New Venture of Destin, LLC, Becnel v. Silver Shells Property Owners Association, Inc., Korfonta, et al

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2024-2977
_____________________________
N EW V ENTURE OF DESTIN , LLC
and DAMON B ECNEL,
Appellants,
v.
SILVER SHELLS PROPERTY
OWNERS A SSOCIATION , I NC .,
C HRISTINE GARGER KORFONTA ,
SUNRISE B EACH SERVICE , LC,
H&T C APITAL , LLC, and SILVER
SHELLS OWNERS C LUB , LLC,
Appellees.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.
John T. Brown, Judge.
December 23, 2025
P ER C URIAM.
DISMISSED. 	See Tarik, Inc. v. NNN Acquisitions, Inc., 17 So.
3d 912, 913 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (concluding that Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii) did not provide the court
with jurisdiction to review an order granting the appellee’s motion
for summary judgment on its claim for possession, even though the
trial court determined that the appellant had no legal right to
possess the real property, because “[i]n real property cases, the

2
trial court’s order on a party’s summary judgment motion does not
determine the ‘immediate right to possession’ even though it may
resolve the underlying legal issues”).
LEWIS and R AY , JJ., concur; TANENBAUM, J., concurs in result with
opinion.
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
T ANENBAUM, J., concurring in result.
The order on appeal is one granting summary judgment in
favor of Silver Shells Property Owners Association on the first
three 	counts 	of 	a 	five-count 	complaint. 	Those 	initial 	counts
collectively stemmed from a declaration of restrictive covenants
and easements covering beach resort property. They sought, on the
one hand, compensatory damages for breach of contract; on the
other—essentially—they sought specific performance (albeit the
third 	count 	having 	been 	labeled 	“injunction”) 	requiring 	the
developer, New Venture of Destin, LLC, to transfer title and
easement rights pertaining to certain common properties. The
remaining 	two 	counts 	sought 	both 	equitable 	reformation 	and
statutory 	civil 	penalties 	and 	damages. 	The 	order 	expressly
withheld entry of a “final judgment” on the first three counts until
there was “resolution of the remaining claims in the case.”
This appeal does not involve one from a final order. It is
common knowledge that an order granting summary judgment
“merely 	establishes 	entitlement 	to 	a 	judgment 	and 	does 	not
actually 	enter 	or 	render 	a 	judgment.” 	Monticello 	Ins. 	Co. 	v.
Thompson, 743 So. 2d 1215, 1215–16 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (citing
Catchings v. Fla.–McCracken Concrete Pipe, 101 Fla. 792, 135 So.
561, 562 (1931)). Even if the order here contained some language
of finality—though it clearly does not—it still would not count as
a “partial final judgment,” because it did not “dispose[] of an entire
case as to any party” and did not “dispose[] of a separate and

