Andrew Medal v. Beckett Collectibles, LLC

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ANDREW MEDAL, as Stakeholders’ )
Representative for the former )
stakeholders of Due Dilly Trilly, Inc., a )
Delaware corporation, )
)
Plaintiff, ) C.A. No. 2023-0984-VLM
)
v. )
)
BECKETT COLLECTIBLES, LLC, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Submitted: May 6, 2024
Decided: August 22, 2024

Upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint,
DENIED.

Peter B. Ladig, Esquire, BAYARD, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware. Attorneys for
Plaintiff.
Paul D. Brown, Esquire, CHIPMAN BROWN CICERO & COLE, LLP, Wilmington,
Delaware, Aaron Z. Tobin, Esquire, Abigail R. Campbell, Esquire, CONDON TOBIN
SLADEK THORNTON NERENBERG PLLC, Dallas, Texas. Attorneys for Defendant.

Medinilla, J.1

1
Sitting as a Vice Chancellor of the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware by designation of
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Delaware under Del. Const. art. IV, § 13(2), pursuant to
In re Designation of Actions Filed Pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 111 (Del. Sept. 18, 2023) (ORDER).
I. INTRODUCTION

This is an action for breach of contract. Plaintiff Andrew Medal brings this

suit in his capacity as the contractually designated representative of the former

stakeholders of Due Dilly Trilly, Inc. (“DDT”). DDT’s former stakeholders sold

DDT to Defendant Beckett Collectibles, LLC through a Stock Purchase Agreement

dated August 4, 2022 (the “SPA”). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant breached the SPA

by failing to pay post-closing milestone consideration.

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint on both

procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, Defendant raises several issues

that stem from Mr. Medal’s multiple roles in this dispute. Specifically, in addition

to representing DDT’s former stakeholders as Plaintiff, Mr. Medal is also a factually

significant individual whose termination from Defendant is at the heart of this

controversy. Defendant thus argues that (1) Mr. Medal, in his representative capacity

as Plaintiff, has no standing to pursue a declaratory judgment; (2) Mr. Medal, in his

personal capacity, is a necessary party; (3) the former stakeholders of DDT, who Mr.

Medal represents as Plaintiff, are each necessary parties; and (4) Mr. Medal, in his

personal capacity, is attempting to “back-door a ruling that his termination was

improper,” which Defendant says must be resolved by the Texas courts. For the

reasons herein, the Court does not agree with any of those contentions.

1
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s claims fail on the merits. Specifically,

that Counts I and II must be dismissed because they do not affirmatively identify

breach of contract as the applicable cause of action. Defendant also offers its own

interpretation of the SPA and the relevant facts, which, if accepted, would refute

Plaintiff’s claims. The Court, however, finds that Plaintiff has pled reasonably

conceivable breach-of-contract claims. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss the Amended Complaint is DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

A. The Parties

As discussed more fully below, Plaintiff Andrew Medal is the contractually

designated representative of DDT’s former stakeholders.3 He is also the founder of

DDT and the former Chief Innovation Officer (“CIO”) of Defendant.4 Unless

otherwise indicated, this decision will refer to Mr. Medal in his representative

capacity as “Plaintiff” and his personal capacity as “Mr. Medal.” Mr. Medal is a

resident of Florida.5

2
The following facts are derived from the allegations in the Amended Complaint and the
documents either incorporated therein or integral thereto. See D.I. No. 8 (hereinafter, “Am.
Compl.”). The Court accepts these allegations as true solely for purposes of this motion.
3
Am. Compl. ¶ 7.
4
Id. ¶¶ 7, 14.
5
Id. ¶ 13.
2
Defendant Beckett Collectibles, LLC is a North Carolina limited liability

company headquartered in Texas.6

B. The SPA

Defendant specializes in pricing collectibles, such as trading cards and sports

memorabilia.7 DDT “provided digital market place intelligence for the collectible

industry.”8 In December 2021, Defendant proposed a transaction between DDT and

Defendant.9 After negotiations, the parties executed the SPA on August 4, 2022,

through which Defendant bought all the shares of DDT.10 The SPA called for

Closing Consideration of $6 million, Installment Consideration of approximately

$3.4 million, and contingent Milestone Payments of up to $5,625,000.11 Only the

Milestone Payments are at issue in this litigation.

SPA Section 2.05 governs the Milestone Payments. Exhibit A to the SPA (the

“Milestone Exhibit”) describes eight Milestones, each of which were worth a

different amount, for a total of $5,625,000.12 Each Milestone Payment would be

“earned upon the successful achievement (to the reasonable satisfaction of

6
Id.
7
Id. ¶ 9.
8
Id. ¶ 8.
9
Id. ¶ 12.
10
Id. ¶¶ 1, 8, 13; see also Def.’s Mot., Ex. A (hereinafter, “SPA”).
11
Am. Compl. ¶ 13.
12
SPA, Ex. A (hereinafter, “Milestone Exhibit”).
3
[Defendant]) of the applicable Milestone.”13 Plaintiff had 22.5 months after closing

to achieve these Milestones.14

The Milestone Exhibit describes the applicable acceptance procedure for

Milestone deliverables.15 First, Plaintiff would submit the relevant deliverable to

