DELCARMEN-LARA

page
830
Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 830 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4233
Matter of Milagro DELCARMEN-LARA, Respondent
Decided August 13, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
A departure from the United States pursuant to a grant of advance parole is a “departure”
within the meaning of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). 	Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771
(BIA 2012), overruled.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Idalis Perez, Esquire, Miami, Florida
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Milor D. Perdomo, Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	GORMAN, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge;
MONTANTE and GALLOW, Appellate Immigration Judges.
GORMAN, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:
The respondent has filed a motion to reopen proceedings to pursue
adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2024). 	In support of the motion, the
respondent submitted evidence that she was paroled into the United States
on January 1, 2024, pursuant to a grant of advance parole. 	In denying the
respondent’s motion, we overrule Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly,
25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012), which held that an alien who leaves the United
States temporarily pursuant to a grant of advance parole does not thereby
make a “departure . . . from the United States” within the meaning of section
212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (2024). 	We
now clarify that the term “departure” under this section of the INA does not
include an exception for aliens who leave the country temporarily under a
grant of advance parole.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The respondent is a native and citizen of El Salvador. In a decision dated
December 7, 2006, an Immigration Judge found the respondent removable
as 	charged 	under 	section 	212(a)(6)(A)(i) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2006), determined that she was ineligible for Temporary
Protected Status (“TPS”), and ordered her removed from the United States.
The Board affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision on June 17, 2008. In

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 830 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4233
page
831
2013, the respondent was granted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(“DACA”).
On June 30, 2015, the respondent filed a motion to reopen proceedings
because she sought to submit an Application for Provisional Unlawful
Presence Waiver (Form I-601A) in order to waive her inadmissibility under
section 212(a)(9)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B), and obtain an
immigrant 	visa 	through 	consular 	processing. 	With 	this 	motion, 	she
submitted evidence that her husband filed a Petition for Alien Relative (Form
I-130) on her behalf and that United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”) approved the petition on July 9, 2014. The Board denied
the motion on August 6, 2015, because it was untimely and the respondent
was ineligible for the waiver as a result of her final order of removal.
On May 27, 2025, the respondent filed a second motion to reopen
proceedings to pursue adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), based on the approved visa petition filed on her behalf
by her husband. 	In 	support of the motion, the respondent provided
documentation that shows she temporarily departed the United States and
was paroled back into the country on January 1, 2024, pursuant to a grant of
advance parole.
We requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties on the
issue of whether the Board should reconsider its interpretation of the term
“departure” within the meaning of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), as articulated in Matter of Arrabally and
Yerrabelly, as well as whether an alien who leaves the United States
temporarily pursuant to a grant of advance parole makes such a “departure.”
II. ANALYSIS
A. Inadmissibility Under Section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA
The INA provides that an alien who “has been unlawfully present in the
United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within
10 years of the date of such alien’s departure or removal from the United
States, 	is 	inadmissible.” 	INA 	§ 	212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). 	The INA requires an applicant for adjustment of
status to prove that he or she is “admissible to the United States for permanent
residence.” INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 830 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4233
page
832
In Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. at 779, we held in a
split decision that an alien who temporarily leaves the United States pursuant
to a grant of advance parole does not make a “departure” under section
212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). We reasoned
that an alien’s departure under a grant of advance parole is “qualitatively
different from other departures, because it presupposes both that he [or she]
will be permitted to return to the United States thereafter and that he [or she]
will, upon return, continue to pursue the adjustment of status application he
[or she] filed before departing.” Id. at 778.
This decision sought to clarify prior Board precedent. 	In Matter of
Lemus, 24 I&N Dec. 373 (BIA 2007) (“Lemus I”), we held that an alien is
inadmissible 	under 	section 	212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(2)(B)(i)(II), even if the alien’s departure was not made pursuant to
an order of removal and was not a voluntary departure in lieu of being subject
to removal proceedings or at the conclusion of removal proceedings. 	We
examined the plain language of the statutory text to conclude that Congress
did not intend to limit the definition of “departure” in this manner. 	Id. at
376–77. We reaffirmed this holding in Matter of Lemus, 25 I&N Dec. 734
(BIA 2012) (“Lemus II”).
