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Cite as 30 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4244
Matter of V-S-A-, Respondent
Decided September 10, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) When inter-proceeding similarities are considered in a credibility determination, the
redaction of personally identifying information from inter-proceeding declarations
provides sufficient protection of the declarants’ privacy and comports with the
confidentiality regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a)–(c) (2026).
(2) The procedural safeguards set forth in Matter of R-K-K-, 26 I&N Dec. 658 (BIA 2015),
do not require declarants to be made available for cross-examination before the
Immigration Judge can consider the declarations for inter-proceeding comparison.
Matter of R-K-K-, 26 I&N Dec. 658 (BIA 2015), clarified.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ashwani K. Bhakhri, Esquire, Burlingame, California
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 	Matthew S. Gabe, Deputy
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	GORMAN, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge;
GOODWIN and VOLKERT, Appellate Immigration Judges.
GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security (“DHS”) appeals 	from 	the
Immigration Judge’s October 8, 2025, decision granting the respondent’s
application for asylum under section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2024). The respondent, a native and citizen
of India, opposes the appeal. 	The appeal will be sustained, and the record
will be remanded.
On October 2, 2025, 6 days prior to the respondent’s merits hearing held
on October 8, 2025, the respondent filed a declaration in support of his
political-opinion-based asylum claim. The respondent asserts that members
of an opposing political party in India attacked and injured him on two
occasions because he supported the Mann Party.
On October 6, 2025, DHS filed copies of similarly worded declarations
from 12 separate political opinion-based Indian asylum applications, which
DHS argued bore boilerplate language hallmarks. 	DHS argued that all
12 declarations contained substantial factual similarities to the respondent’s

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declaration 	and 	that 	the 	inter-proceeding 	similarities 	established 	the
respondent’s claim was fabricated.
To protect the privacy of the other 12 asylum applicants, DHS redacted
personally 	identifying 	information 	from 	each 	of 	the 	12 	submitted
declarations. Despite these protective measures, the Immigration Judge was
concerned with due process issues attached to the declarations and assigned
little to no weight to DHS’ submission. 	The Immigration Judge explained
that she did not know the facts or circumstances in which the 12 documents
were created and was concerned particularly with the privacy protections of
the 12 other asylum applicants from whose cases the declarations were taken.
The Immigration Judge also noted that the respondent in the present case had
no opportunity to cross-examine these 12 individuals. 	The Immigration
Judge ultimately found the respondent credible and granted his application
for asylum.
On appeal, DHS argues the Immigration Judge’s positive credibility
finding 	is 	clearly 	erroneous. 	DHS 	maintains 	that 	the 	respondent’s
declaration 	bears 	striking 	inter-proceeding 	similarities 	to 	those 	of 	the
12 other individuals and argues that the Immigration Judge clearly erred in
disregarding 	and 	assigning 	reduced 	or 	no 	weight 	to 	the 	12 	redacted
declarations. 	DHS further challenges the Immigration Judge’s bases for
giving the evidence reduced weight, namely due process and privacy
concerns, given the redaction of personally identifying information. 	We
agree and will sustain the appeal.
I. INTER-PROCEEDING SIMILARITIES
“In immigration proceedings, the sole test for admission of evidence is
whether the evidence is probative and its admission is fundamentally fair.”
Matter of Mariscal-Hernandez, 28 I&N Dec. 666, 668 (BIA 2022) (citation
modified); accord Sanchez v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2012)
(per curiam). 	In Matter of R-K-K-, 26 I&N Dec. 658, 661–62 (BIA 2015),
we set forth a three-part framework for the proper procedural safeguards
when reviewing inter-proceeding similarities. See Singh v. Bondi, 130 F.4th
1142, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2025) (explaining that the procedural safeguards in
Matter of R-K-K- properly “ensure that the testimony of applicants who
merely happen to have been in similar situations is not automatically
discounted”). The three-part framework consists of meaningful notice of the
similarities, 	reasonable 	opportunity 	to 	explain 	the 	similarities, 	and
consideration of the totality of the circumstances in making a credibility
determination. Matter of R-K-K-, 26 I&N Dec. at 661–62.