Defendant for approval.16 Defendant then had a fifteen-day “Evaluation Period” to

either accept or reject the deliverable.17 A deliverable would be deemed accepted in

two circumstances: “(a) if [Defendant] provides written notice of acceptance within

the Evaluation Period, or (b) if [Defendant] does not provide written notice of

Rejection within the Evaluation period.”18 Defendant could reject a deliverable “by

notifying [Plaintiff] in writing. Such notice of Rejection shall include a written

explanation with details for the basis of such Rejection and what portion of the

Deliverable failed to meet the Acceptance Criteria.”19

Additionally, and central to this litigation, SPA Section 2.05(b) provides:

If, during the Milestone Period, (i) Andrew Medal’s employment is
terminated by [Defendant] or any of its Affiliates without Cause (as
defined in the Medal Employment Agreement), (ii) Andrew Medal
resigns from his employment with [Defendant] or any of its Affiliates
with Good Reason (as defined in the Medal Employment Agreement),
or (iii) [Defendant] determines not to continue pursuing the
development of the intellectual property and technology contemplated

13
SPA § 2.05(a).
14
Id.
15
Milestone Exhibit § 1(A).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. § 1(C).
19
Id. § 1(D).
4
by the Milestones (provided that, if [Defendant] notifies [Plaintiff] of
such a determination at any time during the Milestone Period, [Plaintiff]
agrees to work in good faith with [Defendant] to agree to amendments
and/or adjustments to the Milestones in order to address [Defendant]’s
concerns and avoid triggering this clause (iii), and each Stakeholder
authorizes [Plaintiff] to consent to any such amendments and/or
adjustments on such Stakeholder’s behalf), [Defendant] shall pay to
Stakeholders the full amount of any unpaid Milestone Payments in
accordance with Section 2.05(d).

SPA Section 2.05(c), in contrast, provides:

If, during the Milestone Period, (i) Andrew Medal’s employment is
terminated by [Defendant] or any of its Affiliates for Cause (as defined
in the Medal Employment Agreement) or (ii) Andrew Medal resigns
from his employment with [Defendant] or any of its Affiliates without
Good Reason (as defined in the Medal Employment Agreement), any
Milestone Payments that have not been earned prior to the date of such
termination or resignation shall automatically be forfeited (for the
avoidance of doubt, any Milestone Payments that have been earned
prior to the date of such termination or resignation shall remain payable
in accordance with this Section 2.05).

Regarding remittance of the Milestone Payments, SPA Section 2.05(d)

provides:

Any Milestone Payment that is earned shall be paid by [Defendant] to
the Stakeholders, within 30 calendar days of the date such Milestone is
earned (the “Milestone Payment Date”), pro rata based on their
respective Pro Rata Shares as set forth next to each Stakeholder’s name
in the Closing Stakeholder Certificate, by wire transfer of immediately
available funds to the Stakeholders to their respective accounts as set
forth on the Closing Stakeholder Certificate.

And with respect to disputes, SPA Section 2.05(f) provides:

If [Plaintiff] and [Defendant] disagree on whether a Milestone has been
achieved, [Plaintiff] and [Defendant] shall cooperate in good faith for a
period of 30 days to attempt to resolve such disagreement. If after such
5
period the matter remains unresolved, either [Plaintiff] or [Defendant]
may bring an action pursuant to Section 12.10.

SPA Section 12.10(a) provides in relevant part that the SPA “shall be governed

by and construed in accordance with the internal laws of the State of Delaware

without giving effect to any choice or conflict of law provision or rule.” And the

relevant portion of SPA Section 12.10(b) provides:

ANY LEGAL SUIT, ACTION OR PROCEEDING ARISING OUT OF
OR BASED UPON THIS AGREEMENT OR THE TRANSACTIONS
CONTEMPLATED HEREBY MAY BE INSTITUTED IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OR
THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN EACH CASE
LOCATED IN THE CITY OF WILMINGTON, AND EACH PARTY
HERETO IRREVOCABLY SUBMITS TO THE EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OF SUCH COURTS IN ANY SUCH SUIT, ACTION
OR PROCEEDING.

Finally, Article X of the SPA grants broad powers to Mr. Medal as the

“Stakeholders’ Representative.” In that regard, SPA Section 10.01 states:

Stakeholders hereby appoint Andrew Medal as Stakeholders’
Representative to act as the agent of Stakeholders for the purpose of
this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereunder and to take
any and all actions and make any and all decisions required or permitted
to be taken or made by the Securityholders’ Representative under this
Agreement and the Ancillary Documents, including the exercise of the
right to (i) give and receive notices and communications, (ii) agree to,
negotiate, enter into settlements and compromises of and comply with
court orders with respect to disputes, (iii) agree to, negotiate, enter into
and provide amendments and supplements to and waivers and (iv) take
all actions necessary or appropriate in the good faith judgment of the
Securityholders’ Representative for the accomplishment of the
foregoing.

6
SPA Section 10.02 adds:

Each Stakeholder agrees that Stakeholders’ Representative shall have
the power and authority to take all actions and make all decisions on
behalf of, and to bind, all Stakeholders, and that [Defendant] shall have
the right to rely on such authority of, and any communications given,
actions taken and decisions made by, Stakeholders’ Representative with
respect to this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereunder.
Each Stakeholder acknowledges and agrees that such Stakeholder shall
be bound by the actions and decisions of Stakeholders’ Representative,
and that such Stakeholder shall have no claims against [Defendant] with
respect to any actions taken or decisions made by [Defendant] in
reliance on such actions and decisions of Stakeholders’ Representative.
Any references to “Stakeholders” under this Agreement shall be
deemed to include Stakeholders’ Representative, as appropriate given
the context.

