Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

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Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
v. DOUGLAS J. GILLERAN ET AL.
(AC 48363)
Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff insurance company appealed from the trial court’s partial
summary judgment for the defendants, J and the insureds, D and G, in
its action seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether it was obligated to
defend D under a certain automobile insurance policy in a separate negligence
action J brought after a vehicle operated by D collided with the vehicle J was
operating. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly concluded that
J’s claim for damages in the negligence action for the diminution in value
of her repaired automobile potentially fell within the coverage provided by
the insurance policy. Held:

The trial court properly granted in part the motions for summary judgment
filed by J and by D and G, as there was a reasonable basis to conclude that J’s
diminution in value claim potentially fell within the insurance policy’s cover-
age for destruction of tangible property and, thus, triggered the plaintiff’s
duty to defend D in the underlying negligence action.

This court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that diminution in value to a
motor vehicle cannot constitute destruction of tangible property under the
insurance policy’s provision governing damage to a third party’s vehicle,
as the policy did not specifically disclaim coverage for diminution in value
damages in that provision, as it did elsewhere in the policy, and the term
“destruction” in the policy’s definition of property damage encompassed
partial destruction of tangible property, which obligated the plaintiff to pay
damages that may include costs related to the diminution of a vehicle’s value.

Argued January 5—officially released May 12, 2026

Procedural History

Action for a declaratory judgment determining
whether the plaintiff had a duty to defend the named
defendant under a certain automobile insurance policy
in a separate negligence action, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Hartford, where the court, Gordon, J., granted in part
the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment; judgment
in part for the defendants, from which the plaintiff
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

Mara E. Finkelstein, with whom, on the brief, were
Anthony J. Antonellis and John A. Donovan III, for the
appellant (plaintiff).
Matthew J. Forrest, with whom was Barbara Curatolo,
for the appellee (defendant Jasmin Harding).

Opinion

ELGO, J. The plaintiff, Amica Mutual Insurance
Company, appeals from the partial summary judgment
rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants,
Douglas J. Gilleran, Diane M. Gilleran, and Jasmin Hard-
ing, in this declaratory action regarding an insurer’s
duty to defend.1 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the
court improperly concluded that the underlying com-
plaint contained an allegation that possibly fell within
the scope of the insurance policy at issue. We disagree
and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record before us reveals the following facts and
procedural history. The plaintiff is an insurer licensed
to transact business in this state. The defendants are
residents of Connecticut. At all relevant times, Douglas
and Diane maintained a personal automobile insurance
policy with the plaintiff (policy).
On September 23, 2021, Douglas was operating a motor
vehicle insured by the plaintiff that collided with a 2020
BMW 430i (vehicle) owned and operated by Jasmin. The
collision occurred in Bloomfield and allegedly was caused
by Douglas’ negligent operation of his vehicle.
Jasmin thereafter commenced a negligence action
against Douglas in July 2022 (negligence action). In
her one count complaint, Jasmin alleged that she had
“suffered a diminution in value to her vehicle and under
Connecticut law is entitled to compensation for such.”
She also alleged a loss of “the right to use her vehicle,”
1
For clarity, we refer to Douglas J. Gilleran, Diane M. Gilleran, and
Jasmin Harding individually by first name and collectively as the defen-
dants in this opinion. We also note that Douglas and Diane did not file
briefs in this appeal or participate in oral argument.
Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

