Nicole Robinson & Kaliyah Robinson v. Robin Drive Auto, LLC

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF
DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

NICOLE ROBINSON &
KALIYAH ROBINSON,

Defendants-Below/Appellant,
V. C.A. No: CPU4-24-000736

ROBIN DRIVE AUTO, LLC,

Plaintiff-Below/Appellee.

Submitted: July 14, 2025
Decided: August 19, 2025

Dorranda R. Bordley, Esquire Robert C. McDonald, Esquire

Legal Services Corp. Silverman McDonald & Friedman

100 West 10" Street 1523 Concord Pike, Suite 400

Wilmington, DE 19801 Wilmington, DE 19803

(302) 575-0408 (302) 888-2900

Attorney for Appellant Attorney for Appellee
DECISION AFTER TRIAL

Danberg, C.J.
This breach of contract action, which is before the Court on appeal de novo
from a decision of the Justice of the Peace Court, stems from an agreement between
Appellants (collectively the “Robinsons”) Nicole Robinson (“Ms. Robinson”) and
Kaliyah Robinson (“Ms. Kaliyah”) and Appellee Robin Drive Auto, LLC (“Robin
Drive”) for the sale of a 2008 Honda Accord (the “Honda”). On May 16, 2025, the
case proceeded to trial on Robin Drive’s breach of contract claim. At the conclusion
of the trial, the Court reserved decision. After trial, and before the Court could render
a decision, the Robinsons filed a Motion to Amend on June 13, 2025. Robin Drive
responded on July 14, 2025. At which time, the Court took the Motion and decision
after trial under advisement. This is the Court’s final decision after trial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On or about August 21, 2023, Ms. Kaliyah visited Robin Drive, located at 804
Pulaski Highway, Bear, Delaware, to purchase a used vehicle. There, Ms. Kaliyah
discovered a Honda with a price tag of $10,000.00 displayed around the rear-view
mirror. After determining that she liked the vehicle, Ms. Kaliyah engaged in
negotiations with the owner and manager of Robin Drive, David Andrew (“Mr.
Andrew”). During their discussions, Mr. Andrew informed Ms. Kaliyah that she
would need a co-signer for the Honda. Taking this into account, Ms. Kaliyah called

her mother, Ms. Robinson, to request her assistance as a co-signer.
When Ms. Robinson arrived, the parties began reviewing the paperwork to
finance and purchase the Honda. At the time of signing, the Honda’s odometer
showed 152,936 miles. The parties had agreed that the Honda would cost $9,995.00,
excluding tax and tags.'! Ms. Kaliyah was to make a down payment of $4,000.00,
which included a payment of $2,000.00 at the time of purchase, while agreeing to a
deferred down payment of an additional $2,000.00, to be paid in four bi-weekly
installments starting on August 28, 2023. The payments of the remaining balance of
$8,220.00 were set to be paid beginning on October 19, 2023.

To finalize the purchase, Ms. Kaliyah and Ms. Robinson signed extensive
amounts of paperwork, including the purchase agreement, sales agreement, motor
vehicle retail installment sales contract, promissory note, the buyers guide, and the
odometer disclosure statement. It is important to note that the buyers guide the
Robinsons signed indicated that they were buying the Honda “as-is” and disclaimed
any warranties. Also contained in the contract is a provision awarding attorneys’ fees
to Robin Drive for enforcement of any portion of the contract.” At trial, Ms. Kaliyah
testified that she failed to read the documents thoroughly and relied on Mr. Andrew’s
explanation. Before leaving the lot, Ms. Robinson instructed Ms. Kaliyah to take the

Honda for a test drive.

' The total cost of the Honda was $11,225.00.
2 Appellee’s Ex. A, at 31.
During the drive, Ms. Kaliyah noticed that the radio was inoperable, the tint
on the back window obstructed the view, and the dashboard displayed a check-
engine alert. After returning to Robin Drive, Ms. Kaliyah informed Mr. Andrew of
the three issues. In response, Mr. Andrew assured her that he would address each
one of them.

In reality, there was no malfunction with the radio; it had merely been set to
auxiliary mode. Upon switching it to FM, Mr. Andrew confirmed it functioned
perfectly well. For the tint issue, Mr. Andrew issued Ms. Kaliyah a voucher
redeemable at the neighboring autobody shop, Advance Service Center, to have the
tint removed. He also examined the Honda to determine the cause of the check-
engine light, which indicated a small evaporative emission control system (““EVAP”)
leak. Mr. Andrew tightened the fuel cap, which resolved the issue, and the check-
engine light turned off. Satisfied with these repairs, Ms. Kaliyah drove the Honda
home. From her arrival at Robin Drive to when she drove off the lot with the Honda,
Ms. Kaliyah was at Robin Drive for roughly ten (10) hours.

That, however, was not the end of the issues with the Honda. The check-
engine light reappeared the following day. Consequently, Ms. Kaliyah took the
Honda to Auto Zone for a diagnostic check. The report revealed several issues: (1)
an EVAP issue; (2) a short in the left front seat belt buckle switch; (3) a modulator-

control unit power source low voltage; and (4) a control unit low voltage. With the
diagnostic report in hand, Ms. Kaliyah returned to Robin Drive, and a technician
swapped out the Honda’s battery, and the check-engine light deactivated. Two hours
later, the Honda’s check-engine light reappeared while Ms. Kaliyah was driving to
New York. What occurs next is disputed by the parties.

