Davis v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ARTHUR DAVIS, §
§ No. 223, 2024
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID No. 2201003180
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Appellee. §
§

Submitted: April 30, 2025
Decided: June 26, 2025

Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, and

following oral argument, it appears to the Court that:1

(1) Appellant Arthur Davis was charged with various crimes stemming

from three domestic violence incidents with his child’s mother, Andrea Brown. In

the months leading up to trial, both Davis and the State contacted Brown numerous

times about testifying. Davis, through threats and manipulation, encouraged Brown

to not testify, to testify falsely, or to recant her allegations against him. At the same

1
The facts of this case are undisputed. See Oral Argument Video at 1:20–30, available at
https://courts.delaware.gov/supreme/oralarguments/ (Davis’s Counsel: “[T]he facts are not in
dispute in this case.”). The facts are drawn from the transcripts of the pretrial conference and trial,
as well as the exhibits from trial, unless otherwise noted.
time, the State attempted to persuade Brown to participate in the proceedings and

testify. Despite the State’s efforts to procure Brown’s attendance at trial, the State

determined that it was unlikely that she would appear. With Brown’s attendance

uncertain, the State filed a motion in limine to introduce certain out-of-court

statements that Brown made to law enforcement. The Superior Court granted the

motion, finding that the State established that Brown was “unavailable” under

Delaware Rule of Evidence 804(a)(5) and that Davis, through wrongful conduct,

intended to, and did, procure Brown’s unavailability under Rule 804(b)(6). With

Brown’s statements in evidence, a jury found Davis guilty on numerous charges.

Davis now appeals. He contends that the Superior Court erred in admitting Brown’s

statements at trial. We disagree and affirm.

(2) The three domestic-violence incidents at issue occurred between

December 2020 and January 2022. During the first incident in December 2020,

Davis appeared at Brown’s residence, acting hostile toward her. While arguing,

Davis grabbed an object and struck the windshield of Brown’s car, breaking the

glass. She called 911 and reported to police that Davis was “acting crazy.” During

the second incident in July 2021, Davis entered Brown’s residence without

permission, purportedly to visit his child. When Davis refused to leave, Brown tried

to leave in her car. But before she drove away, Davis threw a soda bottle at her car.

When she got out of the car, Davis poured the soda on her. Brown chased Davis

2
away with mace, but he returned shortly thereafter and initiated a physical altercation

with her. Brown told one of her children to call 911, and police soon arrived to find

Brown distraught and disheveled. The final incident occurred in January 2022. By

this time, Brown had obtained a no-contact order against Davis. Despite the no-

contact order, Davis entered Brown’s residence without permission, became upset,

punched her television, and then left. Brown’s children were present for this

incident.

(3) Several months later, Davis was charged and arrested for the three

incidents.2 Davis was indicted on the following counts: stalking; criminal mischief

(two counts); criminal trespass first degree; assault third degree; endangering the

welfare of a child (three counts); burglary first degree; non-compliance with bond

conditions; act of intimidation; and breach of conditions of bond during commitment

(three counts).3 Unable to post bail, Davis remained incarcerated while awaiting

trial. A pretrial conditions order was issued requiring Davis to have no contact with

Brown.

(4) On a recorded phone line from prison, Davis repeatedly contacted

Brown to dissuade her from participating in his upcoming trial. At the same time,

the State was contacting Brown to persuade her to testify at Davis’s trial. Because

2
App. to Opening Br. at A1 (Superior Court Docket) (Dkt. 1).
3
Id. at A6–11 (Indictment). The State later dismissed one count of breach of conditions of bond
during commitment. Id. at A461 (Aug. 16, 2023 Tr.).

3
the content of these communications are central to the resolution of the issues in this

appeal—namely, whether the State undertook appropriate efforts to procure Brown’s

availability at trial and whether Davis engaged in wrongdoing that was intended to,

and did, procure her unavailability—we provide a timeline and summary of the

relevant communications:4

September 30, 2022: Davis tells Brown to contact his cousin to replace
Brown’s television that Davis punched. Davis then tells Brown to
recant her statements made to police and notify the State that she wants
no involvement with the case and the charges dropped.
October 5, 2022: Davis tells Brown that the State will reach out to her and
that she should inform the State that she wants the charges against him
dismissed.

