Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

LEE DEER ET AL. v. NATIONAL GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL.
(AC 45509)
(AC 45510)
LEE DEER ET AL. v. THE TRAHAN
AGENCY, INC., ET AL.
(AC 45511)
Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Palmer, Js.

Syllabus

In each of two cases arising from the nonrenewal of a homeowners insurance
policy, the plaintiffs, K and L, appealed from the judgment of the trial
court granting the motions for summary judgment filed by the defendant
insurance companies, N Co. and C Co., and the defendant insurance
agents, T Co. and T. K purchased a homeowners insurance policy with
the assistance of T Co. and T that was underwritten by C Co., and the
policy named L as an additional insured. The policy was effective for
one year, commencing in June, 2019, and terminating in June, 2020.
Shortly after the policy was issued, an inspection of the plaintiffs’ home
was conducted at the behest of the insurance companies, which revealed
that a portion of the exterior of the home was missing siding. B, a home
inspection assistant acting on behalf of the insurance companies, sent
an email to P, the office manager of T Co., stating that proof of repair
was required no later than March, 2020, as a condition of continued
coverage. B sent a follow-up email to P in March, 2020, noting that the
policy was set to nonrenew due to a lack of response and that proof
of the repairs was required by the policy expiration date. The plaintiffs
claimed that they did not receive communication from P or anyone else
from T Co. regarding the inspection, the necessary repairs, or the risk
of nonrenewal. In April, 2020, C Co. sent a notice of nonrenewal to K
and T Co. by certified mail. The plaintiffs disputed receipt of this letter,
and the United States Postal Service tracking system indicated that,
although a notice and two reminders were left at the plaintiffs’ address,
approximately two weeks after the initial delivery attempt, the letter
was deemed unclaimed and was returned to C Co. The policy expired
in June, 2020. Less than three weeks later, the plaintiffs’ home was
destroyed in an accidental fire. When the plaintiffs made a claim under
the policy, they learned that it had not been renewed. The plaintiffs
commenced the first action alleging, inter alia, that the insurance compa-
nies had breached the terms of the policy and had violated the applicable
statute (§ 38a-323) by failing to ensure that the plaintiffs received actual
notice of nonrenewal and that the insurance agents were negligent in
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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.
their failure to notify the plaintiffs of the insurance companies’ intention
not to renew the policy. The trial court granted the insurance agents’
motion to strike the count against them. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed
a substitute complaint repleading the negligence count against the insur-
ance agents and further alleging against them a violation of the Connecti-
cut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq) based on a
violation of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA)
(§ 38a-815 et seq.), and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. The trial court granted the insurance agents’ motion
to strike with respect to the CUIPA and CUTPA claims but denied it
with respect to the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing claim. The plaintiffs then filed a second action against the
insurance agents, alleging that they had violated CUIPA and CUTPA by,
inter alia, holding themselves out as exclusive agents of A Co., another
insurance company, and not fully informing their customers that they
were not being insured by A Co.’s homeowners insurance. The two
actions were consolidated. Subsequently, the trial court granted the
motion for summary judgment filed by the insurance companies in the
first action and the motions for summary judgment filed by the insurance
agents in the first action and the second action, and the plaintiffs filed
three separate appeals with this court. Held:
1. The trial court properly granted the insurance companies’ motion for
summary judgment in the first action:
a. The plaintiffs’ claim that C Co.’s mailing of the notice of nonrenewal
was insufficient to comply with the notice requirements of § 38a-323
was not persuasive: § 38a-323 (a) (1) plainly provides that an insurer
could send by registered or certified mail or could deliver to the insured
notice of its intention not to renew, and the plaintiffs’ interpretation of
the statute requiring actual notice would render meaningless the language
affording the insurer the option to send the notice and specifying the
manner in which it could be sent; moreover, § 38a-323 (c), which refers
to an insurer’s failure to ‘‘provide’’ the insured with the required notice
of nonrenewal, was required to be read in the context of the entire
statute and could not logically or reasonably be construed to impose a
different or additional notice obligation on the insurance companies than
that required under § 38a-323 (a) (1); furthermore, in light of the plain
and straightforward language of § 38a-323, this court declined to consider
the legislative history of the statute, which the plaintiffs claimed sup-
ported their assertion that actual notice of nonrenewal was required.
b. C Co. did not breach the terms of the insurance policy by failing to
provide the plaintiffs with actual notice of nonrenewal: the policy provi-
sion governing nonrenewal did not require actual notice but, rather,
stated that written notice could be delivered or mailed, which require-
ment was fully consistent with the notice obligations of § 38a-323; more-
over, the interpretation of the policy advocated by the plaintiffs requiring
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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.
actual notice ignored the policy language advising the plaintiffs that
written notice could be mailed.
c. N Co. was entitled to summary judgment because there was no privity
of contract between the plaintiffs and N Co.: there was no dispute that
the plaintiffs’ policy was underwritten by C Co. and that there was no
privity between the plaintiffs and N Co., and, although the evidence
may have suggested that N Co. had some possible involvement in the
processing of the policy or some affiliation with C Co., the plaintiffs
provided no legal authority for the proposition that such involvement
could form the basis for liability under either § 38a-323 or the insurance
policy; moreover, even if N Co. had played a role in the issuing, underwrit-
ing, or processing of the policy, such that its alleged conduct could have
potentially rendered it liable to the plaintiffs, it would have been entitled
to summary judgment for the same reasons that C Co. was entitled to
summary judgment.
2. The trial court properly granted the insurance agents’ motions for summary
judgment in both the first and the second actions:
a. The trial court properly granted the insurance agents’ motion for
summary judgment in the first action with respect to the plaintiffs’ com-
mon-law negligence claim: the plaintiffs’ contention on appeal that the
insurance agents had a duty to notify them of the inspection results
following receipt of the same and that such duty was separate from the
duty that the insurance agents allegedly owed to provide notice of the
impending nonrenewal of the insurance policy was unpreserved, as it
was not properly raised in the plaintiffs’ operative complaint, in their
trial court memoranda, or at the hearing on the motions for summary
judgment, and, accordingly, this court declined to review the claim;
moreover, the trial court properly concluded that the insurance agents
had no duty to provide notice of nonrenewal to the plaintiffs because
the agency relationship between the parties terminated on procurement
of the policy, as the plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence sufficient to give
rise to a factual issue regarding their claim that a relationship existed
between the parties that imposed on the insurance agents an ongoing
duty of care to the plaintiffs.
b. The trial court properly granted the insurance agents’ motion for
summary judgment in the first action with respect to the issue of whether
they complied with the notice requirements of § 38a-323: this court did
not need to decide whether the insurance agents were acting as agents
of the insurance companies for purposes of § 38a-323 because, under
the statute, notice could be provided by either the insurer or its agent,
and this court determined that the insurance companies complied with
§ 38a-323 by mailing the notice of nonrenewal to K.
c. The trial court properly granted the insurance agents’ motion for
summary judgment in the second action with respect to the plaintiffs’
claim alleging violations of CUIPA and CUTPA: although the plaintiffs’
evidence established an ascertainable loss, namely, the damages arising
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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.
from the loss of their home after the insurance policy was not renewed,
they failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
causation of harm, as they failed to provide any evidence or explanation
as to how being insured by C Co. instead of A Co. was a substantial
factor in that loss.
Argued October 4, 2023—officially released May 28, 2024

Procedural History

Action, in the first case, to recover damages for, inter
alia, breach of contract, and for other relief, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New
London, and transferred to the judicial district of Hart-
ford, and action, in the second case, to recover damages
for, inter alia, violation of the Connecticut Unfair Insur-
ance Practices Act, and for other relief, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where
the cases were consolidated and transferred to the Com-
plex Litigation Docket; thereafter, the court, Schuman,
J., granted the motion to strike filed by the defendant
The Trahan Agency, Inc., et al. in the first case; subse-
quently, the court, Schuman, J., granted in part the
motion to strike filed in the first case by the defendant
The Trahan Agency, Inc., et al. with respect to the plain-
tiffs’ substitute complaint; thereafter, in each case, the
court, Noble, J., granted the defendants’ motions for
summary judgment, denied the plaintiffs’ motions for
summary judgment, and rendered judgment thereon,
from which the plaintiffs filed three separate appeals
with this court. Affirmed.
Joseph M. Barnes, with whom, on the brief, were
Robert I. Reardon, Jr., and Kelly E. Reardon, for the
appellants (plaintiffs).
Lee S. Siegel, for the appellees in Docket No. 45509
(named defendant et al.).
Cara D. Joyce, with whom, on the brief, was Robert
W. Cassot, for the appellees in Docket Nos. 45510 and
45511 (defendant The Trahan Agency, Inc., et al.).
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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