“lost time to pursue one’s interests,” a “loss of life’s
enjoyment,” and “inconveniences” as a result of Douglas’
negligence.
In August 2022, the plaintiff sent Douglas and Diane
a certified letter regarding its representation of Douglas
in the negligence action (reservation of rights letter). In
that letter, Attorney Anthony J. Antonellis, on behalf
of the plaintiff, stated in relevant part: “[The plain-
tiff] hereby reserves all rights to disclaim coverage with
respect to the claim as written in [Jasmin’s complaint].
Nevertheless, as a courtesy to you, [the plaintiff] will
provide a defense for you . . . subject to any and all policy
defenses . . . . [The plaintiff] is proceeding with any
investigation and handling of this matter pursuant to a
full and complete reservation of any and all rights [the
plaintiff] may have under the law or insurance policies.”
Antonellis also explained that “it is [the plaintiff’s] posi-
tion that there is no insurance coverage available for any
alleged ‘diminution in value’ . . . under Connecticut law
and/or the terms and conditions of the [policy]. . . . [The
plaintiff] has no obligation to indemnify or reimburse
the claimant with respect to this ‘diminution in value’
claim.” In accordance with those representations, the
plaintiff retained legal counsel, who filed an appearance
on behalf of Douglas in the negligence action.
On September 7, 2022, Douglas filed an answer to Jas-
min’s complaint, in which he denied the allegations of
negligence in all material respects. A certificate of closed
pleadings was filed on September 22, 2022. On January
19, 2023, Jasmin filed an offer of compromise, in which
she offered to settle the case for $9000. Douglas did not
accept that offer.
On May 22, 2023, the plaintiff commenced this declara-
tory action against the defendants. Its operative com-
plaint contained one count and alleged that the plaintiff
had no duty to defend Douglas in the negligence action.
The plaintiff alleged in relevant part: “There is no cov-
erage because [diminution in value] damages are not
physical injury to, destruction of or loss of use of tangible
Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

property. . . . There is no coverage for claims of loss
of life’s enjoyment, as they are not physical injury to,
destruction of or loss of use of tangible property. . . .
[The plaintiff] has no duty to indemnify [Douglas] for
any claims of [diminution in value] damages, loss of life’s
enjoyment, or loss of time arising out of the [negligence]
action pursuant to the policy. . . . [The plaintiff] has no
duty to defend aris[ing] out of the allegations for [dimi-
nution in value] damages and loss of life’s enjoyment.”
On November 9, 2023, Douglas and Diane filed an
answer to the plaintiff’s complaint, in which they denied
the material allegations contained therein. Jasmin filed
a similar answer on January 5, 2024. On January 12,
2024, the plaintiff filed a certificate of closed pleadings.
On March 11, 2024, Jasmin filed a motion for summary
judgment in the declaratory action, claiming that no
genuine issues of material fact existed and that she was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because both her
diminution in value claim and her separate claim for lost
time, inconvenience, and loss of life’s enjoyment dam-
ages potentially fell within the coverage provided by the
policy. That motion was accompanied by a memorandum
of law and several exhibits.2
On May 2, 2024, the plaintiff filed an objection to Jas-
min’s motion for summary judgment, as well as its own
motion for summary judgment. In its motion for sum-
mary judgment, the plaintiff argued that the policy in
question “does not provide coverage for either diminished
value to a vehicle or a third-party claimant’s ‘inconve-
nience damages.’ ”3 The defendants subsequently filed
2
Those exhibits were (1) a copy of the policy, (2) a copy of the insurance
policy at issue in Lebowitz v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., Superior Court,
judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (August
8, 2013) (56 Conn. L. Rptr. 629), (3) the sworn affidavit of Attorney
Matthew J. Forrest, in which he attested to the accuracy of that copy
of the insurance policy from Lebowitz, (4) a copy of the memorandum
of law filed by the plaintiff in Lebowitz, and (5) a copy of the complaint
filed by Jasmin in the negligence action.
3
Appended as exhibits to that memorandum were (1) a copy of the
complaint filed by Jasmin in the negligence action, (2) a copy of the
Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

