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Cite as 30 I&N Dec. 84 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4250
Matter of M-K-, Respondent
Decided September 25, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
Reopening is unwarranted because the respondent’s claim of a lack of due process is
speculative, based on a series of false assumptions and fallacious reasoning, and wholly
unsupported by the actual evidence in the record.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Marc Van Der Hout, Esquire, San Francisco, California
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 	Numa Metoyer, Associate
Regional Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board 	Panel: 	MALPHRUS, 	Chief 	Appellate 	Immigration 	Judge;
HUNSUCKER and GEMOETS, Appellate Immigration Judges.
MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:
The respondent is a native of Syria and a citizen of Algeria. This matter
was last before the Board on April 15, 2026, when we designated as
precedent an April 9, 2026, decision dismissing the respondent’s appeal from
a September 12, 2025, decision in which an Immigration Judge found him
removable, denied his applications for relief and protection from removal,
and denied his motion to remand. Matter of M-K-, 29 I&N Dec. 556, 559–69
(BIA 2026). 	Presently before the Board is a motion to reopen filed by the
respondent,1 which the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) opposes.
The motion will be denied.2
A motion to reopen for the purpose of presenting additional evidence will
only be granted if the evidence was not previously available and would likely
change the result in the case. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2026); see also Matter
of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 526 (BIA 2015). 	A respondent seeking
reopening must also establish prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief
sought. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988) (“There are at least three
independent grounds on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen. First,
1 	The respondent’s motion to exceed the page limitation is granted.
2 	We have denied the respondent’s motion to reconsider in a separate, unpublished
decision.

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it may hold that the movant has not established a prima facie case for the
underlying 	substantive 	relief 	sought.”); 	see 	also 	Parada-Orellana
v. Garland, 21 F.4th 887, 893 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Abudu); Matter of Chen,
28 I&N Dec. 676, 681–82 (BIA 2023) (denying the respondent’s motion to
reopen because she did not establish prima facie eligibility for the relief
sought). 	Prima facie eligibility is shown when there is a reasonable
likelihood that the statutory requirements for the relief sought have been
satisfied and relief will be granted in the exercise of discretion. 	Matter of
L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 413, 419 (BIA 1996).
In his motion to reopen, the respondent does not seek relief from removal.
Rather, he requests termination of the proceedings or a remand based on his
assertion that he was denied a fair hearing (Respondent’s Mot. at 25–42).
Reopening is unwarranted because the evidence presented does not establish
a reasonable likelihood that this occurred.
Reduced to its essence, the respondent’s argument is both wholly
unsupported by the actual evidence—as opposed to conspiracy theories and
innuendo—and a complete non sequitur. 	The respondent argues that: 	(1)
because multiple Appellate Immigration Judges may have recused from
voting on whether to publish the Board’s initial decision (but were not
involved in the outcome of the panel decision itself); (2) those recusals
necessarily occurred for one—and only one—reason (as opposed to the
myriad of possible reasons for recusal); (3) that one reason was that the
recused Appellate Immigration Judges previously pressured or influenced
the presiding Immigration Judge in the respondent’s case; and (4) because of
that improper influence, the respondent is entitled to a new hearing or the
termination of his proceedings.
The first three points are without foundation and do not logically follow,
rendering the fourth point completely unsupported. First, deciding the merits
of an appeal is a completely separate process from deciding to publish a
precedential decision. See generally 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(g)(3) (2026). Further,
by definition, a recused Appellate Immigration Judge would not sit on the
panel that decided the outcome of the respondent’s appeal. Thus, the recusal
of Appellate Immigration Judges in deciding whether to publish the decision
has no bearing on the outcome or the merits of the case, especially in the
respondent’s case when some of the alleged recusals occurred after the
decision in his case was issued on April 9, 2026.
Second, even if the recusals had occurred at the merits review stage, the
recusals would not reflect anything other than a determination that an
Appellate Immigration Judge felt it was inappropriate for him or her to

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consider the case for some reason. 	Recusals may occur for many reasons;
they 	are 	frequently 	fact-bound 	and 	individualized 	determinations, 	and
reasonable jurists may differ on whether recusal is warranted even when
presented with the same set of facts. Cf. United States v. Medoff, 159 F.4th
107, 124 (1st Cir. 2025) (“Given that reasonable minds may differ on this
matter, we review a court’s decision not to recuse under the highly deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.”).