Opinion

PALMER, J. These three appeals involve two consoli-
dated actions arising from the nonrenewal of a home-
owners insurance policy. The plaintiffs, Lee Deer and
Keleen Deer, appeal from the judgments of the trial
court granting the motions for summary judgment filed
by the defendant insurance companies, National Gen-
eral Insurance Company (National General) and Cen-
tury-National Insurance Company (Century-National)
(collectively, insurance companies), and the defendant
insurance agents, Kevin Trahan and The Trahan Agency,
Inc. (collectively, Trahan defendants).1 On appeal, the
plaintiffs claim, among other things, that the court
improperly granted the defendants’ motions because,
on the basis of the undisputed facts, the defendants
failed as a matter of law to provide them with adequate
notice of the nonrenewal of their policy. We affirm the
judgments of the trial court.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts and
procedural history. The plaintiffs own a home located
at 52 Gurley Road in Waterford. Keleen Deer, with assis-
tance from The Trahan Agency, Inc., purchased a home-
owners insurance policy underwritten by Century-
National. Lee Deer is named as an additional insured
under the policy. The policy was effective from June
27, 2019, until June 27, 2020, and provided, among other
things, coverage for damage to the dwelling up to a
limit of $361,442.
Shortly after the policy was issued, an inspection
of the plaintiffs’ home conducted at the behest of the
The trial court also denied the motions for summary judgment filed by
1

the plaintiffs against each of the defendants. Because the court’s reasoning
with respect to both the plaintiffs’ and the defendants’ motions for summary
judgment is identical, and because the court’s decision granting the defen-
dants’ summary judgment motions necessarily resolves the plaintiffs’
motions against them, we refer hereinafter only to the defendants’ motions
for summary judgment.
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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

insurance companies revealed that a portion of the exte-
rior of the home was missing siding. On July 24, 2019,
Vanessia Babbitt, a home inspection assistant acting on
behalf of the insurance companies, sent an email to
Jessica Perry, The Trahan Agency, Inc.’s office manager,
concerning the results of the inspection. The email
included the home inspection report as an attachment
and stated that the ‘‘[m]issing siding on [the] exterior
walls’’ needed repair. The email further stated, ‘‘Please
discuss the situation with your insured, as repairs are
required as a condition of continued coverage’’ and
indicated that proof of repair was required no later than
March 27, 2020. Babbitt sent a follow-up email to Perry
on March 27, 2020, stating: ‘‘We have not received a
response regarding the . . . request for repairs . . .
[namely] [m]issing siding on the exterior walls. Due to
not receiving a response the policy has been set to non-
renew. Please submit proof of repairs . . . by the pol-
icy expiration date.’’ The plaintiffs contend they never
received any communication from Perry, or anyone else
from The Trahan Agency, Inc., regarding the inspection,
the necessary repairs, or the risk of nonrenewal.
On April 19, 2020, Century-National issued a notice
of nonrenewal, sent by certified mail, to Keleen Deer
and The Trahan Agency, Inc.2 The notice provided that
‘‘[t]his insurance is no longer acceptable due to the
inspection report . . . [that] revealed conditions
which increase the exposure to loss and prevent your
home from meeting underwriting guidelines. Written
requests regarding the following concern/repairs have
been sent but proof of compliance has not been
received.’’ The notice identified the ‘‘concern/repairs’’
2
The nonrenewal provision of the policy provides: ‘‘We may elect not to
renew this policy and may do so by letting you know in writing at least 60
days before the expiration date of this policy. The written notice, stating
the reasons for nonrenewal, may be delivered to you, or mailed to you at
your mailing address shown in the Declarations by registered mail, certified
mail or United States Postal Service certificate of mailing.’’
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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

at issue as the ‘‘[m]issing siding on the exterior walls.’’
The notice also stated that, ‘‘[i]n order to have this
notice rescinded we must receive proof that repairs
have been completed to the company’s satisfaction
prior to the non-renewal date on this notice,’’ and listed
the nonrenewal date as June 27, 2020, at 12:01 a.m.
The plaintiffs dispute receipt of the notice of nonre-
newal. A mail carrier with the United States Postal
Service first attempted delivery of the notice of nonre-
newal on April 23, 2020, but noted in the tracking sys-
tem: ‘‘Notice Left (No Authorized Recipient Available)
. . . .’’ Two subsequent reminders were left at the plain-
tiffs’ address. The postal service declared the notice
‘‘[u]nclaimed’’ on May 6, 2020, and returned the letter
to Century-National.
The policy expired on June 27, 2020. On July 15, 2020,
the plaintiffs’ home was destroyed in an accidental fire.
When the plaintiffs made a claim under the policy, they
learned that the policy had not been renewed.
Thereafter, in August, 2020, the plaintiffs brought an
action against the defendants (first action). The plain-
tiffs alleged that the insurance companies breached the
terms of the policy and violated General Statutes § 38a-
3233 by failing to ensure that the plaintiffs received
actual notice of nonrenewal (count one); violated the
Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA),
3
General Statutes § 38a-323 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) (1) No insurer
shall refuse to renew any policy . . . unless such insurer or its agent sends,
by registered or certified mail or by mail evidenced by a certificate of mailing,
or delivers to the named insured, at the address shown in the policy, or, if
agreed between the insurer and the named insured, by electronic means,
at least sixty days’ advance notice of its intention not to renew. The notice
of intent not to renew shall state or be accompanied by a statement specifying
the reason for such nonrenewal.
***
‘‘(c) Failure of the insurer or its agent to provide the insured with the
required notice of nonrenewal . . . shall entitle the insured to: (1) Renewal
of the policy for a term of not less than one year . . . .’’
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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

General Statutes § 38a-815 et seq., and the Connecticut
Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes
§ 42-110a et seq. (count two); acted in bad faith (count
three); and breached the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing (count four). In count five, the plaintiffs
asserted a negligence claim against the Trahan defen-
dants for their failure to notify the plaintiffs of the
insurance companies’ intention not to renew the policy
based on common-law negligence, a violation of § 38a-
323, and a breach of fiduciary duty.
The Trahan defendants filed a motion to strike the
negligence claim against them, as set forth in count five
of the plaintiffs’ complaint, on the ground that it failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In
support of their motion, the Trahan defendants asserted
that the plaintiffs sought ‘‘to impose a duty upon the
undersigned defendants, as an insurance agent [and
agency], [that] is not recognized in Connecticut.’’
Over the plaintiffs’ objection, the court, Schuman, J.,
granted the motion to strike. Judge Schuman concluded
that § 38a-323 does not apply to the Trahan defendants
because they are insurance brokers and not agents of
the insurance companies; the Trahan defendants did
not have a duty to provide notice of nonrenewal to the
plaintiffs under the common law because the agency
relationship between the parties terminated upon the
procurement of the policy pursuant to Precision
Mechanical Services, Inc. v. T.J. Pfund Associates, Inc.,
109 Conn. App. 560, 565–66, 952 A.2d 818, cert. denied,
289 Conn. 940, 959 A.2d 1007 (2008) (Precision Mechan-
ical); and the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege a
cause of action for breach of a fiduciary duty because,
inter alia, the common law does not recognize the exis-
tence of a fiduciary relationship between an insurance
broker and an insured.
After Judge Schuman granted the motion to strike,
the plaintiffs filed a substitute complaint repleading the
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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

negligence count against the Trahan defendants and
adding two new counts against them, alleging a viola-
tion of CUTPA based on a violation of CUIPA and a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. The Trahan defendants filed an objection to
the new counts, which Judge Schuman sustained in
part and overruled in part. Specifically, Judge Schuman
struck the CUTPA count, explaining that ‘‘[t]he CUTPA
count necessarily alleges violations of CUIPA, which
would raise the new issue of general business practice,
would undoubtedly entail significant new discovery
demands, and would essentially change the nature of
the case. The plaintiffs may well still have the ability
to bring this claim independently.’’ Judge Schuman did
not strike the count alleging a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing because it was
‘‘reasonably related to the detailed negligence allega-
tions of count five and therefore fits with Connecticut’s
liberal policy regarding pleading amendments.’’
Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a separate action
against the Trahan defendants (second action), alleging
that they violated CUIPA and CUTPA by, inter alia,
‘‘using deceitful and misleading practices by not fully
informing their customers that they were not being
insured with Allstate [Insurance Company (Allstate)]
homeowners insurance’’ after holding themselves out
as ‘‘exclusive Allstate . . . representative[s]’’; failing to
notify the plaintiffs of the insurance companies’ notices
regarding the results of the inspection; and failing to
inform the plaintiffs that the policy would not be
renewed unless the missing siding was repaired.
All of the parties subsequently filed motions for sum-
mary judgment in both actions. The actions had been
consolidated and transferred to the Complex Litigation
Docket in the judicial district of Hartford. The court,
Noble, J., heard argument on these motions on January
5, 2022.
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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

On May 3, 2022, Judge Noble issued a memorandum
of decision granting the insurance companies’ motion
for summary judgment in the first action. Judge Noble
explained that a review of the plaintiffs’ policy revealed
that the issuing company was Century-National and not
National General; the terms of the policy did not require
Century-National to provide actual notice of nonre-
newal; and, similarly, § 38a-323 (a) (1) permitted notice
by certified mail, as Century-National had done, and
proof of receipt of notice was not required.
On May 4, 2022, Judge Noble issued separate orders
granting the motions for summary judgment filed by
the Trahan defendants in the first and second actions.
In the orders, Judge Noble explained that he was adopt-
ing the analysis employed by Judge Schuman in granting
the motion to strike. These three appeals followed.4
Before turning to the plaintiffs’ claims, we set forth
the applicable standard of review. ‘‘The standards gov-
erning our review of a trial court’s decision to grant
a motion for summary judgment are well established.
Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judg-
ment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affida-
vits and any other proof submitted show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
. . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the
trial court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party seek-
ing summary judgment has the burden of showing the
absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts [that],
4
The three appeals are Docket No. AC 45509, which is the plaintiffs’
appeal from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the insurance
companies in the first action; Docket No. AC 45510, which is the plaintiffs’
appeal from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the Trahan defen-
dants in the first action; and Docket No. AC 45511, which is the plaintiffs’
appeal from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the Trahan defen-
dants in the second action.
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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle
him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party
opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary
foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact. . . . A material fact . . . [is] a
fact [that] will make a difference in the result of the
case. . . . Finally, the scope of our review of the trial
court’s decision to grant the [defendants’] motion[s]
for summary judgment is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Day v. Seblatnigg, 341 Conn. 815, 825,
268 A.3d 595 (2022).
I
AC 45509
In Docket No. AC 45509, the plaintiffs appeal from
the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for
summary judgment in the first action, in which the
plaintiffs had claimed that the insurance companies
violated § 38a-323 and breached the terms of the policy
by failing to ensure that the plaintiffs received actual
notice of nonrenewal. We reject the plaintiffs’ con-
tention that the trial court improperly rendered sum-
mary judgment for the insurance companies in the
first action.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our disposition of this appeal. In the court’s May
3, 2022 memorandum of decision granting the insurance
companies’ motion for summary judgment, the court
explained: ‘‘As an initial matter, a review of the policy
at issue reveals that the issuing company was Century-
National and not National General. Therefore, summary
judgment enters in favor of National General. . . .
‘‘[With respect to the issue of notice of nonrenewal,
the plaintiffs] argue that this [policy] mandates actual
notice because of the language that nonrenewal may
be done ‘by letting you know in writing at least 60
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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

