BADOR

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Matter of Shlomo BADOR, Respondent
Decided October 6, 2022
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) A fraud waiver under section 237(a)(1)(H) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) (2018), does not waive a respondent’s removability
under section 237(a)(1)(D)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i), where
conditional permanent residence was terminated for failure to file a joint petition,
a reason separate and independent from fraud. Matter of Gawaran, 20 I&N Dec. 938
(BIA 1995), aff’d, Gawaran v. INS, 91 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1996), reaffirmed.
(2) A section 237(a)(1)(H) fraud waiver cannot be used in place of, or in conjunction with,
a “good faith” waiver under section 216(c)(4)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B)
(2018), to waive the requirement to file a joint petition to remove conditions on
residence under section 216 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Kai William De Graaf, Esquire, New York, New York
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: David Schteingart, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: WILSON, GOODWIN, and GORMAN, Appellate Immigration
Judges.
GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judge:
In a decision dated December 6, 2018, an Immigration Judge denied the
respondent’s request to waive the requirement to file a joint petition to
remove the conditions on his permanent residence under section 216 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (2018). 1 The
Immigration Judge also deemed the respondent ineligible for a waiver of his
removability 	pursuant 	to 	section 	237(a)(1)(H) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(H) (2018), and ordered him removed from the United States. 2
1 	The Immigration Judge reviewed de novo the decision of the United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services denying the respondent’s request to waive the joint filing
requirement under section 216(c)(4)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B). 	See
8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(e)(2), (f) (2021).
2 	The respondent does not meaningfully challenge the Immigration Judge’s decisions to
pretermit his application for cancellation of removal pursuant to section 240A(a) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2018), and deny his application for cancellation of removal
pursuant to section 240A(b)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). 	We deem any

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The respondent has appealed from this decision. 	The appeal will be
dismissed.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The respondent is a native and citizen of Israel who was accorded
conditional permanent resident status on April 2, 2009, based on his marriage
to a United States citizen. On March 21, 2011, the respondent and his former
spouse jointly filed a Form I-751, Petition to Remove Conditions on
Residence, with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”). 	His spouse later withdrew her support from this joint petition.
USCIS deemed the jointly-filed petition withdrawn on July 17, 2014. 3
On November 3, 2014, the respondent filed a second Form I-751 with
USCIS based upon this same marriage and sought to waive the joint petition
requirement because, he argued, his marriage was entered into in “good
faith” 	pursuant 	to 	section 	216(c)(4)(B) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1186a(c)(4)(B). 	8 C.F.R. §§ 216.5(a)(1)(ii), 1216.5(a)(1)(ii) (2021). 	On
July 12, 2016, after finding the respondent’s marriage was not entered into
in good faith, USCIS denied his request to waive the joint filing requirement
and his second petition, terminating the respondent’s conditional permanent
residence under section 216.
The respondent was placed in removal proceedings and conceded he was
removable as charged under section 237(a)(1)(D)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(D)(i), for being a conditional permanent resident whose status
has been terminated. 	Initially, the respondent sought review of USCIS’s
decision to deny his request for a “good faith” waiver of the joint filing
requirement 	before 	the 	Immigration 	Judge, 	again 	contending 	that 	his
marriage was entered into in good faith. On direct examination, he testified
at length and in significant detail, asserting the bona fides of his marriage.
He continued to assert that his marriage was valid on cross-examination,
even after he was provided with evidence of a USCIS field investigation
showing that his marriage was fraudulent. The respondent then withdrew his
request that the Immigration Judge review USCIS’s denial of the “good
faith” 	waiver 	and 	instead 	requested 	a 	fraud 	waiver 	under 	section
237(a)(1)(H) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H).
arguments regarding these issues to be waived. See Matter of P-B-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 43, 44
n.1 (BIA 2020) (stating that arguments not raised on appeal are deemed waived).
3 	USCIS’s decision states that the joint petition was “withdrawn” and “denied.” Once a
joint petitioner’s spouse withdraws from the petition it is, by operation of law, withdrawn
from consideration “as if never filed.” Matter of Mendes, 20 I&N Dec. 833, 838–39 (BIA
1994) (stating that written withdrawal of the joint petition by the petitioner automatically
withdraws the petition from consideration).