Ms. Kaliyah testified that she returned the Honda to Robin Drive on August
29, 2023, due to the check-engine light consistently reappearing and that the Honda
would not pass inspection if the light remained activated. She also testified that she
handed the keys to an employee at Robin Drive. Conversely, Ms. Robinson testified
that they gave the keys directly to Mr. Andrew, who instructed them to return the
following day so he could perform a license plate check to verify that there were no
outstanding tickets or accidents involving the Honda.

In contrast, Mr. Andrew testified that Ms. Kaliyah returned the Honda to
Advance Service Center. To support this contention, Robin Drive presented a repair
order from Advance Service Center dated August 29, 2023, as evidence.? Mr.
Andrew further testified that he was absent from Robin Drive on August 29". He
also explained why the check-engine light reappeared. He suggested the light’s

reappearance was caused by a flat tire on the Honda, which he claimed put a strain

3 Incidentally, missing from the repair order was a signature from Ms. Kaliyah authorizing
Advance Service Center to perform the repairs indicated on the form.

5
on the engine. He also testified that despite no police report, the Honda appeared to
have been in a back-end collision.

Regardless of the conflicting testimonies, it is undisputed what occurred next.
The following day, August 30, 2023, Ms. Kaliyah and Ms. Robinson returned to
Robin Drive and spoke with Mr. Andrew. He informed Ms. Kaliyah that if she was
unhappy with the Honda, she could choose another vehicle on the lot, and he would
swap it for the Honda. Ms. Kaliyah declined this offer and instead requested a refund
of her $2,000.00 deposit. Mr. Andrew ignored their request and began assisting
another customer instead. As a result, Ms. Robinson called the police, who informed
the Robinsons that Mr. Andrew wanted them off the property and that they had to
resolve the matter through the court system.

Approximately two weeks later, Ms. Robinson attempted to resolve the issue
with Mr. Andrew, but this effort proved unsuccessful. The parties did not have any
further contact until November 2, 2023, when Robin Drive sent Ms. Kaliyah and
Ms. Robinson a letter stating that it had become aware that the Honda was no longer
in their possession. Robin Drive learned of this through Advance Service Center. At
trial, Mr. Andrew testified that he did not retrieve the Honda from Advance Service
Center, which would have cost $500, due to prior negative experiences in similar
situations. Believing that the Honda was in Robin Drive’s possession, Ms. Kaliyah

and Ms. Robinson opted to disregard the November 2" letter.
Another issue addressed at trial was the mileage on the Honda. Before selling
the Honda to the Robinsons, Robin Drive acquired the Honda through a broker. The
sales form indicated a potential odometer rollback. When the Robinsons purchased
the Honda from Robin Drive, the odometer disclosure statement certified that the
Honda had 152,936 miles. The form also contained a warning stating, “The
odometer reading is not the actual mileage. Warning — odometer discrepancy.” That
box was not checked. The Robinsons performed a CarFax search of the Honda,
which detailed its service history and mileage, indicating a possibility of odometer
rollback.

During the trial, Mr. Andrew claimed that CarFax is unreliable. He testified
that he saw various discrepancies in the Honda’s CarFax report. Additionally, he
asserted that he checked with the Delaware Department of Motor Vehicles
(“DMV”), which did not report any potential odometer rollback. Trusting the
accuracy of Delaware’s DMV, Mr. Andrew concluded that the mileage on the Honda
was accurate, which led him to leave the warning box unchecked on the odometer
disclosure statement.

Ms. Kaliyah and Ms. Robinson were to begin making payments on the Honda
on August 28, 2023. However, they made no payments since they believed they had
returned the Honda to Robin Drive. As a result of their failure to make any payments

on the Honda, Robin Drive initiated suit against them in the Justice of the Peace
Court.* It was not until the trial in that court that the Robinsons learned that Robin
Drive did not have possession of the Honda. After this revelation, Ms. Robinson
called the police to report the Honda stolen.

Ms. Kaliyah and Ms. Robinson appealed the Justice of the Peace Court’s
decision to this Court, raising the following claims: (1) violation of Delaware’s
Disclosure of Odometer Information statute; (2) violation of Delaware’s Retail
Installment Act; (3) violation of Federal Odometer Law, 49 U.S.C. § 32703;° (4)
violation of Delaware’s Consumer Protection Act; (5) violation of 6 Del. C. § 2732;
(6) violation of the Deceptive Practices in Consumer Contracts Act; (7) breach of
express and implied warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; (8)
revocation of acceptance under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the
“UCC”); and (9) failure to mitigate damages. The Robinsons seek a monetary award
of $2,000.00 for the down payment paid to Robin Drive, along with treble damages,
compensatory damages, costs, pre- and post-judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees.

On the other hand, Robin Drive alleges that the Robinsons breached the
agreement by failing to make payments on the Honda as stipulated in the sales and

purchase agreement. Robin Drive seeks a judgment for $10,248.00, plus pre- and

4 Robin Drive Auto LLC v. Nicole Robinson & Kaliyah Robinson, Del. J.P., CA No. JP13-23-
010516, Hanby, M. (March 4, 2024).
> Appellants filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint on June 13, 2025, which was subsequently

granted.
8
post-judgment interest at the per diem rate of 22.90% from August 28, 2023, along
with attorneys’ fees.

A trial was held on May 16, 2025, at the conclusion of which the Court
reserved decision. On June 13, 2025, the Robinsons filed a Motion to Amend the
Complaint to conform to the evidence presented at trial. On July 14, 2025, Robin
Drive filed a Motion in Opposition to the Robinsons’ Motion to Amend.

