Troy William Armstrong v. State of Florida

FIFTH D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 5D2024-1508
L.T. Case No. 2020-CF-001402
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T ROY W ILLIAM ARMSTRONG,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA ,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Putnam County.
Alicia R. Washington, Judge.
Jennifer Walker Cogdill, Fleming Island, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Roberts J.
Bradford, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellee.
April 24, 2026
M AC IVER , J.
Troy 	Armstrong 	raises 	multiple 	issues 	challenging 	his
judgment and sentence for multiple counts of sexual battery and
lewd and lascivious molestation. Among Armstrong’s assertions is
that he is wrongly convicted of violating section 794.011(2)(a),
Florida Statutes (2020), by penetrating or having union with the
victim’s anus with his mouth (Count II). Armstrong asserts and
the State concedes that union is not sufficient for this specific

2
charge1 and there was no evidence of anal penetration. On the
State’s concession of error, we reverse Armstrong’s conviction for
Count II.
We reject Armstrong’s remaining assertions and affirm the
remaining counts without further discussion.
A FFIRMED in 	part; R EVERSED in 	part; 	and R EMANDED for
further proceedings.
LAMBERT and KILBANE , JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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1 	Sexual 	battery 	is 	defined 	as 	“oral, 	anal, 	or 	vaginal
penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the
anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object . . . .” §
794.011(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2020). Thus, where the contact is made
by something other than a sexual organ, in this case Armstrong’s
mouth, penetration is an element of the charge. See Johnson v.
State, 632 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).