Walker, Amanda v. Topher Halligan

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

AMANDA WALKER,1 § No. 326, 2025
§
Petitioner Below, Appellant, § Court Below—Family Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ File No. 24-11-03TN
TOPHER HALLIGAN, § Petition No. 24-26531
§
Respondent Below, Appellee. §

Submitted: January 23, 2026
Decided: March 6, 2026

Before TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the briefs and the record on appeal, it appears to

the Court that:

(1) This is a difficult case. The appellant (“Mother”) sought termination

of the parental rights of the appellee (“Father”) as to the parties’ child (the

“Child”) so that Mother’s husband (“Stepfather”), who has been a loving,

supportive stepparent to the child for almost all her life, could adopt her. The

Family Court found that Father had “done little to assert his parental rights” and

that his efforts to have a relationship with the Child were “abysmal.” But

recognizing the high burden of proof by which a petition to sever the parent-child

1
The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
relationship is tested, the court determined that Mother had not established a

statutory ground for termination and denied the petition. For the reasons

discussed below, we affirm the Family Court’s judgment.

(2) The Child was born in October 2017. In July 2018, Mother filed a

petition for an order of protection from abuse (“PFA”) against Father. In August

2018, Father filed a petition for paternity adjudication.2 Father did not appear for

the PFA hearing, and on August 29, 2018, a default PFA order was entered

against him. Shortly thereafter, Mother filed a petition for custody of the Child,

and Father moved to reopen the PFA order, alleging that he had not received

notice of the hearing. The Family Court granted Father’s motion and scheduled

a new PFA hearing but then reinstated the PFA order when Father again failed to

appear. In November 2018 and March 2019, Father was found to have violated

the PFA order; the PFA no-contact order ultimately remained in place until

November 9, 2021. On July 24, 2019, following a hearing for which Father failed

to appear, the Family Court granted Mother sole custody and primary residence

of the Child.

(3) Mother filed a TPR petition against Father in November 2024 and

amended petitions in December 2024 and February 2025. Mother sought

termination of Father’s parental rights on the grounds of unintentional

2
Father was later adjudicated to be the Child’s biological father.
2
abandonment under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(3) and failure to plan under 13 Del. C.

§ 1103(a)(6). Stepfather filed a petition for adoption of the Child.

(4) At the TPR trial on July 14, 2025, each party testified and presented

three additional witnesses. The evidence reflected that Father had not had contact

with the Child since the PFA petition was filed and had not provided any support

for the Child. Father asserted that he had last attempted to contact Mother in

2023, but she had blocked his number and moved to an unknown location.

Mother denied blocking communications from Father and asserted that he could

have contacted her through her family members. The Child was thriving in

Mother and Stepfather’s home, where she also lived with her younger sibling.

She was excelling in school and engaged in numerous extracurricular activities.

Stepfather treated the Child as his own and wanted to adopt her. The social

worker who performed a home study and prepared a social report to accompany

the TPR and adoption petitions opined that it would be in the Child’s best

interests for the TPR and adoption to be granted. The social worker testified that

she had attempted to contact Father when preparing the social report, but he had

not responded.

(5) Father testified that he had a commercial driver’s license and

worked as a truck driver. Father, his fiancée, and two of his family members

testified about his positive relationship with two of his sons, who spent some time

3
in his care but were not in his full-time custody, and his fiancée’s children, who

were young adults at the time of trial. Father’s sons’ mother testified that Father

had never paid any child support and that the children had told her that Father

was verbally and physically abusive. Father admitted that he had pleaded guilty

to patronizing a prostitute and disobeying a police signal; he also admitted that

he had been charged with second-degree murder when he was sixteen years old.3

(6) In a post-trial decision, the Family Court determined that Mother

had not established statutory grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights.

