State v. D.T.

THE FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
STATE OF DELAWARE, ) Case No.: 2509008858
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. )
)
D----- T-----, )
)
Respondent. )
ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
On October 1, 2025, the State charged D----- T----- (D.O.B. --/--/2008) with two
counts of Possession of a Firearm or Ammunition by a Person Prohibited.1 The State’s
case relies at least in part on two firearms recovered in a search of D-----’s home on
September 16, 2025. Before the Court is D-----’s Motion to Suppress those firearms
and, in general terms, “any evidence seized or obtained during the search of his
residence.”2 Although police obtained a search warrant before entering D-----’s home,
he argues that the affidavit presented in support of that warrant failed to establish
probable cause for the search. For the reasons that follow, D-----’s motion must be
DENIED.
FACTS
On September 16, 2025, the State applied for a warrant to search D-----’s home,
as well as “all outbuildings and curtledges [sic].”3 The affiant, Det. Shayne Linkhorst,
1 11 Del. C. § 1448(a)(5) (prohibiting, with certain exceptions, “[a]ny person under the age of 21” from
possessing firearms or ammunition). The Superior Court has found § 1448(a)(5) unconstitutional as to
individuals between 18 and 21 years of age, who are legally deemed adults, but D----- was 17 when he
was arrested and charged. See Birney v. Del. Dep’t of Safety and Homeland Security, 345 A.3d 1037,
1061–63, 1066 (Del. Super. Ct. 2025).
2 See Mot. to Suppress at 1.
3 Search Warrant Application at 2.

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works with the Wilmington Police Department Crime Gun Intelligence Center (“CGIC”).4
Between August and September 2025, CGIC detectives conducted an ongoing firearm
investigation involving W----- J----, and monitored a series of Instagram posts featuring
him in the presence of firearms.5 Det. Linkhorst’s affidavit specifically identified pictures
published on Instagram on August 18, August 27, September 5, and September 12,
2025.6 Although the pictures were posted by different accounts, each of them appeared
to feature W-----—sometimes on an unknown kitchen counter—holding or sitting near
multiple firearms.7 Further, W----- was “prohibited from possessing a firearm due to
being fifteen (15) years of age.”8 The affidavit then concluded with the following three
paragraphs:
11. Your affiant can truly state that in continuance of this firearm investigation and
in an attempt to locate [W-----], surveillance was established at the residence
of ---- -- --- Street, which is the residence of a known associate of [W-----].
Furthermore, CGIC Detectives were advised by Juvenile Probation and
Parole that [W-----’s] mother contacted Juvenile Probation and Parole and
advised that [W-----] was staying at that residence for an unknown period of
time.
12. Your affiant can truly state that while conducting surveillance, [W-----] was
observed to exit the front door of the residence ---- -- --- Street with another
subject. [W-----] was taken into custody in the --- Block of -- -------- Street due
to his outstanding [probation] warrant. During a search incident to arrest, [W---
--] was not found to be in possession of any concealed firearms.
13. Your affiant can truly state that due to the observations of photographs of [W--
---] in possession of multiple firearms, it is believed that they may still be at
the location he was known to be most recently residing at of ---- -- --- Street.
Through this Detective’s training and experience, firearms are often shared
4 Search Warrant Application, ¶ 1.
5 Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
6 Id. ¶¶ 6–9.
7 Id.
8 Id. ¶ 10.

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among associates. It is common for subjects to pass or share the firearm with
associates when they do not require it. Furthermore, subjects engaged in
illegal criminal activity, including the possession of firearms[,] when not legally
allowed to be in possession of same, will often discard or keep illegal firearms
inside of a residence to avoid police detection.9
The search warrant was issued on September 16, 2025, and D-----, as an alleged
known associate, was arrested and charged that same day.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Neither the scope nor the standard of review is in dispute in this case. “Under the
Delaware and the United States Constitutions, ‘a search warrant may be issued only
upon a showing of probable cause.’”10 When reviewing a warrant for probable cause,
this Court examines only the information contained within the “four corners” of the
affidavit presented to the magistrate in support of the warrant.11 Probable cause exists
when the affidavit contains enough facts for “a neutral judicial officer to form a
reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that seizable property w[ill]
be found” in the particular place to be searched.12 It does not matter whether the
premises are owned or occupied by the person suspected of a crime, or even whether
the affidavit “name[s] the person from whom the things will be seized.”13 The question is
simply whether the affidavit shows a logical connection between the items sought and
9 Id. ¶¶ 11–13.
10 Sisson v. State, 903 A.2d 288, 296 (Del. 2006) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV; Del. Const. art. I, § 6).
11 Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 811–12 (Del. 2000).
12 Johns v. State, 351 A.3d 974, 992 (Del. 2025) (quoting Dorsey, 761 A.2d at 811).
13 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 554–55 (1978); accord State v. Dearry, 2017 WL 3131106, at
*4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 21, 2017) (LeGrow, J.).

