Kenneth Pilak, Russel Pilak and Deborah Ruthenburg v. Timothy G. Reigel and The Estate of Ronald G. Sas

2025-0269Fladistctapp5

Gesamter Gesetzestext

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
Case No. 5D2025-0269
LT Case No. 42-2022-CP-633
_____________________________
KENNETH PILAK, RUSSELL
PILAK, and DEBORAH
RUTHENBURG,
Appellants,
v.
TIMOTHY G. REIGEL, AND THE
ESTATE OF RONALD G. SAS,
Appellees.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County.
Brad E. King, Judge.
Brice Zoecklein, of Zoecklein Law P.A., Brandon, for Appellants.
Daniel J. Raymer, and Caleb V. Smith, of The Florida Legal
Advocacy Group, P.A., Ocala, for Appellee, Timothy G. Reigel.
No Appearance for Remaining Appellee.
February 6, 2026
HARRIS, J.
2
Ronald G. Sas died on June 7, 2015, in Ocala, Florida. In
February 2016, an individual named Gary Fores signed a petition
titled Petition for Establishment [of] Probate of Lost or Destroyed
Will and Appointment of Personal Representative (the “2016
petition”). This petition asserted that on May 10, 2002, the
decedent executed his last will and on September 26, 2005 and
December 18, 2006, he executed codicils to that will. According to
the petition, the original will and codicils were lost or destroyed
without the knowledge or consent of the decedent. Attached to the
petition were photocopies of the will and codicils. The beneficiaries
under the will and codicils were Timothy Reigel (decedent’s long-
term domestic partner and Appellee herein), decedent’s friend
Bruce Weaver, and Arlene Pilak (decedent’s predeceased sister
and the mother of Kenneth Pilak, Russell Pilak and Deborah
Ruthenburg, Appellants herein).
Appellee, Weaver, Appellants, and Robert Pilak (surviving
spouse of Arlene Pilak) each signed a “Consent and Waiver of
Notice” in 2016, which acknowledged receipt of a copy of the 2016
petition, waived hearing and notice of hearing thereon, and
consented to the entry of an order granting the relief requested in
the petition without notice or hearing. The 2016 petition was never
filed in court.
On March 21, 2022, Kenneth Pilak filed a petition for formal
intestate administration, alleging the decedent had no surviving
spouse or children. The petition acknowledged the existence of a
document purporting to be a copy of the decedent’s will, but alleged
that no original will could be located. Russell Pilak and Deborah
Ruthenburg filed waivers of priority and consented to the
appointment of Kenneth as the personal representative of the
estate.
On September 9, 2022, Appellee filed an answer to the 2022
petition for intestate administration, alleging that Appellants had
previously signed consents and waivers consenting to the 2016
petition that was never filed. Appellee also asserted that the
administration of the estate did not proceed on the 2016 petition
because Gary Fores changed his mind about serving as personal
representative and Appellee is unable to serve because he is not a
resident of Florida nor a relative of the decedent.
3
Appellants subsequently filed notices of withdrawal of their
2016 consents and waivers, and on December 26, 2024, Appellee
filed his Petition to Establish Lost Will, First Codicil to Will, and
Second Codicil to Will. Like the unfiled petition in 2016, the
petition alleged that the original will and codicils were lost or
destroyed without the knowledge or consent of the decedent and
without any intent on the part of the decedent to revoke the
instruments. The petition attached a copy of the will and codicils.
Kenneth filed his response to the 2024 petition, arguing there was
a rebuttable presumption that the decedent destroyed the original
will with the intention of revoking it, and that Appellee presented
no evidence to support the assertion that the will and codicils were
not revoked by the decedent.
On January 17, 2025, an evidentiary hearing was held.
Appellee called Weaver to testify, who indicated that he and the
decedent never discussed the decedent’s estate plans, but that he
presumed the decedent would want Appellee to have the house.
Weaver also “had the feeling” that the decedent did not have much
regard for his niece and nephews. The decedent never told Weaver
he intended to destroy his will, nor did he mention making any
changes to the will. Weaver acknowledged he was named as a
beneficiary, which he learned after the decedent’s death, but he did
not know what exactly he was beneficiary of. Weaver further
admitted he did not witness execution of the will or codicils and
had no knowledge regarding the contents of the documents. No
other witnesses were called.
Appellee acknowledged Weaver did not know anything about
the contents of the will but nevertheless argued that the consent
and waivers signed in 2016 barred Appellants’ case. The trial court
agreed, and on January 26, 2025, it entered an order granting
Appellee’s petition to establish lost will and codicils. The court
based its ruling on In re Washington’s Estate, 56 So. 2d 545, 547
(Fla. 1952), which held that where a will that cannot be located
after the testator’s death “is shown to have been in his possession
when last seen, then the presumption is, in the absence of other
evidence, that he destroyed it.” However, the court explained that
the presumption that the will was revoked does not apply in this
4
case because there was no evidence that the original will was ever
in the possession of the decedent at any time.
The court further concluded that the will had not been
established pursuant to section 733.207, Florida Statutes (2024),
because there was no witness to the contents of the will and the
copy was not proved by a disinterested witness. However, the court
found that the consents and waivers signed by Appellants binds
them and authorized the court to enter an order granting the relief
requested by Appellee. Accordingly, the court admitted the lost
will and codicils to probate, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, Appellants first argue that the court erred in
admitting the copy of the lost will and codicils because it failed to
apply the presumption of revocation where the original will was
