E-Z-

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Matter of E-Z-, Respondent
Decided by Board June 5, 20251
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals

The Immigration Judge's predictive findings regarding the harm the respondent will
suffer in Russia based on his travel to the United States and his support for Ukraine were
speculative, and thus the Immigration Judge erred in granting the respondent's application
for protection under the regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture.

FOR THE RESPONDENT: Atara Eig, Esquire, Miami, Florida

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Stacy Norcross, Assistant
Chief Counsel

BEFORE: Board Panel: MULLANE, GOODWIN, and HUNSUCKER, Appellate
Immigration Judges.

GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judge:

The Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") appeals from the
Immigration Judge's October 2, 2024, decision granting the respondent's
application for protection under the regulations implementing the
Convention Against Torture ("CAT").2 The respondent, a native and citizen
of Russia, opposes DHS' appeal and cross appeals the Immigration Judge's
decision denying his applications for asylum and withholding of removal
under sections 208(b)(1)(A) and 241(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A), 1231(b)(3)(A) (2018).
We will dismiss the respondent's appeal, sustain DHS' appeal, and vacate
the Immigration Judge's decision, in part.

The respondent claims to have suffered past harm and fears future harm
in Russia on account of his political opinion. The Immigration Judge found

1
Pursuant to Order No. 6312-2025, dated July 2, 2025, the Attorney General designated
the Board's decision in Matter of E-Z- (BIA Jun. 5, 2025), as precedent in all proceedings
involving the same issue or issues. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3) (2025). Editorial changes
have been made consistent with the designation of the case as a precedent.

2
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States Nov. 20, 1994). 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17 (2025); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a) (2020).

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the respondent credible but denied his applications for asylum and
withholding of removal after finding that the respondent's harm did not rise
to the level of persecution. The Immigration Judge also found that the
respondent did not demonstrate a nexus between the harm he suffered and
fears and his political opinion. However, the Immigration Judge granted the
respondent protection under the CAT because he found it was more likely
than not that the respondent would be subject to torture if he were returned
to Russia.

We first address the respondent's appeal. We affirm the Immigration
Judge's determination that the harm the respondent claims to have
experienced does not rise to the level of persecution. See, e.g., Morales v.
Sessions, 860 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2017) (explaining that whether harm
suffered rises to the level of persecution is a legal question subject to de novo
review). The respondent testified that he was detained twice in Russia by
members of the Federal Security Bureau ("FSB"). On both occasions, the
respondent was interrogated about his suspected participation or involvement
in extremist organizations but was released after it was confirmed that he was
not involved in any extremist organizations and that he had only ever
expressed his opposition to the Ukraine-Russia war in conversations with his
coworkers. On the first occasion in March 2022, the respondent was detained
for 3 hours, and the FSB confiscated and went through his cellphones. On
the second occasion in August 2023, the FSB detained the respondent for
10 hours and threatened to charge him with organizing an extremist group
and inviting people to join the group. The respondent also testified that the
FSB attempted to search his home in October 2023 and called his wife twice
asking about him after he left Russia.

On appeal, the respondent generally argues that the harm he suffered rose
to the level of persecution because the FSB's conduct constituted a
"sustained and systemic effort to target him on account of his political
opinion." However, we agree with the Immigration Judge that the
respondent's interactions with the FSB, considered individually and
cumulatively, do not amount to the extreme conduct contemplated by the
INA as amounting to persecution. See Aben v. Garland, 113 F.4th 457,
465-66 (5th Cir. 2024) ("Persecution 'is an extreme concept," which "does
not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even
unlawful or unconstitutional." (citations omitted)). Although the respondent
may have been held for several hours while he was interrogated, he was not
beaten or otherwise physically harmed, and he was not ultimately arrested or
tried for any crimes. See Martinez-Lopez v. Barr, 943 F.3d 766, 771
(5th Cir. 2019) (holding that "mere denigration, harassment, and threats'
are ordinarily not extreme enough to be considered persecution"

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(citation omitted); see also Morales, 860 F.3d at 816 ("Examples of
persecution include, but are not limited to, 'threats to life, confinement,
torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to
life or freedom." (citation omitted)).

We also affirm the Immigration Judge's determination that the
respondent did not establish that his political opinion was or will be at least
one central reason for the persecution he fears if returned to Russia. See
Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 208, 211 (BIA 2007) (holding that
"an applicant must produce evidence, either direct or circumstantial, from
which it is reasonable to believe that the harm was or would be motivated in
part by an actual or imputed protected ground"), aff'd sub som.
Ndayshimiye v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 557 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 2009). The
Immigration Judge found that the reason for the respondent's arrest and
interrogation was not because he expressed his political opinion but rather
because of a legitimate investigation as to whether the respondent was in
violation of the law prohibiting organizing an extremist group or
disseminating false information. The Immigration Judge found that once the
FSB confirmed the respondent was not in violation of the law through the
search of his phones and their questioning, he was released even though they
were aware of his political opinion.