October 8, 2022: Davis directs Brown to write a letter to the State, declaring
that she recants all statements made against Davis and wants the
charges against him dropped.

October 12, 2022: Davis dictates to Brown the substance of an affidavit that
he wants Brown to execute and deliver to the courthouse. Davis tells
Brown to include in the affidavit that she recants all statements made
against Davis, wants the charges against him dropped, and does not
want to participate in the case.
October 17, 2022: Brown tells Davis that courthouse personnel did not accept
the affidavit and directed her to deliver it to the State. Davis yells at
her for not leaving the affidavit with courthouse personnel.

October 19, 2022: Brown speaks with a social worker from the State and says
that she delivered an affidavit requesting that the State dismiss the
charges against Davis.

4
This timeline does not capture every contact that Davis made with Brown. The calls between
Davis and Brown were recorded and made part of the trial record.

4
October 27, 2022: Brown speaks with a social worker and a prosecutor from
the State and admits that Davis pressured her to author and deliver the
affidavit.

October 29, 2022: Brown notifies Davis that she spoke with the State. Davis
yells at her for doing so.
May 3, 2023: Davis tells Brown that she is not doing enough to get him out
of prison and back to his child.
June 23, 2023: A social worker from the State contacts Brown to discuss a
plea offer that the State presented to Davis. Brown says that she is
reluctant to testify but will do so if Davis rejects the plea offer.5

June 26, 2023: Davis rejects the plea offer.6 The same day, a social worker
from the State contacts Brown and notifies her that Davis rejected the
plea offer. Brown agrees to appear for a trial preparation meeting on
July 6.
June 27, 2023: Davis tells Brown that, if there is no victim, there is no case.

June 29, 2023: Davis calls Brown, and an unidentified person on the call tells
Brown to reiterate to the State that she wants nothing to do with the
case and wants all charges against Davis dropped. Davis tells Brown
that she needs to “fix” her story. Davis also suggests that Brown may
need to appear at trial and testify that Davis did not damage her property
and that she wants all charges dropped.
June 30, 2023: Davis tells Brown that she will get restitution for her
television. Davis also tells Brown to stop answering calls from the
State, and Brown says that she will not appear at trial. Davis says that,
if she does not appear for trial, then the State cannot prosecute him.

July 6–12, 2023: Brown fails to attend the trial preparation meeting. On July
6 and 7, a social worker from the State attempts to reach Brown by
phone, but the attempts are unsuccessful. On July 12, the social worker

5
There is a discrepancy regarding the date of this contact. The State’s motion states that it occurred
on June 20, but the trial court’s ruling states that it occurred on June 23.
6
App. to Opening Br. at A2 (Superior Court Docket) (Dkt. 10).

5
reaches Brown by phone, but Brown ends the call when the social
worker identifies herself.
July 17, 2023: Davis tells Brown that the prosecutor will attempt to use
Brown’s statements to police during trial. Davis directs Brown to write
a letter to the State expressing that she lied about the events leading to
Davis’s arrest.

July 20, 2023: The State mails a subpoena to Brown’s residence, mandating
Brown to appear for trial on August 14.

August 1, 2023: Davis becomes angry with Brown and tells her that he
typically must beat her up to get her to do what he wants.

August 7, 2023: The State sends an investigator to Brown’s residence and
Brown’s mother’s residence to deliver subpoenas requesting that
Brown appear for a trial preparation meeting on August 9 and that
Brown immediately contact the State. Brown did not appear for the
August 9 meeting or contact the State.