Third, apart from financial interests (which are generally not an issue in
removal proceedings) or familial relationships, the most common reasons for
recusal relate to prior involvement in a particular case. 	Contrary to the
respondent’s (and his affiants’) singular assumption, however, there were
multiple 	avenues 	for 	prior 	involvement 	by 	agency 	employees 	in 	the
respondent’s case other than pressuring the presiding Immigration Judge.
For example, the respondent has had parallel litigation in federal court
against the Department of Justice regarding his petition for habeas corpus
since March 2025, in which different Executive Office for Immigration
Review (“EOIR”) employees may have worked with the Civil Division in
defending. Again, such involvement may or may not have mandated recusal
from considering whether to publish the decision in the respondent’s case,
but it certainly would not reflect any pressure or improper behavior toward
the presiding Immigration Judge.3 	In short, the respondent’s argument
reflects outcome-based abductive reasoning—i.e., the Board’s outcome was
not favorable to him, so something improper must have occurred—but it is
both based on fallacious, illogical reasoning and wholly unsupported by the
record.
The respondent avers that at least three Appellate Immigration Judges
improperly influenced the Immigration Judge’s decision-making based on
their recusals from the case and that a “pattern of unusual decisions” by the
Immigration Judge and the Board—especially the expeditious manner in
which the case was adjudicated—violated his right to an impartial hearing
before a neutral adjudicator (Respondent’s Mot. at 19–22, 27, Exhs. A–D).
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (recognizing Immigration Judges’ independent
judgment and discretion in deciding the individual cases before them).
Moreover, the respondent asserts that the Board as currently constituted is
incapable of providing due process not only in this case but to respondents
in general (Respondent’s Mot. at 30–39). This speculative claim is based on
3 	The respondent’s own evidence shows significant limitations on the basis for recusal.
Affidavit of Dana Leigh Marks § 13 (“In my experience, general legal discussions—such
as a discussion about general legal principles or novel legal questions in the abstract—
would not be a basis for recusal. Having a personal relationship with the [Immigration
Judge] would also not be a basis for recusal.”).

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a 	series 	of 	false 	assumptions 	and 	demonstrates 	a 	fundamental
misunderstanding of Board practice and procedure. 	It is inappropriate and
irresponsible—and 	potentially 	a 	violation 	of 	standards 	of 	professional
responsibility, see, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.2(a) (“A lawyer
shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless
disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of
a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer[.]”) (1983); Cal. Rules of
Prof’l Conduct R. 8.2(a) (“A lawyer shall not make a statement of fact that
the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge or judicial officer[.]”)
(2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(g), (j), (n) (2026)—for an attorney to make such
bald assertions based on the evidence presented in this motion.
As the primary new evidence in support of the motion, the respondent
presents a May 8, 2026, New York Times article (“Article”), a May 13, 2026,
affidavit from Andrea Sáenz (“Sáenz Affidavit”), a May 13, 2026, affidavit
from Dana Leigh Marks (“Marks Affidavit”), and a May 14, 2026, affidavit
from Ryan R. Wood. 	In general, a domestic media article consisting
primarily of opinions with minimal (and anonymously-sourced) facts will
almost never be sufficient evidence to warrant reopening. Nearly every well-
known domestic media outlet operates with a particular ideological valence
which must be accounted for in assessing the persuasiveness of its reporting
and its evidentiary weight. 	See, e.g., AllSides Media Bias Chart, AllSides,
https://www.allsides.com/media-bias/media-bias-chart (last visited Sept. 25,
2026); cf. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (“The partiality of a
witness . . . is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the
weight of his testimony.”) (citation modified); see also, e.g., John K. MacIver
Inst. for Pub. Policy, Inc. v. Evers, 994 F.3d 602, 611 (7th Cir. 2021)
(recognizing that some media outlets are traditionally viewed as conservative
leaning, such as the Washington Times, Wall Street Journal, Fox News, and
Washington Examiner, whereas others are viewed as liberal leaning, such as
the Capitol Times, New York Times, and Huffington Post). Media coverage
of judicial decisions warrants particular skepticism because it is often
focused on perceived nonlegal issues rather than the applicable law and legal
reasoning actually at issue before the court. 	See, e.g., Barry Sullivan and
Christina 	Camody 	Tilley, 	Supreme 	Court 	Journalism: 	From 	Law 	to
Spectacle?, 77 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 343, 343–344, 437–442 (2020)
(concluding that contemporary media coverage of the Supreme Court by
newspapers including the New York Times focuses primarily on the justices’
presumed political and policy preferences rather than the legal issues they
confront in the case before them, which can undermine public confidence in
the Court as an institution). To be sure, “[a] publication can be accurate but
still biased.” AllSides Media Bias Chart, supra. But a publication that is (1)

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based on anonymous factual sourcing4 supplemented by opinions of only
individuals whose biases are aligned with that of the narrative of the story
and who lack any firsthand knowledge of the facts at issue, (2) contains
disputed facts, and (3) is clearly biased against the agency and in favor of the
subject of the case warrants minimal, if any, weight, and is unlikely to be
persuasive enough to warrant reopening. 	Further, taking action based on
such an article would likely violate an Appellate Immigration Judge’s ethical
and professional duty to act in a neutral and detached manner. 	See Ethics
and Professionalism Guide for Members of the Board of Immigration
Appeals, 	sec. 	VIII 	(May 	4, 	2011);
https://www.justice.gov/d9/pages/attachments/2017/08/24/bia_ethics_and_
professionalism_guide_for_board_members.pdf (“A Board Member should
not be swayed by partisan interests or public clamor.”) (emphasis added).
