Khan v. Jewish Women International

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion
motions and petitions for certification is the “officially
released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is
to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an
opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and
subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut
Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the
State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced
or distributed without the express written permission of
the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial
Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Khan v. Jewish Women International

SAIFULLAH KHAN v. JEWISH WOMEN
INTERNATIONAL ET AL.
(AC 48383)
Suarez, Clark and Harper, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment dismissing his action
for, inter alia, defamation. While he was a student at Yale University, the
plaintiff was accused of rape by J, a fellow student. The plaintiff was charged
with, tried, and acquitted of sexual assault in the Superior Court, but, in
subsequent disciplinary proceedings at Yale, Yale expelled the plaintiff for
violating its sexual misconduct policy. The plaintiff subsequently brought
an action in the United States District Court against J for defamation and
tortious interference with business relationships. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit ultimately certified questions of Connecticut
state law concerning absolute immunity to the Connecticut Supreme Court,
and the defendants in the present case filed an application with the Supreme
Court to appear as amici curiae. In their attached proposed amicus brief, the
defendants stated that the plaintiff had raped J and referred to the plaintiff
as J’s rapist. The plaintiff then instituted the present action, alleging, inter
alia, that the defendants’ statements constituted defamation. On appeal to
this court, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly
addressed the defendants’ special motions to dismiss pursuant to the anti-
SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a) after concluding that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the action. Held:

The trial court properly concluded that the litigation privilege applied to
persons seeking to appear as amici curiae, as the privilege protects all par-
ticipants in a judicial proceeding and applies to every step of the proceeding
until its final disposition, including statements made in pleadings or other
documents prepared in connection with the proceeding.

The trial court did not err in concluding that the statements in the proposed
amicus brief were pertinent to the certified question before the Supreme Court
for purposes of the litigation privilege, as J’s allegation that the plaintiff
raped her and Yale’s decision to expel the plaintiff on the basis of her allega-
tion were central to the issues both in the underlying federal litigation and
in the proceedings before the Supreme Court, and, because the defendants’
statements referring to the plaintiff as a rapist mirrored J’s allegation, they
unquestionably had some reference to the issues before the court.

The trial court did not err in determining that the count of the plaintiff’s
complaint purporting to assert a claim for abuse of process was barred by
the litigation privilege, as the plaintiff failed to identify specific misconduct
intended to cause specific injury outside of the normal contemplation of
private litigation and, instead, based his claim entirely on the allegation
that the words used by the defendants caused him harm in a way that was
ancillary to the litigation.
Khan v. Jewish Women International

This court concluded that the trial court did not err in dismissing the portion
of the plaintiff’s claims pertaining to the defendants’ alleged republication
of the proposed amicus brief on the alternative ground that, pursuant to Kel-
ley v. Bonney (221 Conn. 549), the litigation privilege barred those claims,
as the proposed amicus brief was a publicly filed court record that remained
accessible to the general public.

The trial court improperly addressed the special motions to dismiss after
concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action, as
once the court determined that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiff’s
claims, it was required to dismiss the action without proceeding further.

Argued December 3, 2025—officially released June 30, 2026

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, defama-
tion, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court
in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court,
Hon. Carl J. Schuman, judge trial referee, granted the
motions to dismiss and the special motions to dismiss
filed by the named defendant et al. and rendered judg-
ment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this
court; thereafter, the plaintiff withdrew his appeal as
against the defendant Advocates for Youth. Vacated in
part; judgment directed.
Alexander T. Taubes, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Amanda S. Amert, pro hac vice, with whom were Sara
Kim, pro hac vice, and Karen T. Staib and, on the brief,
Nicole Lapenta and Joseph Mario Buccilli, pro hac vice,
for the appellees (named defendant et al.).
Joel Kurtzberg, pro hac vice, with whom were Lau-
ren Perlgut, pro hac vice, and, on the brief, David G.
Januszewski, for the appellee (defendant Sanctuary for
Families, Inc.).
Sharon Baldwin, for the appellee (defendant Advo-
cates for Youth).
Scott M. Harrington, for the appellee (defendant The
Fierberg National Law Group, PLLC).
Khan v. Jewish Women International

Opinion

CLARK, J. This appeal concerns the applicability
of the litigation privilege, which provides litigation
participants absolute immunity from suit, to persons
participating in litigation as amici curiae. The plain-
tiff, Saifullah Khan, brought this action against the
defendants, twelve nonprofit organizations (nonprofit
defendants),1 The Fierberg National Law Group, PLLC
(Fierberg), and Attorney Jennifer M. Becker, claiming
that the defendants falsely referred to him as a “rapist”
in a proposed brief they filed with an application to appear
as amici curiae in a proceeding before our Supreme Court.
The trial court dismissed the action as to all defendants
except Sanctuary for Families (Sanctuary) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plain-
tiff’s claims were barred by the litigation privilege.2
The court also dismissed the action as to all defendants
pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes
§ 52-196a, on the ground that the complaint is based on
the defendants’ exercise of their right to petition the
government and that the plaintiff could not prevail on
the merits because the litigation privilege bars his claims.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improp-
erly (1) concluded that the defendants were entitled to
absolute immunity for their statements in the proposed
1
The nonprofit defendants are: Jewish Women International; Legal
Momentum; Chicago Alliance Against Sexual Exploitation; Connecticut
Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Inc.; Futures Without Violence;
National Alliance to End Sexual Violence; National Crime Victim Law
Institute; National Network to End Domestic Violence, Inc.; National
Women’s Law Center; Network for Victim Recovery of the District of
Columbia; Sanctuary for Families, Inc.; and Women’s Law Project.
The plaintiff also named National Coalition Against Domestic Violence
as a defendant in his complaint, but it did not appear before the trial
court and is not participating in this appeal. The plaintiff withdrew his
appeal as to one additional defendant, Advocates for Youth, after oral
argument before this court. Accordingly, all references in this opinion
to the defendants include only the nonprofit defendants, The Fierberg
National Law Group, PLLC, and Attorney Jennifer M. Becker.
2
As discussed subsequently in this opinion, Sanctuary is the only
defendant that did not file or join a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. See part IV of this opinion.
Khan v. Jewish Women International

amicus brief, (2) concluded that the litigation privilege
barred his abuse of process claim, (3) concluded that
the defendants’ alleged republication of the proposed
brief was protected by the fair report privilege, and (4)
addressed the defendants’ special motions to dismiss
after concluding that it lacked subject matter juris-
diction over the action.3 We conclude that the court
erred in addressing the special motions to dismiss after
concluding that the plaintiff’s action was barred by the
litigation privilege. We otherwise affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
The following facts, as alleged in the complaint or as
established by uncontested evidence in the record; see
Derblom v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 203 Conn. App.
197, 200, 247 A.3d 600 (2021), aff’d, 346 Conn. 333, 289
A.3d 1187 (2023); and procedural history are relevant
to this appeal. The plaintiff is a former student at Yale
University (Yale). After being accused of rape by a fel-
low student, the plaintiff was charged with, tried, and
acquitted of sexual assault.4 Yale subsequently held a
disciplinary proceeding relating to the allegations and,
as a result of that proceeding, expelled the plaintiff for
violating its sexual misconduct policy.
Thereafter, the plaintiff brought an action in the
United States District Court for the District of Con-
necticut against his accuser, identified as Jane Doe, for
3
The plaintiff also challenges the court’s dismissal of the action pursu-
ant to § 52-196a on the basis that (1) the court improperly concluded
that he failed to establish probable cause that he would prevail on his
claims, and (2) deprived him of his right to due process by denying his
request for discovery pertaining to the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions.
Because we conclude that the court lacked authority to address the special
motions to dismiss in the first instance, we need not address these claims.
4
As the trial court noted, although the plaintiff alleged in his complaint
that he was acquitted of “rape” and does not identify the jurisdiction in
which his trial took place, it is undisputed that the trial took place in the
Superior Court and that the plaintiff was charged with and acquitted of
sexual assault. See Khan v. Yale University, 347 Conn. 1, 13, 295 A.3d
855 (2023) (“[the plaintiff] faced trial before a jury in early 2018 for
first, second, third, and [fourth degree] sexual assault during a nearly
[two week] trial and was acquitted on all counts after less than [one]
day of deliberations” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Khan v. Jewish Women International

defamation and tortious interference with business rela-
tionships. See Khan v. Yale University, 347 Conn. 1, 16,
295 A.3d 855 (2023).5 The District Court dismissed the
plaintiff’s claims against Doe, concluding that the Yale
disciplinary proceeding was quasi-judicial in nature and
that Doe enjoyed absolute immunity for her statements in
that proceeding. Id. The plaintiff appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, claim-
ing “that the proceedings of [nongovernmental] entities
cannot be quasi-judicial and, thus, Doe’s accusations of
sexual assault in a private university’s disciplinary hear-
ing are not shielded by absolute immunity.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 17. The Second Circuit,
concluding that the outcome of the appeal hinged on
questions of Connecticut state law concerning absolute
immunity, certified those questions to our Supreme
Court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199b (d). See
id., 17–18.
The nonprofit defendants and Fierberg, represented
by Becker, filed an application for permission to appear
as amici curiae and to file a brief in support of Doe and
attached a copy of their proposed brief to their applica-
tion. The argument section of the proposed brief opened
by stating: “When Jane Doe was in college, the plain-
tiff raped her.” The brief also referred to the plain-
tiff as “[Jane Doe’s] rapist,” stated that “Jane Doe was
raped,” and referred to Doe as a “victim.” The plain-
tiff objected to the defendants’ application on the basis
that the statements referring to him as a rapist were “a
false and vicious personal attack” that constituted an
“abuse of . . . the litigation privilege,” which the plaintiff
asserted “bar[red] [him] from suing [the defendants].”6
5
The plaintiff also brought claims against Yale and various Yale
employees, but those claims were not at issue in the proceedings before
our Supreme Court. See Khan v. Yale University, supra, 347 Conn.
11 n.8.
6
We take judicial notice of the relevant filings in the Supreme Court
in Khan v. Yale University, supra, 347 Conn. 1. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Drury, 191 Conn. App. 587, 590 n.4, 216 A.3d 768 (“[a]n appellate
court may take judicial notice of files in the same or other cases”), cert.
denied, 333 Conn. 938, 218 A.3d 1050 (2019); Norris v. Trumbull, 187
Khan v. Jewish Women International