(5) On August 9, 2023, less than one week before trial, the State moved in

limine to introduce out-of-court statements made contemporaneously by Brown

around the times of the domestic violence incidents. Law enforcement had captured

these statements on body-worn-camera videos and 911-call recordings. In its

motion, the State argued that, despite reasonable efforts to procure Brown’s

attendance, she was unavailable under Delaware Rule of Evidence 804(a)(5).7 The

State further contended that Davis procured Brown’s unavailability, making

Brown’s out-of-court statements admissible under Rule 804(b)(6)’s forfeiture-by-

wrongdoing exception to the rule against hearsay.8 Davis responded to the motion

7
See id. at A25–26 (State’s Motion in limine).
8
Id. at A27–33 (State’s Motion in limine).

6
by claiming that the State did not satisfy Rule 804(a) because it did not seek a

material-witness warrant to procure Brown’s attendance at trial.9 Davis also argued

that he did not engage in wrongdoing or attempt to procure or cause Brown’s

unavailability.10

(6) On the day of trial, the Superior Court granted the State’s motion.11 It

highlighted the State’s successful and unsuccessful contacts with Brown in its efforts

to procure her attendance at trial. The court also provided a timeline of the numerous

prison calls between Davis and Brown for the period of September 2022 through

August 2023. The court then found that the State proved, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that Brown was unavailable under Rule 804(a)(5) because the State

established that it had not been able “by process or other reasonable means” to

procure her attendance.12 The court also found that Rule 804(a)(5) did not require

9
Id. at A63–65 (Davis’s Response to Motion in limine).
10
Id. at A68–71 (Davis’s Response to Motion in limine).
11
The Superior Court heard argument from the parties before jury selection on August 14. App.
to Opening Br. at A86–121 (Aug. 14, 2023 Tr.). And on August 15, Davis restated his position
opposing the State’s motion before the court granted it. Id. at A217–23, A255–60 (Aug. 15, 2023
Tr.).
12
Id. at A252 (Trial Court Ruling on Motion in limine) (The Court: “[T]he Department of Justice
spoke to [Brown] several times about testifying. The follow-up included the normal course of
process. They provided subpoenas for trial prep and trial. They called and she hung up when she
knew it was the [Department of Justice’s] social worker. The [Department of Justice] investigator
went to . . . two residences and -- on August 7th, to appear for trail prep on August 9th, and that
she contact the Department of Justice office immediately, and that the trial date was to begin on
the 14th. The [c]ourt finds this is enough to establish that the State has not been able, by process
or other reasonable means, to procure her attendance.”).

7
the State to issue a material-witness warrant.13 The court then found that the State

satisfied Rule 804(b)(6) because Davis’s prison calls were intended to, and did,

procure Brown’s unavailability.14

(7) The parties proceeded to a jury trial. There, the State offered into

evidence Brown’s out-of-court statements. Once the State rested, Davis moved for

judgment of acquittal on all charges. The court granted Davis’s motion, in part, as

to third-degree assault and one count of endangering the welfare of a child. The jury

found Davis guilty as to eight counts and not guilty as to three counts.15 Before

sentencing, the State moved to declare Davis a habitual offender, which the Superior

Court granted.16 In May 2024, the Superior Court sentenced Davis to an aggregate

13
Id. at A255 (Trial Court Ruling on Motion in limine) (The Court: “I reject the notion that the
State must seek a material witness warrant to establish the declarant is unavailable under 804(a).”).
14
Id. at A263–66 (Trial Court Ruling on Motion in limine) (The Court: “In the present case, the
defendant calls Brown more than 20 times persuading her not to testify, at times to -- to come to
court when he realized that perhaps the State could proceed without her presence. There was pleas,
apologies, demands, yelling, directing, orchestrating, commanding her and scripting his
instructions to the victim, at times angrily. He also cried. Other times with precision and
wordsmithing, the use of others was also here to coach her and others that were speaking to her
outside on his behalf. And, lastly, the guilt that he had served enough time and needed to get back
to their child. . . . And, lastly, including that he had to beat her when she doesn’t do what he asks
her to do, which here included either submitting a letter, an affidavit, or lying about what she told
police in court. . . . For these reasons, the victim’s out-of-court statements are admissible under
Rule 804(b)(6), and the defendant has forfeited his confrontation rights.”).
15
The jury found Davis guilty of: stalking; burglary first degree; criminal mischief (one count);
non-compliance with bond conditions; endangering the welfare of a child (one count); act of
intimidation; and breach of conditions of bond during commitment (two counts). App. to Opening
Br. at A584–87 (Verdict); id. at A4 (Superior Court Docket) (Dkt. 24). The jury found Davis not
guilty of: criminal mischief (one count); criminal trespass first degree; and endangering the welfare
of a child (one count). Id. at A584–87 (Verdict); id. at A4 (Superior Court Docket) (Dkt. 24).
16
Id. at A4–5 (Superior Court Docket) (Dkts. 28, 31).