The respondent’s three supporting affidavits fare no better in supporting
his 	motion. 	All 	three 	affiants 	ground 	their 	comments 	in 	unfounded
assumptions and innuendo, none has any firsthand knowledge of the Board’s
deliberations or procedures in this case, and none has even been employed
by EOIR for at least a year. 	All three based their opinions on information
provided by the respondent without any independent verification of the
respondent’s assertions or suppositions and without any exposure to facts
contradicting 	the 	respondent’s 	assertions. 	The 	affiants 	do 	not 	even
acknowledge the possibility of alternative, innocuous conclusions. 	As a
result, all three affidavits suffer from a conformation bias that further
undermines the utility of their statements. 	In sum, neither the media
publication nor the affidavits, considered individually and cumulatively,
provide credible, probative new evidence sufficient to warrant reopening.
The Board dismissed the respondent’s appeal and denied his motion to
remand in a detailed, three-Appellate Immigration Judge panel decision on
April 9, 2026. The en banc Board then voted on April 15, 2026, to designate
the decision as precedent under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3). 	Matter of M-K-,
29 I&N Dec. at 556 n.1. The fact that some Appellate Immigration Judges
may have recused themselves from the case ipso facto shows that they took
no part in the case at the Board. And, as discussed above, there is no credible
evidence to connect the recusals to any improper pressure on the presiding
Immigration Judge.
4 	We also note that disclosing information about the respondent in the manner here
implicates the Privacy Act, which can include criminal penalties. 	See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(i)(1). However, that is beyond the scope of this decision.

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The respondent contends that the Immigration Judge’s denial of his
motion 	to 	change 	venue 	after 	his 	release 	from 	custody 	establishes
interference by the Board in the Immigration Judge’s decision-making
(Respondent’s Mot. at 21–22). 	However, it is DHS that determines when
and whether to initiate removal proceedings through service of the Form
I-862, Notice to Appear, which DHS did in March of 2025 in the LaSalle
Immigration Court in Jena, Louisiana, where the respondent was detained
(Exh. 1; Respondent’s Mot. at 5–6). See Matter of Vizcaino Aybar, 29 I&N
Dec. 736, 738 (BIA 2026) (holding that venue is where the respondent is
currently located); Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17, 19 (BIA 2017)
(explaining that prosecutorial discretion is a matter within the exclusive
jurisdiction of DHS and the Board lacks the authority to review DHS’
exercise of prosecutorial discretion).
The Immigration Judge did not err in denying the motion for a change of
venue. “An Immigration Judge may, for good cause, order a change of venue
upon motion by one of the parties[.]” Matter of I-B-M-S-, 29 I&N Dec. 628,
629 (BIA 2026) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.20(b) (2026)). In assessing whether
there is good cause, Immigration Judges “balance relevant factors including
administrative convenience, expeditious treatment of the case, the location
of witnesses, cost of transporting witnesses or evidence to a new location,
factors commonly associated with the alien’s place of residence, and the
position of the opposing party.” Id. (citing Matter of Rahman, 20 I&N Dec.