The defendants filed an application for permission to
file a reply to the plaintiff’s objection to explain why
they believed their statements were supported by the
record and, in the alternative, requested permission to
file a revised brief without the challenged language. The
Supreme Court denied the defendants’ application for
permission to file an amicus brief “without prejudice
to refiling the application . . . accompanied by a pro-
posed brief that is shorn of all facts not supported by the
record . . . .” The defendants filed a renewed application
accompanied by a proposed brief without the challenged
language, which the Supreme Court granted. The initial
proposed brief, however, remains publicly available on
the Judicial Branch website, and the plaintiff alleges that
the defendants republished the brief on their websites
and “to donors.”
The plaintiff commenced the present action on May 21,
2024, alleging, against all defendants, claims sounding in
defamation, false light, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and abuse of process. All of the defendants
except Sanctuary filed motions to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the litigation
privilege bars the plaintiff’s claims because they arise
from the challenged statements in the proposed amicus
brief. Additionally, all defendants, including Sanctuary,
filed special motions to dismiss pursuant to § 52-196a,
asserting that the plaintiff’s claims are based on the
defendants’ exercise of their rights to free speech and
to petition the government pertaining to a matter of
public concern and that the plaintiff could not establish
probable cause that he would prevail on the merits of his
claims because, inter alia, the litigation privilege bars
those claims.7
Conn. App. 201, 211, 201 A.3d 1137 (2019) (“in conducting our de
novo review [of a trial court’s decision granting a motion to dismiss],
we limit ourselves to the factual record as it existed before the trial
court, supplemented by any additional records of which we may take
judicial notice”).
7
As our Supreme Court has explained, “[u]nder [§ 52-196a] a party may
file a special motion to dismiss when the opposing party’s complaint is
based on the moving party’s exercise of, among other things, the right
Khan v. Jewish Women International

On November 8, 2024, the plaintiff filed an omnibus
memorandum in opposition to the defendants’ motions
to dismiss and special motions to dismiss.8 The plain-
tiff argued that the defendants did not enjoy absolute
immunity for the statements in the proposed amicus
brief because (1) the litigation privilege does not apply
of free speech or the right to petition the government in connection with
a matter of public concern.” Priore v. Haig, 344 Conn. 636, 659, 280
A.3d 402 (2022). A claim is subject to dismissal pursuant to § 52-196a
if the party filing the special motion to dismiss demonstrates that the
complaint “is based on the moving party’s exercise of its right of free
speech, right to petition the government, or right of association under
the [c]onstitution of the United States or the [c]onstitution of the state
in connection with a matter of public concern,” and the nonmoving
party fails to “[demonstrate] to the court that there is probable cause,
considering all valid defenses, that the party will prevail on the merits
of the complaint . . . .” General Statutes § 52-196a (e) (3).
In their special motions to dismiss, the defendants also raised other
arguments in support of their contention that the plaintiff could not
meet his burden under the second prong of § 52-196a (e) (3) to estab-
lish probable cause that he would prevail on the merits. On appeal, the
defendants renew those arguments as alternative grounds to affirm the
trial court’s decision granting the special motions to dismiss. We need
not address those arguments because, as explained subsequently in this
opinion, we conclude that the court should have dismissed the action
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to all defendants and should
not have addressed the special motions to dismiss.
8
Before filing his memorandum in opposition to the defendants’
motions to dismiss and special motions to dismiss, on September 4,
2024, the plaintiff filed a motion for permission to take limited discov-
ery of Sanctuary for the purpose of responding to its special motion to
dismiss. See General Statutes § 52-196a (d). On October 7, 2024, the
court granted the plaintiff’s motion in part. The plaintiff, however, filed
his omnibus memorandum in opposition to the defendants’ motions to
dismiss and special motions to dismiss before taking the deposition of a
representative of Sanctuary. The court, therefore, decided the matter
as to Sanctuary on the basis of the briefing and affidavits.
In his omnibus opposition to the defendants’ motions to dismiss and
special motions to dismiss, the plaintiff, for the first time, requested
permission to take discovery of the remaining defendants. In its memo-
randum of decision, the court denied that request on the basis that the
plaintiff did not establish good cause that such discovery was warranted.
As stated previously; see footnote 3 of this opinion; although the plain-
tiff challenges the court’s discovery rulings on appeal, in light of our
conclusion that the court lacked authority to address the merits of the
special motions to dismiss, we need not address the discovery related
claims because they pertain only to the special motions to dismiss.
Khan v. Jewish Women International

to persons seeking to appear as amici curiae, and (2) even
if it does, the privilege did not apply under the facts of
this case because the challenged statements were not
pertinent to the appeal before the Supreme Court. In
support of the latter argument, the plaintiff argued
that the Supreme Court had “necessarily determined
that the statements . . . were impertinent” to the issues
in the appeal “[b]y ordering the defendants to refile their
brief ‘shorn of all facts not supported by the record.’ ”
The plaintiff also argued that, even if the privilege did
bar any claims that were based on the defendants’ fil-
ing of the proposed brief, it did not bar his claims to
the extent they are based on the defendants’ alleged
republication of the brief. Finally, the plaintiff argued
that the litigation privilege did not bar count four of
the complaint, which was styled as an abuse of process
claim, because the defendants “misus[ed] the amicus
process” by including the statements for an improper
purpose, namely, “to defame the plaintiff, discourage
him from maintaining his case, and generate publicity
and fundraising for their organizations.”
The court, Hon. Carl J. Schuman, judge trial ref-
eree, held a combined oral argument on the defendants’
motions and special motions to dismiss on December 9,
2024. On January 9, 2025, the court issued a memoran-
dum of decision dismissing the action against all defen-
dants. Beginning with the motions to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, the court first concluded
that the litigation privilege applies to persons seeking
to appear as amici curiae and that the statements in the
proposed amicus brief were pertinent to the proceeding.
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s contention that,
because count four of the complaint purportedly sounded
in abuse of process, it is not barred by the litigation
privilege. Although noting that the litigation privilege
does not apply to well pleaded abuse of process claims,
the court concluded that count four does not fall within
that exception “because [it] does not properly allege an
abuse of process action, but rather seeks redress solely
for statements the defendants made during the litiga-
tion process . . . .”
Khan v. Jewish Women International

The court also disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument
that the litigation privilege did not bar his claims to the
extent they are based on the allegation that the defen-
dants republished the proposed brief. Noting that the
complaint alleges that the proposed brief remains avail-
able on the Judicial Branch website, the court concluded
that the defendants’ alleged republication of the brief was
protected by the fair report privilege because it “would
constitute a report of an ‘official action or proceeding
. . . .’ ”9 The court further concluded that, “given the
additional assistance of the fair report privilege, the
defendants’ republication of their amicus brief would
not negate the applicability of the litigation privilege
in this case.” The court therefore granted the motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Despite
the court’s conclusion that it lacked subject matter juris-
diction over the action, the court went on to address, and
grant, the special motions to dismiss.
The court thereafter rendered judgment dismissing
the action, and the plaintiff timely filed the present
appeal. Additional facts and procedural history will be
set forth as necessary.
Before addressing the plaintiff’s claims, we first set
forth our standard of review and the general legal prin-
ciples pertaining to the litigation privilege. The liti-
gation privilege implicates the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and, therefore, is properly raised by way of
a motion to dismiss. See Practice Book § 10-30 (a) (1);
Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120, 136, 314 A.3d
583 (2024). “Whether the litigation privilege applies in a
given case is a question of law subject to de novo review.”
Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra, 137.
9
Under the fair report privilege, “publication of defamatory matter
concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding or of a
meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is
privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement
of the occurrence reported.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Elder
v. 21st Century Media Newspaper, LLC, 204 Conn. App. 414, 422, 254
A.3d 344 (2021).
Khan v. Jewish Women International

“The litigation privilege is a long-standing [common-
law] rule that communications uttered or published in the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged
so long as they are in some way pertinent to the subject
of the controversy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id. The privilege “originated in response to the need to
bar persons accused of crimes from suing their accusers
for defamation,” but has since “developed to encompass
and bar defamation claims against all participants in
judicial proceedings, including judges, attorneys, par-
ties, and witnesses.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 627, 79
A.3d 60 (2013). The privilege has also evolved from its
common-law origins such that it now “extends to an array
of retaliatory civil actions beyond claims of defamation,
including intentional interference with contractual or
beneficial relations arising from statements made during
a civil action, intentional infliction of emotional distress
arising from statements made during judicial proceed-
ings, and fraud against attorneys or party opponents
for their actions during litigation. . . . This expansion
is premised on the rationale that, because the privilege
protects the communication, the nature of the theory [on
which the challenge is based] is irrelevant.” (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dorfman
v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582, 592, 271 A.3d 53 (2022).
I
The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improperly
concluded that the defendants were entitled to absolute
immunity for their statements in the proposed amicus
brief. Specifically, he contends that the court improp-
erly concluded that (1) the litigation privilege applies to
persons seeking to appear as amici curiae in a judicial pro-
ceeding, and (2) the challenged statements referring to
the plaintiff as a rapist were pertinent to the proceedings
before the Supreme Court in Khan v. Yale University,
supra, 347 Conn. 1. We disagree with both contentions.
Khan v. Jewish Women International