3
distinct cause of action that is not interdependent with other
pleaded claims.” Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(k). The only way this court
could have jurisdiction to directly review the order is if it is one of
the non-final orders listed by the supreme court in Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3). See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.
(authorizing a district court to “review interlocutory orders in such
cases to the extent provided by rules adopted by the supreme
court”). New Venture contends that the order is appealable under
either 	rule 	9.130(a)(3)(B)—covering 	an 	order 	that 	grants 	an
injunction—or 	rule 	9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii)—covering 	an 	order 	that
determines “the right to immediate possession of property.”
But the order does neither. The order is not like a preliminary
injunction because it is not directed toward preserving the status
quo, and it does not direct New Venture to do anything and
otherwise is not worded to regulate New Venture’s conduct in a
way that could subject it to contempt proceedings if it failed to
comply. Cf. Alger v. Peters, 88 So. 2d 903, 906 (Fla. 1956) (“An
injunctive decree is a personal decree and in entering it a court of
equity is usually rendering an in personam judgment that acts on
the person of the party affected.”); see also Pizio v. Babcock, 76 So.
2d 654, 655 (Fla. 1954) (noting that an injunctive order “should be
confined within reasonable limitations and cast in such terms as
they can, with certainty, be complied with”; and “[t]he one against
whom it is directed should not be left in doubt about what he is to
do”).
The order also does not entitle the association to immediate
possession of the common properties. Because rule 9.130 is the
supreme 	court’s 	policy 	statement 	regarding 	a 	district 	court’s
jurisdiction to hear enumerated non-final orders, we narrowly
construe its scope. Cf. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bruns, 443 So. 2d 959,
961 (Fla. 1984) (“The thrust of rule 9.130 is to restrict the number
of appealable nonfinal orders.”); Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla.,
Inc., 	889 	So. 	2d 	812, 	819 	(Fla. 	2004) 	(interpreting 	“rule
9.130(a)(3)(C)(v) . . . narrowly”); Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San
Perdido Ass’n, Inc., 104 So. 3d 344, 348 (Fla. 2012) (explaining how
the court “makes policy determinations” when it sets out “which
categories 	of 	non-final 	orders 	are 	appealable 	to 	the 	district
courts”); see also Walker v. Fla. Gas Transmission Co., LLC, 134
So. 	3d 	571, 	572 	(Fla. 	1st 	DCA 	2014) 	(concluding 	that 	“the

4
categories of non-final orders subject to interlocutory appeal are
narrowly construed” (citing Bruns, 443 So. 2d at 961)). To be
appealable under rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii), an order must determine
the “right to immediate possession of property” in a manner like
the 	three 	examples 	it 	lists: 	pre-judgment 	“writs 	of 	replevin,
garnishment, [and] attachment.” These writs are not remedies;
they do not serve to execute on judgments. Rather, each effects a
seizure of property and brings it within the jurisdiction of the court
to preserve it while the litigation proceeds. See Art. V, § 5(b), Fla.
Const. (granting the circuit court the authority to issue “all writs
necessary or proper to the complete exercise of [its] jurisdiction”);
cf. §§ 76.03, 76.08, Fla. Stat. (prejudgment writ of attachment);
§ 77.031, Fla. Stat. (prejudgment writ of garnishment); § 78.068,
Fla. Stat. (“prejudgment writ of replevin”); see also McMurrain v.
Fason, 	573 	So. 	2d 	915, 	917 	(Fla. 	1st 	DCA 	1990) 	(describing
operation of a prejudgment writ of replevin to provide “immediate
possession 	of 	the 	inventory”); 	Cerna 	v. 	Swiss 	Bank 	Corp.
(Overseas), 	S.A., 	503 	So. 	2d 	1297, 	1298 	(Fla. 	3d 	DCA 	1987)
(describing purpose of prejudgment writ of attachment to preserve
property); Garel & Jacobs, P.A. v. Wick, 683 So. 2d 184, 186 (Fla.
3d DCA 1996) (describing prejudgment writ of garnishment as
“ancillary to the main action” and a “civil remedy available to a
party 	to 	secure 	the 	anticipated 	money 	judgment 	the 	party
ultimately expects to recover”).
Nothing 	on 	review 	resembles 	the 	trial 	court’s 	effort 	at
preserving 	the 	status 	quo 	while 	litigation 	remains 	pending—
through 	either 	a 	preliminary 	injunction 	or 	a 	prejudgment
preservation 	writ—so 	we 	do 	not 	have 	jurisdiction 	under 	rule
subdivisions 9.130(a)(3)(B) and (C)(ii). We properly dismiss this
appeal.
_____________________________
Raymond J. Rafool, Patricia M. Montes de Oca, and Seth J.
Rutman of Rafool, PLLC, Miami, for Appellants.
D. Kent Safriet of Holtzman Vogel Baran Torchinsky & Josefiak,
PLLC, Tallahassee; Scott D. Stevens of Starnes Davis Florie LLP,
Mobile, 	AL, 	for 	Appellee 	Silver 	Shells 	Property 	Owners
Association, Inc.