separate objections to the plaintiff’s motion for sum-
mary judgment with corresponding memoranda of law.
On June 14, 2024, Douglas and Diane filed their own
motion for summary judgment in the declaratory action,
arguing that the plaintiff had a duty to defend Douglas
in the negligence action because both the diminution of
value damages and the “inconvenience” damages alleged
by Jasmin were covered by the policy.4 The plaintiff filed
an objection to that motion on August 14, 2024.
The court held a hearing on the parties’ respective
motions for summary judgment on October 21, 2024.
In its subsequent memorandum of decision, the court
concluded that Jasmin’s claim for damages related to
the diminution in value of her vehicle was potentially
recoverable under the policy, which triggered the plain-
tiff’s duty to defend Douglas in the negligence action.
The court thus denied the plaintiff’s motion for sum-
mary judgment and granted the defendants’ correspond-
ing motions for summary judgment with respect to the
diminution in value claim.5 From that judgment, the
plaintiff now appeals.
As a preliminary matter, we note the well established
standard that governs our review of a trial court’s
reservation of rights letter, (3) a copy of the policy, and (4) a copy of
a nine page transcript dated April 27, 2009, from Amica Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Ward, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket
No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S.
4
Appended as exhibits to the memorandum of law filed by Douglas
and Diane were (1) a copy of the policy, (2) a copy of the Superior Court
decision in Spillane v. Kondash, Superior Court, judicial district of
Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (March 18, 2020), and
(3) a copy of the Superior Court decision in Lebowitz v. Amica Mutual
Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No.
CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (August 8, 2013) (56 Conn. L. Rptr. 629).
5
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court also granted the plain-
tiff’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Jasmin’s claim for
lost time, inconvenience, and loss of life’s enjoyment damages under
the policy. See Piecuch v. Courtney, Superior Court, judicial district
of New Haven, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (May 10, 2019) (68 Conn.
L. Rptr. 556, 557) (“[t]he majority view [in Connecticut] holds that
inconvenience, annoyance, and certain other consequential damages,
including emotional distress, lost time, and loss of life’s enjoyment
Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

decision to grant a motion for summary judgment. “In
seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the
burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact.
. . . [T]he moving party for summary judgment has the
burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as
to all the material facts, which, under applicable prin-
ciples of substantive law, entitle[s] him to a judgment as
a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict
standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a
showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that
excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine
issue of material fact. . . . As the burden of proof is on
the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the opponent. . . . When documents
submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment
fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit
documents establishing the existence of such an issue. . .
. Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the
opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates
the existence of some disputed factual issue.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Fiano v. Old Saybrook Fire
Co. No. 1, Inc., 332 Conn. 93, 101, 209 A.3d 629 (2019).
Whether the trial court properly rendered summary judg-
ment is a question of law subject to our plenary review.
See Nash Street, LLC v. Main Street America Assurance
Co., 337 Conn. 1, 8, 251 A.3d 600 (2020).
“Our standard of review for interpreting insurance
policies is [also] well settled. The construction of an insur-
ance policy presents a question of law that we review de
novo. . . . When construing an insurance policy, we look at
the [policy] as a whole, consider all relevant portions
together and, if possible, give operative effect to every
provision in order to reach a reasonable overall result. . . .
Insurance policies are interpreted based on the same
rules that govern the interpretation of contracts. . . .
In accordance with those rules, [t]he determinative
are not recoverable in a motor vehicle diminished value claim”). The
propriety of the court’s decision to render summary judgment in favor
of the plaintiff on that claim is not at issue in this appeal.
Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

question is the intent of the parties . . . . If the terms of
the policy are clear and unambiguous, then the language,
from which the intention of the parties is to be deduced,
must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning. . . .
In determining whether the terms of an insurance policy
are clear and unambiguous, [a] court will not torture
words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning
leaves no room for ambiguity . . . . Similarly, any ambigu-
ity in a contract must emanate from the language used
in the contract rather than from one party’s subjective
perception of the terms. . . . As with contracts generally,
a provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous when it
is reasonably susceptible to more than one reading. . . .
Under those circumstances, any ambiguity in the terms
of an insurance policy must be construed in favor of the
insured . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stew-
art v. Old Republic National Title Ins. Co., 218 Conn.
App. 226, 239–40, 291 A.3d 1051 (2023).
“The duty to defend does not depend on whether the
injured party will successfully maintain a cause of action
against the insured but on whether [the complaint] stated
facts which bring the injury within the coverage. . . . If
an allegation of the complaint falls even possibly within
the coverage, then the insurance company must defend
the insured. . . . That being said, an insurer has a duty
to defend only if the underlying complaint reasonably
alleges an injury that is covered by the policy. . . . [W]e
will not predicate the duty to defend on a reading of
the complaint that is . . . conceivable but tortured and
unreasonable. . . . There is also no duty to defend if the
complaint alleges a liability which the policy does not
cover . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 240.
“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment on a
claim for breach of the duty to defend, an insurer must
establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact
either that no allegation of the underlying complaint
falls even possibly within the scope of the insuring agree-
ment or, even if it might, that any claim based on such an
Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