A
We first address the plaintiff’s claim that the trial
court improperly concluded that the litigation privilege
applies to persons seeking to appear as amici curiae in a
judicial proceeding. In its memorandum of decision, the
trial court noted that “[t]he applicable rule” as set forth
by our Supreme Court “is that the litigation privilege
applies to every step of the proceeding until [its] final
disposition . . . including to statements made in pleadings
or other documents prepared in connection with [the]
proceeding,” and that it “bar[s] . . . claims against all
participants in judicial proceedings, including judges,
attorneys, parties, and witnesses . . . . Deutsche Bank
AG v. Vik, supra, 349 Conn. 137.” (Emphasis in origi-
nal; internal quotation marks omitted.) The trial court
concluded that, “[u]nder this broad standard, amicus
briefs surely qualify.” The court explained that, because
“[o]ur appellate rules of practice specifically provide for
an application for permission to appear as amicus curiae
and the filing of the actual amicus brief . . . amici are
certainly participants in judicial proceedings . . . amicus
briefs are very much a step in the proceeding . . . and
statements made in those briefs are communications
uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings
. . . all within the meaning of the litigation privilege.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
The court further concluded that “[t]he fact that the
challenged statements appeared in an attachment to an
application to appear as an amicus, rather than in the
actual and final version of the amicus brief itself, does
not negate this conclusion.” As the court explained, “[t]he
litigation privilege applies fully to documents prepared
in connection with [a judicial] proceeding,” and applica-
tions for permission to file a pleading accompanied by
proposed pleadings “certainly constitute [steps] in the
proceedings so that the litigation privilege attaches to
statements made in them.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)
We agree with the trial court that the litigation privi-
lege applies to persons seeking to appear as amici curiae
Khan v. Jewish Women International

in a judicial proceeding. As the court recognized, the
litigation privilege protects “all participants in judicial
proceedings”; (emphasis added) MacDermid, Inc. v.
Leonetti, supra, 310 Conn. 627; and applies “to every
step of the proceeding until [its] final disposition . . .
including to statements made in pleadings or other docu-
ments prepared in connection with [the] proceeding.”
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra, 349 Conn. 137; see
also Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 246, 510 A.2d 1337
(1986). Practice Book § 67-7A expressly allows par-
ticipation by amici and sets forth specific requirements
that would-be amici must follow to obtain permission
to file an amicus curiae brief. In order to obtain such
permission, a person seeking to appear and file a brief as
amicus curiae must file an application for permission that
“state[s] concisely the nature of the applicant’s interest
and the reasons why a brief of an amicus curiae should
be allowed.” Practice Book § 67-7A (b). The proposed
amicus brief that contains the challenged statements was
attached to the defendants’ application for permission
that the defendants filed in accordance with § 67-7A.
Thus, the defendants were participants in Khan v. Yale
University, supra, 347 Conn. 1, in accordance with the
rules governing that proceeding, and their application
to appear was a step in the proceeding expressly required
by the rules of practice.
Moreover, the policy concerns underlying the litigation
privilege support extending the privilege to proposed
amici. “The policy underlying the [litigation] privilege
is that in certain situations the public interest in having
people speak freely outweighs the risk that individuals
will occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and
malicious statements. . . . Participants in a judicial pro-
cess must be able to testify or otherwise take part without
being hampered by fear of defamation [or other retalia-
tory litigation].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra, 349 Conn. 137–38. If
attorneys were “hobbled by the fear of reprisal by actions
for defamation . . . [it] may tend to lessen [counsel’s]
Khan v. Jewish Women International

efforts on behalf of clients.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 535, 69
A.3d 880 (2013). Thus, the litigation privilege “pro-
tects the rights of clients who should not be imperiled
by subjecting their legal advisors to the constant fear
of lawsuits arising out of their conduct in the course of
legal representation.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id. “Put simply, absolute immunity furthers the
public policy of encouraging participation and candor in
judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. This objective
would be thwarted if those persons whom the common-
law doctrine [of absolute immunity] was intended to
protect nevertheless faced the threat of suit.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Chamerda v. Opie, 185 Conn.
App. 627, 641–42, 197 A.3d 982, cert. denied, 330 Conn.
953, 197 A.3d 893 (2018).
These concerns apply equally to amici and their attor-
neys. Like judges, parties, and witnesses, persons par-
ticipating as amici and the attorneys representing them
should “do so with [their] mind[s] uninfluenced by the
fear of an action for defamation or a prosecution for
libel.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v.
Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 538. As the court explained
in Simms, because questions concerning whether a state-
ment is true and whether it was spoken with malice “are,
and always will be . . . questions . . . upon which opinions
may differ . . . which can only be resolved by the exercise
of human judgment”; (internal quotation marks omitted)
id.; even the threat of a retaliatory defamation action
may cause would-be amici or their attorneys either to
self-censor or to refrain from seeking to participate as
amici curiae at all. See id., 538–39 (noting importance
of providing litigation participants with absolute immu-
nity “because of the simple and obvious reasons that a
witness free from malice could be judged otherwise and
that the expense and distress of . . . harassing litigation
might cause a witness not to speak openly and freely”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).10
10
For this reason, we disagree with the plaintiff’s characterization
of the chilling effect that retaliatory litigation would have on amici
Khan v. Jewish Women International

As the trial court recognized, “[a]micus briefs are an
important part of the appellate process.” Amicus briefs
aid judicial decision making by providing valuable infor-
mation about broader implications of the legal issues
before the court that the parties themselves may not
address in their briefs. See 3B C.J.S., Amicus Curiae §
12 (2026) (“[a]micus curiae presentations assist the court
by broadening its perspective on the issues raised by the
parties; among other services, they facilitate informed
judicial consideration of a wide variety of information
and points of view that may bear on important legal
questions”). The importance of amicus briefs is under-
scored by the fact that our Supreme Court regularly
solicits participation by amici curiae to address specific
legal issues presented in pending appeals. See, e.g.,
Supreme Court Notices, Connecticut Judicial Branch,
available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/supremecourt (last
visited June 18, 2026) (inviting amici to file briefs for
specific appeals on August 15 and December 5, 2025,
and January 30, 2026). Moreover, the court frequently
cites or discusses arguments raised by amici; indeed, as
the trial court noted, our Supreme Court cited informa-
tion presented by the defendants in their amicus brief,
ultimately concluding that “the public policy of this
state supports providing a qualified privilege for state-
ments made by individuals alleging sexual assault to
proper authorities at institutions of higher education.”
Khan v. Yale University, supra, 347 Conn. 52; see id.,
8 (“[s]upporting Doe’s position, the amici indicate that
as “speculative” and “dubious.” He argues that “denying absolute
immunity to proposed amici in no way silences or chills legitimate
advocacy” because “[t]he only ‘speech’ that would be deterred by with-
holding immunity is false and defamatory factual allegations” which
is “not protected speech in any event . . . .” As the court recognized in
Simms, however, the very purpose of the litigation privilege is to avoid
the chilling effect that would result from having to predict in advance
whether a statement could be later construed as false or defamatory.
“[I]f absolute immunity is not available, attorneys may feel constrained
in advocating for their clients because of fears that their legitimate
conduct may be misinterpreted as wrongful by dissatisfied parties and
thus give rise to future lawsuits.” (Emphasis in original.) Simms v.
Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 563 n.25.
Khan v. Jewish Women International

one in four women, and one in fifteen men, will experi-
ence sexual assault while attending college” (footnote
omitted)); id., 52 (“As the amici explain, sexual assault
remains a serious and vastly underreported crime. The
hesitation of victims to report such crimes is, in no small
part, due to a fear of retaliation.” (Footnote omitted.)).
The value of amici depends on their ability to be candid
in their arguments. If amici and their attorneys had to
worry about the prospect of retaliatory litigation from
disaffected litigants, it would chill their participation
and diminish the usefulness of their contributions to
the litigation process.
The plaintiff argues that persons seeking to appear
as amici curiae are not participants in the proceeding
because they require permission to appear and that,
“[u]ntil such permission is granted, a proposed amicus
is literally a nonparticipant.” (Emphasis in original.) As
the trial court correctly observed, however, this distinc-
tion is both inconsistent with our case law concerning
the litigation privilege and unworkable as a matter of
practice. Our Supreme Court has recognized that the
privilege applies not just to formal pleadings, but to all
“documents prepared in connection with a court proceed-
ing . . . [including] those preparatory communications
that may be directed to the goal of the proceeding.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1, 28–29, 266 A.3d 127
(2021). For that reason, the litigation privilege applies
to statements made prior to the formal commencement
of litigation, as long as those statements are prepared
in connection with a contemplated proceeding and are
directed toward the goal of the proceeding. See, e.g.,
Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 841, 925 A.2d
1030 (2007) (statement contained in police report that
officer was required to prepare in order to commence
proceedings before Probate Court for commitment of
person with psychiatric disabilities); Craig v. Stafford
Construction, Inc., 271 Conn. 78, 95, 856 A.2d 372 (2004)
(citizen complaint that led to police department internal
affairs investigation); Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549,
Khan v. Jewish Women International