C. The Employment Agreement

In connection with the SPA, Mr. Medal signed an employment agreement with

Defendant (the “Employment Agreement”).20 The SPA expressly listed the “Medal

Employment Agreement” as an “Ancillary Document,” and the SPA’s closing was

conditioned on Mr. Medal delivering the executed Employment Agreement to

Defendant.21 The Employment Agreement called for Mr. Medal to serve as

Defendant’s CIO for two years.22

20
Am. Compl. ¶ 14; see also Def.’s Mot., Ex. B (hereinafter, “Empl. Agmt.”)
21
SPA §§ 1, 8.01(f).
22
Am. Compl. ¶ 14.
7
The Employment Agreement is relevant to this dispute primarily because it

provides the applicable definition of a termination for “Cause.” 23 As relevant here,

the definition of “Cause” includes:

(iii) any conduct by or at the direction of [Mr. Medal] constituting a
breach of [Mr. Medal]’s duty of loyalty or other fiduciary duty owing
to [Defendant] or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates . . . ; (iv) any willful
and continued failure by [Mr. Medal] to perform [Mr. Medal]’s
material, ordinary and customary duties as an employee of [Defendant]
hereunder or any lawful directive of the Board, a material breach by
[Mr. Medal] of any provision of this Agreement or an intentional and
material violation by [Mr. Medal] of any of [Defendant]’s written
employment policies, in each such case, which has continued for more
than thirty days following written notice of such non-performance from
[Defendant] and an opportunity to cure such purported non-
performance during such 30-day notice period[.]24

Also of note, the Employment Agreement provides that it “shall be governed

by the internal law of the State of Texas, without regard to conflict of law principles

that would result in the application of any law other than the law of the State of

Texas.”25 Moreover, the Employment Agreement states: “all Actions arising out of

or based upon this Agreement or the subject matter hereof shall be brought and

maintained exclusively in the State of Texas or any federal court located in the State

of Texas[.]”26

23
SPA § 2.05(b).
24
Empl. Agmt. § 5(d).
25
Id. § 19.
26
Id.
8
D. Relevant Post-Closing Developments

Plaintiff believes that three different circumstances each entitle DDT’s former

stakeholders to additional Milestone Payments under SPA § 2.05.

At the outset, Plaintiff contends that “[o]n several occasions,” Plaintiff

submitted deliverables to Defendant that were each rejected.27 And that those

rejections were not accompanied by written explanations as required by Milestone

Exhibit Section 1(D).28 Thus, according to Plaintiff, the nonconforming rejection

notices are without effect, so the purportedly rejected deliverable should be “deemed

accepted” pursuant to Milestone Exhibit Section 1(C).29

Separately, Defendant terminated Mr. Medal on August 15, 2023.30 Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant had not provided notice of any material nonperformance or

other deficiency, so the termination cannot be considered for Cause.31 Plaintiff

maintains that even after Mr. Medal’s counsel pressed Defendant for an explanation,

Defendant never offered a viable Cause for termination.32 Because Plaintiff asserts

that Defendant terminated Mr. Medal without Cause, Plaintiff claims “the full

27
Am. Compl. ¶ 23.
28
Id.
29
Id. ¶ 45.
30
Id. ¶ 24.
31
Id.
32
Id. ¶¶ 24–27.
9
amount of any unpaid Milestone Payments” came due under SPA Section

2.05(b)(i).33

Last, between the filing of Plaintiff’s initial Complaint and the at-issue

Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant terminated eight “key” DDT

employees.34 Defendant purportedly told the terminated employees that Defendant

was “going in another direction.”35 According to Plaintiff, these terminations mean

Defendant ceased pursuit of the Milestones, which—like Mr. Medal’s alleged

termination without Cause—triggers the accelerated payment of all unpaid

Milestone Payments pursuant to SPA Section 2.05(b)(iii).36

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff commenced this action with the initial Complaint on September 28,

2023.37 Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint,38 so Plaintiff filed an Amended

and Supplemental Complaint on December 20, 2023.39 Defendant moved to dismiss

the Amended Complaint on January 22, 2024.40 Plaintiff opposed that motion on

33
Id. ¶¶ 31–34.
34
Id. ¶ 29.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
D.I. No. 1.
38
D.I. No. 7.
39
Am. Compl.
40
Def.’s Mot.
10
April 8, 2024.41 Defendant replied on April 23, 2024.42 The Court heard oral

argument on May 6, 2024.43

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW44

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Motions under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(1) contest this Court’s subject

matter jurisdiction and are “in essence a question of the power of a court to hear and

decide the case before it.”45 The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the Court’s

subject matter jurisdiction.46 “In resolving a motion to dismiss under Court of

Chancery Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must take

all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and make reasonable inferences