480, 	482–84 	(BIA 	1992)). 	No 	single 	factor 	is 	dispositive 	and 	“the
significance 	of 	each 	factor 	will 	vary 	depending 	on 	the 	facts 	and
circumstances of a given case.” 	Id. at 630. 	After the respondent appeared
before 	the 	Immigration 	Judge 	and 	she 	made 	substantive 	rulings, 	the
respondent was released from detention in June 2025 (Respondent’s Mot. at
7–10). 	Where, as was the case when the respondent filed his motion to
change venue, the proceedings have significantly progressed, the factor of
expeditious treatment of the case increases in importance. 	Id. at 630. 	The
Immigration Judge properly applied these standards in finding that the
respondent failed to establish good cause for a change of venue, and we reject
the assertion that the Article and affidavits show that her decision “was
motived by EOIR and the federal government’s animus towards [him] and
their desire to keep this case with an [Immigration Judge] who would issue a
pre-determined, 	pretextual, 	and 	pre-approved 	removal 	order.”
(Respondent’s Mot. at 21–22, Exhs. A–D). These claims are inaccurate and
wholly unsupported by the evidence presented.
There also is no basis for the respondent’s assertion that the Board
impeded the Immigration Judge’s independent judgment and discretion in
her decision by determining that the respondent was ineligible for a waiver

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under section 237(a)(1)(H) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) (2024) (Respondent’s Mot. at 22, Exh. C). 	The
respondent bases this claim on the Immigration Judge stating in her order
that she disagreed with Matter of Agour, 26 I&N Dec. 566 (BIA 2015), and
concluding that the phrase “at the time of admission” in section 237(a)(1)(H)
of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H), refers to an alien’s lawful entry into
the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration
officer, and thus fraud and misrepresentations occurring at the time of
adjustment of status cannot be waived under section 237(a)(1)(H). 	As an
initial matter, it is in no way unprecedented for an Immigration Judge to issue
an order that expresses disagreement with a Board decision. See, e.g., In re
Miles Osbourne, 2004 WL 2952116, at *3 (BIA Nov. 16, 2004) (“With
respect to the aggravated felony charge, the Immigration Judge expressed
disagreement 	with 	this 	Board’s 	decision 	in 	Matter 	of 	Rodriguez-
Ruiz[, 22 I&N Dec. 1378 (BIA 2000).]”); see also, e.g., Matter of Garcia-
Flores, 29 I&N Dec. 230, 231 (BIA 2025) (concluding that the Immigration
Judge acknowledged but failed to apply Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296,
304 (BIA 1996)). Further, the Immigration Judge also ruled in the alternative
that the respondent did not merit the waiver in discretion. 	The Board
affirmed the alternative determination on discretion but did not affirm the
Immigration Judge’s initial determination that the respondent was ineligible
for the waiver. 	As noted by the respondent, the Board overruled Matter of
Agour in Matter of Forjoe, 29 I&N Dec. 463, 466–71 (BIA 2026), while his
appeal was pending with the Board, but the new decision was of no
significance 	to 	the 	respondent’s 	case 	because 	it 	was 	expressly 	made
prospective in nature only to cases that arose after the new decision’s
effective date. Matter of M-K-, 29 I&N Dec. at 563 (citing Matter of Forjoe,
29 I&N Dec. at 472). This in no way supports the respondent’s contention
that he was denied a fair hearing.
The respondent’s assertion that the Sáenz and Marks Affidavits establish
that the Board’s handling of his case show that he was denied a full and fair
hearing is patently meritless (Respondent’s Mot. at 22–23; Exhs. B–C). The
regulations provide that the Chief Appellate Immigration Judge of the Board
“shall have authority to . . . set priorities or time frames for the resolution of
cases, . . . regulate the assignment of [Appellate Immigration Judges] to
cases, and otherwise to manage the docket of matters to be decided by the
Board.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(2)(i)(C) (2026). Pursuant to this authority, the
Board has long prioritized different types of cases, including those involving
detained aliens, collateral federal litigation, and cases of significant public

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interest.5 	In this case, Secretary of State Marco Rubio determined that the
respondent is removable under section 237(a)(4)(C)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) (2024), because his presence in the United States would
have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences and would
compromise a compelling United States foreign policy interest based on his
participation and role “in antisemitic protests and disruptive activities which
fosters a hostile environment for Jewish students in the United States.”