574, 606 A.2d 693 (1992) (discussion with potential wit-
ness aimed at marshaling evidence to support prospective
administrative complaint to state board of education).
Thus, the fact that the defendants’ statements were
contained in a filing made before they were granted per-
mission to appear and file their brief does not preclude
the application of the litigation privilege.
Moreover, as a practical matter, it would be illogical
to withhold the protections of the litigation privilege
until after proposed amici receive permission to appear,
as doing so would effectively dissuade participation in
the amicus process to the same extent as if the litiga-
tion privilege did not apply at all. Because our rules of
practice generally require persons interested in filing
an amicus brief to obtain permission before doing so,
under the plaintiff’s proposed rule, prospective amici
would have to file their applications for permission and
proposed briefs under a cloud of uncertainty, not knowing
whether the statements in their filings were protected
by the litigation privilege until after the court ruled
on their applications. It would defeat the prophylactic
purpose of the privilege to require the person seeking its
protection to speak before knowing whether they could
be held liable for their words.
Relying on case law from our Supreme Court address-
ing the distinct doctrine of judicial immunity, the plain-
tiff also argues that the protections of the litigation
privilege should be limited to “essential participants”
in judicial proceedings that are “directly involved in
the core functions of the judicial process.”11 He argues
that, unlike judges, attorneys, parties, and witnesses,
the role of amici is “that of an impartial advisor offer-
ing perspective” and is not “intrinsically linked to the
11
The doctrine of judicial immunity provides judges and certain other
judicial officers immunity from suit “for judicial acts [a judge] under-
takes in his capacity as a judge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Gross v. Rell, 304 Conn. 234, 246, 40 A.3d 240 (2012). Absolute judicial
immunity extends to judicial officers other than judges only “insofar as
they perform actions that are integral to the judicial process.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 247.
Khan v. Jewish Women International

adversarial system and the pursuit of justice within a
dispute.” We are not persuaded.
The plaintiff does not cite any case from this or any
other jurisdiction holding that application of the litiga-
tion privilege requires an inquiry into whether the person
seeking its protections was an “essential participant.” As
discussed previously, our Supreme Court repeatedly has
stated that the privilege applies to “all participants in
judicial proceedings.” (Emphasis added.) MacDermid,
Inc. v. Leonetti, supra, 310 Conn. 627. Our Supreme
Court observed in Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn.
523, that this formulation is consistent with the scope
of the privilege recognized by state and federal courts in
other jurisdictions. See id., 555 (“as the United States
Supreme Court explained in Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S.
325, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983), the litiga-
tion privilege at common law protected all participants
in the court system” (emphasis in original)); see also, e.g.,
Day v. Johns Hopkins Health System Corp., 907 F.3d
766, 772 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[t]he benefits of the immunity
[afforded by the litigation privilege] flow to all partici-
pants in litigation”); Loigman v. Township Committee
of Middletown, 185 N.J. 566, 585, 889 A.2d 426 (2006)
(“[t]he privilege shields any communication . . . made in
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings . . . by litigants or
other participants authorized by law” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307,
1311 (Utah 1990) (“the integrity of the judicial system
requires that there be free and open expression by all
participants and that this will only occur if they are not
inhibited by the risk of subsequent defamation suits”).
In fact, the only decisions of which we are aware that
have addressed the issue have held that amici curiae
are considered litigation participants for purposes of
the privilege and that they therefore enjoy absolute
immunity for their litigation related statements. See
Weiser Law Firm PC v. Hartleib, United States Court
of Appeals, Docket No. 23-55693 (9th Cir. December 5,
2024) (statements by amicus curiae in briefs and during
court proceedings are protected by litigation privilege
Khan v. Jewish Women International

because amicus is “[participant] authorized by law”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Randazza v. Cox,
United States District Court, Docket No. 2:12-CV-2040
(JAD) (May 21, 2014) (attorney’s statements in amicus
brief were protected by litigation privilege).
Moreover, we disagree with the plaintiff that extending
the protections of the privilege to amici is unnecessary
because their role is limited to “that of an impartial advi-
sor offering perspective . . . .” Courts and commentators
have recognized that, although the description of amici
as “an impartial individual who suggests the interpreta-
tion and status of the law, gives information concerning
it, and whose function is to advise in order that justice
may be done, rather than to advocate a point of view so
that a cause may be won by one party or another . . . was
once accurate and still appears in certain sources . . . [it]
became outdated long ago.” (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Neonatology Associates, P.A.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 293 F.3d 128, 131
(3d Cir. 2002); see also 16AA C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed-
eral Practice and Procedure § 3975 (5th Ed. 2026) (“There
is nothing wrong, in current practice, with an amicus
possessing an interest in the relevant issues. The notion
of the amicus as impartial became outdated long ago.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)); S. Krislov, “The
Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy,”
72 Yale L. J. 694, 703–704 (1963) (describing evolution
of amicus curiae participation by private groups with
interest in litigation and explaining that “the institution
of the amicus curiae brief has moved from neutrality to
partisanship, from friendship to advocacy”). Given the
time and resources required to prepare a thorough and
persuasive amicus brief, it is not surprising that amicus
participants will have some interest in the outcome of
the cases in which they seek to appear. See, e.g., Neo-
natology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, supra, 131–32 (“[a] quick look at . . . opinions
[of the Supreme Court of the United States] discloses
that corporations, unions, trade and professional asso-
ciations, and other parties with ‘pecuniary’ interests
Khan v. Jewish Women International

appear regularly as amici”). Indeed, our rules of practice
expressly require that applications for permission to file
an amicus brief “state concisely the nature of the appli-
cant’s interest” in the matter; Practice Book § 67-7A
(b); and contemplate that amici may support one side or
the other in the litigation. See Practice Book § 67-7A (a)
(requiring application to appear as amicus curiae to be
filed “within twenty days after the filing of the brief of
the party, if any, whom the applicant intends to support”
or, “[i]f there is no such party, then . . . twenty days after
the filing of the last appellee’s brief”).
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court
properly concluded that the litigation privilege applies
to persons seeking to appear as amici curiae.
B
We also disagree with the plaintiff’s claim that the
court erred in concluding that the challenged statements
were pertinent to the proceeding in Khan v. Yale Univer-
sity, supra, 347 Conn. 1. “[C]ommunications uttered or
published in the course of judicial proceedings are abso-
lutely privileged so long as they are in some way pertinent
to the subject of the controversy.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra, 349
Conn. 137. The test for determining whether a state-
ment is sufficiently pertinent to fall within the privilege
is “very generous”; Bruno v. Travelers Cos., 172 Conn.
App. 717, 727, 161 A.3d 630 (2017); and is satisfied as
long as the statement “has some reference to the subject
matter of the proposed or pending litigation, although
it need not be strictly relevant to any issue involved in
it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McManus v.
Sweeney, 78 Conn. App. 327, 335, 827 A.2d 708 (2003);
see also 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 587, comment
(c), p. 249 (1977) (“It is not necessary that the defama-
tory matter be relevant or material to any issue before
the court. It is enough that it have some reference to the
subject of the inquiry.”).
Khan v. Jewish Women International

The challenged statements in the proposed amicus brief
plainly satisfy this broad standard of pertinence. In the
federal lawsuit that gave rise to the certified appeal in
Khan v. Yale University, supra, 347 Conn. 1, the plaintiff
claimed that Doe defamed him by accusing him of rape
during a university disciplinary proceeding in which the
decision maker ultimately credited her statements and
expelled the plaintiff on the basis of her accusations.
Id., 15–16. As our Supreme Court explained, “[t]he
primary question presented” in the certified appeal was
“whether Doe should . . . be afforded absolute immunity
from suit for her statements made during the [disciplin-
ary] proceeding.” Id., 7–8. Thus, Doe’s allegation that
the plaintiff raped her and Yale’s decision to expel the
plaintiff on the basis of her allegation were central to
the issues both in the underlying litigation and in the
appellate proceedings before the Supreme Court. The
defendants’ statements referring to the plaintiff as a
rapist mirrored Doe’s allegation and, therefore, unques-
tionably “ ‘ha[d] some reference’ ” to the issues before the
court. McManus v. Sweeney, supra, 78 Conn. App. 335.
Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the fact that
the Supreme Court initially rejected the proposed amicus
brief has no bearing on whether those statements were
pertinent to the subject of the appeal for purposes of
the litigation privilege. As the trial court observed, the
Supreme Court’s order did not address the relevance of
the defendants’ statements but, rather, indicated that
those statements were “ ‘not supported by the record.’ ”
The broad standard for pertinence under the litigation
privilege does not depend on whether there is evidentiary
support for the challenged statement. “The fact that
the defamatory publication is an unwarranted infer-
ence from the alleged or existing facts is not enough to
deprive the party of his privilege, if the inference itself
has some bearing upon the litigation.” 3 Restatement
(Second), supra, § 587, comment (c), p. 249. Thus, while
a statement without evidentiary support may constitute
improper or overzealous advocacy under the rules of
practice or the Rules of Professional Conduct, that does
Khan v. Jewish Women International

not render it impertinent for purposes of the litigation
privilege. As our Supreme Court has explained, in deter-
mining whether a statement by a litigation participant
is protected by absolute immunity, “we [do] not assess
whether the [statement] was proper advocacy” because
“the purpose of the privilege is to provide immunity from
having to defend such advocacy decisions, even if that
means immunity occasionally applies to misconduct.”
Scholz v. Epstein, supra, 341 Conn. 14–15.
The plaintiff also argues that the challenged state-
ments were impertinent in light of the procedural context
of the certified appeal in Khan v. Yale University, supra,
347 Conn. 1, which required the court “to accept [the
allegations of the complaint] as true and construe [them]
in [the plaintiff’s] favor for purposes of answering the
certified questions of law.”12 Id., 11–12. The plaintiff
argues that the statements referring to him as a rapist
were impertinent because they “directly contradicted”
the allegations of the complaint and, therefore, were not
“germane to the legal questions presented . . . .”
We disagree with the plaintiff’s argument because
it essentially equates the pertinence inquiry with the
standard of relevance governing the admissibility of
evidence, and it is well established that “the bounds of
[pertinence] with respect to the doctrine of absolute
privilege are more generous than the relevance of evi-
dence at trial.” Brady v. Bickford, 179 Conn. App. 776,
797–98, 183 A.3d 27 (2018). Evidence is relevant at
trial if it “tend[s] to make the existence of any fact that
is material to the determination of the proceeding more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Glen
S. v. Commissioner of Correction, 223 Conn. App. 152,
162, 307 A.3d 951, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 951, 308
A.3d 1038 (2024). In contrast, a statement is pertinent
for purposes of the litigation privilege as long as it “has
12
As the court explained, the certified appeal arose from the District
Court’s granting of Doe’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
pursuant to rule 12 (b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Khan v. Yale University, supra, 347 Conn. 12 n.9.
Khan v. Jewish Women International