8
of twenty-eight years in prison, suspended after nine years for decreasing levels of

supervision.17 Davis has appealed.

(8) On appeal, Davis argues that the Superior Court erred in admitting

Brown’s out-of-court statements at trial. Specifically, Davis contends that the State

did not meet its burden under Rule 804(a)(5) because the State did not issue a

material-witness warrant to procure her attendance at trial. Davis also contends that

the court erred when it found that the State satisfied its burden under Rule 804(b)(6)

because the State failed to establish that Davis engaged in wrongdoing, intended to

procure Brown’s unavailability, or did procure it. The State responds that the court

correctly found that the State did not need to issue a material-witness warrant to

satisfy Rule 804(a)(5) and that it satisfied all elements of Rule 804(b)(6). We review

a trial judge’s evidentiary ruling based on Rule 804(a)(5) and (b)(6) for abuse of

discretion.18

(9) Rule 804 covers exceptions to the rule against hearsay when the

declarant is unavailable as a witness. In seeking to introduce Brown’s out-of-court

17
See Ex. C to Opening Br. (Corrected Sentence Order). The charges and convictions most
relevant in this appeal relate to criminal ID number 2201003180. Davis, in another matter, pled
guilty to one count of strangulation and one count of endangering the welfare of a child. That
matter is criminal ID number 2206008364. Davis’s May 2024 sentencing pertained to both
matters, but Davis has not appealed the latter matter. See Dkt. 4 at 1 (Notice of Appeal).
18
Phillips v. State, 154 A.3d 1130, 1143 (Del. 2017) (citing Charbonneau v. State, 904 A.2d 295,
318 (Del. 2006)); Iverson v. State, 326 A.3d 1169, 2024 WL 4039927, at *4 (Del. Sept. 4, 2024)
(TABLE) (stating that abuse of discretion applies to an analysis under Rule 804(a)(5) and (b)(6)).

9
statements, the State first had to establish that Brown was unavailable under Rule

804(a), which provides that “[a] declarant is considered to be unavailable as a

witness if the declarant: . . . (5) [i]s absent from the trial or hearing and the

statement’s proponent has not been able, by process or other reasonable means to

procure the declarant’s attendance.” “Generally, the proponent must show a good-

faith, genuine, and bona fide effort to procure the declarant’s attendance.”19 The

proponent—here, the State—must satisfy its burden by a preponderance of the

evidence.20

(10) The primary question on appeal is whether issuing a material-witness

warrant was necessary in this case to satisfy the “reasonable means” requirement in

Rule 804(a)(5). The short answer is no. Within the past year, this Court held in a

similar case, Iverson v. State, that a “material-witness warrant was unnecessary” to

satisfy Rule 804(a)(5). In Iverson, this Court emphasized that the State needed to

use “reasonable means” to procure the domestic-violence victim’s attendance at

trial.21 There, the State “attempted to subpoena [the witness], called her, and sent an

investigator to her home when she missed a trial preparation meeting[.]”22 The Court

19
Moss v. State, 166 A.3d 937, 2017 WL 2806269, at *4 (Del. June 28, 2017) (TABLE).
20
Iverson, 2024 WL 4039927, at *4 (citing State v. Miller, 2020 WL 4355557, at *8 (Del. Super.
July 30, 2020)).
21
Id. at *5 (emphasis in original).
22
Id.

10
concluded that the State’s efforts amounted to a “good-faith, genuine, and bona fide

effort” to procure the witness’ attendance and that a material-witness warrant was

unnecessary.23 The same is true here.