(Exh. 7). Matter of M-K-, 29 I&N Dec. at 557, 565.6 Even the respondent
recognizes in his motion that his case is “one of the most high-profile
immigration cases in the country.” 	(Respondent’s Mot. at 30). 	Moreover,
the respondent’s own evidence indicates that the expeditious handling of a
Board appeal is not unique to his case. 	See Article (quoting the former
Director of the Justice Department’s Office of Immigration Litigation in
saying that “the speed of the decision [in the respondent’s case] . . . [was] not
necessarily a signal of something nefarious” and that “[d]uring previous
administrations, . . . senior officials would occasionally fast-track cases that
presented pressing legal issues”).7 	The Board therefore appropriately
prioritized this case under the regulations as a matter affecting the public.
The Chief Appellate Immigration Judge also adjudicates cases and properly
participated on the panel in this matter. 	See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(2)(i)(C),
(E).
The fact that a case is expedited does not mean that the judge or judges
involved in deciding it prejudged the case or were biased against either party.
It is well established that “Immigration Judges and the Board have a duty to
promptly and fairly bring removal proceedings to a close.” Matter of B-N-K-,
29 I&N Dec. 96, 100 (BIA 2025); see also Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N
5 	The Board may affirm an Immigration Judge in an unpublished decision by a single
Appellate Immigration Judge under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(3) (2026). However, one of the
regulatory reasons for a case to be decided by a panel of three is if the case is “of major
national import.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6)(iv) (2026).
6 	While we recognize the declaratory judgment issued in Stanford Daily Pub. Corp. v.
Rubio (5:25-cv-06618), it is not an injunction and thus does not vitiate the removal charge.
See Ulstein Maritime, Ltd. v. United States, 833 F.2d 1052, 1055 (1st Cir. 1987) (“An
injunction is a coercive order by a court directing a party to do or refrain from doing
something, and applies to future actions. A declaratory judgment states the existing legal
rights in a controversy, but does not, in itself, coerce any party or enjoin any future
action.”). 	The declaratory judgment is also not binding on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which is considering the respondent’s petition for review.
7 	The Saenz Affidavit incorrectly implies that the only basis for prioritizing cases is when
the alien is detained.

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Dec. 348, 350 (BIA 1982) (observing that Immigration Judges have a “duty”
to resolve immigration proceedings “in an expeditious manner”); accord
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (2026) (“The Board shall resolve the questions
before it in a manner that is timely, impartial, and consistent with the Act and
regulations.”). This furthers the “important public interest in the finality of
immigration proceedings.” Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. at 19. There is
no correlation between the length of time in which the Immigration Court or
the Board decided the respondent’s case and the accuracy and fairness of the
decision reached. 	The Immigration Judge’s decision and the record in this
case also remained pending while the appellate briefing was delayed through
agreement of the parties.
There 	is 	no 	basis 	for 	the 	claim 	that 	the 	panel 	in 	this 	case 	was
predetermined. 	Additionally, for a case to be designated as precedent, a
majority of the members of the Board must vote in favor of publication, even
when, as in this case, the decision is published as a three-member panel
decision. Any Appellate Immigration Judges who recused from the case also
did not reduce the necessity for a majority of the 15 permanent members to
have voted for publication. The fact that the majority of the permanent Board
voted to publish this case is a further indication that the respondent received
due process. 	We also note that it is not unprecedented for the Board to
publish a decision after it has been issued as an unpublished one. See, e.g.,
Matter of Z-R-C-N-, 29 I&N Dec. 523, 523 n.1 (BIA 2026); Matter of
Alvarado, 26 I&N Dec. 895, 897 n.4 (BIA 2016); Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N
Dec. 951, 951 n.1 (BIA 2006).
The respondent’s contention that the substantive rulings in Matter of
M-K- establish a lack of fairness in these proceedings further lacks merit
because “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias
or partiality motion.” (Respondent’s Mot. at 23–25). Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). The respondent’s disagreement with the Board’s
ruling regarding the import of the preliminary injunction issued in Khalil v.
Trump, 786 F.Supp.3d 871 (D.N.J. 2025), following its vacatur in Khalil v.