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the place to be searched.14 But stale information will not do: “probable cause must exist
to believe that the specified items are presently on the premises.”15
If a warrant is issued without probable cause, it is constitutionally unreasonable,
and any evidence discovered in the search must be suppressed.16 But because judicial
search warrants are “presumptively valid,”17 a defendant challenging such a search
bears the burden of proving the absence of probable cause.18 Moreover, the issuing
magistrate is free to make reasonable, common-sense inferences from the facts
presented in the affidavit, and a finding of probable cause is reviewed with “great
deference” on a motion to suppress.19 This Court will reverse only if there was no
“substantial basis” for the magistrate’s determination.20
ANALYSIS
Here, D----- does not dispute that the warrant established probable cause that a
crime had occurred.21 The affidavit described a series of recent social-media posts
appearing to feature W----- in possession of firearms, and it noted that he was a person
prohibited from such possession by virtue of his young age. D----- instead argues that
the affidavit failed to provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for believing that
evidence of W-----’s crimes would be found in D-----’s home at the time it was searched.
14 Johns, 351 A.3d at 992 (citing Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 203 (Del. 1980)); see also 11 Del. C.
§ 2306.
15 Sisson, 903 A.2d at 297 (quoting Pierson v. State, 338 A.2d 571, 573 (Del. 1975)) (emphasis in
original).
16 Dorsey, 761 A.2d at 820–21 (citing Rickards v. State, 77 A.2d 199 (1950) and declining to adopt the
federal good-faith exception created by United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)).
17 State v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359, 1362 (Del. 1978), aff’d on other grounds, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
18 Swanson v. State, No. 364, 2024, 2025 WL 3778943, at *3 (Del. Dec. 31, 2025).
19 Johns, 351 A.3d at 993.
20 Buckham v. State, 185 A.3d 1, 16 (Del. 2018) (citing Sisson, 903 A.2d at 296).
21 See Mot. to Suppress, ¶ 16.

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He raises four main complaints about the averments linking his home to W-----’s
crimes. First, the affidavit does not offer any facts in support of the assertion that D-----’s
home is “the residence of a known associate of [W-----].”22 Second, it relies on the
“double hearsay” of probation officers repeating the words of W-----’s mother without
indicating when she spoke to probation, how she knew W-----’s whereabouts, or
whether police had corroborated her tip through independent investigation before
beginning surveillance of D-----’s home.23 Third, the affidavit fails to identify when that
surveillance began or when W----- was “most recently residing” in D-----’s home. Finally,
it relies on generic statements about the tendency of criminals to share illegal firearms
with associates and store them in houses.
It is true that the dates of some events were not specified. But while “time is a
fundamental element in the concept of probable cause,”24 a magistrate may infer some
missing dates from their context.25 Taken as a whole, the information in this affidavit was
not stale. After chronologically describing the series of pictures—some clearly taken
inside a house—shared on Instagram between August 18 and September 12, 2025, the
affidavit explained that police began surveilling D-----’s home “in continuance of this
firearm investigation.”26 In the same paragraph, Det. Linkhorst noted that probation
officers had relayed a statement from W-----’s mother that he “was staying at [D-----’s]
residence for an unknown period of time.”27 Even though neither of these events was
22 Search Warrant Application, ¶ 11.
23 Mot. to Suppress, ¶ 18.
24 State v. Pulgini, 374 A.2d 822, 823 (Del. 1977).
25 See Sisson, 903 A.2d at 297–98.
26 Search Warrant Application, ¶ 11.
27 Id.

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explicitly dated, the magistrate could reasonably infer that the investigating officers
began their surveillance and heard from probation between September 12 (the date of
the last picture) and September 16 (the date police sought a warrant). Although
specifying a timeframe for the tip from W-----’s mother that he was staying with D-----
would have been helpful, that minor deficiency is not fatal.28
It is also true that the statement by probation officers repeating the words of W----
-’s mother was hearsay within hearsay. It is well-established, however, that hearsay can
support a warrant if “the hearsay declarant was reliable.”29 Information relayed from one
law-enforcement officer to another is deemed presumptively reliable.30 For other
sources, the magistrate must consider “the reliability of the informant, the details
contained in the informant's tip, and the degree to which the tip is corroborated by
independent police surveillance and information.”31
There was good reason to believe that the information from W-----’s mother was
reliable. She identified herself, exposing herself to possible criminal penalties if she
provided false information.32 Despite the lack of details, the source of her knowledge
28 See Pulgini, 374 A.2d at 823 (“Where [an] affidavit properly recites facts indicating activity of a
protracted and continuous nature . . . the passage of time becomes less significant.”).
29 Hooks, 416 A.2d at 202.
30 State v. Morris, 2017 WL 6513487, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2017) (citing Hooks, 416 A.2d at
202–03; United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965)); see also id. at *3 (“when officers have
been in communication with one another, ‘the collective knowledge of an entire organization may be
imputed to an individual officer.’”) (quoting State v. Cooley, 457 A.2d 352, 355 (Del. 1983)).
31 Swanson v. State, 351 A.3d 496, 516 (Del. 2025). The State is simply incorrect when it asserts that
police need not corroborate a tip from an identified informant. Although such a tip may support a finding of
reasonable suspicion, our Supreme Court “has generally found a tip to be sufficiently reliable to meet this
higher standard [of probable cause] only where the police corroborate aspects of the tip relating to the
alleged criminal act even if the informant’s identity is known.” Id. at 512–13, 516. Significantly, however,
whether a tip has been sufficiently corroborated is measured at the time the police apply for a search
warrant—not, as D----- suggests, at the time they begin surveillance (unless that surveillance itself
involves a constitutional search).
32 See Swanson, 351 A.3d at 512.