allegation is excluded from coverage under an applicable
policy exclusion.”6 (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 241.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improp-
erly concluded that Jasmin’s claim for diminution of
value damages in the negligence action possibly fell
within the scope of the policy. We do not agree.
“[T]he question of whether an insurer has a duty to
defend its insured is purely a question of law, which is
to be determined by comparing the allegations of [the]
complaint with the terms of the insurance policy.” (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Misiti, LLC v. Travelers
Property Casualty Co. of America, 308 Conn. 146, 154,
61 A.3d 485 (2013); see also Stewart v. Old Republic
National Title Ins. Co., supra, 218 Conn. App. 255 n.9
(“when determining an insurer’s duty to defend, we must
look to the allegations within the complaint made by a
third party against the insured” (emphasis in original)).
We begin, therefore, with a review of the relevant allega-
tions contained in the negligence complaint.
In her complaint, Jasmin alleged that her vehicle
“sustained collision damage” due to the negligence of
Douglas. More specifically, she alleged that her vehicle
“was damaged so as to require the expense of a consider-
able sum to repair it.” Jasmin further alleged that she
“suffered a diminution in value to her vehicle and under
Connecticut law is entitled to compensation for such.”
With those allegations in mind, we turn to the relevant
provisions of the policy. Part A concerns coverage for
damages sustained by a third party in an automobile
accident for which an insured is liable. It provides in rel-
evant part: “We will pay for damages for bodily injury or
property damage for which any insured becomes legally
responsible because of an auto accident. . . . We will
settle or defend, as we consider appropriate, any claim
or suit asking for these damages. . . . We have no duty to
6
At no time has the plaintiff claimed that a policy exclusion applies
to the coverage issue in this case.
Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

defend any suit or settle any claim for bodily injury or
property damage not covered under this policy.” (Empha-
sis in original.) The policy defines “property damage”
as “physical injury to, destruction of or loss of use of
tangible property.” The policy does not define the term
“destruction.”
Connecticut courts have long recognized that destruc-
tion can be total or partial in nature. See, e.g., State v.
Anonymous, 240 Conn. 708, 711, 694 A.2d 766 (1997)
(noting “the total or partial destruction of several school
buses”); Kroop v. Kroop, 186 Conn. 211, 215, 440 A.2d
293 (1982) (house was “partially destroyed by fire”);
Thomas v. Roper, 162 Conn. 343, 347, 294 A.2d 321
(1972) (discussing statute applicable when building
“is wholly or partially destroyed by fire, water, or by
a mob” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Delinks
v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 85
Conn. 102, 104, 81 A. 1036 (1911) (collision caused
“partial destruction” of vehicle); Mata v. Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles, Superior Court, judicial district of
New Britain, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (June 7,
2022) (stone wall “was partially destroyed” by motor
vehicle), aff’d, 221 Conn. App. 25, 299 A.3d 1262 (2023).
That is not a novel proposition. As the Supreme Court
of Mississippi observed almost one century ago, “[t]he
wreck of an automobile may mean either a total or par-
tial destruction thereof . . . .” National Casualty Co. v.
Mitchell, 162 Miss. 197, 203, 138 So. 808 (1932); see
also Republic/NFR & C Parking of Louisville v. Regional
Airport Authority of Louisville & Jefferson County, 410
F.3d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[d]estruction does not
have to be total”); Ins. Co. of North America v. Atlantic
National Ins. Co., 329 F.2d 769, 779 (4th Cir. 1964)
(“the loss involved . . . the partial destruction of the
automobile”); American Service Center Associates v.
Helton, 867 A.2d 235, 240 (D.C. App. 2005) (discussing
damages in “cases concerning partial destruction to an
automobile”); Mareci v. General Motors, 90 Ill. App.
3d 335, 340, 413 N.E.2d 34 (1980) (“as a result of the
collision the automobile was thrown off the road and
Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