days before the expiration date of this policy’ of the
nonrenewal.5 This phrase, in their view, clearly and
unambiguously established a standard of actual notice.
The argument ignores the language that Century-
National may let them know of the nonrenewal and the
following language that provides the means by which
notice may be provided, i.e., delivery to them, [or] mail
at their mailing address by registered, certified mail
or United States Postal Service certificate of mailing.
Delivery, the only certain method of ensuring actual
notice, is one of several means by which the notice of
nonrenewal may be made. . . . The phrase ‘letting you
know,’ read in context with the rest of the paragraph,
may only reasonably be interpreted to mean that Cen-
tury-National will advise the insured of a nonrenewal
by one of several means, one of which, delivery, will
result in actual notice, and the others may not.
‘‘The [plaintiffs] also argue that the attempt at nonre-
newal runs afoul of . . . § 38a-323 (a) (1) . . . . Giv-
ing the words and phrases of the nonrenewal statute
their plain and ordinary meaning leaves no room for
ambiguity or dispute—it is the sending of, inter alia,
the certified mail that satisfies the statute. No proof
of receipt is required. The legislature afforded several
options for a carrier to be compliant with the statute—
sending by registered mail, sending by certified mail, a
certificate of mailing, or, in the alternative, delivery to
the named insured. The statute mandates no require-
ment that upon sending the appropriate notice, an
insurer must thereafter confirm actual receipt, other-
wise the mailing options would be redundant with the
delivery option. Such a construct renders the word
‘delivers’ superfluous and unreasonable.
‘‘Connecticut courts have repeatedly found that . . .
sending notice of cancellation [of an insurance policy]
5
The nonrenewal language of the policy is set forth in footnote 2 of
this opinion.
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14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

by certified mail (see [General Statutes] § 38a-343 (a)6),
satisfies an insurer’s obligations to its insured. The Con-
necticut Supreme Court articulated that there is no
actual receipt requirement when a provision allows
notice by certified mail. Westmoreland v. General Acci-
dent Fire & Life Assurance Corp., Ltd., 144 Conn. 265,
270, 129 A.2d 623 (1957). [Our] Supreme Court held that
mailing, without proof of actual receipt, was sufficient
to cancel coverage. ‘[T]he giving of notice by the method
contracted for is sufficient whether it results in actual
notice or not.’ Id. In a different context, the [Appellate
Court] found that actual receipt was immaterial when
a contract permitted notice via certified mail. Scoville
v. Shop-Rite Supermarkets, Inc., 86 Conn. App. 426,
[434–35], 863 A.2d 211 (2004), [cert. denied, 272 Conn.
921, 867 A.2d 838 (2005)]. The Appellate Court observed
that when the contract permits notice by certified mail,
actual receipt is not contemplated. Moreover, ‘[a]ny
rule that provides that the risk of delivery of certified
mail should be placed solely on the sender would set
a dangerous precedent. There are many variables asso-
ciated with any type of mail delivery that are out of
the control of either party, such as misdelivery or late
delivery. In addition, by placing the risk solely on the
optionee, the optionor could intentionally avoid
accepting delivery until after the terminal date had
passed.’7 Id., 433. The court finds this reasoning persua-
sive, and binding, that the notice required by § 38a-323
was provided by Century-National.’’ (Citation omitted;
6
General Statutes § 38a-343 (a) provides in relevant part that no cancella-
tion of a policy to which that statutory subsection applies ‘‘shall be effective
unless the notice is delivered or sent by the insurer to the named insured
. . . by registered mail, certified mail, [or] mail evidenced by a certificate
of mailing . . . .’’
7
‘‘The [Appellate Court] declined to speculate, as this court does, ‘as to
whether there was any avoidance of the letter in this case. [It] merely
point[ed] out that a rule that places the risk on the sender may allow for
uncertainty and manipulation of the contracting process.’ [Scoville v. Shop-
Rite Supermarkets, Inc., supra, 86 Conn. App.] 433 n.8.’’
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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