The issue before us—the meaning of “departure” under the INA—is a
matter of statutory construction. 	See, e.g., Lemus II, 25 I&N Dec. at 740.
Based on our interpretation of the plain statutory language, we now conclude
that a departure from the United States pursuant to a grant of advance parole
is a “departure” within the meaning of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). 	We will overrule Matter of Arrabally and
Yerrabelly.
To determine whether an alien has effected a “departure” under section
212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), we begin by
assessing the plain language of the statute. Lamie v. United States Tr., 540
U.S. 526, 534 (2004). We presume that Congress “says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat’l Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992). 	Adjudicators must adhere to the
unambiguous meaning of statutory language, unless doing so would lead to
an absurd or bizarre result that is “demonstrably at odds with the intentions
of its drafters.” Matter of Forjoe, 29 I&N Dec. 463, 467 (BIA 2026) (quoting
Matter of Briones, 24 I&N Dec. 355, 361 (BIA 2007)).
In examining the plain meaning of the statutory text, we find insufficient
evidence 	that 	Congress 	intended 	to 	limit 	the 	definition 	of 	the 	word
“departure.” Neither “depart” nor “departure” is defined in the INA. Matter

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 830 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4233
page
833
of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. at 774. To ascertain the ordinary
meaning 	of 	an 	undefined 	statute, 	adjudicators 	may 	consult 	dictionary
definitions for guidance. United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th
Cir. 2009). We observe, as we did at the time we issued Matter of Arrabally
and Yerrabelly, that “depart” is defined as “to go away: 	leave.” 	Depart,
Merriam-Webster, 	https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/depart
(last visited Aug. 13, 2026). 	The statutory text does not contain limiting
language that exempts certain departures from this definition.
The legislative history also lacks any indication that Congress intended
to exclude departures pursuant to advance parole from the meaning of
“departure.” 	See Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. at 776
(noting that the legislative history of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), is “rather sparse”). 	The pertinent statutory
text was enacted pursuant to section 301(b) of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L.
No. 	104-208, 	110 	Stat. 	3009-546, 	3009-575 	(effective 	Apr. 	1, 	1997)
(“IIRIRA”). We have noted that “[t]he unifying theme of section 212(a)(9)
is that all its subparagraphs seek to compound the adverse consequences of
immigration violations by making it more difficult for individuals who have
left the United States after committing such violations to be lawfully
readmitted thereafter.” 	Matter of Rodarte, 23 I&N Dec. 905, 909 (BIA
2006). Although Congress granted the Attorney General of the United States
discretion to waive inadmissibility in certain circumstances under section
212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), there is insufficient
evidence that Congress sought to exempt departures pursuant to advance
parole from the definition of “departure.” 	See Cheruku v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
662 F.3d 198, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (acknowledging that such departures may
lead to “a harsh result”).
As we previously recognized in Lemus I, “in every case where Congress
has extended eligibility for adjustment of status to inadmissible aliens, it has
done so unambiguously.” 	Lemus I, 24 I&N Dec. at 378. 	For example,
Congress expressly created a waiver of the inadmissibility grounds in section
212(a)(9)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B), for aliens seeking
adjustment of status under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American
Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2193 (“NACARA”), as amended
by Pub. L. No. 105-139, 111 Stat. 2644 (1997), and the Haitian Refugee
Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, tit. IX, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681-538 (“HRIFA”). 	See id. 	Congress’s express provision of waivers of
inadmissibility for NACARA and HRIFA adjustment applicants supports a
conclusion 	that 	Congress 	did 	not 	intend 	a 	“departure” 	under 	section

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 830 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4233
page
834
212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), to exclude
advance parolees. Id.; see also Matter of Briones, 24 I&N Dec. at 367–68.