in the non-movant’s favor.”47

B. Rule 12(b)(7)

“This Court may dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join a

necessary and indispensable party in accordance with Rule 19.” 48 There are two

41
D.I. No. 14 (hereinafter, “Pl.’s Opp’n”).
42
D.I. No. 18 (hereinafter, “Def.’s Reply”).
43
D.I. No. 25.
44
The Court applies the Court of Chancery Rules in effect at the time this action was filed. See
Bricklayers Pension Fund of W. Pa. v. Brinkley, 2024 WL 3384823, at *12 n.143 (Del. Ch. July
12, 2024) (citations omitted).
45
Advent Int’l Corp. v. Servicios Funrarios GG S.A. de C.V., 2024 WL 3580934, at *4 (Del. Ch.
June 7, 2024) (quoting Abbot v. Vavala, 2022 WL 453609, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2022)).
46
Id. (quoting Ropp v. King, 2007 WL 2198771, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 25, 2007)).
47
Id. (citing de Adler v. Upper N.Y. Inv. Co., 2013 WL 5874645, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2013)).
48
Sorenson Impact Found. v. Cont’l Stock Transfer & Tr. Co., 2022 WL 17039158, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 17, 2022) (citing Ct. Ch. R. 12(b)(7)).
11
components to this inquiry.49 First, “the Court determines whether an absent party

is necessary.”50 If so, the absent, necessary party “should be joined if feasible.”51

“When an absent party is necessary but joinder is not feasible, the Court weighs the

four factors of [Rule] 19(b) to determine that party’s indispensability.”52

C. Rule 12(b)(6)

Under the well-establish standard of review applicable to a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6):

(i) all well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true; (ii) even
vague allegations are “well-pleaded” if they give the opposing party
notice of the claim; (iii) the Court must draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the non-moving party; and (iv) dismissal is inappropriate
unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any
reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.53

“A trial court is not, however, required to accept as true conclusory allegations

without specific supporting factual allegations.”54

49
Id.
50
Id. (citing NuVasive, Inc. v. Lanx, Inc., 2012 WL 2866004, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 11, 2012)).
51
Id. (citing NuVasive, 2012 WL 2866004, at *2).
52
Id. The four factors are: “(1) to what extent a judgment might be prejudicial to the absent person
or the parties; (2) the extent to which provisions in the judgment can lessen or avoid prejudice;
(3) whether the person’s absence will render the judgment inadequate; and (4) whether the plaintiff
will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for non-joinder.” Id. at *2 (citing Ct. Ch.
R. 19(b)).
53
Ramco Asset Mgmt., LLC v. USA Rare Earth, LLC, 2024 WL 1716399, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22,
2024) (quoting Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896–97 (Del. 2002)).
54
Id. (quoting In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., 897 A.2d 162, 168 (Del. 2006)).
12
V. DISCUSSION

A. The “Stakeholders’ Representative” Can Represent DDT’s Former
Stakeholders in this Litigation.

First, Defendant raises several procedural issues regarding Plaintiff’s ability

to represent DDT’s former stakeholders, as well as Plaintiff’s ability to pursue this

action without Mr. Medal first litigating a Texas-based action in his personal

capacity. The Court will address each of Defendant’s arguments in turn.

1. The Court has Jurisdiction to Issue a Declaratory Judgment.

Count III of the Amended Complaint requests, in part, “a declaration that any

milestone submissions rejected without written reasons are deemed accepted.”55

Delaware courts are empowered by 10 Del. C. § 6501 to issue declaratory

judgments.56 “There are four prerequisites for declaratory judgment jurisdiction.”57

They are: (1) “a controversy involving the rights or other legal relations of the

party seeking declaratory relief”; (2) “a controversy in which the claim of right or

other legal interest is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting the

claim”; (3) “the controversy must be between parties whose interests are real and

adverse”; and (4) “the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial

determination.”58

55
Am. Compl. ¶ 46.
56
See 10 Del. C. § 6501.
57
Goldenberg v. Immunomedics, Inc., 2021 WL 1529806, at *19 (Del. Ch. Apr. 19, 2021) (citing
Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 565 A.2d 268, 274 (Del. Super. 1989)).
58
Id. (citations omitted).
13
Defendant argues that the first prerequisite is lacking because the right to

Milestone Payments belongs to DDT’s former stakeholders, not their designated

representative.59 That is despite SPA Section 2.05(f)’s language that expressly gives

“the Stakeholders’ Representative” authority to bring actions with respect to

Milestone Payment disputes.60 Regardless, Defendant posits that representative

parties are incapable of pursuing declaratory relief on behalf of those who they

represent.61 That proposition runs counter to existing precedent.

Simply put, “[t]he contractual appointment of a shareholder representative to

bring certain actions makes that representative the real party in interest in those

actions.”62 “This structure is helpful to both buyers and sellers, as it ‘enables each

side to resolve post-closing disputes efficiently.’”63 That eye toward efficiency

aligns with the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act, which was “born out of

practical concerns, providing efficient relief where a traditional remedy is otherwise

unavailable.”64

59
Def.’s Mot. at 27–28.
60
SPA § 2.05(f) (“If after [thirty days of disagreement about whether a Milestone has been
achieved] the matter remains unresolved, either the Stakeholders’ Representative or Buyer may
bring an action pursuant to Section 12.10.” (emphasis added)).
61
Def.’s Mot. at 27–28.
62
Fortis Advisors LLC v. Allergan W.C. Hldg. Inc., 2020 WL 2498068, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 14,
2020) (emphasis added) (citing Coughlan v. NXP B.V., 2010 WL 1531596, at *2–3 (Del. Ch. Apr.
15, 2010)).
63
Id. (citing Ballenger v. Applied Dig. Sols., Inc., 2002 WL 749162, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24,
2002)).
64
Intermec IP Corp. v. TransCore, LP, 2021 WL 3620435, at *24 (Del. Super. Aug. 16, 2021)
(cleaned up) (citing Schick Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 533 A.2d
1235, 1238 (Del. Ch. 1987)).
14
Moreover, “[t]his Court has been ‘reluctant to disregard the clear contractual

authority of the Stockholders’ Representative at the behest of a party, [Defendant],

whose aims are clearly adverse to those of the former [Stockholders].’”65 And this

Court routinely entertains declaratory judgment actions brought by parties in a

representative capacity.66 Defendant’s brief acknowledges as much in its recitation

of the four prerequisites to a declaratory judgment.67 Defendant has provided no

substantive reason to break from that precedent and the Court declines to do so here.