emphasis in original; footnotes added; footnote in origi-
nal.)
On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court
improperly concluded that the insurance companies
were entitled to summary judgment because (1) Cen-
tury-National8 failed to provide actual notice of its inten-
tion not to renew the policy pursuant to § 38a-323, (2)
Century-National failed to provide actual notice of non-
renewal pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy,
and (3) the court failed to consider evidence demonstra-
ting that National General was involved in the pro-
cessing and management of their insurance policy.9 We
address each claim in turn.
A
The plaintiffs first claim that Century-National’s mail-
ing of the notice of nonrenewal, without ensuring that
it subsequently was delivered to and received by the
plaintiffs, was insufficient to comply with the notice
requirements of § 38a-323. Specifically, they contend
that subsection (c) of § 38a-323, which sets forth the
remedies available for an insurer’s failure to provide
the required notice, and the legislative history of the
8
Although the plaintiffs direct their first and second claims against both
National General and Century-National, it is undisputed that their insurance
policy was underwritten by Century-National. Consequently, as we explain
more fully in part I C of this opinion, only Century-National, and not National
General, potentially could be liable to the plaintiffs. Accordingly, our discus-
sion of the plaintiffs’ first two claims is limited to Century-National.
9
The plaintiffs also claim that they presented sufficient evidence to rebut
any presumption under the mailbox rule that they received the notice after
it was mailed. See Britto v. Bimbo Foods, Inc., 217 Conn. App. 134, 141
n.10, 287 A.3d 1140 (2022) (‘‘[t]he mailbox rule provides that a properly
stamped and addressed letter that is placed into a mailbox or handed over
to the United States Postal Service raises a rebuttable presumption that it
will be received’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 346 Conn.
921, 291 A.3d 1040 (2023). In light of our conclusion, as explained in part
I A and B of this opinion, that receipt of notice was not required under
either § 38a-323 (a) or the terms of the policy, we need not address the
plaintiffs’ contention regarding the mailbox rule.
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statute, demonstrate that ‘‘actual notice’’ is required.
We are not persuaded.
Analysis of this claim ‘‘raises a question of statutory
construction, which is a [question] of law, over which
we exercise plenary review. . . . The process of statu-
tory interpretation involves the determination of the
meaning of the statutory language as applied to the
facts of the case, including the question of whether the
language does so apply. . . . When construing a stat-
ute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give
effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In
other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned man-
ner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied
to the facts of [the] case, including the question of
whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seek-
ing to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z
directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself
and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining
such text and considering such relationship, the mean-
ing of such text is plain and unambiguous and does
not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual
evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be
considered. . . .
‘‘A statute is ambiguous if, when read in context, it
is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpreta-
tion . . . . When a statute is not plain and unambigu-
ous, among other things, we look for interpretive guid-
ance . . . to the legislative policy [the statute] was
designed to implement, and to its relationship to
existing legislation and common law principles govern-
ing the same general subject matter . . . .’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Belgada v.
Hy’s Livery Service, Inc., 220 Conn. App. 102, 118–19,
297 A.3d 199 (2023).
Section 38a-323 (a) (1) provides in relevant part that
the owner of an insurance policy subject to the terms
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of that statutory provision is entitled to renewal of
the policy unless the insurer ‘‘sends, by registered or
certified mail . . . or delivers to the named insured, at
the address shown in the policy . . . at least sixty days’
advance notice of its intention not to renew. . . .’’ We
agree with the trial court that, under the clear and
unambiguous language of § 38a-323 (a) (1), sending a
notice of nonrenewal by certified mail, as Century-
National undisputedly did in the present case, satisfies
the statutory notice requirement. Although the plaintiffs
contend that an insurer is required to provide ‘‘actual
notice’’ of nonrenewal—that is, to ensure both delivery
and receipt of the notice—§ 38a-323 (a) (1) plainly pro-
vides that an insurer may decline to renew a policy
after it ‘‘sends, by registered or certified mail . . . or
delivers to the named insured . . . advance notice of
its intention not to renew. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
General Statutes § 38a-323 (a) (1). Because the methods
by which an insurer may satisfy the notice requirement
of § 38a-323 are framed in the disjunctive, any one of
them will suffice. See 777 Residential, LLC v. Metropol-
itan District Commission, 336 Conn. 819, 838, 251 A.3d
56 (2020) (‘‘[o]rdinarily, [t]he use of the disjunctive or
between the two parts of the statute indicates a clear
legislative intent of separability’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)).10
Indeed, the interpretation of § 38a-323 (a) (1)
advanced by the plaintiffs would render meaningless
the language of that provision affording the insurer the
10
We recognize that ‘‘[t]he disjunctive or can be construed as and where
such construction clearly appears to have been the legislative intent.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) 777 Residential, LLC v. Metropolitan District
Commission, supra, 336 Conn. 838. The present case, however, is distin-
guishable from cases in which ‘‘or’’ has been interpreted to mean ‘‘and,’’ as
the plaintiffs have not claimed or demonstrated that the terms ‘‘sends’’ and
‘‘delivers’’ are defined synonymously. See id., 838–39 (disjunctive ‘‘or’’ not
interpreted as ‘‘and’’ where statutory terms at issue were not defined synony-
mously).
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option to send the notice and specifying the manner in
which it may be sent. ‘‘It is a basic tenet of statutory
construction that the legislature [does] not intend to
enact meaningless provisions. . . . [I]n construing
statutes, we presume that there is a purpose behind
every sentence, clause, or phrase used in an act and
that no part of a statute is superfluous. . . . Because
[e]very word and phrase [of a statute] is presumed to
have meaning . . . [a statute] must be construed, if
possible, such that no clause, sentence or word shall be
superfluous, void or insignificant.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Lopa v. Brinker International, Inc.,
296 Conn. 426, 433, 994 A.2d 1265 (2010).
The plaintiffs maintain that their contention regard-
ing the requirement of actual notice is supported by
§ 38a-323 (c), which provides that the insurer’s ‘‘[f]ailure
. . . to provide the insured with the required notice of
nonrenewal’’ entitles the insured to renewal of the pol-
icy for a term of not less than one year. (Emphasis
added.) Subsection (c) of § 38a-323, however, must be
read in the context of the entire statute, including, of
course, § 38a-323 (a) (1). See Torres v. Kunze, 106 Conn.
App. 802, 807, 945 A.2d 472 (2008) (‘‘A statute is passed
as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated
by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each
part or section should be construed in connection with
every other part or section so as to produce a harmoni-
ous whole.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). The
‘‘required notice’’ that an insurer is obligated to provide
under § 38a-323 (c) is expressly delineated in § 38a-323
(a) (1), and the use of the word ‘‘provide’’ in § 38a-
323 (c) cannot logically or reasonably be construed to
impose a different or additional notice obligation on
the insurer.
The plaintiffs also argue that the legislative history
of § 38a-323 supports the conclusion that the legislature
intended actual notice of nonrenewal to be received by
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an insured before the insurer may opt not to renew
the policy. We will not consider the legislative history,
however, in view of the provision’s plain and straightfor-
ward language. ‘‘Where the language of the statute is
clear and unambiguous, it is assumed that the words
themselves express the intent of the legislature and
there is no need for statutory construction or a review
of the legislative history.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Gaudett v. Bridgeport Police Dept., 218 Conn.
App. 720, 729, 293 A.3d 351 (2023); see also General
Statutes § 1-2z. The statutory text clearly indicates that
an insurer’s obligation may be satisfied by sending the
notice of nonrenewal by certified mail; General Statutes
§ 38a-323 (a) (1); and the plaintiffs concede that the
notice in the present case was sent in this manner.
Accordingly, the trial court properly rendered summary
judgment in favor of Century-National on the plaintiffs’
claim under § 38a-323.
B
The plaintiffs also assert that Century-National
breached the terms of the insurance policy by failing
to provide actual notice of nonrenewal. In support of
this contention, the plaintiffs rely on the policy language
providing that Century-National may elect not to renew
the policy ‘‘by letting [them] know’’ of that decision in
writing. See footnote 2 of this opinion. In addition, the
plaintiffs argue that the nonrenewal language of the
policy was added as a special provision, modifying the
standard policy, to be consistent with what the plaintiffs
contend is the requirement under § 38a-323 of ‘‘actual
receipt by the insureds of the notice . . . .’’ We dis-
agree.
Our standard of review for interpreting insurance
policies is well settled. ‘‘The construction of an insur-
ance policy presents a question of law that we review
de novo. . . . Insurance policies are interpreted based
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on the same rules that govern the interpretation of
contracts. . . . In accordance with those rules, [t]he
determinative question is the intent of the parties . . . .
If the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous,
then the language, from which the intention of the par-
ties is to be deduced, must be accorded its natural and
ordinary meaning. . . . In determining whether the
terms of an insurance policy are clear and unambigu-
ous, [a] court will not torture words to import ambiguity
where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambigu-
ity . . . . Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must
emanate from the language used in the contract rather
than from one party’s subjective perception of the
terms. . . . As with contracts generally, a provision in
an insurance policy is ambiguous when it is reasonably
susceptible to more than one reading. . . . Under
those circumstances, any ambiguity in the terms of an
insurance policy must be construed in favor of the
insured . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Warzecha v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co.,
206 Conn. App. 188, 191–92, 259 A.3d 1251 (2021).
‘‘It is always competent for parties to contract as to
how notice shall be given, unless their contract is in
conflict with law or public policy. When they do so
contract, the giving of a notice by the method con-
tracted for is sufficient whether it results in actual
notice or not.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Stratton v. Abington Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 9 Conn. App.
557, 562, 520 A.2d 617, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 807,
525 A.2d 522 (1987); see also Westmoreland v. General
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., supra, 144 Conn.
270; Scoville v. Shop-Rite Supermarkets, Inc., supra,
86 Conn. App. 434.
It is apparent that, like § 38a-323 (a) (1), the policy
provision governing nonrenewal does not require that
the plaintiffs receive actual notice of nonrenewal. The
policy provides that, if Century-National elects not to
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renew the policy, it ‘‘may do so by letting you know in
writing at least 60 days before the expiration date of
this policy,’’ and, further, that such notice ‘‘may be deliv-
ered to you, or mailed to you at your mailing address
. . . by registered mail, [or] certified mail . . . .’’11
Sending a notice of nonrenewal by certified mail, as
Century-National did in the present case, complies with
the express terms of the policy. The policy plainly
informs the plaintiffs that the written notice ‘‘may be
delivered to you, or mailed to you’’; (emphasis added);
which, contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument, is fully con-
sistent with an insurer’s notice obligation under § 38a-
323. See part I A of this opinion. As with the language
of § 38a-323, the policy’s use of the disjunctive ‘‘or’’
indicates that either method of providing notice is suffi-
cient to comply with the terms of the policy; see Con-
necticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Drown, 314 Conn. 161,
189, 101 A.3d 200 (2014); and the policy interpretation
that the plaintiffs advocate simply ignores the language
advising the plaintiffs that the written notice may be
mailed to them. See Karas v. Liberty Ins. Corp., 335
Conn. 62, 96, 228 A.3d 1012 (2019) (‘‘[s]ince it must
be assumed that each word contained in an insurance
policy is intended to serve a purpose, every term will
be given effect if that can be done by any reasonable
construction’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly ren-
dered summary judgment in favor of Century-National
on the plaintiffs’ claim under the policy.12
11
The general terms of the policy set forth a nonrenewal provision that
states: ‘‘We may elect not to renew this policy. We may do so by delivering
to you, or mailing to you at your mailing address shown in the Declarations,
written notice at least 30 days before the expiration date of this policy.
Proof of mailing will be sufficient proof of notice.’’ The operative language
of the policy, however, as discussed previously, is contained in an endorse-
ment of special provisions applicable to Connecticut policies.
12
The plaintiffs also maintain that the trial court improperly rendered
summary judgment for the insurance companies on the plaintiffs’ claim that
Century-National refused to honor the terms of the policy in bad faith in
violation of CUIPA and CUTPA. The plaintiffs’ bad faith claim necessarily
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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

C
The plaintiffs further argue that the court, in granting
the motion for summary judgment in favor of National
General, failed to properly consider certain evidence
demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact that
National General was involved in the processing and
management of their policy. National General responds
that it was entitled to summary judgment because, as
the plaintiffs acknowledge, there was no privity of con-
tract between the plaintiffs and National General. We
agree with National General.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to this claim. At the hearing on the parties’ motions
for summary judgment, the following colloquy took
place between the court and the plaintiffs’ counsel
regarding National General’s involvement with the
plaintiffs:
‘‘The Court: . . . [A]s part of the [insurance compa-
nies’] motions for summary judgment, [National Gen-
eral] indicated that it didn’t write the policy and it had
no contractual relationship with your clients, the con-
tractual relationship [was] with [Century-National]. I
didn’t see any evidentiary opposition to that assertion
solely as to [National General], did I miss it or?
‘‘[The Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: Only referenced to the vari-
ous documents that were provided to the plaintiff[s]
from [National General] that indicates [National Gen-
eral] was involved in this. I guess at the end of the day,
to be completely honest, it probably doesn’t matter
much even from a practical standpoint because there
is a defendant and an insurance company here. But the
argument was that the various documents that were
provided by [National General], they did list [National
fails, however, in light of our conclusion that Century-National did not
breach the terms of the policy.
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General] so. But you’re correct, Your Honor, you didn’t
see much other than maybe a few letter[s].
‘‘The Court: And there’s no policy in so far as you
know, and you have no basis to establish that there’s
a policy from [National General] with your clients?
‘‘[The Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: Correct.
‘‘The Court: So that the breach of contract claims,
the bad faith, which would need to have a contractual
basis, any claim that would be dependent upon the
existence of an insurance contract between [National
General] and your clients [are] entitled to summary
judgment?
‘‘[The Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: Correct.’’
On appeal, the plaintiffs challenge the trial court’s
decision granting National General’s motion for sum-
mary judgment based on the court’s determination that
the issuing company was Century-National and not
National General. In support of their contention, the
plaintiffs point to certain evidence that, they claim,
tends to establish that National General was involved in
processing and managing the plaintiffs’ policy.13 There
is no dispute, however, that, as reflected on the first
page of the policy, on the policy’s signature page, and
in the notice of nonrenewal, the plaintiffs’ policy was
underwritten by Century-National, and there was no
13
Specifically, the evidence identified by the plaintiffs includes the declara-
tions page of the policy, which mentions National General; the notice of
nonrenewal, which lists ‘‘National General’’ on the return address and ‘‘Nat-
Gen Premier’’ on the letterhead; the United States Postal Service electronic
delivery confirmation for the notice of nonrenewal, which lists ‘‘National
General’’ on the address for the return receipt, indicates that it was returned
to that address, and lists the recipient who signed for the delivery as being
located at ‘‘NGIC’’; the emails from Babbitt to Perry regarding the results
of the inspection, which indicate that Babbitt is associated with ‘‘NatGen
Premier,’’ as listed in her signature block; and email correspondence regard-
ing the plaintiffs’ insurance claim after the fire, which includes individuals
using email addresses with the domain ‘‘@ngic.com.’’
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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