We also deem it significant that Congress has clarified the consequences
of departures for advance parolees in portions of the INA outside section
212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). 	See, e.g.,
INA § 201(c)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)(4)(A) (2024) (specifying that
numerical limitations for family-sponsored immigrants include aliens who
were paroled into the United States “who did not depart from the United
States (without advance parole) within 365 days” or meet certain other
conditions); INA § 245A(g)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(g)(2)(B)(ii) (2024)
(providing that periods outside the United States pursuant to advance parole
procedures shall not be considered as a period outside the country for
purposes 	of 	continuous 	physical 	presence 	required 	for 	legalization).
“[Where] Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute
but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.” 	Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citation
omitted).
Congress has also clarified the effects of brief departures in other portions
of the INA where these departures may have adverse consequences. See INA
§ 240A(d)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(2) (2024) (providing that a departure from
the United States “for any period in excess of 90 days or for any periods in
the aggregate exceeding 180 days” will trigger a finding that an alien has
failed to maintain continuous physical presence in the United States for
certain cancellation of removal applicants); see also INA § 244(c)(4),
8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(4) (2024) (stating that continuous physical presence in
the United States for aliens eligible for TPS will not be affected by “brief,
casual, 	and 	innocent” 	absences). 	We 	presume 	that 	Congress 	acted
intentionally in treating departures pursuant to advance parole differently
throughout the INA. It is therefore important that Congress did not explicitly
exempt advance parolees from the definition of “departure” in section
212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
Prior to Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, it was widely recognized that
a departure pursuant to advance parole may have significant, adverse
consequences. Between the enactment of IIRIRA and the issuance of Matter
of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, internal policy memoranda of DHS and the
former 	Immigration 	and 	Naturalization 	Service 	(“INS”) 	interpreted 	a
departure under a grant of advance parole as a “departure” within the
meaning 	of 	section 	212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). See Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec.

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 830 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4233
page
835
at 781–82 (Pauley, dissenting). Documents authorizing advance parole also
explicitly warned that parolees may be deemed inadmissible and ineligible
for adjustment of status without a valid waiver. 	See Cheruku, 662 F.3d at
208 (discussing advance parole warnings); see also Matter of Arrabally and
Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. at 779 n.7 (same). This evidence further supports
a conclusion that the Board impermissibly construed the definition of
“departure” 	under 	section 	212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), to include an exception for aliens who left the country
pursuant to a grant of advance parole.
The respondent has not identified, and we do not discern, evidence that
another interpretation of “departure” is merited to avoid absurd or bizarre
consequences in the case of an alien who has been granted advance parole.
This Board previously expressed concern that an expansive definition of
“departure” may include departures that occur by accident, deception, threat,
or violence. Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. at 775. We
emphasize that our holding applies to aliens who become inadmissible under
section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), after
a temporary trip abroad undertaken pursuant to a grant of advance parole.
Our decision does not consider these additional scenarios contemplated in
Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, which are beyond the scope of this
matter. In the absence of demonstrated absurd or bizarre consequences for
advance parolees, we are not permitted to reject the plain language of the
statutory text. See generally Jian Le Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 681 F.3d 1236,
1240 (11th Cir. 2012).
We now clarify that 	the term “departure,” as provided in section
212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), does not
include an exception for aliens who leave the country temporarily under a
grant of advance parole. This holding comports with the natural meaning of
“departure,” as well as the Government’s longstanding interpretation of the
term prior to Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly. 	Accordingly, Matter of
Arrabally and Yerrabelly is overruled.1
1 	We recognize that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the
controlling jurisdiction in this case, has applied the then-definition of “departure” as
articulated in Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly. See Ortiz-Bouchet v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
714 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). We do not construe the language in
Ortiz-Bouchet to preclude the Board from revisiting the definition of “departure” under
section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 830 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4233
page
836
B. Retroactivity
We must undertake a retroactivity analysis because we are explicitly
overruling Board precedent. Matter of Forjoe, 29 I&N Dec. at 472. The test
for retroactivity requires the Board to consider the following factors:
(1) whether the particular case is one of first impression, (2) whether the new rule
represents an abrupt departure from well established practice or merely attempts to
fill a void in an unsettled area of law, (3) the extent to which the party against whom
the new rule is applied relied on the former rule, (4) the degree of the burden which
a retroactive order imposes on a party, and (5) the statutory interest in applying a
new rule despite the reliance of a party on the old standard.