(11) In our view, the State’s actions constituted a “good-faith, genuine, and

bona fide effort to procure”24 Brown’s attendance by employing “process or other

reasonable means.”25 The State made multiple successful and unsuccessful attempts

to contact Brown via phone.26 When she proved unresponsive as trial approached,

the State mailed a subpoena for trial27 and sent an investigator to deliver subpoenas

to her residence and her mother’s residence for trial preparation.28 These efforts are

sufficient to satisfy the State’s burden. The State was not required to issue a material-

witness warrant to satisfy Rule 804(a)(5) in this case. We are unconvinced by

Davis’s argument that we should follow the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in

23
Id. (quoting Moss, 2017 WL 2806269, at *4).
24
Moss, 2017 WL 2806269, at *4.
25
DRE 804(a)(5).
26
In June 2023, a social worker spoke with Brown regarding Davis’s plea offer. Brown indicated
that she was reluctant to testify but would do so if Davis rejected the plea offer. A few days later,
after Davis rejected the plea offer, the social worker contacted Brown to notify her of the plea
rejection and that the State would move forward with trial. Brown indicated that she understood
and agreed to appear for a trial preparation meeting on July 6. Brown did not show up on July 6,
so the social worker attempted unsuccessfully to reach Brown by phone. The social worker made
additional unsuccessful attempts to reach Brown by phone over the next week.
27
On July 20, the State mailed a subpoena to Brown’s residence, mandating Brown to appear for
trial on August 14.
28
On August 7, a State investigator delivered a subpoena to Brown’s and Brown’s mother’s
residences, requesting that Brown appear for a trial preparation meeting on August 9 and to
immediately contact the State.

11
State v. Iseli, which—based on the specific facts there—affirmed a trial court

decision requiring a material-witness warrant to satisfy Oregon’s rule for

establishing unavailability.29 We follow Iverson.

(12) Having established that Brown was unavailable, the State next had to

prove that Rule 804(b)(6)’s forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception applied to make

Brown’s statements admissible. That exception applies when the statement is being

“offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was

intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.”30 The

State must prove: “(1) that the defendant engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing, (2)

that the wrongdoing was intended to procure the declarant’s unavailability, and (3)

that the wrongdoing did procure the unavailability.”31 The State’s burden of proof

is a preponderance of the evidence.32

(13) Here, all three elements are satisfied. Davis argues that his actions did

not constitute wrongdoing. He contends that because this Court in Phillips v. State

found wrongdoing when the defendant killed the witness, Davis’s actions here do

29
458 P.3d 653, 669–70 (Or. 2020) (“[T]he additional facts about the defendant’s wrongful
conduct in causing the victim’s nonattendance underscored the likelihood that the victim would
not attend trial, thus supporting—together with the other factors—the trial court’s conclusion that
‘other reasonable means’ in this case included seeking a material witness warrant or a remedial
contempt order.”).
30
DRE 804(b)(6).
31
Phillips, 154 A.3d at 1143 (quoting United States v. Baskerville, 448 F. App’x 243, 249 (3d Cir.
2011)).
32
Iverson, 2024 WL 4039927, at *4 (citing Miller, 2020 WL 4355557, at *8).

12
not constitute wrongdoing as they did not rise to such a level. The plain language of

the rule contemplates mere “wrongdoing”—murder is not the threshold to establish

wrongdoing. We find that Davis engaged in wrongdoing in various ways. He

directed Brown to get his charges dropped, which included reciting the contents of

an affidavit that he had her execute and deliver to the State. He attempted to

persuade her not to come to trial, or to come to trial and change her story. He even

used others to attempt to dissuade her from testifying. He attempted to encourage

her with money, telling her to seek restitution from his cousin for the property that

he damaged. He attempted to emotionally manipulate her, telling her that she was

not doing enough to get him out of prison for the sake of their shared child. He also

yelled at her and made threats, stating that he usually needed to beat her to get what

he wants. And Davis contacted Brown despite that a no-contact order remained in

place during his communications with her. Taken collectively, these actions are

sufficient to establish that Davis engaged in wrongdoing.33

(14) Likewise, the other elements are satisfied—through his actions, Davis

intended to, and did, procure Brown’s unavailability. Davis argues that he did not

33
See, e.g., id. at *1, *4–5 (finding the defendant’s actions sufficient to establish wrongdoing
where the defendant: asked the witness to deliver an affidavit to the Department of Justice stating
that she did not want the defendant charged for his actions against her; used others to tell the
witness that she did not have to comply with a subpoena to testify at trial; told the witness that if
she did not show up to trial then the State would drop the case; and told the witness that she should
come to trial and speak on his behalf).