privity between the plaintiffs and National General.
Although the evidence may suggest some possible
involvement by National General in the processing of
the policy, or some affiliation or association between
National General and Century-National,14 the plaintiffs
offer no legal authority, and we are aware of none, for
the proposition that such involvement can form a basis
for liability under either § 38a-323 or the terms of the
contract at issue in the present case. See Travinski v.
General Ins. Co. of America, 224 Conn. App. 838, 846,
A.3d (2024) (this court was unaware of any legal
authority for proposition that affiliation or involvement
that certain other insurance companies had with named
defendant as underwriter of insurance policy could
form basis for liability under terms of policy).
Moreover, even if National General had played a role
in the issuing, underwriting or processing of the policy,
such that its alleged conduct, like that of Century-
National, could potentially have rendered it liable to
the plaintiffs, National General would be entitled to
summary judgment on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim
for the same reasons that Century-National is entitled
to summary judgment. See part I A and B of this opinion.
We therefore agree with National General that the court
properly rendered summary judgment in its favor.
II
AC 45510 & AC 45511
In Docket Nos. AC 45510 and AC 45511, the plaintiffs
appeal from the judgments of the trial court, Noble, J.,
granting the motions for summary judgment filed by
14
On appeal, the insurance companies represent that National General is
‘‘a sister subsidiary company of Century-National under the National General
Holdings Corp. banner . . . .’’ This representation by the insurance compa-
nies is consistent with the evidence before the trial court indicating that
both Century-National and National General are members of the National
General Insurance Group.
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the Trahan defendants in the first and second actions.15
The following additional procedural history is relevant
to our disposition of these appeals. In granting the Tra-
han defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the
court explained that it was relying on Judge Schuman’s
analysis in granting the motion to strike: ‘‘The court
adopts the well reasoned analysis set forth in the deci-
sion of the court, Schuman, J., in his memorandum of
decision [on the motion to strike], which concluded
that there is no duty imposed on the Trahan defendants
by virtue of . . . § 38a-323 (a) (1) and that an insurance
agent has no duty to notify the plaintiffs of the
impending nonrenewal of the policy or their receipt of
the notice of nonrenewal. . . . In the absence of any
duty or imposition of liability pursuant to § 38a-323, the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted
and the plaintiffs’ motion is denied.’’ (Citation omitted.)
In Judge Schuman’s decision granting the motion to
strike, he explained that ‘‘[t]he plaintiffs’ incorporation
of § 38a-323 (a) and (c) seems almost inadvertent. They
do not specifically entitle count five as a statutory cause
of action. Other than incorporating the statutes by refer-
ence as part of a wholesale incorporation of count one,
the plaintiffs do not expressly mention or cite the stat-
utes, much less allege the elements of a statutory viola-
tion by the Trahan defendants. In any event, the statute
does not apply to the Trahan defendants. Section 38a-
323 (a) (1) does include the term ‘agent’ . . . . But
neither the statute nor any related statutes provide a
definition of the term ‘agent’ or any indication that the
term refers to an insurance broker. In fact, when the
legislature has sought to address the separate category
of insurance ‘brokers,’ it has used that term expressly.
. . . There is no reason to believe that § 38a-323
15
The briefs filed by the parties are identical in both appeals. In addition,
the two appeals, although not consolidated, were heard together at oral
argument in this court pursuant to an order of this court.
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26 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
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changes what the Appellate Court has described as the
‘general rule’ that ‘the agency relationship between a
broker and the insured terminates upon procurement of
the requested insurance policy.’ Precision Mechanical
Services, Inc. v. T.J. Pfund Associates, Inc., [supra, 109
Conn. App. 565–66]. Thus, the better interpretation of
the term ‘agent’ in § 38a-323 is that it refers to an
employee or contractor of the insurance company spe-
cifically charged with the duty of sending notice of
cancellation, rather than an ‘agent’ as a synonym for
insurance broker.’’ (Citation omitted.)
Judge Schuman next concluded that the Trahan
defendants did not have a duty to provide notice of
nonrenewal or cancellation to the plaintiffs under the
common law. Judge Schuman explained: ‘‘Our appellate
courts have recognized that an insurance broker
becomes the agent of the insured [w]hen procuring
insurance for a person [or entity]. . . . But, as men-
tioned, and as summarized in Precision Mechanical
Services, Inc. v. T.J. Pfund Associates, Inc., supra, [109
Conn. App. 565–66], the general rule is that the agency
relationship between a broker and the insured termi-
nates upon procurement of the requested insurance
policy. In other words, [o]nce that purpose is accom-
plished . . . and the insurance is procured, the agency
relationship between the insured and the broker termi-
nates, and the broker is without any authority to do
anything which further affects the insured unless
expressly or impliedly authorized by the insured to do
so. [Id., 565] . . . . The logical consequence is that the
broker has no duty to provide a subsequent notice of
cancellation to the insureds.
‘‘Both sides, however, rely on other language in Preci-
sion Mechanical to advance their positions. The plain-
tiffs observe that the Precision Mechanical court
quoted general language from other sources suggesting
that brokers do have a duty to inform their insureds of
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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

cancellation. . . . As the defendants suggest, however,
these quotations do not state the actual holding of the
Appellate Court. . . . Although the Appellate Court
did, in passing, quote from the other sources as indi-
cated, the actual holding of the court was that the bro-
ker had a duty to notify the insureds because the broker
made erroneous misstatements to the plaintiff that the
plaintiff’s policy remained in effect during the time that
a fire occurred. . . . There were thus special circum-
stances, involving culpable acts or omissions by the
broker, that justified departure from the general rule.
. . .
‘‘Here the plaintiffs do not allege any special circum-
stances that imposed any duty on the broker to notify
the plaintiffs about impending cancellation. The plain-
tiffs do allege that the Trahan defendants had acted as
their insurance agent for several years prior to the fire
and that the plaintiffs had come to rely on the [Trahan]
defendants to ensure that various policies were active
and up-to-date. . . . The plaintiffs also allege that the
Trahan defendants advised the plaintiffs in writing that
the plaintiffs should contact [them] if the plaintiffs had
questions about the policy or if they would like to review
their coverage or report a claim. . . . But these con-
tacts appear routine and do not involve a level of blame-
worthiness as in Precision Mechanical or the other
cases. The same is true of the fact, as alleged, that the
insurers sent a copy of the notice of cancellation to the
broker. The broker could reasonably assume, based on
the general rule, that the insurers would also notify
the insureds. The court concludes that, under the facts
alleged, there is no basis for an exception to the general
rule that the broker does not have a duty to notify the
insured of a policy’s forthcoming cancellation.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Judge Schuman finally concluded that count five of
the plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a cause of action
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28 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

for breach of a fiduciary duty. Specifically, Judge Schu-
man stated: ‘‘Our appellate courts have apparently not
held that there is a fiduciary relationship between an
insurance broker and an insured at any point in their
dealings. It seems most unlikely that our courts would
find a fiduciary relationship after the broker has pro-
cured the insurance policy when the courts have already
held that there is generally no agency relationship after
that point. . . . Further, notification of cancellation of
a policy, while extremely important, does not involve
the sort of ‘superior knowledge, skill or expertise’ that
forms the basis of a fiduciary relationship.’’ (Citation
omitted.)
On appeal, in Docket No. AC 45510, the plaintiffs
claim that Judge Noble improperly rendered summary
judgment in favor of the Trahan defendants because,
contrary to the court’s conclusion, the Trahan defen-
dants (1) owed a common-law duty of care to provide
the plaintiffs with notice of the results of the failed
inspection and notice of the nonrenewal of their policy,
and (2) failed to comply with the notice requirements
of § 38a-323. In Docket No. AC 45511, the plaintiffs
contend that Judge Noble improperly rendered sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Trahan defendants on
their clam in the second action that the Trahan defen-
dants violated CUIPA and CUTPA by virtue of their
deceptive and misleading advertising practices, which,
according to the plaintiffs, caused them to believe that
their homeowners insurance policy was issued by All-
state.16 We address each claim in turn.
A
The plaintiffs first contend that the trial court improp-
erly rendered summary judgment in favor of the Trahan
16
Like their claim in Docket No. AC 45509, the plaintiffs also contend
that they presented sufficient evidence to rebut any presumption under the
mailbox rule that they received the notice after it was mailed. We do not
consider this claim, however, for the same reason we did not address it in
the plaintiffs’ appeal in Docket No. AC 45509. See footnote 9 of this opinion.
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defendants on their common-law negligence claim. Spe-
cifically, the plaintiffs assert that the Trahan defendants
owed a duty to provide them notice of (1) the results
of the inspection, and (2) the nonrenewal of their policy.
The Trahan defendants respond that (1) the plaintiffs
failed to adequately preserve their claim that the Trahan
defendants had a duty to provide notice of the inspec-
tion results, and (2) the court properly concluded that
the Trahan defendants had no duty to provide notice
of nonrenewal because the agency relationship between
the parties terminated upon procurement of the policy.
We agree with the Trahan defendants.
1
We first address the Trahan defendants’ contention
that the plaintiffs failed to preserve their claim that the
Trahan defendants had a duty to notify them of the
inspection results. ‘‘Our appellate courts, as a general
practice, will not review claims made for the first time
on appeal. We repeatedly have held that [a] party cannot
present a case to the trial court on one theory and then
seek appellate relief on a different one . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v.
Eichten, 184 Conn. App. 727, 756, 196 A.3d 328 (2018).
‘‘The requirement that [a] claim be raised distinctly
means that it must be so stated as to bring to the atten-
tion of the court the precise matter on which its decision
is being asked. . . . The purpose of our preservation
requirements is to ensure fair notice of a party’s claims
to both the trial court and opposing parties.’’ (Citations
omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) White v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 313
Conn. 610, 620, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014). ‘‘[T]he determina-
tion of whether a claim has been properly preserved will
depend on a careful review of the record to ascertain
whether the claim on appeal was articulated below
with sufficient clarity to place the trial court [and the
opposing party] on reasonable notice of that very same
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claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lowthert v.
Freedom of Information Commission, 220 Conn. App.
48, 56–57, 297 A.3d 218 (2023).
In addition, as previously noted, Judge Noble rejected
the plaintiffs’ common-law negligence claim in reliance
on Judge Schuman’s analysis in his decision granting the
Trahan defendants’ motion to strike. Judge Schuman’s
decision, however, did not address the inspection issue
because that claim was not before him. Consequently,
Judge Noble’s decision also does not purport to address
that claim. Because, as we explain hereinafter, the plain-
tiffs did not file a motion for articulation with respect
to that claim, we treat the claim as having been
rejected.17 See, e.g., Tremont Public Advisors, LLC v.
Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 333 Conn.
672, 685, 217 A.3d 953 (2019) (‘‘[a]lthough the trial court
did not expressly address the plaintiff’s contentions
that it was entitled to sovereign immunity and immunity
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 35, it implicitly rejected those
claims’’); Bank of New York Mellon v. Horsey, 182 Conn.
App. 417, 441–42, 190 A.3d 105 (holding that court
‘‘implicitly rejected’’ defendant’s claim at hearing,
where defendant never sought articulation of subse-
quent ruling), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 928, 194 A.3d
1195 (2018).
Our review of the record reveals that the issue of the
Trahan defendants’ failure to notify the plaintiffs of
the inspection results was not properly raised by the
plaintiffs in the trial court. The negligence count of
the plaintiffs’ operative complaint in the first action
includes allegations pertaining to the Trahan defen-
dants’ ‘‘ample opportunity to notify the plaintiffs con-
cerning the necessity of correcting the missing exterior
17
In light of our conclusion hereinafter that the inspection claim was not
properly raised in the trial court, there is reason to believe that Judge Noble
did not address the claim for that reason. Although we cannot resolve that
question definitively given the silent record, we have no need to do so.
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siding,’’ but only in the context of the Trahan defen-
dants’ alleged duty to inform the plaintiffs of Century-
National’s ‘‘intention not to renew [their policy].’’ The
plaintiffs focused on the notice of nonrenewal that the
Trahan defendants had received on April 19, 2020, and
alleged that the Trahan defendants’ duty to notify the
plaintiffs arose after that date. The plaintiffs did not
allege that the Trahan defendants had a duty to provide
them notice of the inspection results that they received
on July 24, 2019, more than six months earlier.18