some reference to the subject matter of the proposed or
pending litigation,” even if it is “not . . . strictly relevant
to any issue involved in it.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) McManus v. Sweeney, supra, 78 Conn. App.
335. As we have explained, the statements referring to
the plaintiff as a rapist had “some reference” to the sub-
ject matter of the litigation in Khan v. Yale University,
supra, 347 Conn. 1, because the plaintiff sued Doe for
her statements accusing him of rape in the disciplinary
proceeding, and the issues before the Supreme Court in
the certified appeal concerned whether Doe had immunity
for those statements. Accordingly, we conclude that the
trial court did not err in concluding that the statements
in the proposed amicus brief were pertinent for purposes
of the litigation privilege.
II
We next address the plaintiff’s claim that the court
erred in concluding that the litigation privilege barred
count four of the complaint, which purports to assert
a claim for abuse of process. As explained previously,
although at common law the litigation privilege “bar[red]
persons accused of crimes from suing their accusers
for defamation,” the scope of the privilege has since
“expanded to bar a variety of retaliatory civil claims
arising from communications or communicative acts
occurring in the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding, including, but not limited to, claims for
tortious interference, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, fraud, and violations of [the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act].” Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra,
349 Conn. 137. Despite this expansion, “there are limits
to the application of the litigation privilege to attorney
conduct and communications.” Scholz v. Epstein, supra,
341 Conn. 10. Specifically, “[our Supreme Court] has
recognized a distinction between attempting to impose
liability [on] a participant in a judicial proceeding for the
words used therein and attempting to impose liability
[on] a litigant for his improper use of the judicial sys-
tem itself. . . . In this regard, [the court has] refused to
Khan v. Jewish Women International

apply absolute immunity to causes of action alleging the
improper use of the judicial system.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra, 138.
As a general matter, well pleaded claims of vexatious
litigation and abuse of process are not barred by the liti-
gation privilege “because they challenge the underlying
purpose of the litigation rather than an attorney’s role
as an advocate for his or her client.” Simms v. Seaman,
supra, 308 Conn. 546. Specifically, these causes of action
“seek to hold an individual liable for . . . the improper
use of the judicial process for an illegitimate purpose,
namely, to inflict injury [on] another individual in the
form of unfounded actions.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra, 349 Conn.
138. “We have treated these claims differently in part
because of restraints built into [them] by virtue of [their]
stringent requirements”; id., 138–39; which safeguard
against the possibility that they will be used by disap-
pointed litigants to pursue retaliatory litigation, rather
than to challenge the improper use of the judicial system
itself. With respect to abuse of process claims in particu-
lar, these safeguards are met by requiring the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the defendant used the “legal process
. . . primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not
designed”; (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted) Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490, 494, 529
A.2d 171 (1987); and to “point to specific misconduct
intended to cause specific injury outside of the normal
contemplation of private litigation.”13 Id., 497.
This does not, however, mean that a plaintiff can avoid
the litigation privilege merely by repackaging a defama-
tion claim as one for abuse of process. Rather, it is well
recognized that the label a party attaches to a cause of
13
Although not at issue in the present case, the tort of vexatious litiga-
tion likewise includes such “built-in restraints” in that it requires proof
that “the defendant acted with malice, primarily for a purpose other
than that of bringing an offender to justice . . . [that] the defendant
acted without probable cause . . . [and that] the [prior] proceeding ter-
minated in the plaintiff’s favor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 542 n.12.
Khan v. Jewish Women International

action does not control whether it is barred by the liti-
gation privilege. As our Supreme Court has explained,
“in expanding the doctrine of absolute immunity to
bar claims beyond defamation, [the] court has sought
to ensure that the conduct that absolute immunity is
intended to protect, namely, participation and candor
in judicial proceedings, remains protected regardless of
the particular tort alleged in response to the words used
during participation in the judicial process. Indeed . . .
because the privilege protects the communication, the
nature of the theory [on which the challenge is based]
is irrelevant.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, supra,
310 Conn. 628; see also DeLaurentis v. New Haven,
220 Conn. 225, 264, 597 A.2d 807 (1991) (“whether
or not a party is liable for ‘vexatious suit’ in bringing
an unfounded and malicious action, he is not liable for
the words used in the pleadings and documents used to
prosecute the suit”). To ensure that the protections of
the privilege cannot be evaded through creative pleading,
our Supreme Court has instructed that courts should
“consider not only the elements of the cause of action
but also whether the complaint contains allegations that
a party suffered harm because of a falsehood communi-
cated by the opponent’s attorney.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Dorfman v. Smith, supra, 342 Conn.
600–601; see also id., 601 n.9 (“[T]he fact that the plain-
tiff alleged that the conduct at issue constituted an abuse
of the judicial system does not make the claim at issue
akin to a claim for abuse of process. Rather, we look to
the plaintiff’s factual allegations to determine whether
the plaintiff’s claim is premised on the communication
of false statements.”).
Applying the foregoing principles to the present case,
we conclude that the trial court did not err in determin-
ing that count four is barred by the litigation privilege.
As explained previously, to adequately state an abuse
of process claim, a plaintiff is required to identify “spe-
cific misconduct intended to cause specific injury out-
side of the normal contemplation of private litigation.”
Khan v. Jewish Women International

(Emphasis added.) Mozzochi v. Beck, supra, 204 Conn.
497. This requirement is not satisfied merely by alleging
that a defendant has as one of his or her goals the desire
to obtain a result that is ancillary to the usual purpose
of litigation. Rather, the plaintiff must allege that the
defendant used the machinery of legal process, and not
just the words therein, to accomplish a result that could
not be obtained through proper means. See, e.g., Suffield
Development Associates Ltd. Partnership v. National
Loan Investors, L.P., 260 Conn. 766, 775, 802 A.2d 44
(2002) (plaintiff stated abuse of process claim by alleging
that defendant wrongfully obtained execution in excess
of amount owed and used execution to pressure plaintiff
to settle disputed claim).
Here, the only alleged conduct identified by the plain-
tiff to support count four of the complaint is the defen-
dants’ choice of words in the proposed amicus brief, and
the only harm that the plaintiff alleges he suffered is that
caused by the fact that the defendants labeled him a rapist
in the brief. There is no allegation that the defendants
took any action outside the normal course of the amicus
process or that they sought any relief other than to urge
the Supreme Court to hold that university disciplinary
proceedings are quasi-judicial in nature. Instead, count
four rests entirely on the allegation that the words used
by the defendants caused him harm in a way that was
ancillary to the litigation. In fact, the plaintiff acknowl-
edges in his appellate brief that count four is based on
the allegation that the defendants misused the amicus
process “by falsely branding [the plaintiff] a rapist . . . .”
The plaintiff’s attempt to hold the defendants liable for
their communication of allegedly defamatory statements
in a court filing is quintessentially a defamation claim
that falls within the core of the litigation privilege. See,
e.g., Dorfman v. Smith, supra, 342 Conn. 600 (claim is
barred by litigation privilege where, “like a defamation
claim, [it] is premised on the communication of false
statements during litigation”).
Khan v. Jewish Women International

We disagree with the plaintiff that the trial court
“improperly resolved factual questions about the defen-
dants’ purpose” when it stated that the allegations in the
complaint concerning the defendants’ primary purpose
in filing the amicus brief “are essentially conclusions
concerning the defendants’ motivation that the court
need not rely upon in evaluating whether the defendants’
actions amounted to abuse of process.” The plaintiff
relies on the allegations in count four averring that “the
defendants’ primary purpose in attempting to file the
[proposed] amicus brief was . . . [t]o smear the plaintiff .
. . [t]o harm the plaintiff’s reputation . . . [t]o serve as an
adversary in the litigation against the plaintiff . . . [t]o
discourage the plaintiff from maintaining his lawsuit;
and . . . [t]o raise funds for the defendants’ organiza-
tions.” The plaintiff argues that these allegations are
sufficient to state an abuse of process claim because they
“assert that the defendants misused the amicus process
for purposes entirely foreign to the proper role of an
amicus curiae.”
As we have explained, however, to state an abuse of
process claim, the plaintiff was required to allege that
the defendants engaged in “specific misconduct intended
to cause specific injury outside of the normal contempla-
tion of private litigation.” Mozzochi v. Beck, supra,
204 Conn. 497. The trial court properly concluded that,
because count four is based entirely on the assertion that
the defendants’ choice of words in the proposed amicus
brief caused the plaintiff harm incidental to the litiga-
tion, it did not identify any misconduct that is actionable
in an abuse of process claim. Thus, the court did not
“[resolve] factual questions about the defendants’ pur-
pose” but, rather, properly concluded that the allegations
in question were insufficient to state an abuse of process
claim.14 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
14
In the trial court, the defendants also claimed that, as a matter of
law, the plaintiff could not maintain an abuse of process claim against
them because an amicus brief is not the kind of “process” that can give
rise to such a claim. See, e.g., Dorfman v. Smith, supra, 342 Conn.
637 n.11 (Ecker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
Khan v. Jewish Women International