partially destroyed”); Mochel v. Iowa State Traveling
Men’s Assn., 203 Iowa 623, 627, 213 N.W. 259 (1927)
(“The word ‘wreck’ means one of two things: Either (1) a
total or (2) a partial destruction of the thing wrecked. The
damage or destruction is simply a matter of degree.”);
Fred Frederick Motors, Inc. v. Krause, 12 Md. App. 62,
64–65, 277 A.2d 464 (1971) (comparing plaintiff’s recov-
ery “[i]f the vehicle were partially destroyed” to “[i]f the
car were completely destroyed”); Barber v. McAdoo, 110
A. 119, 119 (N.J. 1919) (“[t]he plaintiff in this case sues
to recover compensation for the partial destruction of
his automobile which was wrecked in a collision”); Lusty
v. Ostlie, 71 N.W.2d 753, 755 (N.D. 1955) (“[p]laintiff
brings this action to recover damages for the partial
destruction of his automobile in a collision with a car
owned by the defendant”); Rakich v. Anthem Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 172 Ohio App. 3d 523, 531, 875 N.E.2d
993 (2007) (discussing damages “for partial destruction
of a vehicle”); Mondragon v. Austin, 954 S.W.2d 191,
196 (Tex. App. 1997) (distinguishing “partial destruc-
tion” cases from “total destruction cases”).
In the present case, it is undisputed that Jasmin’s
vehicle required repair following the September 23,
2021 collision, as alleged in the negligence complaint.
As this court has noted, the term “repair” is defined as
“[t]o mend, remedy, restore, renovate. To restore to a
sound or good state after decay, injury, dilapidation, or
partial destruction. . . . The word repair contemplates an
existing structure or thing which has become imperfect,
and means to supply in the original existing structure
that which is lost or destroyed . . . .” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc. v.
Jacobs, 64 Conn. App. 15, 19 n.4, 779 A.2d 222, cert.
denied, 258 Conn. 916, 782 A.2d 1254 (2001). A vehicle
that requires repair following a collision necessarily is one
that has been partially destroyed. We therefore conclude
that “destruction,” as that term is used in the definition
of property damage set forth in the policy, encompasses
both total and partial destruction of tangible property.
Accordingly, part A of the policy obligates the plaintiff
Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

to pay damages for both total and partial destruction of a
motor vehicle for which its insured is legally responsible
following an automobile accident.
Under Connecticut law, those damages may include
costs to repair a motor vehicle and costs related to the
diminution of its value. As our Supreme Court explained
decades ago, “[o]ur rule is that when the injury is less
than a complete loss . . . the measure of damages is the
difference in value between the property before and
after the loss, with interest from date of loss.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Littlejohn v. Elionsky, 130
Conn. 541, 543, 36 A.2d 52 (1944). Such diminution in
value damages are appropriate because a vehicle “may be
badly damaged and be repaired so as to put it in a sound
or good state, and yet be worth much less than before
the collision.” Id.; see also Orlando v. Liburd, 353 Conn.
845, 867, 348 A.3d 430 (2026) (“our case law clearly
establishes that a plaintiff has a right to recover for . . .
diminution in property value, even if his vehicle has been
repaired”); Hammarlund v. Troiano, 146 Conn. 470,
473, 152 A.2d 314 (1959) (concluding that trial court
properly awarded plaintiff damages for diminution in
value to vehicle “as a result of the collision”); Damico
v. Dalton, 1 Conn. App. 186, 187, 469 A.2d 795 (1984)
(“[i]n the present case, there can be no doubt that the
measure of damages to the defendant’s automobile was
the difference between its value immediately prior to the
collision and its value immediately thereafter”). When
repairs fall short of putting a vehicle “in substantially
the same condition as before the collision,” leaving the
vehicle partially destroyed, diminution in value dam-
ages are warranted. Littlejohn v. Elionsky, supra, 543.
That precept is consonant with the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, which provides in relevant part: “When
one is entitled to a judgment for harm to chattels not
amounting to a total destruction in value, the damages
include compensation for . . . the difference between the
value of the chattel before the harm and the value after
the harm or, at his election in an appropriate case, the
Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