In the factual recitation set forth by the plaintiffs
in their memorandum in support of their motion for
summary judgment,19 they state that they ‘‘were not
aware that an inspection had been performed and were
not informed of the results of the inspection until after
the July 15, 2020 fire.’’ In the portion of their memoran-
dum addressing their negligence claim, however, they
did not argue that the Trahan defendants had a duty to
inform the plaintiffs of those inspection results, focus-
ing, rather, on their claim that the defendants had failed
to provide them with notice of the nonrenewal of
their policy.

In the plaintiffs’ memorandum in opposition to the
Trahan defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiffs again referred to the inspection, but not in
the context of claiming that the Trahan defendants had
a duty to inform them of the inspection results. Specifi-
cally, in response to the Trahan defendants’ contention
that their duty to the plaintiffs ended upon procurement
of the policy, the plaintiffs maintained that the policy
18
At oral argument in this court, the plaintiffs’ counsel observed that the
plaintiffs raised the issue of the inspection results in their complaint in the
second action. That complaint, however, concerned the plaintiffs’ separate
CUIPA/CUTPA claim against the Trahan defendants, not their claim sounding
in common-law negligence.
19
See footnote 1 of this opinion.
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had not yet been finalized because of the failed inspec-
tion. The plaintiffs argued: ‘‘The home inspection, which
revealed the missing siding, and [the insurance compa-
nies’] decision to nonrenew and terminate coverage
flows directly from [the Trahan defendants’] attempts
to secure homeowners coverage with [the insurance
companies] on behalf of the [the plaintiffs] in June of
2019. On July 24, 2019, approximately one month after
submitting the insurance application with [the Trahan
defendants], [the insurance companies] notified [those
defendants], not the [plaintiffs], that repairs to the miss-
ing siding were required to continue coverage. . . .
The home inspection was required by [the insurance
companies] as part of the insurance application pro-
cess. The [Trahan defendants contend] that any duty
owed to the plaintiffs terminates once the requested
insurance has been secured. While the plaintiffs dis-
agree with this contention, it is clear that insurance
had not been finalized due to the missing siding. . . .
[The Trahan defendants] had ample time to fulfill [their]
duty to properly inform the plaintiffs that [the insur-
ance companies were] threatening to terminate the
policy because of the failed inspection.’’ (Citations
omitted; emphasis added.) It is apparent that this refer-
ence by the plaintiffs to the ‘‘failed inspection’’ was
merely to identify the reason for the potential nonre-
newal of the policy and was not an assertion that the
Trahan defendants had a duty to notify the plaintiffs of
the inspection separate and apart from their alleged
duty to notify them of the nonrenewal. Indeed, the plain-
tiffs’ reference to the ‘‘failed inspection’’ in their memo-
randum opposing the Trahan defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is contained in the portion of the
memorandum captioned, ‘‘The [Trahan defendants]
owed the plaintiffs a duty to act with reasonable skill,
care, and diligence including a duty to notify the [plain-
tiffs] of [the insurance companies’] decision to nonre-
new their homeowners insurance policy.’’ (Emphasis
added.)
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At the hearing conducted by the trial court on the
parties’ summary judgment motions, the plaintiffs’
counsel argued that ‘‘[t]he inspection was part of the
application process’’ and that ‘‘[t]he reason for the non-
renewal has everything to do with the results of that
inspection.’’ The court questioned the plaintiffs’ counsel
as to whether the plaintiffs had previously raised such
a claim, and the plaintiffs pointed to the previously
referenced language in their opposition memorandum.
The plaintiffs’ counsel indicated that he had raised the
issue of the inspection to explain why the Trahan defen-
dants had an ongoing duty to provide notice of the
nonrenewal, stating: ‘‘[T]he reason why this is
important, why I’m bring[ing] this up, is because, to the
extent that the case law suggests that any obligation of
the agent terminates, any duty of the agent terminates,
upon procurement of the policy, this all stems from their
procurement of the policy.’’ Subsequently, the plaintiffs’
counsel also stated that ‘‘[t]he facts show that clearly
there was some obligation here on the part of [the
Trahan defendants] to notify their insureds [about] the
siding issue and the repair issue as well as the nonre-
newal. And they’re connected but they are separate.’’
Considered in the broader context of counsel’s argu-
ment concerning the application process, however, this
isolated statement did not clearly alert the court that
the plaintiffs had alleged a separate and distinct claim
that the Trahan defendants had a duty to inform the
plaintiffs about the inspection results.20
20
Moreover, even if this argument could be construed as alleging liability
based on the Trahan defendants’ claimed failure to notify the plaintiffs of
the inspection results, separate and distinct from their alleged duty to provide
notice of the nonrenewal, the plaintiffs’ counsel could not properly raise
such a claim for the first time at the argument on the summary judgment
motions. See, e.g., White v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., supra, 313 Conn.
629 (plaintiff could not properly raise new theory of liability for first time
in opposition to defendants’ summary judgment motion when he failed to
plead theory in his complaint).
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Thus, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ contention on
appeal that the Trahan defendants had a duty to notify
them of the inspection results when the Trahan defen-
dants received those results in July, 2019, and that that
duty was separate from the duty that the Trahan defen-
dants allegedly owed to provide notice of the impending
nonrenewal, was not properly raised in the plaintiffs’
operative complaint, in their memoranda, or at the hear-
ing on the motions for summary judgment.21 Accord-
ingly, we further conclude that the claim as framed on
appeal is unpreserved and we decline to review it.
2
We next consider whether the trial court properly
determined, as a matter of law, that the Trahan defen-
dants owed no duty to the plaintiffs to notify them
of the nonrenewal of the policy. The following legal
principles are relevant to our evaluation of this claim.
‘‘The essential elements of a cause of action in negli-
gence are well established: duty; breach of that duty;
causation; and actual injury. . . . Contained within the
first element, duty, there are two distinct considera-
tions. . . . First, it is necessary to determine the exis-
tence of a duty, and [second], if one is found, it is
necessary to evaluate the scope of that duty. . . .
Although it has been said that no universal test for
[duty] has ever been formulated . . . our threshold
inquiry has always been whether the specific harm
alleged by the plaintiff was foreseeable to the defen-
dant. . . . Furthermore, [a] duty to use care may arise
from a contract, from a statute, or from circumstances
under which a reasonable person, knowing what he
21
Although not required to do so, we note that the plaintiffs could have
filed a motion for reargument or reconsideration and thereby cleared up
any ambiguity in the record as to the breadth of their common-law claim
and the court’s purported failure to consider separately whether the Trahan
defendants breached a duty to the plaintiffs by not informing them of the
failed inspections.
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knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm
of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result
from his act or failure to act. . . . Only if such a duty
is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine
whether the defendant violated that duty in the particu-
lar situation at hand. . . . If a court determines, as a
matter of law, that a defendant owes no duty to a plain-
tiff, the plaintiff cannot recover in negligence from the
defendant.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) D’Angelo Development & Construction
Corp. v. Cordovano, 121 Conn. App. 165, 184–85, 995
A.2d 79, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 923, 998 A.2d 167 (2010).
In addition, ‘‘[t]he issue of whether a defendant owes
a duty of care is an appropriate matter for summary
judgment because the question is one of law.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Gonzalez v. O & G Indus-
tries, Inc., 341 Conn. 644, 680, 267 A.3d 766 (2021).
‘‘It is well established that an insurance broker owes
a duty to his principal to exercise reasonable skill, care,
and diligence in effecting the insurance, and any negli-
gence or other breach of duty on his part which defeats
the insurance which [the broker] undertakes to secure
will render [the broker] liable to his principal for the
resulting loss. . . . Where [a broker] undertakes to
procure a policy affording protection against a desig-
nated risk, the law imposes upon him an obligation to
perform with reasonable care the duty he has assumed,
and he may be held liable for loss properly attributable
to his default. The principal may sue either for breach
of the contract or in tort for breach of duty imposed
by it. . . .
‘‘Our Supreme Court also has held that [w]hen procur-
ing insurance for a person [or entity], a[n] [insurance]
broker becomes the agent of that person [or entity] for
that purpose. . . . Once that purpose is accomplished,
however, and the insurance is procured, the agency
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relationship between the insured and the broker termi-
nates, and the broker is without any authority to do
anything which further affects the insured unless
expressly or impliedly authorized by the insured to do
so.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Precision Mechanical Services, Inc. v. T.J. Pfund
Associates, Inc., supra, 109 Conn. App. 565; see also
12 E. Holmes, Appleman on Insurance (2d Ed. 1999)
§ 88.4, p. 721 (‘‘[o]rdinarily, an agent or broker’s obliga-
tion to his client ends with the placement of a policy
unless he either agrees to do certain renewal or other
servicing acts or through some understanding or pattern
of conduct the insured relies on the agent or broker
for that servicing’’).
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the Trahan
defendants continued to owe them a duty of care, even
after the policy went into effect, because a special or
fiduciary relationship existed between the parties.22 We
disagree.
The plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence sufficient to
give rise to a factual issue regarding their claim that a
relationship existed between the parties that imposed
upon the Trahan defendants an ongoing duty of care
to the plaintiffs. In Precision Mechanical, this court
recognized that there are certain circumstances in
which an agency relationship may extend beyond the
procurement of a policy. See Precision Mechanical Ser-
vices, Inc. v. T.J. Pfund Associates, Inc., supra, 109
22
The plaintiffs also point to an affidavit from an alleged expert with
experience in the insurance industry that they submitted in the trial court
in opposition to the Trahan defendants’ motions for summary judgment. In
the affidavit, the affiant opined that the Trahan defendants owed a duty to
advise their clients of the nonrenewal of policies and that they breached
their duty to the plaintiffs in this case. This evidence does not create a
genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the Trahan defendants
owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs because that issue presents a question
of law for the court to decide. See Gonzalez v. O & G Industries, Inc.,
supra, 341 Conn. 680.
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Conn. App. 570. In that case, the plaintiff, Precision
Mechanical Services, Inc. (Precision), submitted evi-
dence that it had retained the defendants, T.J. Pfund
Associates, Inc., and Marianne Pfund (collectively,
Pfund), a brokerage firm and an insurance agent, to
procure general liability insurance coverage for a period
between September, 1995, and January, 1997. Id., 566.
Pfund procured a policy that provided only twelve
months of coverage, which commenced on September
25, 1995, and was set to expire on September 25, 1996.
Id., 567.