did not err in dismissing count four of the complaint on
the basis that it was barred by the litigation privilege.
III
We next address whether the litigation privilege barred
the portion of the plaintiff’s claims alleging that the
defendants republished the proposed amicus brief. As
explained previously, the trial court concluded that
the defendants’ alleged republication of the brief was
protected by the fair report privilege, rather than the
litigation privilege. Following oral argument before
this court, we, sua sponte, ordered the parties to file
supplemental briefs addressing “whether the dismissal
of the portion of the plaintiff’s claims pertaining to
the defendants’ republishing of the proposed amicus
brief may be affirmed on the alternative ground that
the republishing of the brief was protected by the litiga-
tion privilege.”15 In that order, we directed the parties’
attention to Kelley v. Bonney, supra, 221 Conn. 549,
in which our Supreme Court held that “[p]ublication to
the media of material that the media was independently
“that there is little clarity regarding the scope and meaning of the term
‘process’ ” that can give rise to abuse of process claim and that “[some]
authorities have limited the tort to process of a type that compels the
performance or forbearance of some prescribed act” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The trial court did not address this issue because it
concluded that, even if an amicus brief could give rise to an abuse of
process claim, the plaintiff failed to allege such a claim. Because the
defendants do not raise this claim as an alternative ground to affirm,
we likewise do not address that issue.
15
We note that, although the trial court did not address this issue
and neither party raised it as an alternative ground for affirmance, we
properly may address it because we afforded the parties the opportunity
to brief the issue and, unlike the fair report privilege, the litigation
privilege implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See
Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut,
Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 161, 84 A.3d 840 (2014) (“the reviewing court not
only can but must address an issue implicating subject matter jurisdic-
tion whenever it arises, regardless of how the issue comes to the court’s
attention”); Kloiber v. Jellen, 207 Conn. App. 616, 621, 263 A.3d 952
(2021) (addressing issue of whether plaintiff had standing to maintain
action after ordering parties to file supplemental briefs because “a ques-
tion of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, including
sua sponte invocation by a reviewing court”).
Khan v. Jewish Women International

entitled to view . . . cannot provide a basis for a claim of
defamation.” Id., 576. We conclude that the trial court
did not err in dismissing the portion of the plaintiff’s
claims pertaining to the defendants’ alleged republica-
tion of the brief on the alternative ground that, under
Kelley, the litigation privilege bars those claims.
In Kelley, our Supreme Court held that the litigation
privilege barred a defamation claim against a member
of a local board of education (board) who provided to a
local newspaper a copy of an administrative complaint
that she had submitted to the state department of edu-
cation (department). The plaintiff in Kelley was a for-
mer teacher who retired while facing investigation for
inappropriate classroom conduct. Id., 553. After the
board voted not to proceed with the investigation, four
members of the board who had dissented from that vote,
including the defendant, submitted a verified petition
and complaint to the department detailing the allegations
against the plaintiff and requesting that the department
investigate the matter. Id., 555–56. Thereafter, an edi-
torial writer for the local newspaper asked the defendant
for a copy of the complaint, and the defendant provided
him with a copy. Id., 574–75. The plaintiff brought a
defamation claim against the defendant alleging, inter
alia, that she defamed him when she sent the complaint
to the editorial writer. Id., 575.
Our Supreme Court concluded that the litigation privi-
lege barred the plaintiff’s claim. In reaching that con-
clusion, the court first explained that, although “the . . .
proceedings before the [department] were quasijudicial
in nature,16 not all communications relating to that topic
are necessarily absolutely privileged.” (Footnote added.)
Id. The court further observed that, “[i]n determining
16
Earlier in its opinion, the court in Kelley concluded that the plain-
tiff’s claims against the other board members, which were based on the
allegation that they submitted the verified complaint to the department,
were barred by the litigation privilege because the administrative pro-
ceeding that resulted from the complaint was quasi-judicial in nature
and the “submission of the verified petition and complaint was a step in
that proceeding.” Kelley v. Bonney, supra, 221 Conn. 571.
Khan v. Jewish Women International

whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal
factor is frequently to whom the matter is published”
and that “[t]he privilege may be lost by unnecessary or
unreasonable publication to one for whom the occasion
is not privileged.” (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id. The court went on to explain,
however, that, although “[p]ublication to the media is
ordinarily not privileged . . . [p]ublication to the media
of material that the media was independently entitled to
view . . . cannot provide a basis for a claim of defamation.”
(Citation omitted.) Id., 576. Because there would be “no
persuasive justification for punishing [the defendant] for
publication to [the newspaper] of the formal written com-
plaint and petition if [the newspaper] was independently
permitted to view the material,” the court reasoned that
“[t]he pivotal question [was] whether, regardless of the
actions of the defendant, the [newspaper] would have
been entitled to access to the complaint.” Id., 576–77.
After explaining that the Freedom of Information Act,
General Statutes § 1-200 et seq.,17 provided the newspa-
per a right to access and receive a copy of the complaint
from the department, the court concluded that, “because
[the newspaper] had a statutory right to the information
provided by [the defendant],” the plaintiff’s claim was
barred by the litigation privilege. Id., 579.
Since Kelley, numerous state and federal courts have
concluded that, under the holding of that case, the litiga-
tion privilege bars claims against a person who repeats
or republishes the contents of an otherwise privileged
statement contained in a publicly accessible document.18
17
At the time Kelley was decided, the relevant provisions of the Free-
dom of Information Act were codified at General Statutes (Rev. to 1991)
§§ 1-18a and 1-19. See Kelley v. Bonney, supra, 221 Conn. 577.
18
See, e.g., Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-
Norwalk, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (August 2, 2024) (relying on
Kelley in applying litigation privilege where statements in question were
contained in “public record under the [Freedom of Information Act] . . .
and the public would be therefore independently entitled to view this
information”), aff’d, 238 Conn. App. 158, 355 A.3d 628 (2026); Barr v.
MFI Management, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-
Norwalk, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX (March 25, 2019) (litigation
Khan v. Jewish Women International

Courts in several other jurisdictions have reached the
same conclusion.19 These courts recognize that the act
of republishing a publicly accessible court filing “is a
truthful sharing of a privileged and public document”;
privilege barred claims based on party’s act of forwarding copy of com-
plaint “ ‘to reporters and various websites’ ”); Moore v. Sequeira, United
States District Court, Docket No. 3:21-CV-787 (VAB) (D. Conn. August
18, 2023) (dissemination to media of police officer’s termination letter
was protected by privilege because it was public record under Freedom of
Information Act); AF Holdings, LLC v. Olivas, United States District
Court, Docket No. 3:12-CV-01401 (JBA) (D. Conn. September 24, 2014)
(relying on Kelley in concluding that, “[s]ince legal complaints, once
filed, are available to the public, the publication of [the] [p]laintiff’s
complaint on its counsel’s website, like the publication of a complaint to
the media, is protected by the judicial proceedings privilege”); Held v.
Silver, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:10-CV-00992 (CSH)
(D. Conn. October 16, 2013) (“[the] forwarding of [a] complaint to [a
third party], even if done with the explicit intention of impacting [the
third party’s] view on [the] [d]efendant’s character or reputation, is
not actionable as defamation, because such an act is a truthful sharing
of a privileged and public document,” but commentary on complaint
was not privileged because it “[went] significantly beyond anything
that could be considered privileged or a mere summary of the contents
of [the] complaint”); Field v. Kirton, 856 F. Supp. 88, 97–98 (D. Conn.
1994) (litigation privilege barred claims based on statement to press
about prior action because statement “contains no information which
cannot be gleaned from the [v]erified [p]etition which had already been
filed, and which was therefore already publicly available, in the New
York Supreme Court . . . [and] there is nothing to suggest that the media
somehow lacked the ability to gain access, and to review independently,
the [v]erified [p]etition” (footnote omitted)).
19
See, e.g., Phi Theta Kappa Honor Society v. HonorSociety.Org,
Inc., United States District Court, Docket No. 3:22-CV-208 (CWR)
(RPM) (S.D. Miss. March 29, 2024) (press release announcing litiga-
tion was protected by privilege where statements were “so similar to
[the plaintiff’s] claims in the [a]mended [c]omplaint that they warrant
privilege”); Norman v. Borison, 418 Md. 630, 664, 17 A.3d 697 (2011)
(attorney’s republication of complaint on website was protected by
litigation privilege because, “[o]nce a document is made public, Mary-
land law does not limit who, where, or the extent to which one may
view that document” (emphasis omitted)); Prokop v. Cannon, 7 Neb.
App. 334, 343, 583 N.W.2d 51 (1998) (attorney’s statements to media
describing nature and purpose of action were protected by litigation
privilege); Chavez-Neal v. Kennedy, 485 P.3d 811, 815 (N.M. App.
2021) (attorney’s statements in television interview discussing litigation
were protected by litigation privilege “because they were . . . limited to
reiteration and explanation of the allegations of the complaint”). But
see Asay v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 594 F.2d 692, 698 (8th Cir. 1979)
(holding litigation privilege did not protect party who provided copy
of complaint to newspaper).
Khan v. Jewish Women International

Held v. Silver, United States District Court, Docket No.
3:10-CV-00992 (CSH) (D. Conn. October 16, 2013); and
it would serve no practical purpose to hold that a party
enjoys an absolute privilege to publish defamatory state-
ments in a court filing but loses that privilege merely by
facilitating public access to that filing, even though the
filing itself is a matter of public record. As the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New
York recognized, especially “[i]n the age of digital com-
munication, it is illogical to protect allegations in a pub-
licly filed complaint but not repetition or explanation of
those same allegations outside the courthouse” because
“[a]llegations of interest to the public or even to a single
competitive industry will inevitably reach interested
parties . . . .” (Footnote omitted.) PowerDsine, Inc. v.
AMI Semiconductor, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 673, 684
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
We agree with these courts and conclude that, under
Kelley, the litigation privilege bars the plaintiff’s claims
to the extent they are based on the defendants’ republica-
tion of the proposed amicus brief. As our Supreme Court
stated in Kelley, there is “no persuasive justification for
punishing [a defendant]” merely for republishing a docu-
ment that the public is “independently permitted to view
. . . .” Kelley v. Bonney, supra, 221 Conn. 577. Here, the
complaint alleges that the defendants published the pro-
posed brief “online” and “to donors . . . .” The complaint
also alleges that the brief remains publicly available on
the Judicial Branch website and, in fact, the complaint
contains a hyperlink to the proposed brief on the Judicial
Branch website, confirming that it is publicly accessible.
There is no allegation in the complaint that the defen-
dants edited or altered the brief before they republished
it or that they made any statements about the contents
of the brief other than simply republishing a verbatim
copy of what is already publicly available. Because the
proposed amicus brief is a publicly filed court record that
remains accessible to the general public, the litigation
privilege bars any claims that are based on the allegation
that the defendants republished the brief.
Khan v. Jewish Women International