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At a continued hearing, the respondent stated that he would not call his
former spouse as a witness and admitted that the marriage was not bona fide
but was entered into to “fix [his] green card.” The respondent then reinstated
his request that the Immigration Judge review the denial of a “good faith”
waiver of the joint filing requirement and sought a section 237(a)(1)(H) fraud
waiver in conjunction with a “good faith” waiver.
The Immigration Judge denied both waivers. She found the fraud waiver
could not waive the respondent’s removability under section 237(a)(1)(D)(i)
and only waived a charge of removability under section 237(a)(1)(A). She
then denied the respondent’s request for a “good faith” waiver of the
joint-filing requirement because the respondent did not establish his marriage
was entered into in “good faith.” This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
There are two main interrelated issues in this case. The first is whether
the respondent may use a waiver under section 237(a)(1)(H) to waive his
removability 	under 	section 	237(a)(1)(D)(i), 	which 	is 	based 	on 	the
termination of his conditional permanent resident status for failure to file
a joint petition. 	The second issue is whether the respondent may use the
237(a)(1)(H) waiver in place of, or in conjunction with, a “good faith” waiver
under section 216(c)(4)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B), to waive
the joint petition requirement under section 216 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a.
We review these legal questions de novo. 	See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii)
(2021).
A. Legal Background
Section 237(a)(1)(H) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
The provisions of this paragraph relating to the removal of aliens within the United
States on the ground that they were inadmissible at the time of admission as aliens
described in section 212(a)(6)(C)(i), whether willful or innocent, may, in the
discretion of the Attorney General, be waived for any alien . . . who—
(i)(I) 	is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or
of an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence; and
(II) 	was in possession of an immigrant visa or equivalent document and was
otherwise admissible to the United States at the time of such admission except
for those grounds of inadmissibility specified under paragraphs (5)(A) and
(7)(A) 	of 	section 212(a) 	which 	were 	a 	direct 	result 	of 	that 	fraud or
misrepresentation.
. . . .

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A waiver of removal for fraud or misrepresentation granted under this subparagraph
shall also operate to waive removal based on the grounds of inadmissibility directly
resulting from such fraud or misrepresentation.
Generally, this provision authorizes a waiver of removability under section
237(a)(1)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A), based on charges of
inadmissibility at the time of admission under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the
INA, 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1182(a)(6)(C)(i) 	(2018), 	for 	fraud 	or 	willful
misrepresentation of a material fact, or section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for lack of valid immigration documents.
Matter of Fu, 23 I&N Dec. 985, 988 (BIA 2006).
In 1986, Congress added section 216 to the INA through section 2 of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639,
100 Stat. 3537, 3537. 	This law was aimed at uncovering and deterring
marriage fraud in immigration proceedings, while protecting law-abiding
individuals seeking status through valid marriages. 	H.R. Rep. No. 99-906,
at 6–7 (1986); 132 Cong. Rec. 33,802–03 (Oct. 18, 1986); 132 Cong.
Rec. 27,015–17 (Sept. 29, 1986).
To provide immigration authorities time to examine the bona fides of
a marriage more fully, section 216 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a, created
a 2-year conditional permanent resident status for those who sought to obtain
permanent resident status based upon marriage to a United States citizen. See
Matter of Munroe, 26 I&N Dec. 428, 430 (BIA 2014). The statute provided
the benefits of permanent resident status during those 2 years. 	After this
period, the United States citizen and his or her spouse had the burden to prove
that their marriage was bona fide and entered into in good faith and were
required to file a joint petition to remove the conditions on residence. INA
§ 	216(c)(1)(A), 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1186a(c)(1)(A); 	8 	C.F.R. 	§§ 	216.4(a)(1),
1216.4(a)(1) (2021) (providing that the citizen spouse and the conditional
permanent resident must, within the 90-day period immediately preceding
the second anniversary of the date the noncitizen obtained conditional
permanent residence, file a joint petition to lift the conditions on residence).
If they are able to meet this burden, the conditions on residency are lifted.
INA § 216(c)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3)(B). However, should officials
find that the marriage is not bona fide and was entered into for the purpose
of circumventing the immigration laws, section 216 permits the Government
to terminate the conditional permanent resident status and initiate removal
proceedings under section 240 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2018). 	INA
§ 216(c)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3)(C).
Recognizing that some marriages may be entered into in good faith
but fail prior to the end of the 2-year conditional residency period for
reasons other than fraud, Congress provided a discretionary waiver of
the 	joint 	petition 	requirement 	under 	section 	216(c)(4) 	of 	the 	INA,