2. The Represented Former Stakeholders are Not Necessary Parties.

Defendant makes a similar argument pursuant to Rule 19. That is, Defendant

says DDT’s former stakeholders are each necessary parties and, therefore, should be

joined pursuant to Rule 19(a).68 Similarly to the preceding analysis, the Court will

not deprive DDT’s former stakeholders of their chosen representative in the guise of

protecting their interests.

Under Rule 19(a), party is necessary and must be joined if feasible when:

65
Allergan W.C., 2020 WL 2498068, at *3 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting
Ballenger, 2002 WL 749162, at *11).
66
See, e.g., Fortis Advisors LLC v. Medtronic Minimed, Inc., 2024 WL 3580827, at *5 (Del. Ch.
July 29, 2024); VT S’holder Representative, LLC v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., 2023 WL
8597956, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 12, 2023); S’holder Representative Servs. LLC v. HPI Hldgs., LLC,
2023 WL 3092895, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 26, 2023); S’holder Representative Servs. LLC v. Alexion
Pharms., Inc., 2021 WL 3925937, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2021).
67
Def.’s Mot. at 22, 27 (quoting Mehiel v. Solo Cup Co., 2005 WL 1252348, at *4 (Del. Ch. May
13, 2005)); Mehiel, 2005 WL 1252348, at *1 (“Plaintiff, Dennis Mehiel, is the designated
stockholder representative of [non-party] SFH[.]”).
68
See Def.’s Mot. at 21–23. Defendant did not argue that DDT’s former stakeholders are
indispensable parties, so this analysis only pertains to whether the former stakeholders must be
joined if feasible.
15
the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is
so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect
that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of the claimed interest.69

At its core, Rule 19(a) requires joinder when a party’s absence risks prejudice to

either the absent party or one of the active litigants. No such risk is present here.

The Court is guided by the analysis in Ballenger.70 There, three contractually

designated stockholders’ representatives filed suit to obtain unpaid earnout payments

that, like here, the represented former stockholders would “share on a pro rata

basis.”71 The defendant “contend[ed] that th[e] case must be dismissed because the

plaintiffs [did] not join[] all the previous stockholders . . . who sold their shares in

the merger.”72 That contention was rejected in Ballenger.

That court first emphasized that stockholders’ representatives serve a mutually

beneficial purpose in simplifying post-closing litigation.73 The court also explained

the incongruity of allowing a buyer to frustrate a sellers’ case by claiming that the

sellers’ litigation strategy would prejudice the sellers.74 And, as here, there was no

risk of prejudice to the defendant because the relevant contract bound the former

69
NuVasive, 2012 WL 2866004, at *1 (quoting Ct. Ch. R. 19(a)).
70
See Ballenger, 2002 WL 749162, at *10–11.
71
Id.
72
Id. at *9.
73
Id. at *10.
74
Id. at *11.
16
stockholders to the actions taken by their representatives.75 Accordingly, the

Ballenger court found the represented former stockholders were not necessary

parties under Rule 19.

Defendant asks this Court to distinguish these facts from Ballenger since

DDT’s former stakeholders were each signatories to the SPA.76 It appears that in

Ballenger, the stockholders signed a separate “Stockholder Authorization Form” but

not the at-issue merger agreement.77 Defendant argues the distinction is controlling

because “‘[u]nless it is obvious that one not joined has no interest whatever in the

subject matter of the suit,’ all parties to a contract under dispute are necessary.”78

The Court, however, views that argument as a misapplication of a general rule, and

is instead guided by Ballenger in this closely analogous circumstance.

DDT’s former stakeholders might have an interest in the subject matter of this

suit, but they have no interest in individually pursuing relief. Rather, in the very

document that Defendant argues forces DDT’s former stakeholders into this action,

the former stakeholders expressly gave Plaintiff authority to bring this suit on their

behalf.79 Defendant offers no reason for why this Court would blindly adhere to a

broadly stated rule that runs counter to the former stakeholders’ contractually

75
Id.; SPA § 10.02.
76
Def.’s Reply at 6.
77
Ballenger, 2002 WL 749162, at *10 n.27.
78
Germaninvestments AG v. Allomet Corp., 2020 WL 6870459, at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2020)
(quoting Elster v. Am. Airlines, 106 A.2d 202, 204 (Del. Ch. 1954)).
79
SPA §§ 2.05(f), 10.02.
17
enshrined decision to do otherwise. The courts of this State endeavor to give effect

to contractual arrangements in all but the rarest of circumstances.80 Through the

SPA, DDT’s former stakeholders unambiguously designated Plaintiff to represent

them in post-closing Milestone disputes; the Court will not invalidate that choice at

Defendant’s urging.