13
intend to procure Brown’s unavailability because he told her to appear at trial. But

Davis told Brown to appear at trial and change her story, suggesting that she testify

that Davis did not burglarize her residence. Davis also told Brown not to cooperate

with the State, evidenced by his repeated statements to Brown where he directed her

to either (a) stop talking to the State or (b) communicate that she did not want to be

involved in the case. He thus intended to procure her unavailability. And he did

indeed procure it. Brown did not attend trial. That Brown wavered about whether

to cooperate with the State does not save Davis.34 The record shows that Davis’s

actions substantially impacted Brown’s ultimate decision not to appear for trial. The

Superior Court did not err in finding that the State satisfied Rule 804(b)(6).

(15) Finally, Davis argues that the Superior Court violated his constitutional

confrontation rights when it admitted Brown’s out-of-court statements.35 This

argument is meritless. The United States Supreme Court has held that “one who

obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to

34
For instance, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that “[w]here a defendant
actively assists a witness’s efforts to avoid testifying, with the intent to keep the witness from
testifying, forfeiture by wrongdoing may be established regardless of whether the witness already
decided on [her] own not to testify.” Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 933 N.E.2d 633, 638–39 (Mass.
2010) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
35
Opening Br. at 7 (“As a result of the [c]ourt’s ruling Davis was forced to have a trial by videotape
and lost the right to confront the most important witness against him.”); id. at 8 (“The trial court’s
ruling that Davis’ wrongdoing procured [Brown]’s unavailability and thus admitting her out-of-
court statements under D.R.E. 804(b)(6), was erroneous under Delaware law and violated Davis’
right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Del. Const., art. I § 7
and due process rights to a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

14
confrontation.”36 This Court adopted that same reasoning in Phillips.37 Having

found that Rule 804(b)(6)’s forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception applies in this case,

we also find that Davis surrendered his right to confront Brown.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths
Justice

36
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
37
Phillips, 154 A.3d at 1143 (“In Davis v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court reiterated
what is said in Crawford: that the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing . . . extinguishes confrontation
claims on essentially equitable grounds.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). To the extent that Davis argues that the court violated his confrontation rights by not
holding an evidentiary hearing and relying on the prosecutor’s statements, see Opening Br. at 9–
10, that argument also fails. The court accepted the representations from the prosecutor because
she is an “officer of the court.” App. to Opening Br. at A243 (Trial Court Ruling on Motion in
limine); see also Chapman v. State, 962 A.2d 256, 2008 WL 4750342, at *2 (Del. Oct. 30, 2008)
(TABLE) (accepting representation by defendant’s counsel, as “an officer of the Court,” regarding
the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s execution of a waiver of his rights to be present
during the verdict). And the subpoenas sent to Brown and the recordings of certain prison calls
are part of the trial record. It would have been prudent for the State to have submitted a sworn
statement from the social worker, but the outcome does not change for lack of such statement.
Additionally, in his briefs, Davis argued that the Superior Court violated his right to compulsory
process. During oral argument, Davis’s counsel “surrender[ed]” this argument. Oral Argument
Video at 39:45–40:30. Nonetheless, we note that Davis’s trial counsel represented to the Superior
Court that he did not intend to call Brown as a witness at trial. See App. to Opening Br. at A111
(Pretrial Conference) (The Court: “[A]re you intending to call [Brown] as a witness?” Trial
Counsel: “I am not.”). Thus, Davis’s right to compulsory process was not violated. See Brown
v. State, 729 A.2d 259, 263 (Del. 1999) (“A criminal defendant has the right to compulsory process
to obtain the appearance of witnesses to testify on his behalf.”), overruled in part on other grounds,
Priest v. State, 879 A.2d 575 (Del. 2005).

15