The plaintiff argues that Kelley is distinguishable from
the present case because the defendant in Kelley shared
a copy of the complaint in response to a specific request
from the editorial writer. The plaintiff contends that
we should construe Kelley to protect republication only
when the recipient of the document “would have obtained
the material anyway” because, in that instance, the act
of republication does not cause “incremental defamatory
exposure . . . .” (Emphasis omitted.)
Nothing in Kelley, however, suggests that the court’s
decision turned on the fact that the editorial writer had
requested a copy of the complaint. Although the court
mentioned that fact in passing while summarizing the
factual background, the court’s analysis focused on the
legal question of whether the reporter had a right to
access the complaint under the Freedom of Information
Act. Indeed, the court referred to the issue of whether
the reporter “would have been entitled to access to the
complaint” as “[t]he pivotal question” in its analysis;
(emphasis added) Kelley v. Bonney, supra, 221 Conn.
576–77; and concluded that the litigation privilege
applied “because [the reporter] had a statutory right to
the information . . . .” Id., 579. The court’s analysis did
not even refer to the fact that the reporter had sought a
copy of the complaint, much less suggest, as the plain-
tiff argues, that its decision “turn[ed] on whether” the
reporter “would have obtained the material anyway.”
In fact, the plaintiff does not cite a single case that has
construed Kelley in such a limited fashion, and we have
not discovered any such case in our own research. Accord-
ingly, we reject the plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish
Kelley on that basis.
The plaintiff also argues that, even if we disagree with
his interpretation of Kelley, dismissal is not warranted
because there are factual questions relevant to this issue
that must be resolved by the trial court. Specifically,
he contends that (1) whether the proposed brief “was
publicly accessible on the Judicial Branch website at
the time of republication,” (2) whether visitors to the
Khan v. Jewish Women International

defendants’ websites “had any independent means or
motivation to access the brief,” and (3) “whether the
defendants’ republication reached a new audience” are
all questions that “remain unresolved.” We disagree.
As to the first issue, the complaint expressly alleges
that the defendants filed the proposed brief with the
Supreme Court and that the brief “remains available
permanently on the Connecticut Supreme Court website
. . . .” It is well established that, in the absence of cer-
tain exceptions, pleadings and other judicial documents
filed in court are presumptively open to the public. See
Practice Book § 11-20A; Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman
Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 46, 970 A.2d 656,
cert. denied, 558 U.S. 991, 130 S. Ct. 500, 175 L. Ed. 2d
348 (2009). The complaint does not allege, and there is
nothing in the record to indicate, that the proposed brief
was subject to any such exception. Moreover, the defen-
dants expressly argued before the trial court that their
republishing of the brief was privileged, either by way
of the litigation privilege20 or the fair reporting privi-
lege, because it was a publicly accessible document, and
the plaintiff never attempted to refute the defendants’
contention that the proposed brief was publicly available.
Thus, the record does not support the plaintiff’s claim
that there was an unresolved factual question concerning
the public availability of the proposed brief.
The other two factual issues identified by the plaintiff
have no bearing on the applicability of the litigation
privilege under Kelley. As we have explained, the court’s
analysis in that case turned on whether the document in
question was one that the public has a right to access, not
20
Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, one set of defendants did
claim before the trial court that the litigation privilege barred those
portions of the plaintiff’s claims that are based on the defendants’ alleged
republication of the brief. Specifically, these defendants argued that,
because “the proposed amicus brief was a public judicial filing, and the
plaintiff alleges only that it was republished as-is by the defendants . . .
[t]he plaintiff’s allegation is thus insufficient to take the proposed
amicus brief outside the scope of the litigation privilege and fails to
establish subject matter jurisdiction.” (Citation omitted.)
Khan v. Jewish Women International

whether the audience that actually received the document
would have done so in the absence of the defendants’
actions. Accordingly, the factual issues identified by the
plaintiff are not relevant to whether the litigation privi-
lege bars the plaintiff’s claims. We, therefore, conclude
that the trial court did not err in granting the defendants’
motions to dismiss those portions of the plaintiff’s claims
asserting that the defendants republished the proposed
amicus brief, albeit on the alternative ground that the
litigation privilege bars those claims.21
IV
Finally, the plaintiff claims that the court improp-
erly addressed the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions
after concluding that the litigation privilege barred his
claims. The plaintiff argues that, because the litigation
privilege implicates subject matter jurisdiction, “[t]he
trial court’s determination that the litigation privilege
applied deprived it of jurisdiction to do anything except
dismiss the case immediately.” In support of his claim,
the plaintiff relies on this court’s decision in Robinson
v. V. D., 229 Conn. App. 316, 328 A.3d 198 (2024), in
which we held that, “[b]ecause [a] defendant’s absolute
immunity claim implicates the trial court’s subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, it presents a threshold issue that we must
address before turning to the merits of the special motion
to dismiss.” Id., 25–26. The plaintiff further argues that
the fact that Sanctuary did not file a motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “is immaterial”
because “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived,
and once the court found [that] the privilege applied to
any defendant’s conduct, it was required to dismiss as to
all defendants whose conduct fell within that privilege.”
We agree.
21
Fierberg, which filed an affidavit in connection with its motion to
dismiss attesting that it did not republish the brief, also argued before
the trial court and on appeal that it was entitled to dismissal of the action
on that basis. Although the trial court agreed with that argument, our
conclusion that the litigation privilege applies irrespective of whether
Fierberg republished the proposed brief obviates any need to address
that alternative basis for dismissal as to Fierberg.
Khan v. Jewish Women International

The following procedural history is relevant to this
claim. As stated previously in this opinion, although all
of the other defendants filed both motions to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and special motions to
dismiss pursuant to § 52-196a, Sanctuary only filed a spe-
cial motion to dismiss. All of the defendants, including
Sanctuary, asserted in their special motions to dismiss
that the complaint should be dismissed because it is based
on the defendants’ exercise of their right to petition the
government in connection with a matter of public concern
and that the plaintiff could not establish probable cause
to prevail on the merits of the complaint because, inter
alia, the litigation privilege barred his claims.
In its memorandum of decision, after addressing the
motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion filed by the other defendants, the trial court stated
that, because “Sanctuary . . . filed a separate . . . special
motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute and
did not file a motion to dismiss for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction . . . [i]t is therefore necessary to resolve
its motion.” The court went on to note that “the other .
. . defendants . . . have filed or joined their own special
motions to dismiss” and stated that “[r]esolving these
other . . . special motions to dismiss may provide an
alternative ground for their dismissal from the case in
the event that an appellate court reverses the court’s
decision on their motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.” Addressing the merits of the special
motions to dismiss, the court concluded that the defen-
dants met their burden under the first prong of § 52-196a
(e) (3)22 by establishing that the complaint is based on
their exercise of their right to petition the government
in connection with a matter of public concern. The court
further concluded that, because the plaintiff’s claims are
barred by the litigation privilege, the plaintiff necessar-
ily failed to meet his burden under the second prong of §
52-196a (e) (3) to establish probable cause that he would
prevail on the merits.
22
See footnote 7 of this opinion.
Khan v. Jewish Women International

The court thereafter issued separate orders granting
both the motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction filed by all defendants except Sanctuary
and the special motions to dismiss filed by all defen-
dants. Subsequently, all defendants jointly filed a motion
requesting that the court extend the time to file motions
for attorney’s fees pursuant to § 52-196a (f)23 until thirty
days after the resolution of this appeal. The court granted
that motion without objection. Thus, the issue of attor-
ney’s fees remains pending, and the availability of those
fees under § 52-196a (f) is contingent on our resolution
of this issue.
“Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court
to hear and determine cases of the general class to which
the proceedings in question belong.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn.
531, 542, 590 A.2d 914 (1991). “Our Supreme Court
has long held that because [a] determination regarding
a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question
of law, our review is plenary. . . . Moreover, [i]t is a
fundamental rule that a court may raise and review
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. . . .
The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be
waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party,
or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceed-
ings, including on appeal.”24 (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Haydusky’s Appeal from Probate, 220 Conn.
App. 267, 276, 297 A.3d 1072 (2023).
Because subject matter jurisdiction goes to the court’s
authority to decide the case before it, a trial court faced
with a claim that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction
23
General Statutes § 52-196a (f) provides in relevant part: “(1) If the
court grants a special motion to dismiss under this section, the court
shall award the moving party costs and reasonable attorney’s fees,
including such costs and fees incurred in connection with the filing of
the special motion to dismiss. . . .”
24
Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be
raised at any time, we reject the defendants’ contention that the plaintiff
waived his jurisdictional challenge to the trial court’s consideration
of the anti-SLAPP motions by failing to raise it before the trial court.
Khan v. Jewish Women International

