 440.13(3)(j) as the
specific implementing law for the Department’s proposed rules.
B.
Having 	identified 	section 	440.13(3)(j) 	as 	the 	specific
implementing 	law 	at 	issue, 	we 	now 	turn 	to 	whether 	the
Department’s 	proposed 	rules 	fall 	within 	the 	sweep 	of 	that
enabling 	statute’s 	language. 	“Either 	the 	enabling 	statute
authorizes the rule[s] at issue or it does not.” Sw. Fla. Water
Mgmt. Dist. v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc., 773 So. 2d 594, 599
(Fla. 1st DCA. 2000). As detailed below, the language of section
440.13(3)(j) fails to authorize either of the proposed rules.

10
To recap, section 440.13(3)(j) entitles an injured employee “to
free, full, and absolute choice in the selection of the pharmacy or
pharmacist dispensing and filling prescriptions for medicines
required under this chapter.” § 440.13(3)(j), Fla. Stat. It also
expressly forbids any interference by the Department, employer,
or insurance carrier in the “selection 	by the sick or injured
employee of a pharmacy or pharmacist.” Id. So the heart of our
inquiry 	is 	whether 	the 	phrase 	“pharmacy 	or 	pharmacist” 	in
section 	440.13(3)(j) 	can 	be 	read 	to 	encompass 	a 	dispensing
practitioner.
Because Chapter 440 fails to expressly define the terms
pharmacy 	or 	pharmacist, 	we 	consider 	“all 	the 	textual 	and
structural clues” that may shed light on their specific meaning
within the “absolute choice” provision. Conage v. United States,
346 So. 3d 594, 598 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Alachua Cnty. v. Watson,
333 So. 3d 162, 169 (Fla. 2022)). This includes the plain and
ordinary meaning of these common words within the statute’s
context. See Ripple v. CBS Corp., 385 So. 3d 1021, 1027 (Fla. 2024)
(citing Barnett v. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 303 So. 3d 508, 513 (Fla.
2020) (“Because the Act does 	not define the term ‘surviving
spouse,’ we accord the phrase its ordinary meaning while giving
regard to the context in which the phrase is used.”)).
Typically, the word pharmacist refers to someone licensed
and 	trained 	in 	the 	practice 	of 	pharmacy. 	See 	Pharmacist,
Webster’s 	Third 	New 	International 	Dictionary 	1694 	(1986)
(defining “pharmacist,” in part, as “one engaged in the practice of
pharmacy.”); Pharmacist, The American Heritage Dictionary (3d
ed. 1994) (defining “pharmacist” as “one trained in pharmacy.”);
Pharmacist, Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary (27th ed.
1988) (defining “pharmacist” as “one who is licensed to prepare
and 	sell 	or 	dispense 	drugs 	and 	compounds, 	and 	make 	up
prescriptions.”).
Beyond Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law, Chapter 465
of the Florida Statutes governs and regulates pharmacists. In
section 465.003, the Legislature defines “pharmacist” as “any
person licensed pursuant to this chapter to practice the profession
of 	pharmacy.” 	§ 	465.003(19), 	Fla. 	Stat. 	And 	section 	465.003
outlines the “[p]ractice of the profession of pharmacy” to “include

11
compounding, dispensing, and consulting concerning contents,
therapeutic values, and uses of any medicinal drug” § 465.003(22),
Fla. 	Stat. 	Meanwhile, 	section 	465.0276, 	the 	“dispensing
practitioner” 	statute, 	expressly 	differentiates 	between 	a
pharmacist and a dispensing practitioner:
A 	person 	may 	not 	dispense 	medicinal 	drugs 	unless
licensed as a pharmacist or otherwise authorized under
this 	chapter 	to 	do 	so, 	except 	that 	a 	practitioner
authorized by law to prescribe drugs may dispense such
drugs to her or his patients in the regular course of her
or his practice in compliance with this section.
§ 465.0276(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The statute’s use of
“except” provides an exception to the general prohibition that only
licensed pharmacists are allowed to dispense medication. The
statute’s clear language establishes that dispensing practitioners
are the only non-pharmacists permitted to distribute medication,
thus making them distinct from licensed pharmacists.
With all of this in mind, we do not find the term “pharmacist”
in section 440.13(3)(j) to include a dispensing practitioner. A
“pharmacist” is someone licensed to practice pharmacy under
Chapter 465. The Department contends that by registering to be
a dispensing practitioner, healthcare providers obtain a “limited
license” to practice pharmacy. Not so. Chapter 465 makes clear
that a “license” to practice pharmacy is obtained in only two ways:
(1) through examination or (2) endorsement. § 465.007, Fla. Stat.;
§ 465.0075, Fla. Stat. Both forms of licensing require that the
candidate (1) obtain a degree from a pharmacy college or school,
(2) complete a board-certified internship program, and (3) pass
the Florida pharmacy exam or a comparable exam. § 465.007, Fla.
Stat.; § 465.0075, Fla. Stat. Meanwhile, dispensing practitioners
are not subject to the same rigorous licensing requirements. To
become a dispensing practitioner, a practitioner only needs to
register with their professional licensing board, pay a fee of less
than $100, and follow the rules as dictated in the statute. At most,
practitioners who register as dispensing practitioners have a
“dispensing practitioner license” but do not possess the license,
training, or credentials to be considered a licensed pharmacist.