As to unintentional abandonment, the Family Court found that Father had “done

little to assert his parental rights,” made “little effort” to communicate with or

visit the Child, and had “a history of violence, bad decisions, and threatening

behavior toward Mother, Stepfather and the public.” But the court concluded

that Mother had not established unintentional abandonment under Section

1103(a)(3) because “Mother prohibited Father’s contact and contact from

paternal relatives,” “moved without disclosing her address,” “actively sought to

stay away from Father,” and “created barriers to his contact.” The court also

found that Mother failed to prove that Father did not pursue the establishment of

3
It is unclear from the record on appeal whether Father was convicted of second-degree
murder.
4
paternity, because he sought adjudication of paternity in 2018. Moreover, the

court emphasized:

Most significantly, Mother failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence Father is not able or willing to promptly establish and maintain
contact with [the Child] and pay reasonable support for her care. Father’s
efforts to maintain a relationship with [the Child] were abysmal[;]
however[,] now he is willing to promptly establish and maintain contact
with her. He filed a Petition to Modify Custody on April 29, 2025, and he
agrees to participate in therapy with [the Child] to develop a relationship.
Father is also gainfully employed. Though he has not financially
supported [the Child] or provided any gifts to her, if Mother files a Petition
for Child Support against Father, he can pay reasonable support.

The court therefore concluded that Mother had not proven unintentional

abandonment under Section 1103(a)(3).

(7) Regarding failure to plan, the Family Court found that the Child was

both neglected and dependent as to Father—and that Father had failed to

discharge parental responsibilities for at least twelve of the eighteen months

preceding the filing of the TPR petition—because he had done nothing to provide

for the Child’s care and support and lacked any relationship with her.4 The court

found that the evidence was not clear and convincing that Father was unlikely to

remedy the dependency or neglect in the near future,5 however, because he was

4
See 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(6) (providing for a “private” termination of parental rights if the
child “is a dependent child or neglected child in the respondent’s care at the time of the
hearing” and the Court finds all of four additional factors, including that the “respondent failed
to discharge parental responsibilities for at least 12 of the 18 months preceding the filing of the
petition”).
5
Id. § 1103(a)(6)d.
5
“parenting two of his children,” was “alleged to have a meaningful place in the

lives of his stepchildren,” had the financial means to provide support, and was

willing to engage in therapy to develop a relationship with the Child. Having

found that Mother had not demonstrated a statutory basis for termination under

Section 1103(a)(3) or (a)(6), the court did not reach the best-interest question.6

(8) Mother asserts three arguments on appeal. First, she challenges the

Family Court’s finding that she did not prove unintentional abandonment under

Section 1103(a)(3). Second, she contends that her counsel’s performance was

deficient, prejudicing her case. And third, she argues that the Family Court erred

by not considering whether termination of Father’s parental rights was in the

Child’s best interests.

(9) This Court reviews the Family Court’s factual and legal

determinations as well as its inferences and deductions.7 We will not disturb the

Family Court’s rulings on appeal if the court’s findings of fact are sufficiently

supported by the record and its explanations, deductions, and inferences are the

6
See id. § 1103(a) (providing that parental rights may be terminated if at least one of the
statutory grounds are established and termination “appears to be in the child’s best interest”).
7
Long v. Div. of Family Servs., 41 A.3d 367, 370 (Del. 2012).
6
product of an orderly and logical reasoning process.8 We review legal rulings de

novo.9

(10) The law has recognized parental rights as fundamental liberties,

which may not be abrogated absent the most compelling reasons.10 The statutory

standard for terminating parental rights under Delaware law requires the court to

undertake two separate inquiries. First, the Family Court must determine that the

petitioner has established, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is a

statutory basis for termination.11 Second, the Family Court must find, also by

clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child’s best interest.12

“This Court has consistently held that the best interest element of the statute can

be considered only after there has been a finding of an enumerated statutory basis

for termination.”13 Mother’s argument that the Family Court erroneously failed

to consider whether termination was in the Child’s best interest therefore does

8
In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995); see also id. (stating that this Court can make
“independent findings” in a TPR appeal if the Family Court’s factual findings are “clearly
erroneous”).
9
Id.
10
Whitmore v. Robinson, 223 A.3d 417, 421 (Del. 2019); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (stating that parents have a fundamental right, protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, “to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children”).
11
Whitmore, 223 A.3d at 421; Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 537 (Del. 2000).
12
Whitmore, 223 A.3d at 421; Shepherd, 752 A.2d at 537.
13
Shepherd, 752 A.2d at 537.
7
not warrant reversal unless the Family Court erroneously found that Mother did