reasonable cost of repair or restoration, with due allow-
ance for any difference between the original value and
the value after repairs . . . .” 4 Restatement (Second),
Torts § 928, p. 543 (1979); see also 1 D. Dobbs, Law of
Remedies (2d Ed. 1993) § 5.13 (1), p. 838 (“[i]f the chat-
tel is only damaged, the plaintiff may be permitted to
recover the reasonable costs of repairs plus any remain-
ing diminution in value”). It therefore is not surprising
that the proposition articulated by our Supreme Court
in Littlejohn is familiar to other jurisdictions.7
The Superior Court of this state repeatedly has held
that a plaintiff may recover diminution in value damages
7
See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona v. R.B.L. Investment Co.,
138 Ariz. 562, 564, 675 P.2d 1381 (App. 1983) (“[j]urisdictions that
have addressed the issue . . . have generally held that the measure of
compensation to the owner of a negligently damaged motor vehicle may
include the cost of repair and proven residual diminution in fair market
value”); MFA Ins. Co. v. Citizens National Bank of Hope, 260 Ark.
849, 851, 545 S.W.2d 70 (1977) (“[w]here the repairs by the insurer
under a collision policy did not substantially restore the automobile to
its former condition and value, the proper measure of damages was the
difference in the value before it was wrecked and the value after it was
wrecked, repaired, and tendered to the insured” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); American Service Center Associates v. Helton, supra,
867 A.2d 243 (“[w]e . . . hold that when a plaintiff can prove that the
value of an injured chattel after repair is less than the chattel’s worth
before the injury, recovery may be had for both the reasonable cost of
repair and the residual diminution in value after repair”); Halferty v.
Hawkeye Dodge, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Iowa 1968) (“if the value
of the repaired or restored property is less than the value of the property
before the injury, such difference in value is also allowed, in addition
to the reasonable cost of repair or restoration” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Broadie v. Randall, 114 Kan. 92, 94, 216 P. 1103
(1923) (“where the repair of an injury did not restore the property to
its original condition and value, but was a reasonable effort to make it
as nearly usable as practicable, and as repaired was not as valuable as
it was before the injury, the cost of the repair together with the dif-
ference in value of the repaired property and its value before injury
[can] be a fair measure of the loss sustained”); Smith v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 435, 437 (La. App. 1977) (“if the vehicle
is not totally destroyed the measure of damages is the cost of repair
plus diminution in value resulting from the accident”), aff’d, 358 So.
2d 1289 (La. 1978); Fred Frederick Motors, Inc. v. Krause, supra, 12
Md. App. 64 (“[A] recovery of the full market value is allowed if the
vehicle is completely destroyed. Although the measure is different,
Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