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In Matter of R-K-K-, we also commented on the application of the
confidentiality requirements in inter-proceeding similarity cases. Id. at 661
n.3. 	The declaration at issue in Matter of R-K-K- was not redacted but
comported with the confidentiality requirement set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6
(2015) because the asylum applicant’s brother in that case waived his
confidentiality 	protections.1 	Id. 	at 	663 	n.4. 	Although 	there 	are 	no
confidentiality waivers in the respondent’s case, the declarations submitted
by DHS were redacted to ensure the 12 individuals’ privacy, which also
obscured any personal information that would have otherwise potentially
linked the 12 individuals to their declarations or asylum applications. When
inter-proceeding similarities are considered in a credibility determination, the
redaction of personally identifying information from the inter-proceeding
declarations provides sufficient protection of the declarants’ privacy and
comports with the confidentiality regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a)–(c).
This approach is consistent with the precedent of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this case arises, as
well as that of other federal courts. See Singh v. Bondi, 130 F.4th at 1149–53
(affirming an adverse credibility finding where redacted declarations were
submitted to show that the alien’s application had striking similarities to
other asylum applicants’ applications); Tuffly v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 870 F.3d 1086, 1091, 1095–98 (9th Cir. 2017) (upholding DHS’
decision to redact the personal identifying information of released detainees
to protect their privacy); see also Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 489 F.3d
517, 520–21 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that an Immigration Judge complied
with 	procedural 	protections 	in 	the 	consideration 	of 	inter-proceeding
similarities where the Immigration Judge asked DHS to prepare a redacted
version of an unrelated asylum application due to “privacy concerns . . . in
the sharing of affidavits across unrelated cases”).
Additionally, 	contrary 	to 	the 	Immigration 	Judge’s 	findings, 	the
procedural safeguards set forth in Matter of R-K-K- do not require the
1 	The confidentiality regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a)–(c) (2026), prohibits the disclosure
of information contained in or pertaining to any asylum application to the public or any
third party. See also Owino v. Holder, 771 F.3d 527, 534–35 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining
that a 2001 memorandum issued by the former Immigration and Naturalization Service
provided that confidentiality “is breached when information contained therein or pertaining
thereto is disclosed to a third party, and the disclosure is of a nature that allows the third
party to link the identity of the applicant to . . . [the] facts or allegations pertaining to the
individual asylum claim” or that “give rise to a reasonable inference that the applicant has
applied for asylum” (citation omitted)). The regulation was created to ensure that third
parties are unable to identify an applicant to prevent “subject[ing] an applicant to retaliatory
measures in [the applicant’s] country of origin.” See id. at 533.

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12 other declarants to be made available for cross-examination before the
Immigration 	Judge 	can 	consider 	the 	declarations 	for 	inter-proceeding
comparison. 	See Matter of R-K-K-, 26 I&N Dec. at 661–62. 	As the
declarations are submitted for the limited purpose of establishing similarities
in the words and phrases therein, cross-examination of the declarants is not
required. See United States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265, 1278 (9th Cir. 2017)
(explaining that out-of-court statements are admissible where they are
submitted “for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter
asserted” and that the submission of such statements does not violate the
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause (citation omitted)). In such cases,
the redacted, similarly worded inter-proceeding evidence that is suggestive
of boilerplate or fictitious submissions is not being offered for the truth of
the statements made within but solely for the comparative purpose of
showing specific similarities in words and phrases.
Accordingly, we conclude that no due process or privacy violations
occurred concerning DHS’ submission of the redacted declarations, and the
Immigration Judge erred in finding otherwise. See Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d
1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008) (“‘In order to successfully attack . . . the
conclusions and orders made upon such [removal] hearings it must be shown
that the proceedings were manifestly unfair’ and that the actions of the IJ
were such as to prevent a fair investigation.” (quoting Low Wah Suey v.
Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 468 (1912) (alteration original))).
As set forth in Matter of R-K-K-, when analyzing inter-proceeding
similarities, Immigration Judges should clearly identify on the record the
documentary similarities. 	26 I&N Dec. at 661. 	In addition to ensuring a
complete record, the three-part review framework helps the Immigration
Judge discover the “extent and nature of [the inter-proceeding] similarities in
the case,” which also assists with our appellate review. 	Id. 	In engaging in
this concentrated review, Immigration Judges should examine whether there
are “‘word for word’ repetition[s],” “repeated similarities in narrative
structure,” and “unique, detailed factual similarities.” 	Singh v. Bondi,
130 F.4th at 1150.
Here, in comparing the respondent’s declaration to the 12 declarations
filed by DHS, the Immigration Judge found the similarities insufficient to
undermine the respondent’s credibility without detailing whether there were
“identical phrases or words, the same grammatical mistakes and punctuation,
the use of distinctive language, or the unnecessary addition of extraneous
detail.” 	Singh v. Garland, 118 F.4th 1150, 1161 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing
Matter of R-K-K-, 26 I&N Dec. at 661–62). 	In doing so, the Immigration
Judge focused on such broad factual differences as the following: 	1) the