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8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4). To qualify for the waiver, an applicant must establish
that he or she was not at fault for failing to meet the filing requirement and
that: extreme hardship would result if he or she was removed; the marriage
was entered into in good faith, but had been terminated; or the marriage was
entered in good faith, but the applicant was subjected to battery or extreme
cruelty 	by 	either 	the 	petitioning 	spouse 	or 	intended 	spouse. 	INA
§ 216(c)(4)(A)–(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(A)–(D); see also 8 C.F.R.
§§ 216.5(a)(1), 1216.5(a)(1). 	The applicant for a waiver has the burden of
establishing that a waiver of the joint filing requirement is warranted. 	See
INA 	§ 	216(c)(4), 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1186a(c)(4) 	(stating 	that 	the 	individual
requesting the waiver has the burden of proof to demonstrate his or her
eligibility for the waiver).
For purposes of a “good faith” waiver under section 216(c)(4)(B),
a marriage is considered to have been entered into in good faith if the parties
intended to establish a life together at the time they were married. See, e.g.,
Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1, 2–3 (BIA 1983); cf. Matter of McKee,
17 I&N Dec. 332, 333 (BIA 1980) (concluding that a fraudulent marriage is
one that is entered into to circumvent the immigration laws and solely for the
purposes of obtaining immigration benefits). 	The “conduct of the parties
after marriage is relevant to their intent at the time of the marriage.” Matter
of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. at 3. To determine whether an applicant for this
waiver entered into a marriage in good faith, an adjudicator must consider
evidence “relating to the amount of commitment by both parties to the
marital relationship.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 216.5(e)(2), 1216.5(e)(2).
If a request for a waiver of the joint petition requirement is denied and
conditional status is terminated, the respondent is removable under section
237(a)(1)(D)(i), and he or she may seek review of the specific waiver USCIS
denied before an Immigration Judge in removal proceedings. 	See INA
§ 216(c)(3)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3)(D); Matter of Lemhammad, 20 I&N
Dec. 316, 322 (BIA 1991); 8 C.F.R. §§ 216.5(f), 1216.5(f); see also Matter
of Anderson, 20 I&N Dec. 888, 892 (BIA 1994) (stating that an Immigration
Judge only has jurisdiction to review the denial of the specific waiver that
was requested). 	In removal proceedings, the waiver applicant bears the
burden of demonstrating his or her eligibility for a waiver of the joint filing
requirement. See Matter of Mendes, 20 I&N Dec. 833, 838 (BIA 1994); see
also Matter of Stowers, 22 I&N Dec. 605, 608 (BIA 1999).
B. Application to the Respondent’s Case
As noted, the 	respondent conceded his removability 	under section
237(a)(1)(D)(i). Thus, the only issue is whether he is eligible for relief from
removal. 	In addition to bearing the burden of establishing that a waiver of

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the joint filing requirement is warranted under section 216(c)(4)(B), the
respondent bears the burden of establishing his eligibility for a section
237(a)(1)(H) waiver of his removability. See INA § 240(c)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(4)(A); Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 760–61 (2021);
8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (2021). Here, the respondent has not met either burden.
Although the respondent first argued during his removal proceedings that
his marriage was entered into in good faith, he later admitted that he entered
into this marriage for the express purpose of obtaining immigration benefits.
He also submitted numerous false documents in support of his first joint
petition. 	Nevertheless, he maintains on appeal that the Immigration Judge
erred in finding him ineligible for a waiver under section 237(a)(1)(H) of the
INA, arguing that his fraudulent marriage was the underlying reason for the
termination of his conditional permanent resident status. 	As a result, he
contends, he can use a section 237(a)(1)(H) waiver to cure the fraud
underlying 	the 	termination 	of 	his 	conditional 	status 	and 	waive 	his
removability under section 237(a)(1)(D)(i). We disagree.
The circumstances of the respondent’s case are nearly identical to those
in Matter of Gawaran, 20 I&N Dec. 938 (BIA 1995), aff’d Gawaran v. INS,
91 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1996). In that case, the respondent was charged with
deportability 	under 	former 	section 	241(a)(1) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(1) (1988), as a respondent who was excludable at the time of entry,
and under former section 241(a)(9)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(9)(A),
as a respondent whose conditional status has been terminated. 4 In addition
to seeking a waiver of her deportability under former section 241(f)(1) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f)(1), the predecessor of section 237(a)(1)(H), the
respondent in Matter of Gawaran sought an “extreme hardship” waiver of
the joint filing requirement pursuant to section 216(c)(4)(A) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(A) (1988).
The 	respondent 	argued 	former 	section 	241(f)(1) 	waived 	the 	fraud
underlying her deportability as a conditional resident whose status has been
terminated because “her acquisition of conditional residence ‘was tied
directly to her original fraudulent behavior in entering the United States
through a bigamous relationship.’” 	Matter of Gawaran, 20 I&N Dec. at
940–41. 	The Board rejected this argument, finding that, even if former
section 	241(f) 	waived 	the 	underlying 	fraud, 	it 	could 	not 	waive 	the
respondent’s deportability based on the termination of her conditional status,
since that status “was terminated because she failed to file a joint petition to
remove the conditional basis of her status,” rather than marriage fraud.
4 	Former section 241(a)(1) was later renumbered as 237(a)(1)(A), and former section
241(a)(9)(A) was renumbered as section 237(a)(1)(D)(i). See Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, § 305(a)(2),
110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-598.