known to exist but could not be found after the testator’s death.
They further argue the trial court incorrectly required Appellants
to prove the original will was in the possession of the decedent
prior to his death before the presumption could apply. Finally,
Appellants argue the trial court erred by admitting the will and
codicils without the evidence required by section 733.207. We
agree on all three counts.
“It is well-settled under Florida law that when an original
will that is known to have existed cannot be located after the death
of the decedent, the presumption is that the testator destroyed the
will with the intent to revoke it.” Brennan v. Honsberger, 101 So.
3d 415, 416 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012); see also In re Est. of Hatten, 880
So. 2d 1271, 1274 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (“When a decedent who has
made a will dies, and the will cannot be found among the decedents
personal papers (or other logical locations such as safety deposit
box or family lawyer), a presumption arises that the decedent
[himself] destroyed the will, intending to revoke it.”); In re Parker’s
Est., 382 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. 1980). To avoid a finding of
revocation, proponents of the lost will bear the burden of
presenting competent substantial evidence that justify a finding
that the will had not been revoked. See Brennan, 101 So. 3d at 416.
The first step in overcoming the presumption is establishing the
terms of the will and to offer it for probate pursuant to section
733.207. See id.; In re Est. of Musil, 965 So. 2d 1157, 1159 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2007).
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Some cases have specified that “evidence that a testator’s will
was in his possession prior to death and cannot be located
subsequent to death gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that
the testator destroyed the will with the intention of revoking it.”
Balboni v. LaRocque, 991 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
(emphasis added); see also Musil, 965 So. 2d at 1158. Here, there
was no evidence that the decedent was in possession of his will
before his death. In this case we find this factor to be irrelevant.
Even if the presumption of revocation did not arise because there
was no evidence the decedent was in possession of the will prior to
his death, a proponent of a lost will still must comply with the
statutory requirements of section 733.207.
Section 733.207 provides:
Any interested person may establish the full and
precise terms of a lost or destroyed will and offer the
will for probate. The specific content of the will must
be proved by the testimony of two disinterested
witnesses, or, if a correct copy is provided, it shall be
proved by one disinterested witness.
§ 733.207, Fla. Stat. (2024) (emphasis added). A “correct copy”
means an identical copy such as a carbon or photostatic copy. See
In re Est. of Kero, 591 So. 2d 675, 677 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Parker’s
Est., 382 So. 2d at 654. A “disinterested witness” refers to a person
“who has no private interest in the matter at issue,” or “no stake
in the outcome of the matter in which he or she offers evidence.”
Smith v. DeParry, 86 So. 3d 1228, 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).
The only person to testify at the hearing was Weaver, who
was a beneficiary in the second codicil. Although Appellee argued
below that Weaver was a disinterested witness because there
existed no assets named in the second codicil, Weaver explained he
did not know that until that point; he was aware he was a
beneficiary of something but was not sure of what he was a
beneficiary. Even if he had no stake in the outcome, he knew
nothing of the contents of the will and never discussed such
contents with the decedent, nor was he a witness to the execution
of the will or codicils. See Brennan, 101 So. 3d at 417 (holding
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proponent of will failed to meet requirements of section 733.207
where she presented correct copy of lost will and testimony of two
witnesses as to its execution, but neither witness had knowledge
of contents of will). Accordingly, Weaver’s testimony was
insufficient to prove the contents of the lost will under the statute.
The trial court instead relied on the 2016 consents and
waivers in finding that Appellee proved the contents of the lost will
under the statute. This was error. First, the consent and waivers
to the 2016 petition were never filed in or accepted by a court, nor
was the 2016 petition filed in court. The consents and waivers also
did not waive the parties’ right to challenge the will or the
proponent’s requirement to prove the will, and they were
withdrawn prior to Appellee formally filing his 2024 petition to
establish the lost will. See, e.g., In re Ballett’s Est., 426 So. 2d 1196,
1199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (finding that a stipulation that a will be
admitted to probate did not constitute a waiver where brother did
not intend to waive any objections to will he might later determine
were valid).
Moreover, the consents and waivers did not provide any
testimony about the specific contents of the will. See Brennan, 101
So. 3d at 417; see also Brennan v. Est. of Brennan, 40 So. 3d 894,
897 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (finding trial court could not admit lost
will upon submission of witness affidavits alone, which merely
stated witnesses saw decedent execute will and they signed as
witnesses immediately thereafter). Appellants were also not
disinterested witnesses, as they have an interest in the outcome of
the proceeding to establish the lost will. See DeParry, 86 So. 3d at
1236.
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the order admitting the
lost will and codicils into probate and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
WALLIS, and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.
7
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________

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