Precision also submitted evidence that, after the pol-
icy was procured, Pfund continued to act on Precision’s
behalf. See id. Pfund, among other things, sought an
amendment of the policy to extend coverage until Janu-
ary 1, 1997, as initially requested by Precision; id.; and
had a discussion with Precision’s president about
renewal, stating that if Precision did not contact them,
they would contact Precision to provide it with options
for future coverage. Id., 569. Precision submitted evi-
dence that, in May, 1996, Pfund received a copy of the
insurer’s notice of intent to cancel and the notice of
cancellation of the policy, after Precision ceased mak-
ing its monthly payments to the insurer at Pfund’s
advice. Id., 568, 570. Nevertheless, Pfund continued to
repeatedly represent to Precision, until August 10, 1996,
that its policy remained in effect until September, 1996.
Id., 568, 570–71. On August 10, 1996, Precision learned
from Pfund, for the first time, that the policy had been
cancelled in May, 1996. Id., 569. Precision subsequently
brought negligence and breach of contract claims
against Pfund. Id., 561. The trial court granted Pfund’s
motion for summary judgment on the basis that the
agency relationship between the parties had ended in
September, 1995, when the policy was obtained and
that Pfund thereafter owed no duty to Precision. Id., 562.
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38 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
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On appeal, this court determined that the trial court
had improperly concluded that, as a matter of law,
Pfund owed Precision no duty of care, including no
duty to inform Precision that the insurer had cancelled
the policy, because the agency relationship between
the parties had terminated upon procurement of the
policy. See id., 570. This court ‘‘agree[d] that a broker
would have no liability for failing to notify the insured
of the cancellation of its policy when the agency rela-
tionship had ended,’’ but concluded that the circum-
stances of that case ‘‘present[ed] a different scenario.’’
Id., 569–70. Specifically, this court concluded, on the
basis of Precision’s submissions, that there was a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to the existence of an
agency relationship between Precision and Pfund after
September, 1995, and, therefore, the trial court improp-
erly concluded that Pfund owed Precision no duty of
care after that date. Id., 570.

In reaching this conclusion, this court recognized
that, ‘‘as a general rule, the agency relationship between
a broker and the insured terminates upon procurement
of the requested insurance policy. . . . However,
‘[i]nherent in the obligation to seek continuation of
an insurance policy is the duty to notify the applicant
if the insurer declines to continue [to insure] the risk,
so the applicant may not be lulled into a feeling of
security or put to prejudicial delay in seeking protec-
tions elsewhere.’ . . . Lazzara v. Howard A. Esser,
Inc., 802 F.2d 260, 266 (7th Cir. 1986); see also 12 E.
Holmes, supra, § 86.6, p. 497 (‘[a]n agent or broker can-
not sit idly with a cancellation notice or information,
but must seasonably inform the insured client thereby
giving the client sufficient time to obtain protect[ion]
with another insurer’).’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis
added.) Precision Mechanical Services, Inc. v. T.J.
Pfund Associates, Inc., supra, 109 Conn. App. 565–66.
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The present case is distinguishable from Precision
Mechanical because, in this case, the evidence submit-
ted by the plaintiffs did not identify any actions that
the Trahan defendants took after the policy was pro-
cured or any conversations between the parties to indi-
cate that the Trahan defendants undertook an obliga-
tion to seek continuation of the policy. Here, the
plaintiffs claim that a special relationship existed
between the parties because of the unique degree of
trust that they had established with The Trahan Agency,
Inc.’s office manager, Perry, on the basis of their prior
experience with her. The plaintiffs rely on the evidence
they had submitted to the court describing their rela-
tionship with Perry, specifically, deposition testimony
from Lee Deer, in which he stated, among other things,
that they had ‘‘[a] very personal relationship with
[Perry]; we trusted her, she took care of our insurance
needs.’’ He testified that they had an ‘‘unusually close’’
relationship with Perry and stated that they had ‘‘relied
on her for years.’’
Unlike in Precision Mechanical, the plaintiffs in the
present case submitted no evidence that they initially
hired the Trahan defendants to obtain coverage for a
period beyond the coverage period of the policy they
had procured.23 There was no evidence that the Trahan
defendants affirmatively sought to extend coverage on
behalf of the plaintiffs after the policy already was in
effect. There was also no evidence that the parties dis-
cussed renewal or that the Trahan defendants told the
plaintiffs that they would provide options for future
coverage beyond the end of the policy period. In addi-
tion, in contrast to the evidence of Pfund’s misstate-
ments to Precision in Precision Mechanical, the plain-
tiffs in the present case adduced no evidence that the
Trahan defendants made any representations to them
23
It is undisputed that the policy remained in effect during the entire
policy period, from June 27, 2019, until June 27, 2020.
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that their policy would renew or remain in effect after
the end of the policy period on June 27, 2020. Thus,
the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs in the present
case did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as
to the existence of an agency relationship between the
parties after the procurement of the policy on June 27,
2019, because that evidence provided no indication that
the Trahan defendants undertook an obligation to seek
continuation of the policy after that date.24 See Preci-
sion Mechanical Services, Inc. v. T.J. Pfund Associates,
24
Two Superior Court cases relied on by the plaintiffs, namely, Barry v.
Boccarossa, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No.
CV-XX-XXXXXXX (October 2, 2006) (42 Conn. L. Rptr. 92), and Kohn v. John
M. Glover Agency, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket
No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX (April 24, 2001) (29 Conn. L. Rptr. 377), are also distin-
guishable from the present case. In Barry, the plaintiff, Bryan Barry, brought
an action against the defendant, Steven Boccarossa, an insurance agent,
alleging, inter alia, that Boccarossa failed to use reasonable care with respect
to the renewal of Barry’s automobile insurance policy. Barry v. Boccarossa,
supra, 92. The court denied Boccarossa’s motion to strike Barry’s negligence
claim, concluding that Boccarossa had a duty to inform Barry about a notice
of cancellation. Id., 94. In that case, Barry’s father allegedly had informed
Boccarossa, before the policy’s cancellation date, that Barry had been in
an accident and that he was hospitalized. Id., 92. The court concluded
that a fact finder reasonably could infer that Barry’s father had contacted
Boccarossa on behalf of his hospitalized son to request or authorize Boccaro-
ssa, either implicitly or explicitly, to make a claim with the insurer for
Barry’s benefit. Id., 93–94. The court emphasized the importance of the
subsequent information that Boccarossa had received and the authorization
to act on it, explaining that such contact ‘‘reestablished’’ the agency relation-
ship that had terminated after the acquisition of the insurance policy. Id.,
93. Moreover, the court explicitly recognized that ‘‘[t]his is not a case where
the agent merely received notification of an impending cancellation and did
not contact the insured.’’ Id. In the present case, by contrast to Barry, there
is no claim that the plaintiffs contacted the Trahan defendants after the
procurement of their policy and before its nonrenewal to give the Trahan
defendants express or implied authorization to take further action on
their behalf.
In Kohn, certain personal property was stolen from the home of the
plaintiffs, Kevin Kohn and Pamela Kohn, and only a portion of the loss was
covered by the policy that they had procured insuring the premises and
contents of their home. Kohn v. John M. Glover Agency, Inc., supra, 29
Conn. L. Rptr. 377. The Kohns thereafter brought a negligence action against
their insurance agent, the defendant, the John M. Glover Agency, Inc. (Glover
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Inc., supra, 109 Conn. App. 566. Accordingly, the court
properly concluded, as a matter of law, that the Trahan
defendants owed the plaintiffs no duty of care because
the agency relationship between them terminated upon
procurement of the policy.
B
The plaintiffs next argue that the trial court improp-
erly rendered summary judgment in favor of the Trahan
defendants on their claim in the first action that the
Trahan defendants failed to comply with the notice
requirements of § 38a-323. The Trahan defendants con-
tend, inter alia, that § 38a-323 applies only to agents of
the insurance company, not agents of the insured, and,
therefore, they owed no statutory duty to the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs respond that the Trahan defendants were
Agency), claiming that their policy was inadequate and that the Glover
Agency had breached a fiduciary or special relationship with the Kohns by
failing to assist them in obtaining appropriate insurance. Id., 377–78. The
Glover Agency filed a motion to strike the Kohns’ claim on the ground that
its agency relationship with the Kohns ended once the policy was procured.
Id., 378. The court denied the motion, concluding that the Kohns had suffi-
ciently alleged a fiduciary relationship with the Glover Agency on the basis
of their allegations that they relied on the agency’s expertise to obtain
appropriate insurance. Id., 378–79. Unlike in the present case, in which the
plaintiffs alleged a duty to provide notice of the nonrenewal of their policy,
the plaintiffs in Kohn alleged that the agent had a duty to review their
coverage and its adequacy and to explain what coverage was available. Id.,
377–78. The court in Kohn recognized that, ‘‘once the coverage is procured,
the agency relationship with the insured is ended, and the insurance broker
has no authority to do anything further unless so authorized by the insured,’’
but concluded that ‘‘Connecticut law does recognize an agency relationship
between insurance agent and insured at the time insurance is contracted
and some duties flow from that relationship. At the very least the agent has
a duty to put into effect the type and amount of coverage requested. It also
does not seem too much to ask that an agent, with his or her expertise
and knowledge of the insurance business, review existing and available
coverages, at that time.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 378. In the present case,
the plaintiffs contend that the Trahan defendants had an ongoing duty to
the plaintiffs after the procurement of the policy, but, as previously
explained, the plaintiffs have failed to present evidence to substantiate
that claim.
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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