3. Mr. Medal, in his Personal Capacity, is Not a Necessary Party,
and Mr. Medal Need Not Bring a Preliminary Litigation in Texas.

Defendant also contends that Mr. Medal, in his personal capacity, is an

indispensable party under Rule 19. Here, the argument is that because the basis for

Mr. Medal’s termination is at issue, he must litigate that issue in his personal

capacity.81 The Court is not persuaded that Mr. Medal is necessary here.

First, with respect to any potential prejudice to Mr. Medal, the Court sees

none. Although this Court keeps distinct legal entities analytically separate,82 the

Court will not disregard reality to reach an absurd result. Here, although Mr. Medal

presents to the Court in two capacities, he remains one person. And critically, Mr.

Medal faces no internal conflict because—in both of his roles—his interest is in

80
See Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Ainslie, 312 A.3d 674, 676–77 (Del. 2024) (“The courts of this
State hold freedom of contract in high—some might say, reverential—regard. Only ‘a strong
showing that dishonoring [a] contract is required to vindicate a public policy interest even stronger
than freedom of contract’ will induce our courts to ignore unambiguous contractual undertakings.”
(alteration in original) (quoting ev3, Inc. v. Lesh, 103 A.3d 179, 181 n.3 (Del. 2014))).
81
Def.’s Mot. at 24–26.
82
See Feely v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 667 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“[T]he separate legal existence
of juridical entities is fundamental to Delaware law.”).
18
denying that he gave Defendant Cause to terminate him. It would be nonsensical to

hold—at his adversary’s request—that Mr. Medal risks prejudicing himself by

pursuing this action in his own absence.

The prejudice to Defendant is facially more plausible but, ultimately, no more

availing. Defendant complains that a ruling on whether Mr. Medal’s termination

was supported by Cause will bear directly on issues related Mr. Medal’s

Employment Agreement. It further argues that such a ruling would place it at risk

of inconsistent obligations and deprive Defendant of the benefit of the Employment

Agreement’s exclusive forum selection clause, which designates Texas.

The problem with Defendant’s argument is that it presupposes that SPA

Section 2.05(b)(i) can only be vindicated through piecemeal, bi-jurisdictional

litigation. In other words, Defendant’s theory assumes Mr. Medal must bring an

employment action in Texas and, once that is resolved, then bring an action on behalf

of DDT’s former stakeholders in Delaware. The Court rejects this reasoning.

Delaware has a “clear policy against piecemeal litigation.”83 Accordingly,

absent plain language to the contrary, the Court will not interpret SPA Section

2.05(b)(i) to not only risk piecemeal litigation but to actually require it. The SPA

does not contain any explicit language to that effect. Defendant simply reads that

83
REJV5 AWH Orlando, LLC v. AWH Orlando Member, LLC, 2018 WL 1109650, at *5 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 28, 2018).
19
requirement into Section 2.05(b) under the assumption that Mr. Medal will

eventually bring employment-related claims.

Importantly, to the Court’s knowledge, litigation regarding Mr. Medal’s

personal rights under the Employment Agreement remains purely hypothetical. The

Court cannot require Mr. Medal to bring an employment claim in Texas in his

personal capacity, and the Court will not place the parties in “litigation limbo” to

await a claim Mr. Medal may never assert.84 Instead, SPA Section 2.05(b)(i)—which

inures to the benefit of all of DDT’s former stakeholders, not just Mr. Medal—is

enforceable separately from any claims Mr. Medal may or may not have under his

Employment Agreement. The Court offers no opinion on what effect this litigation

might have on any future attempt by Mr. Medal to pursue rights under his

Employment Agreement.

Finally, the Court briefly addresses the venue issue underlying much of

Defendant’s reasoning.85 As quoted above, the SPA selects Delaware as the

exclusive forum for disputes,86 but the Employment Agreement selects Texas.87 The

84
See Lima USA, Inc. v. Mahfouz, 2021 WL 5774394, at *13–14 (Del. Super. Aug. 31, 2021)
(declining to grant a stay until the resolution of a threatened, but not yet pending, action).
85
Defendant did not move under Rule 12(b)(3). Nevertheless, a preference for Texas as the proper
venue for this dispute informs Defendant’s analysis. See, e.g., Def.’s Reply at 3 (“[A] ruling on
Medal’s employment issue . . . is required before any claims regarding rights or obligations to pay
Milestone Payments under the SPA are ripe. Importantly though, only Texas courts have
jurisdiction to rule on Medal’s employment issues.”)
86
SPA § 12.10(b).
87
Empl. Agmt. § 19.
20
SPA’s integration clause, however, reflects that the SPA “and the Ancillary

Documents”—which includes the Employment Agreement88—constitute the parties’

full agreement.89 Accordingly, the SPA and the Employment Agreement are part of

a “unitary contractual scheme” and the Court must read them “harmoniously.”90 If

any terms in the SPA and Employment Agreement are inconsistent, “the statements

in the body of [the SPA] will control.”91

This Court finds that the forum selection clauses in the SPA and Employment

Agreement can be harmonized if the SPA’s forum clause covers disputes that relate

to both the SPA and the Employment Agreement, while the Employment

Agreement’s forum clause only applies to disputes regarding the Employment

Agreement but not the SPA. This is so because the SPA’s clause applies to actions

based upon the SPA “or the transactions contemplated hereby,”92 whereas the

Employment Agreement’s clause applies only to actions based upon “this Agreement

or the subject matter hereof.”93 Thus, only the SPA’s broader clause can apply to

disputes touching upon both contracts. And even if the Court found these clauses to

be in conflict with respect to actions that implicate both the SPA and Employment

88
SPA § 1.
89
Id. § 12.06.
90
See Medtronic, 2024 WL 3580827, at *9 (citations omitted).
91
SPA § 12.06.
92
Id. § 12.10(b) (all capitals omitted).
93
Empl. Agmt. § 19.
21
Agreement, the SPA plainly states that its terms “will control” in that circumstance.94

Therefore, disputes as to SPA Section 2.05(b)(i) must be litigated in Delaware, not

Texas.

