Berglass v. Dworkin

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Berglass v. Dworkin

STEVEN BERGLASS, TRUSTEE v. HEIDI
DWORKIN ET AL.
(AC 48263)
Cradle, C. J., and Seeley and Eveleigh, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment dismissing his action,
which sought, inter alia, an injunction preventing the defendants from
constructing a fence on certain real property. The plaintiff claimed that
the court improperly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over his complaint. Held:

The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s action, as the plaintiff’s
request for injunctive relief was rendered moot by the completed construction
of the fence, and the plaintiff failed to allege facts to satisfy the exception
to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine.

Argued April 16—officially released June 2, 2026

Procedural History

Action seeking, inter alia, an injunction preventing
the defendants from constructing a fence on certain real
property, and other relief, brought to the Superior Court
in the judicial district of New Haven, where the court,
Noble, J., granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and
rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Brendon P. Levesque, with whom were Michael S.
Taylor and, on the brief, Corinne A. Burlingham and
Eric P. Anderson, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Michael T. Cretella, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

PER CURIAM. In this action for injunctive relief to
prevent the construction of a fence, the plaintiff, Ste-
ven Berglass, trustee of the Steven Berglass Revocable
Living Trust, appeals from the judgment of the trial
court dismissing his complaint against the defendants,
Heidi Dworkin and Jay Dworkin. On appeal, the plain-
tiff claims that the court improperly determined that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his complaint on
Berglass v. Dworkin

the grounds that the completed construction of the fence
rendered the matter moot and the plaintiff had failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
disposition of this appeal. The plaintiff commenced the
present action in July 2022, seeking injunctive relief to
prevent the defendants’ construction of a fence on their
property, which was adjacent to the plaintiff’s property,
on Kings Highway in Milford.1 The plaintiff alleged
that the construction of the fence violated the Milford
zoning regulations, that the fence was “encroaching and
overlapping [his] land,” and, “[i]f the construction is not
enjoined until it is properly designed and permitted, [he]
is likely to suffer immediate and irreparable harm for
which there is no adequate remedy at law.” He sought
“[d]eclaratory and injunctive relief against the defen-
dants from constructing the fence” and “[s]uch other
and further relief as law and equity may provide.” The
plaintiff also filed a motion for a temporary injunction
and an order to show cause.
On August 22, 2024, the defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The defendants’ motion was accompanied by a memoran-
dum of law and an affidavit with several exhibits. The
defendants contended that the plaintiff’s request for
injunctive relief was moot because construction of the
fence had been completed in June 2022, and the plaintiff
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
On October 3, 2024, the plaintiff filed an objection to
the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Although he acknowl-
edged that construction of the fence had been completed,2
he argued that the action was not moot because the
1
The plaintiff filed a separate but similar action with respect to the
defendants’ construction of an inground swimming pool. See Berglass
v. Dworkin, 234 Conn. App. 834, 836, 344 A.3d 619 (2025).
2
The plaintiff disputes that the construction of the fence was com-
pleted in June 2022, before he filed his complaint, but acknowledges
that the construction of the fence had been completed by the time the
defendants filed their motion to dismiss.
Berglass v. Dworkin