DISCUSSION

In a bench trial, the Court serves as finder of fact; it must weigh the credibility
of witnesses and resolve the conflicts in their testimony.® It is incumbent on the
plaintiff to prove each element of their claims by a preponderance of the evidence,
meaning “proof that something is more likely than not.”’ As such, the Court must
“find in favor of the party upon whose side the greater weight of the evidence is

found.’

6 See Johnson v. State, 929 A.2d 784 (Del. 2007) (TABLE); Jn re 2004 Harley Davidson VIN No.
1VF9FV31A84R116374, 2011 WL 601440, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2011); Pencader
Associates, LLC v. Synergy Direct Mortgage Inc., 2010 WL 2681862, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June
30, 2010).

7 Del. Express Shuttle, Inc., 2002 WL 31458243, at *17 (quoting Del. Super. P.J.I. Civ. § 4.1
(2000)).

8 D. W. Burt Concrete Construction, Inc. v. Dewey Beach Enterprises, Inc., 2016 WL 639653, at
*2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2016) (citing Patel v. Patel, 2009 WL 427977, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct.
Feb. 20, 2009)).
I. Motion to Amend
The Robinsons seek to amend their counterclaim to include breach of the Federal
Odometer Disclosure Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 32705, 32710, pursuant to Court of
Common Pleas Civil Rule 15(b). Rule 15(b) allows a party to amend a complaint to
conform to the evidence at any time, even after judgment:

When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the Court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of
the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party
fails to satisfy the Court that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice the party in maintaining the party’s action or defense upon the
merits. The Court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party

to meet such evidence.

10
The Robinsons aver that there is no prejudice to Robin Drive because the
Robinsons already pled a counterclaim for breach of the State odometer disclosure
act at the onset of this action and had the opportunity to rebut this allegation at trial.

In the inverse, Robin Drive argues that Rule 15(b) has no application to the
current matter and the Court should deny the Robinsons’ post-trial motion. While
Robin Drive does not argue that it is prejudiced by the Robinsons’ Motion, it does
allege that the Robinsons had their day in court, where the issues were fully and
fairly litigated. Robin Drive also contends that for the Robinsons to be entitled to
amend pursuant to Rule 15(b), it would have needed to make an objection at trial, or
the Robinsons would have needed to request a pre-trial continuance, an action which
neither party pursued.

Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 15 permits amendments to pleadings
unless it would prejudice the opposing party.’ The purpose of the rule is to resolve
cases based on their merits.'° A decision to permit or deny an amendment is left to
the trial judge’s discretion.'!

While there is minimal Delaware case law on Rule 15(b), federal courts,

whose Rule 15(b) serves as the model for Delaware’s, often allow post-trial

° State ex rel. Structa-bond, Inc. v. Mumford & Miller Concrete, Inc., 2002 WL 31101938, at *2
(Del. Super. Sept. 17, 2002).

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amendments of the complaint.!* Federal precedent indicates that an amendment
under Rule 15(b) “should be permitted if the record indicates that the parties
understood that the evidence was aimed at the unpleaded issue.”'? The party
opposing the amendment must demonstrate that allowing it would be prejudicial to
their defense."4

Robin Drive’s allegation that Rule 15(b) comes into play only if it objected to
evidence presented at trial is misconceived. Instead, the rule is laying out the
procedure should a party object to evidence presented at trial outside the claims
alleged in the pleadings.!° The Rule clearly allows for post-trial motions to amend
the complaint to conform to evidence presented at trial.!° More importantly, Robin
Drive clearly states in its Opposition Motion that neither party is prejudiced by the
Robinsons’ Motion to Amend. Further, the evidence the Robinsons presented at trial
was aimed at the unpleaded issue. Thus, the Court has no reason to deny the
Robinsons’ Motion.

Therefore, the Robinsons’ Motion to Amend the Complaint is granted.

12 Td. at *3.

'3 State ex rel. Structa-bond, Inc. v. Mumford & Miller Concrete, Inc., 2002 WL 31101938, at *3
(Del. Super. Sept. 17, 2002).

14 Id.

'S CCP Civ. R. 15(b).

16 Td.

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II. Delaware’s Retail Installment Act & Delaware’s Disclosure of Odometer
Information Statute

The Robinsons alleged two claims in their appeal that can quickly be disposed
of: (1) violation of Delaware’s Retail Installment Act, and (2) violation of
Delaware’s Disclosure of Odometer Information statute.

The Robinsons claim that Robin Drive violated Delaware’s Retail Installment
Sales Act (““DRISA”). While DRISA regulates installment sales of personal and
household goods,!’ it does not cover the sale of motor vehicles.!* Thus, the
Robinsons’ claim that Robin Drive violated DRISA fails.

Similarly, Delaware’s Disclosure of Odometer Information statute does
involve motor vehicles.!? But does not provide for a civil cause of action.”° Only the
State can bring forth criminal charges when a person violates this statute.”!
Therefore, the Robinsons’ claim that Robin Drive violated Delaware’s Disclosure of

Odometer Information statute also fails.

7 6 Del. C. § 4301(3).

18 6 Del. C. § 4301(3); Freeman v. DE Auto Sales, Inc., 1987 WL25492, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct.
Nov. 19, 1987).