President, 164 F.4th 259, 281 (3d Cir. 2026), does not establish bias. 	See
Matter of Exame, 18 I&N Dec. 303, 306 (BIA 1982) (recognizing that an
alien is not deprived of a fair hearing simply because the adjudicator has a
different view about a question of law).8 	The respondent provides no
8 	In fact, the Third Circuit has since denied the respondent’s petition for rehearing en
banc. 	Khalil v. President, 176 F.4th 295 (3d Cir. 2026) (mem.). 	With his motion to
reconsider, the respondent presented evidence that on May 26, 2026, the court granted his
motion to stay the issuance of the court’s mandate pending his filing of a petition for
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. The respondent has filed a petition for
certiorari.

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evidentiary support for his unfounded claim that, in Matter of M-K-, the
Board “rushed his case through as quickly as possible with the goal of issuing
a pre-determined final order of removal (and affirming the [Immigration
Judge’s] 	pre-determined 	removal 	order 	issued 	below) 	as 	quickly 	as
possible.” 	(Respondent’s Mot. at 25). 	There is no evidence that the
Immigration Judge below or the Appellate Immigration Judges on appeal
involved in the case were biased, rushed, or pressured to decide the case in a
certain manner.
The respondent also cites various exhibits in support of his contention
that he did not receive a fair hearing because the Immigration Courts and the
Board are currently incapable of providing all respondents a fair hearing
(Respondent’s Mot. at 30–39). 	In particular, the respondent avers that his
evidence shows that widescale institutional bias may be inferred from: 	(1)
hiring practices of the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (“OCIJ”),
(2) hiring practices of the Board; (3) EOIR’s hiring of “deportation judges;”
(4) EOIR policy directives; and (5) EOIR actions inconsistent with district
court rulings. 	Many of the respondent’s exhibits concern matters publicly
known before the issuance of the Immigration Judge’s September 12, 2025,
decision and/or the Board’s April 9, 2026, decision (Respondent’s Mot. at
31–32, Exhs. O, S–T, V–Z, AA, CC–MM, OO–RR, TT–WW). As an initial
matter, we deny the respondent’s motion to reopen to the extent it is based
on previously available evidence. 	See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also
Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. at 526. 	Furthermore, the respondent’s
evidence fails to support his meritless claims for various reasons.
First, statements of selected former Immigration Judges who have made
disparaging comments about the Immigration Court system to media outlets
do not establish systemic bias or unfairness (Respondent’s Mot. at 31–34,
Exhs. T, V–Z, TT–VV). 	The respondent’s observation that Immigration
Judges are career attorneys who report to the Attorney General, an appointee
of the Executive Branch, likewise does not establish that Immigration Judges
lack independence in their decision-making (Respondent’s Mot. at 32–33).
Immigration Judges have long been attorneys appointed by the Attorney
General as administrative judges within OCIJ to conduct specified classes of
proceedings. 	See INA § 101(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2024); 8 C.F.R.
§ 	1003.10(a) 	(2026). 	Moreover, 	the 	regulations 	have 	long 	expressly
provided that Immigration Judges exercise “independent judgment and
discretion” in their adjudication of cases. 8 C.F.R. §1003.10(b) (2026); see
also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(c). 	They have a duty to follow governing law—
including the INA, its implementing regulations, and binding precedential
decisions—when adjudicating the merits of a particular case, without giving
preferential treatment to any organization or individual or being swayed by

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partisan interests or public clamor. See Ethics and Professionalism Guide for
Immigration 	Judges, 	Secs. 	V, 	VIII 	(Jan. 	2011);
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/05/23/Ethicsand
ProfessionalismGuideforIJs.pdf. 	Being required to apply binding authority
does not mean that an adjudicator lacks independence or has been denied the
discretion afforded by the INA or the regulations.
We further disagree that a recent statement by the then-Acting Attorney
General indicates a lack of judicial independence (Respondent’s Mot. at 34,
Exh. 	BB). 	The 	requirements 	that 	Immigration 	Judges 	apply 	binding
precedent, regardless of their personal views, and efficiently process cases
do not mean that they have been denied independence. 	Indeed, the
respondent’s own evidence notes that Immigration Judges are required to
apply binding precedent. And, Immigration Judges who consistently fail to
apply binding precedent violate their ethical and professional responsibility
duties and may potentially face removal from their positions due to either
incompetence (if the failure is due to ignorance) or bias or lack of impartiality
(if the failure is intentional in order to benefit one party). 	See Ethics and
Professionalism Guide for Immigration Judges at sec. IV (“An Immigration
Judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in
it.”), sec. V (“An Immigration Judge shall act impartially and shall not give
preferential treatment to any organization or individual when adjudicating
the merits of a particular case.”); see also 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(8).