For those reasons, the Court rejects the argument that Mr. Medal must litigate

an employment action in his personal capacity before he can assert claims on behalf

of DDT’s former stakeholders in Delaware.

B. Plaintiff’s Claims to Relief are Viable.

Having decided that Plaintiff can represent DDT’s former stakeholders in this

action and need not first pursue an individual employment action in Texas, the Court

next addresses Defendant’s two primary substantive challenges as to Counts I and II

of the Amended Complaint. First, Defendant says Counts I and II seek specific

performance with no underlying cause of action to support that request.95 Second,

Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under the terms of the SPA. 96

The Court discusses each argument in turn.97

94
SPA § 12.06.
95
Def.’s Mot. at 13–14.
96
Id. at 14–20.
97
Defendant also briefly argues that it properly terminated Mr. Medal for Cause because Mr.
Medal breached his fiduciary duties to Defendant. Id. at 17. That argument relies upon
quintessential issues of facts that cannot be resolved in Defendant’s favor at this stage. See Ramco
Asset Mgmt., 2024 WL 1716399, at *4.
22
1. Counts I & II State Cognizable Breach of Contract Claims.

Defendant’s argument that Counts I and II fail to plead an underlying cause of

action does not warrant dismissal of either Count. Defendant is correct that “specific

performance is a form of equitable relief dependent upon an underlying cause of

action.”98 Defendant is incorrect, however, that Plaintiff’s omission of the word

“breach” in the relevant portion of the Amended Complaint mandates dismissal. At

the pleading stage, this Court is concerned with the factual sufficiency of the

complaint, not whether the claimant used certain and precise language to phrase its

legal claims.99

Counts I and II both contain “a short, plain statement of facts sufficient to

support” a breach-of-contract claim.100 A breach-of-contract claim requires the

plaintiff to prove: “(1) the existence of a contractual obligation, (2) a breach of that

obligation, and (3) damages as a result.”101

Counts I and II identify the existence of Defendant’s alleged payment

obligations under SPA Section 2.05(b).102 Each Count also identifies the

circumstances that allegedly triggered Defendant’s payment obligations

98
See Boulden v. Albiorix, Inc., 2013 WL 396254, at *12 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2013).
99
See In re McDonald’s Corp. S’holder Deriv. Litig., 289 A.3d 343, 375–76 (Del. Ch. 2023)
(explaining Delaware’s rejection of the “theory of the pleadings” doctrine and adoption of a
permissive “notice pleading” standard).
100
See id. at 376.
101
Levy Fam. Invs., LLC v. Oars + Alps LLC, 2022 WL 245543, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2022)
(quoting Deluxe Ent. Servs. v. DLX Acq. Corp., 2021 WL 1169905, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2021)).
102
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 36.
23
thereunder.103 And Counts I and II both allege that Defendant has refused to fulfill

its contractual obligation.104 Whether specific performance is the proper remedy for

that alleged breach is a question for another day and certainly not grounds for

dismissal today.105 Counts I and II both adequately plead breach of contract.

2. Defendant’s Interpretation of SPA Section 2.05 is Not the Only
Reasonable One.

The final issue is whether Plaintiff’s interpretation of the SPA could

conceivably support Plaintiff’s claims. The Court may address “the proper

interpretation of language in a contract” at the pleading stage if “the language of

[the] contract is plain and unambiguous.”106 “Contract language is ambiguous ‘only

when the provisions in controversy are reasonably or fairly susceptible of different

interpretations or may have two or more different meanings.’” 107 “Dismissal is

appropriate when the defendant’s interpretation is the only reasonable construction

as a matter of law and that construction reveals that the plaintiff cannot sustain an

actionable claim.”108

103
Id. ¶¶ 32–33, 37–38.
104
Id. ¶¶ 2, 30, 35.
105
Palkon v. Maffei, 311 A.3d 255, 285 (Del. Ch. 2024) (“A court determines remedies after trial,
so a pleading-stage assessment is usually premature.” (collecting authority)).
106
CHS/ Cmty. Health Sys., Inc. v. Steward Health Care Sys. LLC, 2020 WL 4917597, at *3 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 21, 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Allied Cap. Corp. v. GC-Sun Hldgs., L.P., 910
A.2d 1020, 1030 (Del. Ch. 2006)).
107
Id. (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Lillis, 953 A.2d 241, 252 (Del. 2008)).
108
Id. (citations omitted).
24
Here, the parties’ primary interpretive dispute is whether the final sentence of

SPA Section 2.05(b) provides for the acceleration of all unpaid Milestone Payments,

or whether it only clarifies that Milestones could continue to be earned after one of

the three enumerated circumstances. The relevant language is “[Defendant] shall

pay to Stakeholders the full amount of any unpaid Milestone Payments in accordance

with Section 2.05(d).”109

Plaintiff focuses on the language “the full amount of any unpaid Milestone

Payments,” while Defendant focuses on the language “in accordance with Section

2.05(d).” Defendant relies heavily on Section 2.05(d) because it provides, in part,

“[a]ny Milestone Payment that is earned shall be paid by [Defendant] to the

Stakeholders.”110 Accordingly, Defendant posits that even if Section 2.05(b) was

triggered, it would not require payment of unearned Milestone Payments.