1991 Del. C. § 6407.

2091 Del. C. § 6420.

2191 Del. C. § 6420.

13
III. Federal Odometer Act
The Federal Odometer Act (“the Act”) provides for a private cause of action
where a party violates the Act with the intent to defraud.” The Act’s stated purpose
is: “(1) to prohibit tampering with motor vehicle odometers; and (2) to provide
safeguards to protect purchasers in the sale of motor vehicles with altered or reset
odometers.””? Here, the Robinsons allege that Robin Drive violated 49 U.S.C. §
32705.
Section 32705 provides:

a person transferring ownership of a motor vehicle shall give the

transferee the following written disclosure: (A) Disclosure of the

cumulative mileage registered on the odometer. (B) Disclosure that the

actual mileage is unknown, if the transferor knows that the odometer

reading is different from the number of miles the vehicle has actually

traveled.”
Further, “[a] person transferring ownership of a motor vehicle may not violate a
regulation prescribed under this section or give a false statement to the transferee in

making the [odometer] disclosure required by such a regulation.”

22 Goldman Motor Sales & Leasing v. Singh, 2025 WL 1256722, at *8 (N.D. Ohio April 30,
2025).

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Id.

14
The Act also provides that “[a] person may bring a civil action to enforce a
claim under this section in an appropriate United States district court or another court
of competent jurisdiction.””° “A person that violates this chapter or a regulation
prescribed or order issued under this chapter, with intent to defraud, is liable for 3
times the actual damages or $10,000, whichever is greater.”?’ In addition, Section
32710 mandates that the Court “shall award costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee to
the person when a judgment is entered for that person.”?8

Here, the Robinsons allege that Robin Drive sold the Honda to them with
knowledge that the odometer had been tampered with and was inaccurate, thus
making false statements to the Robinsons with the intent to defraud. The Robinsons
presented evidence from CarFax and Robin Drive’s Honda purchase form indicating
a potential odometer rollback. However, when the Robinsons purchased the Honda,
Robin Drive failed to put them on notice that the odometer may have been tampered
with, and that the mileage may be inaccurate.

As a preliminary matter, the Robinsons failed to prove that there was a
problem with the odometer reading. At best, they raised a question about whether it

may have been inaccurate. Nor have they proven that Robin Drive knew the

odometer reading was unknown or inaccurate. The Court finds it reasonable that

6 Singh, 2025 WL 1256722, at *8.
27 Id.
28 Id.

15
Robin Drive relied upon Delaware’s DMV. Mr. Andrew testified that he does not
use CarFax because of its unreliability and that even though it had a warning of
potential odometer rollback when he purchased the Honda, he certified the mileage
through the DMV. More importantly, nothing in § 32710 mandates that the seller of
a motor vehicle must investigate whether there has been a potential odometer
rollback.

In addition, the Robinsons failed to provide testimony from an expert on the
veracity of the CarFax report. CarFax reports are only a compilation of information
submitted by third parties. There was no information presented as to what steps
CarFax takes to verify the accuracy of these third-party reports. While CarFax
reports may be widely used, their accuracy and the process generating them is not
common knowledge. All of which leads the Court to believe that Robin Drive was
reasonable in its belief that the mileage on the Honda was accurate. Accordingly, the
Robinsons failed to prove that Robin Drive failed to comply with the Act.

IV. Delaware’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act
The Robinsons allege that Robin Drive violated Delaware’s Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (“DTPA”). In support of this allegation, the Robinsons argue that
Robin Drive made false or misleading statements regarding the Honda’s price and

standard, quality, and grade, when it was in fact another.

16
The DTPA prohibits engaging in a “deceptive trade practice ... in the course
of business, vocation, or occupation.””? In pertinent part the DTPA provides: “[a]

person engages in deceptive trade practice” if they:

(7) Represents that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality,
or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are

of another;

(12)Engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of
confusion or misunderstanding.*°

To succeed in a claim under DTPA, a plaintiff need only prove that the

defendant’s conduct constitutes one of the twelve enumerated categories of

acts.*! “[T]he DTPA was not intended to redress wrongs between a business

and its customers.” Thus, for a litigant to have standing under the DTPA, they

29 Smash Franchise Partners, LLC y. Kanda Holdings, Inc., 2023 WL 45608984, at *23 (Del.
Ch. July 14, 2023; Coretel America, Inc. v. Oak Point Partners, LLC, 2022 WL 2903104, at *9Q
(Del. Super. July 24, 2022); Tygon Peak Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. Mobile Inv. Investco, LLC, 2022
WL 34688, at *27 (Del. Ch. Jan. 4, 2022).

3° 6 Del. C. § 2532.

31 Kanda Holdings, Inc., 2023 WL 4560984, at *25.

32 Banner v. Moris Auto. Corp., 2017 WL 439335, at *4 (Del. Com. Pl. Feb. 1, 2017) (citing
Grand Ventures, Inc. v. Whaley, 632 A.2d 63, 65 (Del. 1993).

17
must have “a business or trade interest at stake which is the subject of
interference by the unfair or deceptive trade practices of another.”