The respondent’s assertion that recent regulatory reorganization of the
Board establishes the impossibility of a fair hearing is similarly unsupported
(Respondent’s Mot. at 34–35). 	EOIR published an interim final rule
amending the regulations governing the organization of the Board reducing
its size from 28 to 15 members to “increase the consistency of Board
decisions and facilitate an efficient en banc process, thereby improving the
quantity and value of Board precedents.” Reducing the Size of the Board of
Immigration Appeals, 90 Fed. Reg. 15525-01, 15527 (Apr. 14, 2025).
Published decisions increased significantly after the reorganization, from 28
in FY2025 to 73 in FY2026, even excluding cases designated for publication
by the Attorney General. This shows achievement of the regulatory goal of
increased efficiency, not an interference in judges’ independence. 	Further,
there is no logical correlation between a reduction in the overall membership
of the Board and the independence of its members, particularly when that
independence is enshrined in regulation, 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(d)(1)(ii), and
buttressed by Supreme Court precedent. See United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266–67 (1954) (“In unequivocal terms the
regulations delegate to the Board discretionary authority as broad as the
statute confers on the Attorney General . . . . 	And if the word ‘discretion’

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means anything in a statutory or administrative grant of power, it means that
the recipient must exercise his authority according to his own understanding
and conscience. This applies with equal force to the Board and the Attorney
General.”).
Moreover, the Appellate Immigration Judges who were released from
their position were released in accordance with Reduction in Force (“RIF”)
regulations in an exercise of the Attorney General’s Article II Constitutional
authority, which are based on the inverse order of retention standing. 	See
5 	C.F.R. 	§ 	351.601(a) 	(2025) 	(“Each 	agency 	must 	select 	competing
employees for release from a competitive level . . . under this part in the
inverse order of retention standing, beginning with the employee with the
lowest retention standing on the retention register.”); 5 C.F.R. § 351.502(a)
(2025) (explaining that competing employees are classified in the retention
register on the basis of their tenure of employment, veteran preference, length
of service, and performance in descending order). 	A RIF, almost by
definition, generally affects employees in reverse order of tenure. 	That
effect, however, reflects a function of the RIF regulations themselves, rather
than any sort of targeting by the agency.
We further reject the respondent’s assertion that the outcomes of certain
precedential decisions indicate bias (Respondent’s Mot. at 35). 	The Board
exercises “independent judgment and discretion” in adjudicating cases,
precedential or otherwise. 	8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii). 	This necessitates
interpretation of governing law based on the record presented without
affording preferential treatment to either party or consideration of outside
influences. See Ethics and Professionalism Guide for Members of the Board
of Immigration Appeals, at secs. V, VIII. 	The respondent’s disagreement
with precedential rulings does not establish error or bias. 	See Liteky,
510 U.S. at 555.
Further, the respondent’s assertion that no fair adjudication by the Board
is possible is unsupported by his own evidence, as a March 23, 2026, article
provides that 10.31% of aliens received favorable appellate outcomes during
the covered period (Exh. WW at 1629). Even if we assume for the sake of
argument 	the 	reliability 	of 	the 	underlying 	methodology 	behind 	the
respondent’s evidence that he says shows the Board is ruling more favorably
to the Government than in the past, that claim does not establish bias.
Instead, it may be the result of the Board being committed to following the

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language of the INA and the applicable regulations rather than acting as a
court of equity or otherwise circumventing the law in favor of one party.9
The respondent also has not shown that Immigration Judge hiring
practices evince institutional bias in EOIR (Respondent’s Mot. at 35–37).
The respondent takes issue with a final rule aligning “the regulatory
requirements for candidates for Temporary Immigration Judge (“TIJ”)
appointments 	to 	mirror 	the 	regulatory 	requirements 	for 	permanent
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) appointments, thus allowing the Attorney General
and Director of EOIR to select TIJs from a larger pool of well-qualified
candidates.” 	Designation of Temporary Immigration Judges, 90 Fed. Reg.
