MILLS

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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 668 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4201
Matter of Albert D. MILLS, Respondent
Decided by Board April 28, 20261
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
The Immigration Judge erred in granting cancellation of removal for certain permanent
residents as a matter of discretion because the respondent’s extensive criminal history
outweighed his equities.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Jamy Patterson, Esquire, Batavia, New York
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Cheryl L. Grundy, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	HUNSUCKER, GEMOETS, and CHABAN, Appellate
Immigration Judges.
CHABAN, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security (“DHS”) appeals 	from 	the
decision 	of 	the 	Immigration Judge 	dated 	July 	9, 	2025, 	granting 	the
respondent’s application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2024).
The respondent, a native and citizen of Canada, filed a brief in opposition to
the appeal. 	We will sustain the appeal, vacate the Immigration Judge’s
decision, and order the respondent removed to Canada.
On appeal, DHS argues that the Immigration Judge erroneously granted
the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal on discretionary
grounds. 	Whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted is a
question that we review de novo. 	8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2026). 	To
determine whether a respondent merits cancellation of removal as a matter
of 	discretion, 	we 	must 	balance 	the 	negative 	factors 	evidencing 	his
undesirability 	as 	a 	permanent 	resident 	with 	the 	social 	and 	humane
considerations presented on his behalf to determine whether the granting of
1 	Pursuant to Order No. 6920-2026, dated May 29, 2026, the Acting Attorney General
designated the Board’s decision in Matter of Mills (BIA Apr. 28, 2026), as precedent in all
proceedings involving the same issue or issues. 	See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3) (2026).
Editorial changes have been made consistent with the designation of the case as a
precedent.

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relief appears in the best interest of this country. Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I&N
Dec. 7, 11–12 (BIA 1998); 	Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581, 584–85
(BIA 1978).
We acknowledge, as did the Immigration Judge, that the respondent
presented numerous equities. The respondent is 60 years old and has several
health issues. He has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States
for over 30 years. He has close relationships with his son, daughter-in-law,
and grandchild who reside in the United States. 	The respondent also
maintained steady employment and consistently filed his tax returns in the
United States. 	However, the respondent also has an extensive history of
violating the law in the United States.
Upon de novo review, we conclude that the respondent’s equities are
insufficient to outweigh his extensive criminal history. 	The respondent’s
testimony and evidence of record reflect two separate convictions for
criminal possession of stolen property and burglary in 2000, a conviction for
endangering the welfare of a child in 2004, a conviction for driving while
ability impaired (“DWAI”) in 2007, and a conviction for harassment in 2024.
The respondent’s 2007 conviction for DWAI, in which he caused an
accident that resulted in physical damage, is a significant adverse factor. The
Supreme Court of the United States has noted that the offense of driving
while impaired involves conduct that “presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another” and that “[d]runk driving is an extremely serious
crime.” Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008) (citation omitted),
abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591
(2015); see also Matter of Castillo-Perez, 27 I&N Dec. 664, 670 (A.G. 2019)
(noting that “drunk and other forms of impaired driving are unacceptable
conduct that imposes intolerable harms on society”). Moreover, in 2004, the
respondent was convicted of endangering the welfare of a child. 	The
respondent testified that the incident involved his babysitter and confirmed
that he was initially charged with sexual abuse in the third degree, though the
conviction was limited to endangering the welfare of a child.
In 2024, the respondent was charged for criminal obstruction of breathing
and assault in the third degree but was convicted of harassment. 	The
respondent testified that he had a problem with an ex-girlfriend that led to an
altercation and ultimately resulted in an order of protection being issued on
behalf of the victim. See Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20, 23 (BIA 1995)
(noting that unfavorable conduct, even in the absence of a conviction, may
be considered in the exercise of discretion); see also Wallace v. Gonzales,
463 F.3d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 2006) (identifying “no reason to prevent an

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[Immigration Judge] or the [Board] from considering an applicant’s anti-
social conduct—whether leading to a conviction . . . or no legal judgment
whatsoever—as 	an 	adverse 	factor 	in 	evaluating 	an 	application 	for
discretionary relief”). 	In many contexts, immigration law considers crimes
against persons to be particularly grave. 	See, e.g., Nethagani v. Mukasey,
532 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2008) (observing that crimes against persons are
more likely to be particularly serious in the asylum context than crimes
against property).
We recognize that the respondent expressed a desire to better himself.
However, the record does not support the Immigration Judge’s finding that
the respondent has sufficiently demonstrated rehabilitation, particularly
considering his ongoing criminal activity. 	See Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I&N
Dec. at 12. While the Immigration Judge found that the respondent did not
engage in any criminal conduct from 2007 to 2024, the respondent’s 2024
conviction for harassment, resulting in an order of protection issued on behalf
of the victim, demonstrates the ongoing nature of his recidivist behavior and
undermines his claimed desire for rehabilitation and intent to change his life.
See id. at 11 (recognizing the existence of a criminal record as an adverse
factor in discretionary determinations).
Like 	the 	Immigration 	Judge, 	we 	acknowledge 	the 	respondent 	has
noteworthy equities in the United States, including his long-term residence
in the United States, family ties, employment history, and history of tax
compliance. 	While the respondent has lived in the United States for
approximately 	3 	decades, 	the 	discretionary 	weight 	attributable 	to 	his
long-term residence is reduced by the fact that he has an extensive criminal
record in the United States. 	The respondent’s family ties provide another
positive factor to be weighed against his criminal record. 	However, these
ties, 	in 	conjunction 	with 	the 	respondent’s 	additional 	equities, 	do 	not
outweigh his extensive criminal history. See Matter of Sotelo, 23 I&N Dec.
201, 203 (BIA 2001) (“In any balancing test, various factors, whether
positive or negative, are accorded more weight than others according to the
specific facts of the individual case.”).
We do not minimize the significance of the respondent’s positive factors
and ties to the United States. However, weighing the respondent’s equities
against the adverse factors present in his case, we conclude that the
respondent’s undesirability as a permanent resident outweighs the favorable
factors and social and humane considerations presented on his behalf such
that a grant of cancellation of removal is not in the best interest of the
United States. See Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. at 11; see also Matter of
Nemis, 28 I&N Dec. 250, 260 (BIA 2021) (stating that we review the

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discretionary findings of the Immigration Judge de novo), remanded on other
grounds sub nom. Nemis v. Garland, No. 21-6151-ag, 2024 WL 1252947
(2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2024).
ORDER: 	DHS’ appeal is sustained, and the Immigration Judge’s
July 9, 2025, decision granting cancellation of removal under section
240A(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), is vacated.
FURTHER ORDER: 	The respondent is ordered removed from the
United States to Canada.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. 	See INA
§ 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2026). Further,
any respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any
time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than
2 years, or both. See INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024).