generally “must fully resolve [that issue] before proceed-
ing further with the case.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 258
Conn. 804, 813, 786 A.2d 1091 (2002). From this “ ‘juris-
diction first’ rule”; Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Har-
rison, 264 Conn. 829, 839 n.6, 826 A.2d 1102 (2003);
flows two principles applicable to the plaintiff’s claim
that the court erred by addressing the special motion to
dismiss. First, when a potential jurisdictional defect is
brought to the court’s attention, the court must dispose
of that issue first, “no matter in what form it is pre-
sented.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 813; see, e.g.,
Palosz v. Greenwich, 184 Conn. App. 201, 207, 194 A.3d
885 (addressing claim of sovereign immunity, which
implicates subject matter jurisdiction, that was raised
in motion to strike), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 930, 194
A.3d 778 (2018); Sethi v. Yagildere, 136 Conn. App. 767,
770 and n.6, 47 A.3d 892 (treating motion for summary
judgment for lack of standing as motion to dismiss), cert.
denied, 307 Conn. 905, 53 A.3d 220 (2012). Second,
because “any movement is necessarily the exercise of
jurisdiction”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93,
99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996); once the trial court determines
that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, “it need not,
and cannot, consider additional claims raised by a defen-
dant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulvihill v.
Spinnato, 228 Conn. App. 781, 788 n.12, 326 A.3d 251,
cert. denied, 350 Conn. 926, 326 A.3d 248 (2024); see,
e.g., Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Harrison, supra,
264 Conn. 839 n.6 (court lacked jurisdiction to entertain
motion to intervene after it determined that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.
v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., supra, 99 (once defendant moves
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, court
lacks authority to entertain motion to amend aimed at
curing jurisdictional defect); Baldwin Piano & Organ
Co. v. Blake, 186 Conn. 295, 298, 441 A.2d 183 (1982)
(court erred in ruling on plaintiff’s motion for contempt
Khan v. Jewish Women International

without first addressing defendant’s claim that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction).
In Robinson v. V. D., supra, 229 Conn. App. 316, this
court applied these principles in holding that, when a
defendant raises a litigation privilege claim as a defense
in the context of a special motion to dismiss pursuant to §
52-196a, the court must address that claim as a threshold
issue before reaching the merits of the special motion to
dismiss. See id., 325–26. In Robinson, the defendant
raised the litigation privilege in a motion labeled as a
combined motion to dismiss and special motion to dismiss
brought pursuant to both Practice Book § 10-30 and §
52-196a. Id., 325 n.7. The trial court declined to address
the motion to dismiss on the basis that the defendant had
not expressly requested that the court treat his motion
as a “hybrid” motion and, in any event, that our rules of
practice do not expressly authorize such hybrid motions.
Id. In support of its decision not to address the motion
to dismiss portion of the defendant’s motion, the court
also cited “the expedited time requirements pertaining
to a statutory special motion to dismiss [pursuant to §
52-196a]” and “the limited inquiry of [such] a special
motion to dismiss . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id. Instead, the court addressed only the special
motion to dismiss, which it denied after concluding that
“the defendant had failed to meet his burden of show-
ing, by a preponderance of evidence, that the complaint
was based on the exercise of his right of free speech, to
petition the government, or of association.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 322.
On appeal, the defendant in Robinson renewed his
claim that the action was barred by the litigation privi-
lege and, therefore, that the trial court should have dis-
missed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Id., 324. This court noted that, although the trial court
had not addressed that claim, “[b]ecause . . . absolute
immunity . . . implicates the trial court’s subject matter
jurisdiction, it presents a threshold issue that we must
address before turning to the merits of the special motion
Khan v. Jewish Women International

to dismiss.” Id., 325–26. This court also made clear that
the trial court lacked the discretion to decline to address
the jurisdictional issue merely because the defendant had
not distinctly raised it in a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Practice Book § 10-30. In so doing, this court also
rejected the trial court’s rationale that the expedited
nature of the remedy provided by § 52-196a justifies an
exception to the general rule requiring courts to address
jurisdictional claims before reaching other issues. This
court stated that, “[a]lthough a court certainly has broad
discretion to manage its docket and resolve cases as it
sees fit . . . which arguably would include the discretion
to reject a so-called hybrid motion, it is axiomatic that
questions pertaining to the subject matter jurisdiction
of the court may be raised at any time and by any party
. . . and that [o]nce . . . raised, [the challenge] must be
disposed of no matter in what form it is presented.” (Cita-
tion omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 325 n.7. This court went on to conclude
that all but two of the plaintiff’s claims were barred by
the litigation privilege and, therefore, reversed in part
the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case
with direction to the trial court to dismiss the counts
that were barred by the litigation privilege. Id., 349–50.
We conclude that, under the rationale of Robinson,
the trial court erred by addressing the special motions
to dismiss after it concluded that the litigation privilege
barred the plaintiff’s claims. As this court explained in
Robinson, the applicability of the litigation privilege was
a threshold issue that implicated the trial court’s subject
matter jurisdiction and, once that issue was raised, the
court was required to address that issue. Id., 325–26.
The court did not have discretion to entertain the merits
of the special motions to dismiss merely because Sanc-
tuary raised the litigation privilege in that motion as
opposed to a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.25 As in Robinson, once the jurisdictional
challenge was raised, the court was required to “[dis-
25
We note that, although Sanctuary did not file a motion to dismiss, it
expressly argued in its special motion to dismiss that “[t]he applicability
Khan v. Jewish Women International

pose] of [it] no matter in what form it [was] presented.”
(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Robinson v. V. D., supra, 229 Conn. App. 325 n.7; see
also Bruno v. Travelers Cos., supra, 172 Conn. App. 729
(concluding that, even though defendants raised litiga-
tion privilege in motion to strike rather than motion to
dismiss, trial court erred by allowing plaintiff to replead
rather than dismissing action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction after determining that litigation privilege
applied). Moreover, once the court determined that the
litigation privilege barred the plaintiff’s claims, it was
required to dismiss the action without proceeding fur-
ther, as “any action taken after the court determined that
absolute immunity applied to all of the plaintiff’s causes
of action against the defendants is void . . . [because] the
court had no jurisdiction.” Bruno v. Travelers Cos.,
supra, 729.
In addressing the merits of the special motions to
dismiss, the court reached additional issues that went
beyond the question of whether the litigation privilege
applied. Specifically, pursuant to § 52-196a (e) (3), the
court was required to determine whether the defendants
had met their burden of establishing that the plaintiff’s
claims were based on the exercise of their right to petition
the government. The court also addressed claims raised
by the plaintiff concerning the constitutionality of §
52-196a and considered the plaintiff’s request pursuant
to § 52-196a (d) for limited discovery as to all defendants
except Sanctuary.26 All of these issues went well beyond
the threshold question of whether the court had subject
matter jurisdiction over the action. Because the court
had already determined that the litigation privilege
barred the plaintiff’s action, it was required to dismiss
the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
of absolute immunity implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdic-
tion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
26
The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that § 52-196a violated
his right to a jury trial, to due process, and to petition the government.
As stated in footnote 8 of this opinion, the court also denied the plain-
tiff’s belated discovery request.
Khan v. Jewish Women International

lacked the authority to address any additional claims
raised by the parties.
The defendants argue that this court’s decision in
Sicignano v. Pearce, 228 Conn. App. 664, 325 A.3d
1127 (2024), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 908, 330 A.3d
881 (2025), which predates our decision in Robinson by
approximately one month, stands for the proposition that
a trial court may address the merits of a special motion
to dismiss even when a defendant raises the litigation
privilege as a defense in such a motion. As the defendants
note, this court in Sicignano affirmed on the merits a
trial court’s decision granting a special motion to dis-
miss even though the defendants in that case had raised
the litigation privilege in connection with that motion.
On appeal in Sicignano, however, the plaintiff did not
raise any claim with respect to the litigation privilege.
Rather, as this court explained, the plaintiff in Sicignano
claimed that the trial court had erred in concluding that
the complaint was based on the defendants’ exercise of
their right to petition the government, but “fail[ed]
to address the court’s conclusion that [the action was]
barred by the defense of absolute immunity based on the
litigation privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 691. Because the issue was not raised or decided in
Sicignano, that decision has no bearing on our resolu-
tion of the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to address the special motions to dismiss. See
21 C.J.S., Courts § 186 (2026) (“[a] court that resolves
a case on the merits without discussing its jurisdiction
to act does not establish a precedent requiring similar
treatment of other cases once the jurisdictional prob-
lem has come to light”); see also, e.g., Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119, 104
S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984) (“[w]hen questions of
jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub
silentio, this [c]ourt has never considered itself bound
when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional
issue before us” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Glidden v. Chromalloy American Corp., 808 F.2d 621,
625 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[w]hen a court resolves a case on the
Khan v. Jewish Women International

merits without discussing its jurisdiction to act, it does
not establish a precedent requiring similar treatment of
other cases once the jurisdictional problem has come to
light”). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
improperly addressed the special motions to dismiss after
concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
the action and, therefore, that the court’s judgment must
be vacated to the extent it dismissed the action pursuant
to § 52-196a.27
The judgment is vacated only as to the granting of the
special motions to dismiss and the case is remanded with
direction to render a judgment of dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction as to all claims against Sanc-
tuary; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

27
Our conclusion that the court erred by addressing the special motions
to dismiss is limited to circumstances like the present case in which the
question of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction can be decided on the
papers, whether on the pleadings alone or the pleadings as supplemented
by uncontested facts contained in affidavits. We are cognizant of the
fact that, in certain limited circumstances, “[w]hen the jurisdictional
facts are intertwined with the merits of the case, the court may in its
discretion choose to postpone resolution of the jurisdictional question
until the parties complete further discovery or, if necessary, a full trial
on the merits has occurred.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cuozzo
v. Orange, 315 Conn. 606, 616, 109 A.3d 903 (2015). In light of the
fact that the anti-SLAPP statute is intended to provide “an expedited
off-ramp for a party to avoid further litigation”; (internal quotation
marks omitted) Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. 928, 947 n.16, 293 A.3d 851
(2023); different considerations may apply when a court is faced with
a jurisdictional issue that cannot be resolved promptly. Because those
circumstances are not present here, however, we express no view with
respect to whether under those circumstances a trial court may rule on a
special motion to dismiss that raises a nonjurisdictional defense before
deciding the question of subject matter jurisdiction.