41883, 41883 (Aug. 28, 2025). 	A regulation expanding the pool of
applicants to augment the efficiency of immigration adjudications does not
establish bias in those adjudications. 	The evidence presented does not
establish 	that 	applicants 	are 	subject 	to 	anything 	less 	than 	an 	open,
competitive, and merit-based hiring process (Respondent’s Mot. at 36,
Exhs. W, GG–HH).10
In addition, the respondent has not shown that memoranda issued by the
Acting Director of EOIR establish bias (Respondent’s Mot. at 37–38). 	By
regulation, the Director is granted the authority to “[i]ssue operational
instructions and policy” and “[d]irect the conduct of all EOIR employees to
ensure 	the 	efficient 	disposition 	of 	all 	pending 	cases.” 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 1003.0(b)(1)(i)–(ii) (2026). The respondent’s evidence does not establish
that the Acting Director exceeded her authority and improperly issued the
noted memoranda (Respondent’s Mot. at 38, Exh. NN). 	Furthermore, the
memoranda explicitly state that they are not to “be construed as mandating a
particular outcome in any specific case.” 	(Respondent’s Mot. at 38,
9 	The Board notes that as of March 31, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals reversal
rate for Administrative Agency Appeals—most of which are petitions for review of Board
cases—was only 5.1%. See United States Courts, Caseload Statistics Data Tables, Table
B-5, U.S. Courts of Appeals—Decisions in Cases Terminated on the Merits, by Circuit and
Nature 	of 	Proceeding, 	During 	the 	12-Month 	Period 	Ending 	March 	31, 	2026,
https://www.uscourts.gov/data-news/data-tables/2026/03/31/federal-judicial-caseload-
statistics/b-5. Only aliens are authorized to file petitions for review of Board decisions, so
only Board decisions adverse to an alien are considered by the appellate courts. Contrary
to the respondent’s meritless accusations, the relatively low appellate court reversal rate
indicates that the Board’s decisions are, in the main, generally legally correct. In other
words, for the respondent’s theory to carry any weight, both the Board and the courts of
appeals would have to be biased against aliens, and there is no evidence of that.
10 Moreover, because no TIJ presided over the respondent’s case, his claims about their
appointment process are irrelevant to his appeal.

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Exhs. OO–RR). Another memorandum also reaffirms the independence and
impartiality of EOIR adjudicators. 	EOIR Policy Memorandum 25-42,
Adjudicator Independence and Impartiality (Aug. 22, 2025).11
Finally, the assertion that the Board is defying federal court orders is
without merit. 	Some of the orders the respondent cites are District Court
orders citing DHS noncompliance, over which of course the Board or EOIR
in general has absolutely no control (Respondent’s Mot. at 38–39). 	The
respondent was not a party to the United States District Court decisions cited
in his motion (id.). The Board complies with any District Court order where
a respondent is a party that has not been disturbed on appeal.
For all these reasons, we deny the motion to reopen. 	See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(1); Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. at 419; Matter of L-A-C-,
26 I&N Dec. at 526. 	Given the respondent’s failure to show a reasonable
possibility that he was denied a fair hearing, we further deny his request to
remand the record to permit him to conduct discovery (Respondent’s Mot. at
39–40).12 	We also reject the respondent’s assertion that he is entitled to a
new hearing because, contrary to his claim, he has not demonstrated that the
agency violated its governing regulations and created an appearance of bias
(Respondent’s Mot. at 40–41). 	Most—if not all—of the respondent’s
arguments are meritless and raise questions as to whether they have been
brought in good faith. We unequivocally reject his baseless contentions that
there was any inappropriate influence on the adjudication of his case, and we
emphasize that the outcome of his case was determined based on nothing
other than the applicable law and the record before us.
The respondent has filed a petition for review of our April 9, 2026,
decision with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The
parties are ordered to inform the Fifth Circuit of our decision in this matter.
Accordingly, the following order is entered.
11 The respondent’s assertions on this point are simply baseless.
12 Additionally, we previously rejected the respondent’s argument that the Immigration
Judge erroneously denied his motion for discovery because “[a]liens in removal
proceedings are not entitled to conduct discovery directed towards the records, officers,
agents, or employees of DHS, the Department of Justice, or the Department of State[,]” the
respondent failed to indicate why he sought a subpoena under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.35 (2026),
and he did not show prejudice. 	Matter of M-K-, 29 I&N Dec. at 562 (citing 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.12(b) (2020) and Matter of Benitez, 19 I&N Dec. 173, 174 (BIA 1984)). The instant
motion to remand for discovery is thus legally unsound.

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ORDER: The motion to reopen is denied.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. See section
274D of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2026).
Further, any respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or
has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any
time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than
2 years, or both. See INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024).