relief he requested in his complaint was not limited to
an injunction. He claimed that “the appropriate relief
granted by [the] court would be specific performance to
either remove the fence in violation of zoning require-
ments or [to] alter the fence so that it is in compliance
with said requirements.” In addition, he argued that
his action fell within an exception to the exhaustion of
administrative remedies doctrine for “property owners
specifically and materially damaged by the violation of
zoning regulations”3 because the fence encroaches on
and overlaps his property, as he alleged in his complaint,
and he has suffered from “the inherent harm caused by
crowding and aesthetics,” including “a diminishment
in property value due to the nonconforming fence.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)
The defendants filed a reply to the plaintiff’s objec-
tion on November 12, 2024, and the court held a hear-
ing on the motion to dismiss on that same date. At the
hearing, the plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged that the
fence was not on the plaintiff’s property. In addition,
the defendants pointed out that the plaintiff’s claim in
his objection regarding a diminution of property value
and aesthetic harm was not alleged in the complaint.
The defendants similarly indicated that the plaintiff’s
request for specific performance was not alleged in the
complaint and that it was inapplicable to this type of
action. The plaintiff acknowledged that “it may be . . .
argued that [the] prayer for relief [for an injunction] in
itself could be moot,” but continued to argue that the
3
“[P]rivate zoning enforcement actions are an exception to the doc-
trine of administrative exhaustion. This court has observed, ‘property
owners specifically and materially damaged by the violation of zoning
regulations may bring private zoning enforcement actions directly to the
Superior Court, without first applying to municipal zoning authorities,
as an exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine.’
Reichenbach v. Kraska Enterprises, LLC, 105 Conn. App. 461, 468,
938 A.2d 1238 (2008). The reason for this exception to the doctrine of
administrative exhaustion, which grants courts subject matter jurisdic-
tion to hear private zoning enforcement claims, is precisely because,
where specific and material harm is being perpetrated upon a party,
that party should be able to seek equitable relief.” Giglio v. Ardohain,
233 Conn. App. 743, 758 n.14, 341 A.3d 272 (2025).
Berglass v. Dworkin

“claim itself has not become moot, because there still
exists harm that is occurring actively since that con-
struction has been finished,” and “there should be an
order entered, at least, making it so that this fence is in
compliance with zoning regulations or possibly remov-
ing the fence entirely. . . . [I]t may be up in the air as to
what decision is right.”
On November 20, 2024, the court issued a memoran-
dum of decision in which it granted the defendants’
motion to dismiss. The court noted that the defendants
had provided evidence that they obtained various approv-
als for the construction of their fence, including from
the Planning and Zoning Board of the City of Milford.
With respect to the defendants’ motion, the court first
concluded that the plaintiff’s request for declaratory
and injunctive relief was rendered moot by the completed
construction of the fence. The court explained that a
more specific request was required in the complaint to
put the defendants on notice of the relief the plaintiff
had mentioned in opposition to their motion, and he could
not rely on his broad claim for “[s]uch other and further
relief as law and equity may provide.”
In addition, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed
to allege facts to satisfy the exception to the exhaustion
of administrative remedies doctrine. The court explained
in relevant part: “[T]he plaintiff has baldly alleged only
that, ‘[i]f the construction is not enjoined until it is
properly designed and permitted, the plaintiff is likely
to suffer immediate and irreparable harm for which
there is no adequate remedy at law.’ The complaint is
devoid of any assertion of specific and material damage
as a result of the defendants’ activities.”4 Accordingly,
4
Our Supreme Court has explained: “We cannot state too strongly . . .
the necessity for clear and precise allegations of specific and material
claims of damage in order to establish the threshold requirement for
this exception to the exhaustion doctrine.” (Emphasis added.) Cum-
mings v. Tripp, 204 Conn. 67, 76, 527 A.2d 230 (1987). As set forth
previously in this opinion, although the plaintiff alleged that the fence
was “encroaching and overlapping [his] land,” the plaintiff’s counsel
acknowledged at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that the fence
Berglass v. Dworkin

the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on
the grounds of mootness and a failure to exhaust admin-
istrative remedies. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improp-
erly (1) concluded that the action was rendered moot by
the completed construction of the fence, and (2) deter-
mined that the plaintiff’s complaint did not satisfy the
exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies
doctrine. Having reviewed the record and the briefs
of the parties, we conclude that the plaintiff’s claims
are without merit. “Although pleadings must be con-
strued broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly
and technically . . . this does not mean that we may read
into the [plaintiff’s complaint] a prayer for relief or
factual allegations that simply are not there.” (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sovereign
Bank v. Harrison, 184 Conn. App. 436, 446, 194 A.3d
1284 (2018). Accordingly, the court properly dismissed
the action.
The judgment is affirmed.

was not on the plaintiff’s property. In addition, on appeal, the plain-
tiff suggests that he “has sufficiently alleged that the construction of
the fence will obstruct his view of Long Island Sound.” The plaintiff’s
complaint, however, contains no such allegation, and the plaintiff
raised this argument for the first time on appeal, more specifically, in
his reply brief to this court.