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was “self-evident.”33 An officer or magistrate may reasonably assume that a mother
knows her child’s whereabouts, at least in the absence of information to the contrary.
What is more, the police saw W----- walk out of D-----’s home shortly before the search,
corroborating what W-----’s mother had reported to probation.
Finally, in isolation, some of Det. Linkhorst’s averments were generalized or
conclusory, but this Court is bound to review the affidavit “as a whole [and] in a practical,
commonsense manner,” rather than conducting “a hypertechnical analysis of its
separate allegations.”34 Taken together, the allegations described above gave the
magistrate a substantial basis for believing that W----- had possessed weapons in a
home during an extended period in which he lived with D-----. And because W----- was
not carrying any weapons when he was arrested, the officers and the magistrate
reasonably concluded that the firearms pictured on Instagram remained in the home
where W----- had been “most recently residing,” i.e., D-----’s home.35
D----- relies heavily on the Superior Court’s decision in State v. Ada,36 but Ada is
distinguishable. The problem is not, as the State contends, that Ada involved
confidential informants. The informants in Ada, although used unsuccessfully to
investigate whether the defendant was dealing drugs out of an apartment on Lancaster
Avenue, were completely irrelevant to the pertinent application for a warrant to search a
33 See People v. Grimes, 594 N.Y.S.2d 392, 393 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (when defendant’s mother and
girlfriend informed the police that he had firearms, the basis of knowledge for that information “was self-
evident”); compare, e.g., United States v. Shaulis, No. 3:18-33, 2019 WL 7856722, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Sept.
24, 2019) (tip from defendant’s wife, who lived with him, “alone provide[d] a substantial basis” to find
probable cause”), with, e.g., United States v. Knox, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 1224–27 (D. Kan. 2015) (tip
from defendant’s estranged girlfriend needed additional corroboration to support probable cause).
34 Sisson, 903 A.2d at 296.
35 Search Warrant Application, ¶ 13.
36 State v. Ada, 2001 WL 660227 (Del. Super. Ct. June 8, 2001).

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second apartment on West Fourth Street. Instead, the police established probable
cause and exigent circumstances after stopping two genuine buyers carrying crack
cocaine.37
Rather, Ada is inapplicable because this is not a case where police observed
criminal activity at one location (e.g., W-----’s home) and then attempted to generate
probable cause to search a second location (e.g., D-----’s home) based merely on
residence. After establishing probable cause that Ada was selling drugs on Lancaster
Avenue, the police saw him come and go from the Fourth Street apartment with a key.
Once, he carried a bag from that apartment to the Lancaster Avenue unit. And another
officer reported that a buyer caught outside the Lancaster Avenue apartment might be
working for someone on West Fourth Street—three blocks from Ada’s apartment. Based
on those facts, as well as the experience-informed belief that “drug dealers . . . often
keep their main supply location separate from their sales location,” the police sought a
warrant for the Fourth Street apartment. But because they had seen no “illegal or
suspicious activity” at Ada’s Fourth Street apartment, the fact of his residence was an
inadequate logical connection to the drug activity observed on Lancaster Avenue.38
Here, by contrast, the statement from W-----’s mother suggested that W-----’s
criminal activity had occurred in D-----’s home. The magistrate could reasonably
conclude that evidence of his illegal possession of firearms would be found in D-----’s
home because the evidence suggested that W----- had been living with D----- at the time
the Instagram posts depicted him in the possession of those firearms. Based on the
37 Id. at *1–4.
38 Ada, 2001 WL 660227 at *5.

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totality of the circumstances, the facts in the affidavit established probable cause to
search because there was a reasonable nexus between the items to be sought (the
guns) and the home to be searched (D-----’s).
CONCLUSION
D----- has not established that the magistrate issued a warrant to search his
home without probable cause or that the search was otherwise unreasonable.
Consequently, his Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
May 5, 2026_______________ ___/ Eliza M. Hirst /________
Date Written Order Issued ELIZA M. HIRST, JUDGE
Date Emailed to Counsel:
EMH