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Id. at 941 (noting that the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service
“did not allege any fraud or misrepresentation in connection with the . . .
charge, nor was proof of fraud or misrepresentation required in order to
sustain the charge of deportability”).
In other words, we rejected the respondent’s argument that her fraudulent
behavior so thoroughly permeated all charges of deportability that she could
use a fraud waiver to cure them all. We additionally concluded that she had
waived the opportunity to have an “extreme hardship” waiver of the joint
filing requirement considered because she did not seek this waiver before the
Immigration Judge. Id. at 942.
Like the respondent in Matter of Gawaran, the respondent seeks to
expand the use of the fraud waiver under section 237(a)(1)(H) to waive the
joint filing requirement under section 216, even though he does not otherwise
qualify for a waiver of that requirement under section 216(c)(4)(B). Section
216(c) does not contemplate that a fraud waiver under section 237(a)(1)(H)
be used to waive the joint filing requirement. Moreover, the waiver set forth
in section 216(c)(4)(B) requires the respondent to establish that he was not
at fault in failing to meet the joint filing requirement and that his marriage
was 	entered 	into 	in 	good 	faith. 	See 	8 	C.F.R. 	§§ 	216.5(a)(1)(ii),
1216.5(a)(1)(ii). 	As noted, the respondent admitted in proceedings that his
marriage was not bona fide and was entered into for the sole purpose of
obtaining immigration benefits. See Matter of McKee, 17 I&N Dec. at 333.
The respondent seeks to circumvent the requirements of section 216 by
utilizing 	an 	unrelated 	statutory 	provision, 	which 	only 	applies 	to 	his
removability. The fraud waiver at section 237(a)(1)(H) does not supplant the
joint petition requirement in section 216, nor does it excuse the respondent’s
failure to establish that his marriage was entered into in good faith. In effect,
the 	respondent 	seeks 	to 	create 	a 	fraud 	waiver 	for 	the 	joint 	petition
requirement, which does not exist in the statutory scheme and is inconsistent
with Congress’ aim in enacting section 216—namely, uncovering and
deterring marriage fraud in immigration proceedings, while protecting
law-abiding individuals seeking status through valid marriages. 	See H.R.
Rep. No. 99-906, at 6–7; 132 Cong. Rec. 33,802–03; 132 Cong. Rec.
27,015–17.
In support of his arguments, the respondent relies on Vasquez v. Holder,
602 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2010). 	In that case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that section 237(a)(1)(H) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H), may waive a respondent’s removability under

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section 237(a)(1)(D)(i) where the termination of conditional status was based
solely upon a finding of marriage fraud. 5
We find Vasquez to be inapposite and unpersuasive. That case involved
an applicant for a section 237(a)(1)(H) waiver whose joint petition was
“denied on its merits . . . for marriage fraud”—not, as is the case here, the
termination of conditional permanent residence for failure to file the joint
petition. 	Id. at 1008. 	Significantly, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged in
Vasquez that our decision in Matter of Gawaran, and the Ninth Circuit’s
decision affirming it, remain good law. See id. at 1010 (“[W]e hold that our
decision in Gawaran, although it remains a binding precedent, does not apply
to an alien whose conditional permanent residence was terminated not for
failure to file a joint petition but upon a determination of marriage fraud.”).
We therefore reaffirm our holding in Matter of Gawaran, and conclude that
its holding and reasoning, which relate to former section 241(f)(1), extend to
the fraud waiver under section 237(a)(1)(H).
Pursuant to Matter of Gawaran, the respondent has not established that
a fraud waiver under section 237(a)(1)(H) waives his removability under
section 237(a)(1)(D)(i). 	The record reflects that the joint petition was
deemed withdrawn by USCIS because his spouse withdrew her support from
it, and the respondent has not shown that it was denied solely based on a
finding of marriage fraud. We therefore conclude that a section 237(a)(1)(H)
fraud waiver does not waive a respondent’s removability under section
237(a)(1)(D)(i) 	where, 	as 	here, 	conditional 	permanent 	residence 	is
terminated for failure 	to file a joint 	petition, a reason “separate and
independent” from fraud. 6 Gawaran, 91 F.3d at 1335.
Nor can the respondent use the fraud waiver, which applies merely to
grounds of removability, in place of, or in conjunction with, a “good faith”
waiver of the joint filing requirement under section 216(c)(4)(B) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B). 	Because the respondent’s joint petition was
withdrawn by operation of law, he had the burden to prove that he was
eligible for a “good 	faith” waiver of 	the 	joint filing requirement by
a preponderance of the evidence. See Matter of Mendes, 20 I&N Dec. at 838.
We 	agree 	with 	the 	Immigration 	Judge 	that 	he 	cannot 	meet 	this
burden because he admitted he entered into his marriage for the sole
purpose of obtaining immigration benefits. See generally Alom v. Whitaker,
5 	Because the respondent’s case arises within the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit, we
apply the law of the Second Circuit and are not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Vasquez. See Matter of U. Singh, 25 I&N Dec. 670, 672 (BIA 2012).
6 	Under limited and specified circumstances, a section 237(a)(1)(H) waiver may waive
a ground of removability based solely on fraud, and the ability to apply for such a waiver
should not be dependent on how the respondent’s designated ground of removal is charged.
See Vasquez, 602 F.3d at 1015–16.