acting ‘‘as captive insurance agents selling National
General insurance policies,’’ and, therefore, they did
have a duty to provide notice of nonrenewal pursuant
to § 38a-323.
We need not decide whether the Trahan defendants
were acting as agents of the insurance companies for
purposes of § 38a-323. As counsel for the plaintiffs con-
ceded at oral argument before this court, this claim
would be rendered a ‘‘nonissue’’ if we were to conclude
that the notice afforded the plaintiffs by the insurance
companies satisfied the requirements of § 38a-323
because, under that statutory provision, notice may be
provided by either the ‘‘insurer or its agent . . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 38a-323 (a) (1).
Having determined in part I A of this opinion that the
insurance companies complied with the statutory
notice requirement, the plaintiffs’ claim of inadequate
notice must fail. Accordingly, the court properly ren-
dered summary judgment in favor of the Trahan defen-
dants on this issue.
C
Finally, the plaintiffs maintain that the trial court
improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the
Trahan defendants on the plaintiffs’ claim in the second
action alleging a violation of CUIPA and CUTPA. Specif-
ically, the plaintiffs contend that the court erred in
granting the Trahan defendants’ motion with respect
to their contention that the Trahan defendants engaged
in deceptive or misleading acts or practices by failing
to inform them that their policy was issued by Century-
National rather than by Allstate.25 The Trahan defen-
dants respond that the court properly granted their
25
In the trial court, the plaintiffs enumerated several other practices that,
they claimed, violated CUIPA and CUTPA, including the Trahan defendants’
failure to notify them of the inspection results and the impending nonre-
newal. On appeal, however, the plaintiffs’ CUIPA/CUTPA claim concerning
the Trahan defendants is limited to the Trahan defendants’ alleged practice
of not fully informing their customers, including the plaintiffs, that they
were not being insured with Allstate.
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motion for summary judgment on this claim because
the plaintiffs ‘‘failed to allege, never mind introduce, any
evidence that being insured through [Century-National]
and not Allstate in any way caused them damages.’’26
We agree with the Trahan defendants.
The following legal principles guide our analysis of
the plaintiffs’ claim. ‘‘CUTPA is, on its face, a remedial
statute that broadly prohibits unfair methods of compe-
tition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce. . . . To give effect
to its provisions, [General Statutes] § 42-110g (a) of
[CUTPA] establishes a private cause of action, available
to [a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of
money or property, real or personal, as a result of the
use or employment of a method, act or practice prohib-
ited by [General Statutes §] 42-110b . . . . CUIPA,
which specifically prohibits unfair business practices
in the insurance industry and defines what constitutes
such practices in that industry; see General Statutes
§ 38a-816; does not authorize a private right of action
but, instead, empowers the [insurance] commissioner
to enforce its provisions through administrative action.
See General Statutes §§ 38a-817 and 38a-818. . . .
[T]his court [however, has] determined that individuals
may bring an action under CUTPA for violations of
CUIPA.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dorfman
v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582, 614, 271 A.3d 53 (2022).
‘‘In order to sustain a CUIPA cause of action under
CUTPA, a plaintiff must allege conduct that is pro-
scribed by CUIPA.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id. Of particular relevance to the present case, CUIPA
26
The Trahan defendants also argue, alternatively, that they had no duty
to inform the plaintiffs about the expanded insurance program because it
was ‘‘unquestionably no secret’’ that the plaintiffs’ policy was underwritten
by Century-National and the policy makes no reference to Allstate. Because
we agree with the Trahan defendants’ lack of causation argument, we need
not address the Trahan defendants’ alternative argument.
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44 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

prohibits deceptive or misleading advertising of insur-
ance policies, such as ‘‘[m]aking, issuing or circulating,
or causing to be made, issued or circulated, any esti-
mate, illustration, circular or statement, sales presenta-
tion, omission or comparison which . . . uses any
name or title of any insurance policy or class of insur-
ance policies misrepresenting the true nature thereof
. . . .’’ General Statutes § 38a-816 (1) and (2).
The plaintiffs alleged in the second action that the
Trahan defendants violated CUIPA and CUTPA by
‘‘using deceitful and misleading practices [in] not fully
informing their customers that they were not being
insured with Allstate homeowners insurance.’’ Specifi-
cally, the plaintiffs alleged that, from 2003 until 2020,
apart from a brief time during which the plaintiffs were
customers of a different insurance agency and insur-
ance company, the plaintiffs were insured by Allstate,
with their policies secured through the Trahan defen-
dants and its predecessor agency. They further alleged
that, during this time, the Trahan defendants were ‘‘cap-
tive’’ agents of Allstate, that is, they were prohibited
from selling insurance products of other companies,
and they held themselves out to the public, and to the
plaintiffs, as Allstate representatives. Sometime before
2018, however, Allstate withdrew from selling home-
owners insurance in Connecticut and negotiated an
addendum to its exclusive agency agreement, which
allowed captive agents to participate in an ‘‘expanded
insurance program.’’ Under this program, captive agents
were authorized to place homeowners insurance poli-
cies with certain other insurance companies that were
selected by Allstate.
The plaintiffs alleged that the Trahan defendants par-
ticipated in the expanded insurance program without
informing the general public, thereby allowing the Tra-
han defendants to continue to market their homeown-
ers insurance as an Allstate product through their web-
site, advertising, and communications with their
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Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

insureds. The plaintiffs also alleged that, ‘‘[f]rom some-
time before 2018 through 2021, the [Trahan] defendants
have repeatedly and consciously placed hundreds of
their new insurance customers, including the plaintiffs,
with homeowners insurance through the expanded
insurance program using deceitful and misleading prac-
tices by not fully informing their customers that they
were not being insured with Allstate homeowners insur-
ance.’’ Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that, ‘‘[b]y placing
the plaintiffs’ homeowners insurance with another
insurance company under false pretenses, the plaintiffs
have sustained and continue to sustain losses and dam-
ages, including the loss of their residence, the loss of
their personal belongings, the loss of use of their resi-
dence, hotel expenses, interest and attorney’s fees.’’

The court briefly addressed the plaintiffs’ CUIPA/
CUTPA claim at the hearing on the motions for sum-
mary judgment. The following colloquy took place
between the court and the plaintiffs’ counsel:

‘‘The Court: How is there causation between the
alleged misleading of the [plaintiffs] with respect to this
being an Allstate policy?

‘‘[The Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: In other words, if they were
never with—if they [were] informed that they were not
going to be with Allstate, the [plaintiffs] would not have
gone forward with [Century-National], the inspection
wouldn’t have occurred, they would have been . . . .

‘‘The Court: And where—is that in the deposition or
affidavits?

‘‘[The Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: I believe—no, I don’t
believe it is in the deposition.

‘‘The Court: Okay. So . . . [p]resume that I’m going
to find against you on that causation argument.’’
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46 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

The court did not specifically address the plaintiffs’
CUIPA/CUTPA claim in its May 4, 2022 order granting
the Trahan defendants’ motion for summary judgment
in the second action. As explained previously, the
court’s order relied on Judge Schuman’s analysis in his
decision on the motion to strike, which addressed only
the issue of whether the Trahan defendants had a duty
to provide notice of nonrenewal. The plaintiffs, how-
ever, did not seek an articulation of the court’s order
on the motion for summary judgment, or otherwise
move for reargument or reconsideration. As indicated
previously, however, the court effectively rejected the
plaintiffs’ claim at the hearing on the motions for sum-
mary judgment.
We conclude that the plaintiffs cannot prevail on their
claim on appeal because they failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact with respect to causation of harm.
A plaintiff asserting a violation of CUTPA ‘‘must prove
that the ascertainable loss was caused by, or a result
of, the prohibited act. General Statutes § 42-110g (a)
. . . . When plaintiffs seek money damages, the [a
result of] language . . . in § 42-110g (a) requires a
showing that the prohibited act was the proximate
cause of a harm to the plaintiff. . . . [P]roximate cause
is [a]n actual cause that is a substantial factor in the
resulting harm . . . . The question to be asked in
ascertaining whether proximate cause exists is whether
the harm which occurred was of the same general
nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s
act.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Herron v.
Daniels, 208 Conn. App. 75, 100–101, 264 A.3d 184
(2021).
Although the plaintiffs’ evidence establishes an ascer-
tainable loss, namely, the damages arising from the loss
of their home after their policy was not renewed, they
have failed to provide any evidence or explanation as
to how being placed with Century-National rather than
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0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 47
Deer v. National General Ins. Co.

Allstate was a substantial factor in that loss. See id.
In the absence of any such substantiation, we must
conclude that the trial court properly granted the Tra-
han defendants’ motion for summary judgment with
respect to the plaintiffs’ claim in the second action.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.