The Immigration Judge compared the respondent's experience with that
of his colleagues who were detained at the same time as the respondent but
who were actually charged and imprisoned for the crimes. The respondent
testified that he did not participate in any political activity aside from voicing
his opposition to the war in conversations with colleagues. Conversely, he
did not know what activities his colleagues were involved in outside of their
job. Given this testimony, the Immigration Judge's finding that any political
component to the FSB's motive was tangential to their engagement in a
legitimate criminal investigation is not clearly erroneous, as it is a
permissible view of the evidence. See Matter of N-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 526,
532 (BIA 2011) ("A persecutor's actual motive is a matter of fact to be
determined by the Immigration Judge and reviewed by [the Board] for clear
error."); Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 260, 263 (BIA 2007) (providing that
a factual finding is not clearly erroneous merely because there are two
permissible views of the evidence). We therefore affirm the Immigration
Judge's conclusion that the respondent has not demonstrated that his political
opinion was at least one central reason for the claimed harm. See
INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); Matter of C-T-L-,
25 I&N Dec. 341, 348 (BIA 2010) (concluding that the "one central reason"
standard applies to withholding of removal).

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Because nexus is dispositive of asylum and withholding of removal, we
need not reach the respondent's remaining arguments on appeal regarding
his well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)
(2020); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)-(2) (2025); see also INS v. Bagamasbad,
429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) ("As a general rule courts and agencies are not
required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to
the results they reach.").

Without past persecution or nexus to a protected ground under the INA,
eligibility for asylum is not established. It follows that the respondent also
did not satisfy his burden of proof for withholding of removal. See
INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Majd v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d
590, 595 (5th Cir. 2006). Thus, because the Immigration Judge properly
denied the respondent's claims for asylum and withholding of removal under
the INA, the respondent's appeal is dismissed.

Turning to protection under the CAT, we agree with DHS' argument on
appeal that the Immigration Judge's predictive findings about the harm the
respondent will suffer in Russia are clearly erroneous because they are not
supported by the record and are instead based on the Immigration Judge's
speculation or conjecture. See Matter of R-A-F-, 27 I&N Dec. 778, 779
(holding that the Board reviews predictive findings for clear error and
reviews de novo whether the predicted outcome satisfies the definition of
torture). See generally Brnovich v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 594 U.S. 647,
687 (2021) (explaining that if the trier of fact's "view of the evidence is
plausible in light of the entire record, an appellate court may not reverse even
if it is convinced that it would have weighed the evidence differently in the
first instance."); Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec. at 263.

The Immigration Judge's decision does not identify record support for his
finding that the respondent will likely suffer harm rising to the level of torture
upon return to Russia because he is being returned from the United States,
which supports Ukraine in the war. The Immigration Judge does not identify
any record evidence supporting his findings that the respondent was
previously suspected of working with foreign entities and that he would be
again in the future simply because he is being returned from the United
States. The record reflects that the respondent was reported for-and cleared
of- participating in extremist organizations within Russia, not working with
foreign entities. Further, although the record supports the Immigration
Judge's finding that the FSB already investigated him twice and that his
colleagues were imprisoned for the same crimes the respondent was
investigated for, there is no evidence that his colleagues' imprisonment was
not legitimate or that they have been tortured since being imprisoned. Thus,

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while the Immigration Judge's finding that the respondent may be detained
and interrogated upon return from the United States is supported by record
evidence, there is insufficient record evidence to support the Immigration
Judge's finding that the respondent will suffer harm that rises to the level of
torture.

The Immigration Judge also relied on the country conditions evidence in
the record regarding conditions in Russian jails to find that the respondent is
likely to be detained and tortured. There is insufficient record evidence,
however, to support the Immigration Judge's finding. As the Immigration
Judge acknowledges, there is nothing in the country conditions evidence to
support the notion that the respondent, or any Russian, will be subject to
detention, much less torture, in Russia for merely having traveled to the
United States. The respondent has previously traveled outside of Russia to
various countries and has no history of being detained, interrogated, or
tortured upon return from foreign travel. Thus, the Immigration Judge's
finding that the respondent will suffer harm constituting torture upon return
to Russia is not supported by the record evidence and is clearly erroneous.

In sum, the Immigration Judge's determination that the respondent
established a likelihood of future torture is based on a series of clearly
erroneous factual findings, and, under our de novo review, is in error. See
Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I&N Dec. 912, 917-18 (A.G. 2006) (holding that the
Immigration Judge erred in granting CAT protection based on a "series of
suppositions" strung together by the Immigration Judge when the record
evidence "d[id] not establish that any step in th[e] hypothetical chain of
events [was]s more likely than not to happen, let alone that the entire chain
w[ould] come together to result in the probability of torture of respondent");
see also Alexis v. Barr, 960 F.3d 722, 731 (5th Cir. 2020) ("An applicant for
[CAT protection] has the burden of demonstrating 'that it is more likely than
not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of
removal." (citation omitted)). Thus, we will sustain DHS' appeal and vacate
the Immigration Judge's grant of CAT protection. The respondent shall be
removed to Russia pursuant to the Immigration Judge's order of removal.

ORDER: The respondent's appeal is dismissed.

FURTHER ORDER: DHS' appeal is sustained, and the Immigration
Judge's October 2, 2024, decision is vacated, in part, to the extent it grants
the respondent's application for protection under the CAT.

NOTICE: If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the

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order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent's departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. See
INA § 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d; 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14).