Moreover, “[t]he DIPA was designed to prevent patterns of deceptive
conduct, not isolated incidents.”*4 Therefore, “relief under the statute is
dependent on plaintiffs entitlement to injunctive relief.”*> And “must be
supported by allegation of facts that create a reasonable apprehension of a
future wrong.”?°

While the Robinsons raised this claim in their complaint on appeal, at trial,
it appears that they abandoned their DTPA claim. Nor did the Robinsons ever
articulate which of the twelve prohibited practices Robin Drive engaged in.
Even if properly asserted, however, their claim would still fall short of what is
needed to satisfy a claim under the DTPA. Among the aforementioned
categories of deceptive trade practices, the best fit for the Robinsons theory is

Section 2532 (a)(7) and (12). Even assuming that the Robinsons’ allegations fit

into either category, their DTPA claim would fail because they lack standing

33 Id.

34 Mobile Inv. Investco, LLC 2022 WL 34688, at *28; Coretel America, Inc., 2022 WL 2903104,
at *9; see also EDIX Meida Grp., Inc. v. Mahani, 2006 WL 3742595, at *12 (Del. Ch. Dec. 12,
2006) (“The DTPA was designed to prevent patterns of deceptive conduct, not isolated
incidents.”).

35 Id. (citing Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Kirkland, 2009 WL 119865, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 20, 2009));
see State ex rel. Brady v. Pettinaro Enters., 870 A.2d 513, 537 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[T]he failure of
a party to be able to state a claim for injunctive relief at the time the suit is brough is fatal to
claims under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.”)

36 Coretel America, Inc., 2022 WL 2903104, at *9.

18
to bring a claim under the DTPA. The Robinsons’ relationship in this dispute
is that of a purchaser (i.e., a customer), and not as a competing business or a
person with interest in Robin Drive.

Furthermore, they do not allege a pattern of conduct or reasonable
apprehension of future wrong. Instead, the Robinsons’ appeal references an
isolated incident that occurred roughly two years ago. Nor do the Robinsons
seek injunctive relief. Therefore, the Robinsons failed to prove that Robin
Drive violated the DTPA.

V. Delaware Consumer Protection Laws

In their appeal and at trial, the Robinsons claimed that Robin Drive violated
Delaware’s Consumer Protection Act and Consumer Contract Act.

a. Delaware’s Consumer Protection Act

Delaware’s Consumer Protection Act?” (“DCPA”) was enacted in 1965 for the
primary purpose “to protect consumers and legitimate business enterprises from
unfair or deceptive merchandising practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce in part or wholly within [Delaware].”** “Unlike the DIPA, the DCPA

allows for a private cause of action.”*? To bring a private cause of action, the

37 6 Del. C. § 2513

38 6 Del. C. § 2513; Doe v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc.: 2025 WL 1010403, at *12 (Del.
Super Ct. April 4, 2025).

39 Banner v. Morsi Auto Corp., 2017 WL 439335, at *5 (Del. Com. PI. Feb. 1, 2017).

19
plaintiff must allege: “(1) the defendant engaged in conduct which violated the
statute; (2) the plaintiff was a “victim” of the unlawful conduct; and (3) a causal
relationship exists between the defendant’s unlawful conduct and the plaintiffs
ascertainable loss. The DCPA defines an unlawful practice as:
[t]he act, use, or employment by any person of any deception, fraud, false
pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice, or the concealment,
suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon
such concealing, suppression, or omission, in connection with the sale, lease,
receipt, or advertisement of any merchandise.”

To prove a claim under this act, the consumer must establish that the
merchant made a false statement, with the knowledge that the statement was
untrue, or the merchant negligently made a misrepresentation.*' The merchant
need not have intended to make the misrepresentation or omission of a material
fact; instead, the merchant only has to intend that the consumer rely on his
omission or misrepresentation.*? Additionally, an unlawful practice is committed
regardless of the consumer’s reliance.” In determining whether a merchant

committed consumer fraud, “the statute must be interpreted in light of established

40 Td.
41 Banner v. Morsi Auto Corp., 2017 WL 439335, at *5 (Del. Com. Pl. Feb. 1, 2017).
42 Id.
43 Id.

20
common law definitions and concepts of fraud and deceit.”** Relief under the
DCPA includes both injunctive and restitutional relief for violations.

The Robinsons argue that Robin Drive engaged in misrepresentation and
unfair practices concerning the sale and advertisement of the Honda. It is unclear
what exact misrepresentation the Robinsons allege Robin Drive made. In
considering this claim in light of the testimony, it appears that the Robinsons
either alleged that the odometer reading or the overall condition of the Honda was
misrepresented. Neither withstands scrutiny. While neither party apprised the
Court of this case, Brandywine Volkswagen, Ltd. v. State of Dept. of Community,"°
informative.

At first glance, it would appear that this case is identical to the one at hand.
In Brandywine Volkswagen, Ltd., the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a
Superior Court’s ruling that a car dealership violated the DCPA by
misrepresenting a vehicle’s mileage.*’ The dealership sold a car showing 13,000
miles, despite having a New York Motor Vehicle Form indicating over 20,000
miles when it acquired the car from auction.*® The Court determined that this

disparity should have prompted the dealership to investigate further and disclose

44 Id.

45 Baccellieri v. HDM Furniture Ind., Inc., 2013 WL 1088338, at *4 (Del. Super. Feb. 28, 2013).
46 312 a.2d 632 (1973).

47 Id. at 634.

48 Id. at 633.

21
the difference in the mileage.”? Its failure to do so constituted a misrepresentation
under 6 Del. C. 2513.°°

However, Brandywine Volkswagen, Ltd., is distinguishable. While Robin
Drive’s sales form from the auctioneer indicated a potential for a mileage issue,
no evidence has been submitted to substantiate that the odometer had been rolled
back. Although the Robinsons submitted a CarFax report into evidence, which
purports to show that Honda’s mileage exceeds Robin Drive’s representations,
several issues limit its probative value, and Mr. Andrew’s testimony regarding its
reliability was uncontroverted by the Robinsons.

