John H. Baldwin v. Douglas R. Beam, P.A., and Domenico M. Idoni

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
Case No. 5D2024-2423
LT Case No. 2005-CA-067305
_____________________________
JOHN H. BALDWIN,
Appellant,
v.
DOUGLAS R. BEAM, P.A., and
DOMENICO M. IDONI,
Appellees.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County,
George T. Paulk, Judge.
James D. Henderson and Allan P. Whitehead, of Frese,
Whitehead, Anderson & Henderson, P.A., Melbourne, for
Appellant.
Joseph E. DeLeo, of Watson, Soileau, DeLeo & Burgett, P.A.,
Cocoa, for Appellee, Douglas R. Beam, P.A.
No Appearance for Remaining Appellee.
December 5, 2025
JAY, C.J.
Baldwin appeals a charging lien judgment that the trial court
entered for Douglas R. Beam, P.A. (“Beam”). Since we agree that
the court erred in calculating the lien amount, we reverse and

2
remand for the entry of a corrected judgment. We reject Baldwin’s
other arguments without discussion.
A charging lien is an attorney’s equitable right to fees and
costs for his or her services in a lawsuit that yielded a judgment or
recovery for the client. Willis v. Nova Cas. Co., No. 21-13778, 2023
WL 334567, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 20, 2023) (quoting Sinclair, Louis,
Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d
1383, 1384 (Fla. 1983)). It has four elements: (1) a valid contract,
express or implied, between attorney and client; (2) their shared
understanding that payment depends on recovery; (3) the client’s
attempt to avoid payment or a dispute over the amount owed; and
(4) timely notice of the lien. Id. Typically, an appellate court
reviews the lien for an abuse of discretion, but when the appeal
concerns the interpretation of the contract, review is de novo. See
id. (quoting US Acq., LLC v. Tabas, Freedman, Soloff, Miller &
Brown, P.A., 87 So. 3d 1229, 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)).
Because a charging lien “enforces a contract between the
attorney and client,” id., it must be consistent with the terms of
that contract. State v. Am. Tobacco Co., 723 So. 2d 263, 268 (Fla.
1998). It cannot contradict “the provisions” of the agreement. Id.
Thus, the lien must “be based on the amount agreed with the
client, not an amount to be determined by the trial court.” Willis,
2023 WL 334567 at *2 (quoting Gossett & Gossett, P.A. v.
Mervolion, 941 So. 2d 1207, 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)); cf.
Rosenthal, Levy & Simon, P.A. v. Scott, 17 So. 3d 872, 874 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2009) (“A charging lien differs in nature from a claim for
attorney’s fees.”).
Here, the court used a fee judgment previously entered
against an opposing party as the “starting point” for calculating
the amount of the lien. But that fee judgment was based on the
court’s findings about the reasonable hourly rate for each lawyer
and paralegal who worked on the case. See generally Fla. Patient’s
Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). For example, the
fee judgment provides that $600 is a reasonable hourly rate for
Beam’s services. However, at the charging lien hearing, Beam
conceded that neither his written retainer agreement nor billing
records reflect a $600 rate. While the court reasoned that Baldwin
agreed “to the hourly rates, amount of time and total attorney’s

3
fees,” this overstates Baldwin’s testimony. Baldwin never
endorsed a $600 hourly rate or the total fee award.
In sum, there was no basis for the court to anchor the amount
of the charging lien to the fee judgment entered earlier in the case,
which arose from judicial reasonableness findings—not the
contract between Baldwin and Beam. By relying on the fee
judgment instead of the contract, the court committed reversible
error. See Flynn v. Sarasota Cnty. Pub. Hosp. Bd., 169 F. Supp. 2d
1363, 1370 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (“[I]t follows that there can be no
charging lien for additional fees as Florida law clearly holds that
there can be no award of fees . . . in excess of the contract rate.”);
In re Hanson Dredging, Inc., 15 B.R. 79, 83 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981)
(concluding that a lawyer’s charging lien must be based on his
agreement with the client, not the amount of fees awarded to him
by the court). On remand, the court must determine what Baldwin
owes Beam under their contract, not the earlier fee judgment. See
Willis, 2023 WL 334567 at *2; Am. Tobacco Co., 723 So. 2d at 268.
The court may consider if this task requires taking additional
evidence.
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.
MAKAR and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________