The Court need not reach the reasonableness of Defendant’s interpretation at

this stage because the Court finds Plaintiff’s interpretation is reasonable. 111 Simply

put, it is reasonable to read the phrase “the full amount of any unpaid Milestone

Payments” to refer to any Milestone Payment that has not been paid. The Court

recognizes that “in accordance with Section 2.05(d)” modifies that language, but the

bulk of Section 2.05(d) explains the mechanics of how Defendant was obligated to

109
SPA § 2.05(b).
110
Id. § 2.05(d) (emphasis added).
111
See Medtronic, 2024 WL 3580827, at *10.
25
remit the Milestone Payments. Thus, the Court considers it reasonable that the

parties intended Section 2.05(b) to reference Section 2.05(d)’s payment mechanics

without embracing a requirement that the Milestone Payments be “earned” by

achieving said Milestones.

The Court is guided by the fact that SPA Section 2.05(b) would have virtually

no meaning unless it included unachieved Milestones.112 In Defendant’s view, SPA

Section 2.05(b) only operates to maintain the status quo in the event that Defendant

terminates Mr. Medal without Cause or ceases pursuit of the Milestone projects.113

Defendant contrasts Section 2.05(b) with Section 2.05(c), which states that any

unearned Milestones Payments would be forfeited if Mr. Medal is terminated for

Cause or resigns without Good Reason.114 But Defendant does not articulate why

forfeiture would apply in the circumstances listed in Section 2.05(b) in the absence

of an explicit clarification. To the contrary, it seems that even if Section 2.05(b)

were omitted, forfeiture would only apply in the two circumstances enumerated in

Section 2.05(c).115 In sum, the Court finds Plaintiff’s interpretation of SPA Section

2.05(b) to be a reasonable one.

112
See Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153, 1159 (Del. 2010).
113
Def.’s Mot. at 15–16.
114
Id. at 16.
115
See Crispo v. Musk, 2022 WL 6693660, at *5 n.36 (Del. Ch. Oct. 11, 2022) (noting “the
expressio unius est exclusio alterius maxim applies in the contractual interpretation context”
(citing Delmarva Health Plan, Inc. v. Aceto, 750 A.2d 1213, 1216 n.12 (Del. Ch. 1999))).

26
Finally, Defendant asserts that SPA Section 2.05(f) creates a condition to

litigation that Plaintiff failed to comply with—namely, thirty days of good-faith

negotiation regarding whether the Milestones have been achieved.116 Section 2.05(f)

provides:

If [Plaintiff] and [Defendant] disagree on whether a Milestone has been
achieved, [Plaintiff] and [Defendant] shall cooperate in good faith for a
period 30 days to attempt to resolve such disagreement. If after such
period the matter remains unresolved, either [Plaintiff] or [Defendant]
may bring an action pursuant to Section 12.10.117

The Court does not view that provision as dispositive here.

This circumstance was addressed in Anvil Holding Corp. v. Iron Acquisition

Co., Inc.118 There, the relevant agreement commanded that the parties “shall

negotiate the resolution of the claims for a period of not less than twenty-five (25)

Business Days” before bringing litigation.119 The plaintiff admitted that no

negotiation had taken place, but the court did not dismiss the suit.120 Instead, it noted

a lack of detail as to which party was expected to commence negotiations, the

essence of those negotiations, as well as indicia that the negotiations would be

futile.121 Similar circumstances are present here.

116
Def.’s Mot. at 19–20.
117
SPA § 2.05(f).
118
2013 WL 2249655, at *11–12 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2013).
119
Id. at *11.
120
Id. at *11–12.
121
Id. at *12.
27
SPA Section 2.05(f) placed a mutual obligation on Plaintiff and Defendant to

“cooperate in good faith.” But the SPA contains no explanation of what the parties

had to do to fulfill that obligation. Moreover, the Amended Complaint alleges that

Defendant’s rejection of the Milestone deliverables was predetermined, which

suggests negotiations would have been futile.122 And with respect to Mr. Medal’s

termination, Mr. Medal’s counsel sent two letters to Defendant in August 2023 to

ascertain the purported Cause for Mr. Medal’s termination.123 The first such letter

was allegedly ignored, and the second received a steadfast defense of the termination

in response.124 Plaintiff filed the initial Complaint more than forty days after the first

letter was sent. Given these alleged facts, and in accordance with Anvil, SPA Section

2.05(f) provides no basis for a pleading-stage dismissal.

VI. CONCLUSION

No procedural deficiencies warrant dismissal at this stage. Plaintiff’s

contractual claims are reasonably conceivable. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss the Amended Complaint is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Vivian L. Medinilla
_______________________
Vivian L. Medinilla, J.

122
Am. Compl. ¶ 20.
123
Id. ¶¶ 25–26.
124
Id. ¶¶ 26–27; Def.’s Mot., Ex. F.
28