Another fact distinguishing this case from the Brandywine Volkswagen,
Ltd., is that Mr. Andrew testified that he investigated whether the mileage was
accurate. He stated that when he submitted the mileage to the DMV, it did not flag
the vehicle as a potential rollback. The Robinsons failed to present any evidence
or testimony as to what Robin Drive failed to do in relation to the Honda’s
mileage, nor did they challenge the DMV as being a reliable source as to the
mileage. Nor did the Robinsons prove that the odometer reading was wrong. With

regard to the condition of the Honda, the vehicle was sold “as-is,” and the

49 Id. at 634.
50 Id. at 634.

22
Robinsons failed to establish that any further representations were made with
regard to the vehicle's condition.
The Robinsons did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Robin
Drive violated the DCPA.
b. Delaware’s Consumer Contracts Act
Similarly, the Consumer Contracts Act’! (“CCA”) seeks to protect
consumers from deceptive practices in consumer contracts.” The CCA “prohibits
a person, in a contract for the sale of merchandise, from engaging in a deceptive
practice by knowingly or recklessly distorting or obscuring the terms, conditions,
or meaning of the contract or creating a likelihood of confusion or
misunderstanding by the use of unintelligible words, phrases, or sentences.”°°
Furthermore, the CCA “prohibits a person from knowingly or recklessly omitting
information required by law to be disclosed in the contract.”** “Treble damages
are available for any person found to have violated the CCA.””°
Under the CCA, the Robinsons claim that Robin Drive did the following:

(1) knowingly and/or recklessly distorted and obscured the terms, conditions,

and/or meaning of the contract; (2) knowingly and/or recklessly created a

16 Del. C. § 2732.

>2 Baccellieri, 2013 WL 1088338, at *5.
53 Id.

54 Id

55 Id

23
likelihood of confusion and/or misunderstanding by its use of unintelligible.
words, phrases, and/or sentences; and (3) knowingly and/or recklessly omitted
information required by law to be disclosed in contracts with consumers. The
Robinsons’ claim under the CCA cannot prevail.

The Robinsons’ first and second claims are unsuccessful. The Court notes
that the Robinsons failed to identify precisely which contractual terms were
ambiguous or misunderstood, or how any terms were distorted or obscured at trial.
At trial, Ms. Kaliyah testified that she either did not sign or did not recall signing
most of these documents, insinuating that Robin Drive forged her signature.
However, she later conceded to signing the forms without reading them, relying
solely on Mr. Andrew’s explanation. Further, Ms. Robinson testified that she
remembered them signing them. Based upon her selective memory and her
demeanor on the stand, the Court finds Ms. Kaliyah’s testimony to be lacking
credibility. While this does not preclude a claim under the CCA, the Court’s
analysis of the submitted contracts and trial testimony reveals no ambiguous or
confusing terms at issue. Nor was there evidence submitted that Robin Drive
distorted or obscured the agreement’s terms, meanings, or conditions.

As to the Robinsons’ third claim, in neither the complaint nor at trial did they

specify what information was omitted that was required by law.°° To the extent

56 The Robinsons did not identify any law or statute with a mandatory contract disclosure.

24
that they intended to incorporate the federal and/or state odometer acts into this
claim, they are unsuccessful. Even if required, Robin Drive did provide an
odometer disclosure report to the Robinsons. The Robinsons simply failed to
prove that the Robin Drive was aware of an odometer issue, did not properly
investigate an issue, or that the odometer reading was incorrect.

Therefore, the Court finds that the Robinsons failed to prove that Robin Drive
violated the CCA.

VI. Breach of Express and Implied Warranties under the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act

The Robinsons also argue that Robin Drive breached express and implied
warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The Robinsons argue that
Robin Drive made representations to them, which they relied on when purchasing
the Honda. Specifically, they claim that Robin Drive promised to remedy the
engine light, the radio, and the tint on the back window at the time of purchase.
The Robinsons aver that Robin Drive remedied none of these issues and thus it
breached the express warranties made to them.

On the other hand, Robin Drive contends that while it agreed to remedy those
issues, it did not enter into any warranty with the Robinsons. At trial, Robin Drive
pointed to the multiple documents signed at the time of purchase that provide that

the Robinsons did not purchase any warranties, disclaimed all warranties, and sold

25
the Honda “as-is.” Alternatively, Robin Drive alleges that, even assuming the
existence of a warranty, it fully rectified the reported issues with the Honda.

The Magnuson-Moss Act establishes a statutory cause of action for consumers
concerning written warranties and to prevent attempts to disclaim implied
warranties where a merchant has provided a written warranty.°’ The Robinsons’
claim under the Magnuson-Moss Act fails because neither party has produced a
written warranty. In addition, the evidence and testimony presented at trial
demonstrated that the Honda was sold “as-is” and without any warranty. Thus,
the Robinsons’ claim for breach of warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Act is
without merit.

At best, the parties may have entered a verbal contract. Under the UCC, an
express warranty is created by a seller when “any affirmation of fact or promise
made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to
the affirmation or promise.”°® The seller need not use the exact words “warrant”

or “guarantee,” or “have a specific intention to make a warranty.”°? Further

7 Mayew v. Chrysler, LLC, 2008 WL 4447707, at *7 (Del. Super. Oct. 1, 2008).
58 6 Del. C. § 2-313 (1)(a).
>? 6 Del. C. § 2-313 (2).