following repairs to a vehicle involved in an accident. See,
e.g., Spillane v. Kondash, Superior Court, judicial dis-
trict of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S
(March 18, 2020) (“[i]t is well settled in Connecticut that
an individual can bring an action for the diminished value
of his or her vehicle after an accident”); Rigakos v. O’Neill,
Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk,
the position to which the injured party should be restored is the same,
i.e., complete compensation for the injury. If the vehicle is completely
destroyed, the plaintiff receives the market value. To be consistent, the
plaintiff should be put in the same position when his injured vehicle
is repairable; he should have a vehicle of the same market value. If the
repaired vehicle does not have the same market value, the plaintiff should
receive additional damages. To do otherwise would put the plaintiff in
a different position depending on whether the vehicle was partially or
completely destroyed.”); Franklin Corp. v. Prahler, 91 App. Div. 3d 49,
56, 932 N.Y.S.2d 610 (2011) (“[t]he weight of authority supports our
conclusion that [the] plaintiff is entitled to a charge that it may recover
the diminution in value of the vehicle” following automobile accident);
Brennen v. Aston, 84 P.3d 99, 102 (Okla. 2003) (noting that “almost all
jurisdictions which have examined the issue allow recovery for the cost
of repairs made plus the diminution in value of the personal property
upon a proper showing” and concluding that “the overwhelming weight
of legal authority supports the rule that damages are not limited to the
cost of repairs actually made where it is shown that repairs failed to
bring the property up to the condition it was in prior to the damage”);
Newman v. Brown, 228 S.C. 472, 477, 90 S.E.2d 649 (1955) (“[t]he
damages are not limited to the cost of repairs actually made . . . where
it is shown that they did not . . . put the property in as good [a] condi-
tion as it was before the injury” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Senter v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co., 702 S.W.2d 175, 178
(Tenn. App. 1985) (if repairs made to vehicle “restore function and
appearance but not fair market value,” insured is entitled to recover
difference between its fair market value immediately before accident and
immediately after “all repairs [have] been completed”), appeal denied,
Tennessee Supreme Court (December 30, 1985); Averett v. Shircliff, 218
Va. 202, 207, 237 S.E.2d 92 (1977) (“[m]ost jurisdictions . . . have held
that where an automobile has been damaged but not totally destroyed
and it is reasonably susceptible of repairs, the measure of damages is
the cost of repairs and any diminution of the automobile’s market value
which results from the car having been injured after the repairs; that
is, the cost of repairs plus any amount of depreciation in value of the
vehicle as repaired”); Ellis v. King, 184 W. Va. 227, 230, 400 S.E.2d 235
(1990) (“[i]f, after repair, the damaged vehicle cannot be returned to its
condition prior to the accident, we believe that damages for diminution
in value are recoverable”).
Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (September 11, 2017)
(awarding plaintiff damages “for diminution in value
of [her] vehicle as a result of the repairs”); Muckle v.
Pressley, Superior Court, judicial district of Middle-
sex, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (March 30, 2017)
(64 Conn. L. Rptr. 188, 188) (court concluded that “the
plaintiff is entitled to damages for the diminished value
of his vehicle, after its repair”), aff’d, 185 Conn. App.
488, 197 A.3d 437 (2018); Bartnik v. Stehr, Superior
Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-13-
6019999 (September 2, 2014) (58 Conn. L. Rptr. 884,
885) (“[r]ecovery for diminished value [following repairs
to a vehicle] long [has] been permitted under Connecticut
law”). That precedent provides further support for the
trial court’s conclusion that Jasmin’s claim for diminu-
tion in value damages possibly fell within the scope of
the policy.
In addition, we note that an endorsement8 to another
part of the policy contains a definition of the term “dimi-
nution in value,” which states: “ ‘Diminution in value’
means the actual or perceived loss in market or resale
value which results from a direct and accidental loss.”
(Emphasis omitted.) The policy nevertheless does not spe-
cifically disclaim coverage for diminution in value dam-
ages in part A, as it does in other sections. For example,
part D concerns coverage for damage to an insured’s vehi-
cle and provides in relevant part that the plaintiff “will
pay for direct and accidental loss to your covered auto or
any non-owned auto, including their equipment, minus
8
An endorsement “is a writing added or attached to a policy or cer-
tificate of insurance which expands or restricts its benefits or excludes
certain conditions from coverage. . . . When properly incorporated into
the policy, the policy and the . . . endorsement together constitute the
contract of insurance, and are to be read together to determine the
contract actually intended by the parties.” (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) National Grange Mutual Ins. Co. v. San-
taniello, 290 Conn. 81, 93, 961 A.2d 387 (2009); see also Schultz v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 213 Conn. 696, 705, 569 A.2d 1131 (1990) (“[i]n
construing an endorsement to an insurance policy, the endorsement
and policy must be read together, and the policy remains in full force
and effect except as altered by the words of the endorsement” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