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910 F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (stating that a de novo review
standard “applies to the mixed question of law and fact of whether [a
respondent] established that his [or her] marriage was entered into in good
faith”); Matter of Z-Z-O-, 26 I&N Dec. 586, 591 (BIA 2015) (noting that the
Board 	reviews 	de 	novo 	whether 	the 	underlying 	facts 	found 	by 	an
Immigration Judge meet the legal requirements for relief).
Since the waiver under section 237(a)(1)(H) does not extend beyond
section 237(a)(1), it cannot be used in place of a “good faith” waiver under
section 216(c)(4)(B) to waive the joint filing requirement under section 216,
which is a distinct statutory provision. 	See Matter of Tima, 26 I&N Dec.
839, 843–44 (BIA 2016) (finding section 237(a)(1)(H) does not extend
beyond section 237(a)(1)), aff’d Tima v. Att’y Gen., 903 F.3d 272, 274, 278
(3d Cir. 2018). 	It is also incongruous for the respondent to both admit his
marriage was fraudulent and simultaneously ask to use a fraud waiver under
section 237(a)(1)(H) in conjunction with a “good faith” waiver under section
216(c)(4)(B). 	A fraudulent marriage cannot be entered into in good faith,
and thus a respondent cannot receive a “good faith” waiver under section
216(c)(4)(B) where he admits to having entered a fraudulent marriage. See
8 C.F.R. §§ 216.5(e)(2), 1216.5(e)(2). 	A waiver of the joint petition
requirement under section 216(c)(4), therefore, cannot truly be denied solely
for fraud. A respondent who applies for a waiver necessarily cannot satisfy
the joint petition requirement, and therefore the denial of the waiver will also
be based on failure to meet the joint petition requirement. 	See INA
§ 216(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4); 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(a)(1). 	Accordingly,
sections 237(a)(1)(H) and 216(c)(4)(B) apply in diametrically opposed
circumstances—the former applies where fraud is present, while the latter
only applies where fraud is absent. See S.D. Warren Co. v. Me Bd. of Env’t
Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 380 (2006) (stating that statutory provisions “are not
interchangeable, [where] they serve different purposes”). To hold otherwise
would be a legal fiction and would create a fraud waiver to the joint petition
statutory requirement not contemplated by Congress. We therefore conclude
that a fraud waiver under section 237(a)(1)(H) cannot be used in place of, or
in conjunction with, a “good faith” waiver of the joint filing requirement
under section 216(c)(4)(B), and the respondent has not persuasively argued
that Congress intended the waivers operate in this manner.
In conclusion, we agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent
has not met his burden of establishing that a fraud waiver under section
237(a)(1)(H) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H), waives his removability
under 237(a)(1)(D)(i). 	We additionally agree with the Immigration Judge
that a “good faith” waiver of the joint filing requirement is not warranted
under section 216(c)(4)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B), and the
respondent may not use a fraud waiver under section 237(a)(1)(H) in place

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of, or in conjunction with, a “good faith” waiver. Because the respondent is
removable as charged and he has not shown that he is eligible for relief from
removal, his appeal will be dismissed.
ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is dismissed.