not sufficiently prove a statutory basis for termination.14

(11) Mother contends that she proved that termination was warranted on

the basis of unintentional abandonment under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(3). To

terminate a respondent’s parental rights based on unintentional abandonment, the

Family Court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that:

the respondent abandoned the child and the abandonment was
unintentional. The respondent’s subsequent conduct does not cure
the abandonment. Unintentional abandonment is evidenced by both
of the following:
a. For at least 12 consecutive months of the 18 months
preceding the filing of the petition, the respondent has failed
to do all of the following:
1. Communicate or visit regularly with the child.
2. File or pursue a pending petition to establish
paternity or to establish a right to have contact or
visitation with the child.
3. Manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal
and physical custody of the child, if the child was not
in the physical custody of the other parent during this
time.

b. One or more of the following grounds exists:
1. The child is not in the other parent’s legal and
physical custody and the respondent is not able or
willing to promptly assume legal and physical custody
of the child and pay reasonable support for the child.
2. The child is in the legal and physical custody of the
other parent and a stepparent, and all of the following
apply:

14
Mother’s argument that her privately retained counsel did not adequately present her case
also does not establish a reversible error.
8
A. The stepparent is the prospective adoptive
parent.
B. The respondent is not able or willing to
promptly establish and maintain contact with the
child and pay reasonable support for the child.
3. Placing the child in the respondent’s legal and
physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm
to the child’s physical or psychological well-being
because the respondent is unfit to maintain a
relationship of parent and child with the child, as
indicated by at least 1 of the following:
A. The circumstances of the child’s conception.
B. The respondent’s behavior during the
mother's pregnancy or since the child’s birth.
C. The respondent’s behavior with respect to
another child.
4. Failure to terminate the respondent’s parental rights
would be detrimental to the child. In determining
whether this ground exists, the Court shall consider all
relevant factors, including all of the following:
A. The respondent’s efforts to obtain or maintain
legal and physical custody of the child.
B. The role of another person in thwarting the
respondent’s efforts to assert parental rights.
C. The respondent’s ability to care for the child.
D. The child’s age.
E. The quality of a previous relationship between
the respondent and child, and between the
respondent and another child.
F. The duration and suitability of the child’s
current custodial environment.
G. The effect on the child of a change of physical
custody.15

(12) Thus, to establish unintentional abandonment, Mother was required

to prove (i) all the elements of Section 1103(a)(3)a and (ii) at least one of the

15
13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(3).
9
grounds set forth in Section 1103(a)(3)b. We now consider whether the Family

Court erroneously determined that Mother failed to meet that burden.

(13) As to Section 1103(a)(3), the third element of that section,

subsection a.3, is inapplicable because the Child was in Mother’s custody.16

Moreover, we conclude Section 1103(a)(3)a.2 was satisfied here. The Family

Court found that it was not because Father petitioned to adjudicate paternity in

2018. But the statute requires the court to examine Father’s conduct during the

eighteen months preceding the filing of the petition. If the fact that a parent

sought adjudication of paternity years before the filing of a TPR petition could

satisfy Section 1103(a)(3)a.2, then such parent’s rights could never be terminated

on the basis of later unintentional abandonment. Because Father did not file or

pursue a petition to establish a right to have contact or visitation with the Child

in the eighteen months preceding Mother’s filing of the TPR petition, Section

1103(a)(3)a.2 is satisfied.

(14) Whether Mother met her burden under Section 1103(a)(3)a

therefore turns on whether Father “communicate[d] or visit[ed] regularly” with

the Child for a consecutive twelve-month period in the eighteen months

16
See id. § 1103(a)(3)a.3 (requiring petitioner to show that, for at least twelve consecutive
months of the eighteen months preceding the filing of the TPR petition, the respondent failed
to “[m]anifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child, if
the child was not in the physical custody of the other parent during this time” (emphasis
added)).
10
preceding the TPR filing.17 It is undisputed that Father did not actually

communicate or visit with the child for several years before the TPR petition was

filed. The Family Court found that Father could not be faulted for that failure

because Mother prevented him from having contact with the Child by blocking

his number and not telling him where Mother and the Child had relocated.