any applicable deductible . . . .” (Emphasis in original.)
Part D of the policy then explicitly excludes diminution in
value damages from the coverage provided to an insured.9
If the plaintiff intended to exclude diminution in value
damages from the coverage provided to an insured in part
A of the policy, it could have included such an exclusion,
as it did in part D.10 See, e.g., P.I. & I. Motor Express,
Inc. v. RLI Ins. Co., 40 F.4th 398, 408 (6th Cir. 2022)
(“a different part of the policy shows that [the insurer]
knows how to exclude” coverage for particular liability);
Silverball Amusement, Inc. v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co.,
842 F. Supp. 1151, 1159 (W.D. Ark.) (“[i]f there is an
exclusion in one section but not in another, the court
cannot rewrite the contract to place exclusions in both
sections, especially when the insurance company could
have easily done so when it drafted the policy”), aff’d,
33 F.3d 1476 (8th Cir. 1994); FLM, LLC v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., 24 N.E.3d 444, 457 (Ind. App. 2014) (“[w]hen
an insurer knows how to add limiting language but fails
to do so, it is reasonable to adopt a construction in favor
of coverage”); Hanneman v. Continental Western Ins.
Co., 575 N.W.2d 445, 450 (N.D. 1998) (“a limitation
in one section of an insurance policy and the absence
of similar limiting language in another section shows
the insurer intended to limit in one section but not in
another”). The plaintiff’s decision to include a diminution
in value exclusion in part D, but not part A, of the policy
9
The pertinent exclusion to part D of the policy provides: “We will
not pay for: Loss to your covered auto or any non-owned auto due to
diminution in value.” (Emphasis in original.)
10
As the trial court noted in its memorandum of decision, an exclu-
sion disclaiming liability for diminution in value damages “may not
pass muster” under § 38a-334-5 (a) of the Regulations of Connecticut
State Agencies, which obligates insurers in this state “to pay on behalf
of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated
to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused
by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a
motor vehicle owned or long-term leased by the named insured.” See
Safeco Ins. Cos. v. Vetre, 174 Conn. 329, 333, 387 A.2d 539 (1978)
(“any provisions of a private contract of insurance which conflict with
the statutes or regulations must give way to the latter”). Whether such
diminution in value exclusions run afoul of that requirement is an issue
we need not resolve in this case.
Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

provides additional support for the court’s conclusion
that Jasmin’s diminution in value claim potentially fell
within the scope of the policy.
In its principal appellate brief, the plaintiff posits that
diminished value “cannot be considered” destruction of
tangible property. The plaintiff has not provided any
legal authority or analysis to support that bald asser-
tion. As previously noted, although the policy defines
“property damage” as “physical injury to, destruction of
or loss of use of tangible property,” it does not define the
term “destruction.” It therefore is appropriate to turn
to definitions found in dictionaries to determine “the
common, natural, and ordinary meaning of an undefined
term” in the policy. New London County Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Zachem, 145 Conn. App. 160, 166, 74 A.3d 525
(2013). Destruction is defined in part as “[h]arm that
substantially detracts from the value of property, esp.
personal property.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed.
2009) p. 513; see also United States v. Yazzie, Docket No.
CR-10-2460 JB, 2011 WL 5223035, *5 (D.N.M. Octo-
ber 17, 2011) (noting that “[t]he New Oxford American
Dictionary defines ‘destruction’ as ‘the action or process
of causing so much damage to something that it . . . can-
not be repaired’ ”). When a court awards diminution in
value damages following the repair of a vehicle, it does
so because the vehicle is not “in substantially the same
condition as before the collision.” Littlejohn v. Elionsky,
supra, 130 Conn. 543; see footnote 7 of this opinion. In
cases where, “after repair, the damaged vehicle cannot
be returned to its condition prior to the accident”; Ellis
v. King, 184 W. Va. 227, 230, 400 S.E.2d 235 (1990);
the vehicle necessarily has sustained partial destruction
in some respect. See, e.g., Bowman Steel Corp. v. Lum-
bermens Mutual Casualty Co., 364 F.2d 246, 250 n.8
(3d Cir. 1966) (“diminution in market value is evidence
of damage”); Rossier v. Union Automobile Ins. Co., 134
Or. 211, 215–16, 291 P. 498 (1930) (“[i]t cannot be said
that there has been a complete restoration of the property
unless it can be said that there has been no diminution of
value after repair of the car”). We therefore reject the
Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran

plaintiff’s contention that diminution in value to a motor
vehicle cannot constitute destruction of tangible prop-
erty, as that terminology is used in part A of the policy.
As our Supreme Court has explained, “[a]n insurer’s
duty to defend is triggered if at least one allegation of
the complaint falls even possibly within the coverage.”
(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Capstone Building Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co.,
308 Conn. 760, 805, 67 A.3d 961 (2013). Accordingly, we
need not definitively decide whether the policy provides
coverage to Jasmin’s diminution in value claim. Rather,
our task is to determine whether there is a reasonable
basis to conclude that Jasmin’s diminution in value claim
possibly falls within the coverage provided by the policy.
We conclude that such a basis exists in this case, which
triggered the plaintiff’s duty to defend Douglas in the
negligence action. The court, therefore, properly granted
in part the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.