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respondent belonged to the Mann Party while some of the declarants
belonged to the Indian National Lok Dal Party; 2) the respondent was
motivated by the Mann Party’s anti-drug message whereas some of the
declarants did not discuss that issue and were instead motivated by caste
discrimination or the creation of a separate Sikh state, Khalistan; and 3) the
village Sarpanch supported the respondent while local authorities did not
support other declarants. 	Although acknowledging that Matter of R-K-K-,
Singh v. Garland, and Singh v. Bondi required her to consider identical words
and phrases, distinctive language, and unnecessary addition of extraneous
detail, the Immigration Judge clearly erred by focusing instead on the broad
facts of the cases. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2026).
Accordingly, 	on 	remand, 	the 	Immigration 	Judge 	should 	assign
appropriate weight to the admissible and properly redacted declarations and
reassess the respondent’s credibility under the proper Matter of R-K-K-
framework by clearly identifying the similarities in the affidavits prior to
considering the respondent’s explanations or the reliability of the evidence
in the totality of the circumstances. 	Matter of R-K-K-, 26 I&N Dec. at
661–62.
II. PAST PERSECUTION
With 	respect 	to 	the 	respondent’s 	substantive 	asylum 	claim, 	the
Immigration Judge found that the respondent suffered two incidents of harm.
In the first incident, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent was
threatened, pushed from a motorcycle, and beaten with hockey sticks, after
which he sought medical treatment. The Immigration Judge found that in the
second incident the respondent was pushed, beaten, and kicked, resulting in
treatment for bruises and swelling. Citing Singh v. Bondi, 161 F.4th 560 (9th
Cir. 2025), DHS argues that the Immigration Judge erred as a matter of law
in concluding that the respondent’s harm rose to the level of persecution
because the respondent suffered no significant injuries.
We agree with DHS that, even if the respondent is viewed as credible, the
harm he suffered does not rise to the level of persecution under the applicable
standard. 	See Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2021)
(holding that “the harm perpetrated against [the applicant], while disgraceful,
[did] not compel a finding of past persecution” where he was detained for
less than a day, experienced verbal abuse and some physical abuse during
detention, and did not suffer serious bodily harm). 	The respondent alleges
he experienced two short assaults several months apart requiring only
antibiotics and anti-inflammatory medication for minor bruising. Although
medical 	treatment 	is 	not 	necessary 	to 	establish 	harm 	amounting 	to

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persecution, the fact that the respondent sought medical treatment and only
required medication signifies that the harm and injuries were not sufficiently
serious. 	Cf. Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 803 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
that an applicant established persecution, despite his failure to seek medical
treatment, where he was tied up by guerillas, left to die in a burning building,
and experienced additional death threats). 	Further, while the respondent
asserts he was threatened by the Bharatiya Janata Party members who
assaulted him, the incidents occurred several months apart and he did not
receive further threats between his second assault and the day he left India
several months later. See Matter of E-M-F-S-, 29 I&N Dec. 379, 385 (BIA
2026) 	(holding 	that 	“the 	applicant 	must 	establish 	that 	the 	purported
persecutor actually possessed the ability to imminently follow through on the
threat”). 	Consequently, we reverse the Immigration Judge’s determination
that the respondent established harm rising to the level of persecution. 	See
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2026).
Since the Immigration Judge previously found that the respondent
benefited from the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution,
we 	additionally 	remand 	for 	the 	Immigration 	Judge 	to 	determine, 	if
appropriate after assessing credibility anew, whether the respondent meets
his burden to establish that he faces a well-founded fear of future persecution.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2) (2026).
In granting asylum, the Immigration Judge did not reach the respondent’s
application for withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2024), and protection under the Convention Against
Torture.2 	We will therefore also remand proceedings for the Immigration
Judge to consider these forms of relief and protection, if appropriate, in the
first instance.
In sum, we will remand the record to the Immigration Judge for
consideration of the inter-proceeding declaration evidence, reevaluation of
credibility, and reconsideration of the respondent’s applications for relief and
protection. 	We express no opinion on the ultimate outcome of these
proceedings.
2 	The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States Nov. 20, 1994). 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17 (2026); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a) (2020).

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ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained, and the Immigration Judge’s grant
of asylum is vacated.
FURTHER ORDER: 	The record is remanded to the Immigration
Court for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for
the entry of a new decision.