Mother asserts that she did not block his number and, in any event, Father could

have contacted her through relatives.

(15) This Court does not appear directly to have considered the extent to

which a petitioner’s role in preventing contact between the respondent and the

child is relevant to the determination of whether the respondent regularly

communicated or visited with the child under Section 1103(a)(3)a.1.18 Because

a parent can seek intervention from the Family Court if the other parent prevents

contact with a child, and because whether the sidelined parent seeks such relief

is the relevant inquiry under Section 1103(a)(3)a.2, we are inclined to view the

17
Id. § 1103(a)(3)a.1.
18
But cf. Storm v. Dep’t Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families, 2025 WL 3046402 (Del.
Oct. 31, 2025) (affirming termination of a father’s parental rights based on unintentional
abandonment and failure to plan and stating that father had visited with the child until the
child’s grandmother stopped responding to his texts and calls); Tannis v. Moen, 268 A.3d 754,
2021 WL 5858692 (Del. Dec. 10, 2021) (TABLE) (affirming termination of father’s parental
rights based on unintentional abandonment and failure to plan and stating that “on multiple
occasions” the father had asked for pictures of the child and updates on the child’s milestones
but that he had failed to follow through with visits, had last visited with the child more than a
year before the TPR petition was filed, had been incarcerated for much of the child’s life, and
had failed to participate in a court-ordered social study).
11
inquiry under Section 1103(a)(3)a.1 as concerning the extent of actual contact

between the respondent and the child. But we need not resolve that issue in this

case if the Family Court correctly held that Mother did not establish one of the

additional grounds for termination under Section 1103(a)(3)b.

(16) We conclude that Mother has not shown that the Family Court erred

by determining that she did not meet her burden of proving a basis for termination

under Section 1103(a)(3)b. Section 1103(a)(3)b.1 does not apply because the

Child was in Mother’s custody.19 Mother did not argue at trial that Sections

1103(a)(3)b.3 or 1103(a)(3)b.4 were satisfied; instead, she focused on Section

1103(a)(3)b.2.20 Under that section, Mother was required to prove that the Child

was in the custody of Mother and Stepfather; Stepfather was the prospective

adoptive parent; and Father was “not able or willing to promptly establish and

19
See 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(3)b.1 (providing for termination on the grounds of unintentional
abandonment if Section 1103(a)(3)a is satisfied and the “child is not in the other parent’s legal
and physical custody and the respondent is not able or willing to promptly assume legal and
physical custody of the child and pay reasonable support for the child”).
20
Mother’s counsel did not cite the subsection on which Mother was relying, but in his closing
statement he argued that Father had not had contact with the Child or filed a petition for custody
or visitation during the relevant period; Father had not manifested an ability or willingness to
assume physical custody; Stepfather was the prospective adoptive parent; and TPR was in the
Child’s best interests. See File No. 24-11-03TN, Petition No. 24-6531, Trial Transcript, at
123:4-125:6 (Del. Fam. Ct. July 14, 2025). That argument implicitly invoked Section
1103(a)(3)a.1-3 and Section 1103(a)(3)b.2. It did not invoke Section 1103(a)(3)b.3, which
requires proof that “[p]lacing the child in the respondent’s legal and physical custody would
pose a risk of substantial harm to the child’s physical or psychological well-being because the
respondent is unfit to maintain a relationship of parent and child with the child,” or Section
1103(a)(3)b.4, which requires proof that “[f]ailure to terminate the respondent’s parental rights
would be detrimental to the child,” based on consideration of enumerated factors. 13 Del. C.
§ 1103(a)(3)b.3-4.
12
maintain contact” with the Child and pay reasonable support for her.21 The

Family Court found that Father could pay reasonable support and was able and

willing to promptly establish and maintain contact with the Child, including by

participating in therapy with the Child in order to reestablish their relationship.

The court’s factual findings as to that issue were sufficiently supported by the

record, and we therefore decline to disturb the court’s ruling.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow
Justice

21
13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(3)b.2.
13