Matter of Cordero-Garcia, 27 I&N Dec. 652, 658 (BIA 2019) (citation
omitted). This case is not one of first impression. However, we determine
that the first three factors in the test articulated above support applying our
holding 	prospectively 	because 	we 	are 	explicitly 	overruling 	Matter 	of
Arrabally and Yerrabelly, a longstanding Board precedent.
Regarding the fourth factor in the retroactivity test, we note that our
holding will constitute a significant change with respect to the meaning of
“departure” 	under 	section 	212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), as well as eligibility for adjustment of status under
section 245(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). 	We also conclude that the
Board’s interest in applying the newly articulated rule does not outweigh past
expectations based on the prior rule.
In consideration of the foregoing, we will apply this new holding
prospectively. As our holding is prospective, we will not determine whether
the respondent’s temporary trip constitutes a “departure” within the meaning
of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II),
which would render her inadmissible and ineligible for adjustment of status.
Instead, we must address the respondent’s motion to reopen proceedings to
apply for adjustment of status pursuant to the parties’ remaining arguments.
C. 	Motion to Reopen
We will deny the respondent’s motion to reopen. Generally, an alien may
file one motion to reopen, no later than 90 days after the entry of the final
administrative order. 	INA § 240(c)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2024);
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2026). The respondent’s May 27, 2025, motion to
reopen was filed more than 16 years after we entered the final administrative
order in this case on June 17, 2008. Therefore, her motion is untimely. The
respondent’s motion is also number barred because it is her second motion

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 830 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4233
page
837
to reopen these proceedings. The respondent has not shown that her motion
falls within any exception to the motion to reopen time and number
limitations enumerated in the section 240(c)(7)(C) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C), or 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (2026).
The respondent’s circumstances also do not present an exceptional
situation that warrants the exercise of our sua sponte reopening authority in
these proceedings. 	See Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132, 1133–34 (BIA
1999) (stating that generally “we invoke our sua sponte authority sparingly”);
see also Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976, 984 (BIA 1997) (recognizing that
the power to sua sponte reopen proceedings is limited to exceptional
situations and is not meant to cure filing defects or “to otherwise circumvent
the regulations, where enforcing them might result in hardship”). Becoming
potentially eligible for relief from removal years after a final administrative
removal order does not, in itself, constitute an exceptional situation. 	See
Matter of Yauri, 25 I&N Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2009) (indicating that becoming
potentially eligible for adjustment of status is generally not a basis for
granting an untimely motion to reopen); see also Matter of H-Y-Z-, 28 I&N
Dec. 	156, 	161 	(BIA 	2020) 	(recognizing 	that 	equities 	acquired 	while
remaining unlawfully in the United States after being ordered removed
generally do not warrant discretionary reopening). In sum, we will deny the
respondent’s 	untimely 	and 	number-barred 	motion 	to 	reopen 	these
proceedings.2
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the respondent has not shown that reopening of
proceedings is warranted. 	We overrule the holding in Matter of Arrabally
and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. at 779, that an alien who leaves the United
States temporarily pursuant to a grant of advance parole does not thereby
make a “departure . . . from the United States” within the meaning of section
212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). 	We also
clarify that an alien may become inadmissible under this section of the INA
by virtue of a trip abroad undertaken pursuant to a grant of advance parole.
ORDER: The respondent’s motion to reopen is denied.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
2 	Because the foregoing issues are dispositive of the respondent’s motion to reopen, we
will not address the parties’ additional arguments. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24,
25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make
findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 830 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4233
page
838
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. See section
274D of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2026).
Further, any respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or
has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any
time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than
2 years, or both. See INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024).