26
warranty provisions are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the buyer
of goods.”

To prevail on a breach of warranty claim, “[t]he buyer must prove: (1) the
existence of an express warranty; (2) a breach of the defendant’s express ...
warranty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s breach and the
plaintiff's injury or damage, and (4) the extent of loss proximately caused by the
defendant’s breach.”! Further, “the buyer must first prove compliance with any
conditions precedent that the seller has imposed with respect to the warranty.”

First, Appellant must show that a warranty exists. At trial, there was some
contention about whether Robin Drive made an express warranty to the
Robinsons. However, the Court finds that Robin Drive did not make an express
warranty. As noted above, an express warranty is made when it is the basis of the
bargain. That was not the case here. Mr. Andrews agreed to repair the issues on
the Honda only after the Robinsons completed the purchase. The promise was not
made in connection with the purchase, i.e., the basis of the bargain. Therefore,

Mr. Andrew’s promise to remedy the three issues with the Honda cannot be

construed as an express warranty.

60 Miller v. Leidos, Inc., 2024 WL 4534135, at *6 (Del. Super. Oct. 21, 2024).
a Staging Dimensions, Inc. v. KP Walch Assoc., Inc., 2020 WL 1428120, at *5 (Del. Com. PI.
March 19, 2020) (citing Driscoll v. Automaxx, 2016 WL 5107066, at *2 (Del. Com. Pl. April 27,

27
VII. Revocation of Acceptance

In connection with their claim of breach of express warranties, the Robinsons
argue that they revoked acceptance of Honda in a timely manner. The Robinsons
aver that they revoked the contract to purchase the Honda when they returned it
eight (8) days after purchasing it because of the continuous check-engine light
being activated and after Robin Drive’s two attempts to remedy it to no avail.
Moreover, the testimony was that the Honda’s radio and tint were also never
corrected. However, Robin Drive claims that the Robinsons never returned the
Honda to them, but to Advance Service Center.

Under the UCC, the buyer has the right to inspect the goods before payment
or acceptance.® The fact that the buyer paid prior to inspection of the goods does
not mean that the buyer has accepted the goods. However, rejection of the goods
must be at a reasonable time after their delivery or tender, and the buyer must
seasonably notify the seller of the rejection.©

Acceptance of the goods occurs when the buyer fails to make an effective
rejection under 6 Del. C. § 2-602.% Pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 2-607(1), the buyer

must pay the contract rate for any goods accepted. A buyer may revoke acceptance

63 6 Del. C. § 2-513(1).
64 6 Del. C. § 2-512(2).
65 § Del. C. § 2-602(1).
66 6 Del. C. § 2-606(1)(b).

28
of the goods where the defect substantially impairs the value of the goods to
them.®’ However, “revocation of acceptance requires a showing that any non-
conformity has not been ‘seasonably cured’ and notice within a ‘reasonable
time.’”°

The UCC does not define the phrase “reasonable time,” although it is used in
numerous sections of the Sales chapter. In addressing this phrase under the
provisions for revocation, the Delaware Supreme Court has stated that
reasonableness is generally a question of fact for the factfinder to decide.’”” The
Court observed that in some cases, notice given to the seller two or even four years
after discovering the nonconformity is reasonable. Still, there are cases in which
“a buyer has delayed so excessively that his actions become untimely as a matter
of law.”7! In other words, whether a plaintiff has given a defendant reasonable
notice under the UCC sales provisions must be decided on a case-by-case basis.”

At first glance, it appears that the Robinsons may have successfully revoked
under Article 2 of the UCC, but that is not the case. The Honda indeed had a non-

conformity; the check engine light was activated. This effectively impairs the

vehicle’s value because it prevents the Honda from being registered with

67 6 Del. C. § 2-608(1).

68 Staging Dimensions, Inc., 2020 WL 1428120, at *6.

69 Smith v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 2002 WL 31814534, at *4 (Del. Super. Nov. 20, 2002).
70 Td.

71 Id.

72 Td

29
Delaware’s DMV, which both parties agreed to at trial. Further, the Robinsons
had given notice within a reasonable time. They revoked acceptance eight days
after purchasing the Honda, and after two attempts by Robin Drive to remedy the
issue.

The pitfall for the Robinsons is the claim that Robin Drive did not “seasonably
cure” the engine light issue. While neither federal nor state laws specify the exact
number of failed repair attempts required to justify a buyer revoking acceptance,
caselaw suggests “at a minimum there must be more than one or two attempts, or
there must be an outright refusal to repair.”” In this instance, the Robinsons’
unwillingness to obtain satisfaction from Robin Drive regarding the most crucial
defect prevents them from claiming a failure to repair. Given that the Robinsons
afforded Robin Drive only two opportunities to rectify the issue, this falls
demonstrably short of the threshold revocation stipulated by Article 2 of the
UCC.”

In addition, Robin Drive claims to have resolved the engine light issue.
According to Mr. Andrew’s testimony, Ms. Kaliyah subsequently drove the

Honda with a flat tire, which placed undue stress on the engine and reactivated

73 Olmstead v. Gen. Motors Corp,, Inc., 500 A.2d 615, 619 (Del. Super. 1985) (citing Volkswagen
of Am., Inc. v. Harrell, 431 So.2d 156 (Ala. 1983); Winchester v. McCulloch Bros. Garage, 388
So.2d 927 (Ala. 1980)).