12
The Department also argues that dispensing practitioners,
like pharmacists, are both engaged in the practice of pharmacy.
Once again, the Department is mistaken. The statutory definition
of the practice of pharmacy consists of “compounding, dispensing,
and consulting concerning contents, therapeutic values, and uses
of any medicinal drug.” § 465.003(22), Fla. Stat. A dispensing
practitioner 	is 	limited 	to 	only 	dispensing 	medication.
§ 465.0276(1)(a), 	Fla. 	Stat. 	A 	dispensing 	practitioner 	only
practices 	a 	single 	part 	of 	the 	pharmacy 	profession, 	creating
another significant distinction between a dispensing practitioner
and a pharmacist.
We are mindful that a separate provision of section 440.13
expressly references dispensing practitioners when addressing
reimbursement rates for prescription medications under Chapter
440. Section 440.13(12)(c) provides a different reimbursement
rate for medication dispensed by a “dispensing practitioner”:
As to reimbursement for a prescription medication,
the reimbursement amount for a prescription shall be
the 	average 	wholesale 	price 	plus 	$4.18 	for 	the
dispensing 	fee. 	For 	repackaged 	or 	relabeled
prescription medications dispensed by a dispensing
practitioner 	as 	provided 	in 	s. 	465.0276, 	the 	fee
schedule for reimbursement shall be 112.5 percent of
the 	average 	wholesale 	price, 	plus 	$8.00 	for 	the
dispensing fee.
§ 	440.13(12)(c), 	Fla. 	Stat. 	This 	provision 	confirms 	that 	the
Legislature 	contemplated 	that 	dispensing 	practitioners 	could
have a role in dispensing medication under Chapter 440. (For
example, a carrier could choose to authorize an injured employee
to receive medication from a dispensing practitioner.) But the
setting 	of a reimbursement 	rate 	does nothing to 	broaden or
transform the meaning of pharmacist in the “absolute choice”
provision.
The 	language 	of 	section 	440.13(12)(c) 	does 	not 	equate
dispensing practitioners to pharmacists, nor does it speak to the
authorization of pharmacists. In fact, the term pharmacist is not
mentioned at all. If anything, the express mention of dispensing

13
practitioners in section 440.13(12)(c) is further evidence that the
Legislature intended to omit dispensing practitioners from the
absolute choice provision. See L.K. v. Dep’t of Juv. Just., 917 So. 2d
919, 921 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“It is a general canon of statutory
construction 	that, 	when 	the 	legislature 	includes 	particular
language in one section of a statute but not in another section of
the same statute, the omitted language is presumed to have been
excluded intentionally.”).
Had the Legislature wanted dispensing practitioners to be
included in the “absolute choice” provision, it could have expressly
included them in section 440.13(3)(j) or used a broader term like
“health care provider,” which would have covered physicians and
pharmacists and is used in other parts of section 440.13. We
decline to read so broadly language that the Legislature has
written narrowly. See Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999)
(“We are not at liberty to add words to statutes that were not
placed there by the Legislature.”); Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Fla.
Mun. Power Ag., 789 So. 2d 320, 324 (Fla. 2001) (“A court’s
function is to interpret statutes as they are written and give effect
to each word in the statute.”).
We conclude that the “absolute choice” provision in section
440.13 	fails 	to 	include 	dispensing 	practitioners. 	Section
440.13(3)(j) provides that injured employees are entitled to choose
their own pharmacy or pharmacist. Dispensing practitioners do
not fit within the plain meaning of “pharmacist” nor do they
engage in the “practice of the profession of pharmacy.” Thus,
Rules 69L-7.730(2)(1)1.b and 69L-7.740(2)(c) improperly enlarge,
modify, or contravene section 440.13(3)(j) and are an invalid
exercise 	of 	delegated 	legislative 	authority 	under section
120.52(8)(c). See MB Doral, LLC v. Dep’t of Bus. & Pro. Regul.,
Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 295 So. 3d 850, 855 (Fla.
1st DCA 2020) (reversing an ALJ order after finding that Agency’s
rule improperly enlarges, modifies, or contravenes Florida Law);
G.B., 143 So. 3d at 457 (reversing an ALJ order finding a rule
valid 	where 	the 	rule 	expanded 	and 	contravened 	the 	law
implemented).
We SET ASIDE the final order.

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R OWE and LONG, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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William H. Rogner of HR Law, Orlando, for Appellants.
Cassidy Perdue, Katie Privett, and Douglas Ware, Department of
Financial 	Services, 	Tallahassee, 	for 	Appellee 	Department 	of
Financial Services.
Jeffery M. Scott, Florida Medical Association, Tallahassee; Jason
D. Winn, Winn Law, Tallahassee; Virginia C. Dailey, Louise
Wilhite-St. Laurent, and Lindsay K. Ervin, Panza, Maurer &
Maynard, P.A., Tallahassee; for Appellees Prescription Partners,
LLC, 	Florida 	Medical 	Association, 	Inc., 	Florida 	Osteopathic
Medical Association, and Florida Orthopaedic Society.
Maria Elena Abate and L. Michael Billmeier, Jr., Colodny Fass,
Tallahassee, for Amici Curiae American Property and Casualty
Insurance Association and Florida Insurance Council.