MAYORGA IPINA

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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 110 (BIA 2025) 	Interim Decision #4104
Matter of Cesar Rolando MAYORGA IPINA, Respondent
Decided June 26, 2025
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
The respondent’s conviction for indecent exposure in violation of section 18.2-387 of the
Virginia Code is for a crime involving moral turpitude because the requirement of an
“obscene display or exposure” necessarily involves a lewd intent. 	Matter of Cortes
Medina, 26 I&N Dec. 79 (BIA 2013), reaffirmed.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Pro se
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 	Nicholas J. Bolzman,
Assistant Chief Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board 	Panel: 	MULLANE, 	O’CONNOR, 	MAHTABFAR, 	Appellate
Immigration Judges.
O’CONNOR, Appellate Immigration Judge:
On June 18, 2020, the Immigration Judge ordered the respondent released
from the custody of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) upon the
payment of a bond.1 DHS appealed that decision, arguing that the respondent
is mandatorily detained based on a conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude. 	The respondent, through counsel, filed a brief opposing the
appeal.2 The appeal will be sustained.3
The respondent, a native and citizen of Guatemala, was convicted in 2017
for indecent exposure in violation of section 18.2-387 of the Virginia Code.
He 	was 	later 	detained 	by 	DHS 	and 	filed 	a 	motion 	for 	custody
redetermination. DHS argued that the respondent was subject to mandatory
detention based on his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. On
1 	On September 1, 2020, the Immigration Judge issued a written bond memorandum
supporting the bond order.
2 	On June 4, 2025, we granted Pooja Bhagat, Esquire’s motion to withdraw as the
respondent’s attorney.
3 	The Board previous issued a decision in this matter on May 16, 2025. On June 4, 2025,
we issued an interim order reopening the matter and reinstating DHS’ appeal.

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February 28, 2020, a prior Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s
request for redetermination of custody. 	On June 18, 2020, the present
Immigration Judge reconsidered sua sponte the prior Immigration Judge’s
decision and set a bond in the amount of $1,500. 	The Immigration Judge
concluded that the respondent’s conviction was not categorically for a crime
involving moral turpitude. 	Specifically, he found that the statute punishes
activities that are not for the purpose of arousing lewd or lascivious interest,
such as the exposure of a breast for sunbathing, political protest, or an interest
in nudism; urinating in a public area; or adjusting one’s underwear for
comfort. 	DHS appealed from that decision.4 	We review de novo whether
the respondent is subject to mandatory detention. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii)
(2025).
Section 236(c)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A) (2018), provides that “any alien who . . . is
inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section
212(a)(2) [of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2018)]” is mandatorily
detained. 	Section 	212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), in turn, provides that an alien convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude is inadmissible.
To determine whether an offense is a crime involving moral turpitude, we
employ the categorical approach. 	Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 484
(4th Cir. 2012); Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. 826, 830 (BIA 2016).
In doing so, we focus on whether the elements of the crime, rather than the
conduct of the respondent, fit within the generic definition of a crime
involving moral turpitude. 	See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190
(2013); Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 484.
Moral turpitude “generally refers to conduct that is ‘inherently base, vile,
or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties
owed between persons or to society in general.’” 	Matter of Silva-Trevino,
26 I&N Dec. at 833 (citation omitted); accord Matter of Ortega-Lopez,
26 I&N Dec. 99, 100 (BIA 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 834 F.3d 1015
(9th Cir. 2016). “To involve moral turpitude, a crime requires two essential
elements: reprehensible conduct and a culpable mental state.” 	Matter of
Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. at 834; accord Matter of Ortega-Lopez, 26 I&N
Dec. at 100. 	A culpable mental state includes acts that are committed
knowingly, intentionally, or with criminal recklessness. 	See Sotnikau v.
Lynch, 846 F.3d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 2017). 	Conduct is reprehensible if it
4 	During the pendency of this appeal, the respondent was released from custody.

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shocks the conscience and violates a moral norm. See Mohamed v. Holder,
769 F.3d 885, 888 (4th Cir. 2014).
Section 	18.2-387 	provides, 	in 	relevant 	part: 	“Every 	person 	who
intentionally makes an obscene display or exposure of his person, or the
private parts thereof, in any public place, or in any place where others are
present, or procures another to so expose himself, shall be guilty of a Class 1
misdemeanor.” Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-387 (West 2017). There is no dispute
that 	a 	conviction 	under 	this 	statute 	requires 	a 	culpable 	mental 	state.
However, the Immigration Judge concluded that the statute did not require a
lewd intent such that the offense violated a moral norm.
For indecent exposure to constitute a crime involving moral turpitude,
“the statute prohibiting the conduct must require not only the willful
exposure of private parts but also a lewd intent.” Matter of Cortes Medina,
26 I&N Dec. 79, 83 (BIA 2013). Although section 18.2-387 of the Virginia
Code does not include the word “lewd,” it requires an “obscene display or
exposure.” The Virginia Code defines obscene as:
[T]hat which, considered as a whole, has as its dominant theme or purpose an appeal
to the prurient interest in sex, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sexual
conduct, 	sexual 	excitement, 	excretory 	functions 	or 	products 	thereof 	or
sadomasochistic abuse, and which goes substantially beyond customary limits of
candor in description or representation of such matters and which, taken as a whole,
does not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Va. 	Code 	Ann. 	§ 	18.2-372 	(West 	2017); 	see 	also 	Copeland 	v.
Commonwealth, 525 S.E.2d 9, 10 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (“To be obscene,
conduct must violate contemporary community standards of sexual candor.”
(citing House v. Commonwealth, 169 S.E.2d 572, 576 (Va. 1969))). 	The
Board has previously defined “lewd” in the context of a lewd intent as
“obscene or indecent.” Matter of Cortes Medina, 26 I&N Dec. at 82 (citation
omitted). Thus, “lewd” and “obscene” have the same meaning.
We agree with DHS that the Immigration Judge erroneously determined
that 	the 	minimum 	conduct 	proscribed 	by 	the 	respondent’s 	statute 	of
conviction reaches conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. Obscenity
is a necessary element for a conviction under section 18.2-387 of the Virginia
Code. 	Absent a finding of obscene conduct, the Immigration Judge’s
examples of topless sunbathing, urinating in public, and adjusting one’s
underwear for comfort would not result in a conviction. 	See generally
Price v. Commonwealth, 201 S.E.2d 798, 800 (Va. 1974) (stating the
“portrayal of nudity is not, as a matter of law, a sufficient basis for a finding

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that a work is obscene” (citing House, 169 S.E.2d at 577)). Because section
18.2-387 of the Virginia Code explicitly and unequivocally requires an
“obscene display or exposure,” it encompasses the reprehensible conduct that
brings it into the rubric of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent’s conviction for
indecent exposure in violation of section 18.2-387 of the Virginia Code is for
a crime involving moral turpitude because the requirement of an “obscene
display or exposure” necessarily involves a lewd intent. 	The respondent’s
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude renders him mandatorily
detained under section 236(c)(1)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A).
Therefore, we will sustain the appeal and reverse the Immigration Judge’s
grant of the respondent’s release on bond.
ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained.
FURTHER ORDER: The Immigration Judge’s June 18, 2020, order
is vacated.