14 See id.

30
the warning light. This testimony was not effectively rebutted. The Court finds
Mr. Andrew’s testimony to be credible and concludes that the engine light would
not have reappeared had Ms. Kaliyah not driven on the flat tire.

The testimony also indicated that the radio was fully functional when switched
from auxiliary mode to FM. After Mr. Andrew adjusted the setting, Ms. Kaliyah
voiced no dissatisfaction with its performance. Moreover, the Robinsons failed to
redeem the voucher provided by Robin Drive to remove the rear window tint.
Therefore, the Court cannot find that the reason for the revocation of the Honda
could be attributed to the issue with the radio or tint.

Thus, the Robinsons’ Article 2 revocation claim fails because the weight of the
credible evidence is against them.

VII. Breach of Contract

To prevail on a breach of contract claim, the party alleging the breach must
prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that: (1) a contract existed between the
parties; (2) the defendant materially breached an obligation imposed by the
contract; and (3) the plaintiff suffered damages because of the breach.”” Delaware
law has established that “to recover damages for any breach of contract, plaintiff

must demonstrate substantial compliance with all of the provisions of [the]

™ Gregory v. Frazer, 2010 WL 4262030, at *1 (Del. Com. PI. Oct. 8, 2010); VLIW Tech., LLC v.
Hewlett-Packard, CO., 840 A.2d 606, 612 (Del. 2003).

31
contract.””© Damages for breach of contract will be in an amount sufficient to
return the party damaged to the position that party would have been in had the
breach not occurred.”

In this case, there is no dispute that the parties entered into a contract. Thus,
the issues presented to this Court are: (1) whether the Robinsons were excused
from their duties under the contract, and (2) if they breached their contractual
duties, whether Robin Drive is owed any damages.

For the reasons stated above, the Robinsons were not excused from their duties
under the contract. Robin Drive had substantially complied with its
responsibilities under the contract by delivering the Honda to the Robinsons.
Therefore, the Robinsons breached their contractual duties on August 28, 2023,
when they failed to start making payments on the Honda.

IX. Mitigation of Damages

The non-breaching party, Robin Drive, has a duty to mitigate once a breach of

contract occurs.’® However, the Robinsons’ claim is unsuccessful for the

following reasons.

7 Emmett Hickman Co. y. Emilio Capano Dev., Inc., 251 A.2d 571, 73 (Del. Super. 1969).

7” Delaware Service, Inc. v. Royal Limousine Svc., Inc., 1991 WL 53449, at *3 (Del. Super. April
5, 1991).

78 Lowe v. Bennett, 1994 WL 750378, at *4 (Del. Super. Dec. 29, 1994).

32
A fundamental principle of contract law is that the party suing for breach of
contract must mitigate damages once a breach occurs, regardless of whether
mitigation is expressly prescribed in the underlying contract.”” The injured party’s
duty to mitigate commences after the offending party materially breaches the
contract.®° A party’s duty to mitigate “is subject to reasonableness and whether
the loss is mitigable.”*' Where a party fails to mitigate, their damages are limited
to what they would have been had mitigation occurred.”

Here, the Court finds that the Robinsons breached their duty under the sales
contract when they failed to pay for the Honda. Robin Drive’s obligation to
mitigate damages was triggered when the Robinsons breached the contract on
August 28, 2023. Even assuming that the Honda was returned to Advance Service
Center, as Robin Drive alleges, Robin Drive knew where the vehicle was. Robin
Drive was also aware of the cost of recouping the Honda and how to sell it.
Further, they have a cooperative agreement with Advance Service Center. Thus,
once the Robinsons breached their agreement with Robin Drive, Robin Drive had
a duty to recoup the Honda and sell it to mitigate its damages under the contract.

Their failure to do so limits the amount of damages they can seek.

19 SHL Gen. Contractor, Inc. v. Ambience Inc., 2020 WL 1130325, at *6 (Del. Com. Pl. March 4,

82 Td.
33
The Robinsons would have been entitled to mitigation costs in the amount of
the difference between the contract price and the price of the Honda at the time of
breach. However, the Robinsons have failed to provide evidence on how much
the Honda was worth to mitigate Robin Drive’s damages. While it may seem
axiomatic that the value of the vehicle eight (8) days later would be the same as
at purchase, that is not necessarily true. In this case, there was testimony regarding
a potential accident, driving on a flat tire, and adding substantial miles to the car.
All of which, if true, would diminish the value even over a short period of time.
Since the Court “may not set damages based on mere ‘speculation or conjecture,”
it cannot arbitrarily set an amount because the Robinsons failed to adduce any

evidence as to the worth of the Honda at the time of breach. ®

83 Beard Rsch., Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 613 (Del. Ch. 2010) (quoting Medek v. Medek, 20019
WL 2005365, at *12 (Del. Ch. July 1, 2009).

34
CONCLUSION

The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence at trial that Robin Drive
has proven damages in the amount of $10,248.00. Therefore, the Court enters
judgment in favor of Robin Drive against the Robinsons in the amount of
$10,248.00, plus pre- and post-judgment interest at the contractual rate of 22.30%
from August 28, 2023. The Court also awards Robin Drive reasonable attorneys’
fees, in accordance with the agreement. To determine the attorney fee award,
Plaintiff must file an affidavit of its attorneys’ fees with an itemized billing

statement for consideration.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

35