Zheng v. Xia

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Zheng v. Xia

ZHE ZHENG v. FEIFEI XIA
(AC 47991)
Moll, Seeley and Flynn, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dissolved,
appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying her postjudgment motion
for modification of child support, in which she sought a court order requir-
ing the plaintiff to pay 100 percent of their minor child’s private school
tuition fees and costs. She claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in not
finding the existence of a substantial change in circumstances warranting
a modification. Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion
for modification, as the court’s finding of no substantial change in circum-
stance was not clearly erroneous, the defendant having failed to provide the
court with evidence demonstrating that circumstances had changed since
a previous court order denying her request for the plaintiff to contribute
toward the cost of private school education for their child.

The defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to give proper weight to
the parties’ shared history of prioritizing elite, tuition based education was
unavailing, as it was not the province of this court to reweigh the evidence
before the trial court or to substitute its judgment in the matter.

The defendant’s claims that the trial court improperly failed to find the
plaintiff in violation of his obligation to meet with a parenting coordinator
to resolve disputes regarding educational matters and that the court failed
to consider the regular school field trip costs for the child were also unavail-
ing, as a motion for modification was not the proper procedural vehicle for
the defendant to bring these claims.

Argued September 8, 2025—officially released January 20, 2026

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Stamford-Norwalk, and tried to the court, Hon.
Stanley Novack, judge trial referee; judgment dissolving
the parties’ marriage and granting certain other relief
in accordance with the parties’ separation agreement;
thereafter, the court, Regan, J., denied the defendant’s
Zheng v. Xia

postjudgment motion for modification of child support,
and the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Feifei Xia, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
Zhe Zheng, self-represented, the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The self-represented defendant, Feifei
Xia, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying
her postjudgment motion for a modification of the child
support obligation of the self-represented plaintiff, Zhe
Zheng, in which the defendant sought an order requiring
the plaintiff to pay for the private school tuition and fees
of the parties’ minor son (child). On appeal, the defen-
dant claims that the court improperly failed (1) to find
the existence of a substantial change in circumstances
warranting a modification, (2) “to give proper weight to
the parties’ shared history of prioritizing elite, tuition
based education,” (3) to find the plaintiff in violation of
his legal obligation to meet with a parenting coordinator
to resolve disputes regarding educational matters per-
taining to the child, and (4) to consider the regular school
field trip costs for the child. We disagree and affirm the
judgment of the court.
The following facts and procedural history, as dis-
closed by the record and as set forth by this court in a
prior appeal involving the parties, are relevant to our
resolution of the defendant’s appeal. The plaintiff and
the defendant are originally from China. After they pur-
sued master’s degrees in the United States, they “were
married in Stamford on March 28, 2010. Their only child
was born in September, 2011. On January 26, 2012, the
plaintiff commenced an action for dissolution of marriage
on the basis of irretrievable breakdown. At the time the
action was commenced, the plaintiff was employed as
a hedge fund analyst, and the defendant was a law stu-
dent. The parties entered into a separation agreement
[in July, 2013] that included a detailed parenting plan,
which the trial court, Hon. Stanley Novak, judge trial
Zheng v. Xia

referee, incorporated into the uncontested judgment
of dissolution rendered on July 23, 2013. Pursuant to
the agreement, the parties share joint legal custody of
their child, who is in the primary physical custody of the
defendant.” Zheng v. Xia, 204 Conn. App. 302, 303–304,
253 A.3d 69 (2021). Although the agreement contains a
provision regarding educational support orders for the
child’s undergraduate college educational expenses,1 it
contains no provision concerning the child’s kindergarten
through grade twelve education. Paragraph 2.7 of the
agreement provides: “By agreeing to joint legal custody
of the minor child, the parties agree that they shall confer
in advance with each other on all decisions pertaining to
the child’s health, welfare, education and religion, with a
view toward arriving at a harmonious policy calculated to
promote the child’s best interest. As such, neither party
shall unilaterally arrive at any decisions as to any issues
pertaining to the child’s health (including medical and
dental treatments, and procedures), welfare, education
and religion.” The agreement further requires the par-
ties to utilize the services of “a parenting coordinator for
all issues relating to the parenting of the minor child.”
“Judge Novak, pursuant to the separation agreement,
ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant unallocated
alimony and child support in the amount of $1600 per
month until August 2, 2014. On May 13, 2015, the court,
Tindill, J., ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant
$161 per week in child support. Since that time, the
1
Article VI, paragraph 6.1, of the agreement provides in relevant
part: “In accordance with . . . General Statutes § 46b-56c, the parties
acknowledge that had they remained an intact family, they would have
paid for their child’s undergraduate college educational expenses to
the best of their abilities. In the event that the parties are unable to
agree in the future as to the allocation of the undergraduate college
educational expenses, either party may file a motion for a determina-
tion of such allocation in the Superior Court pursuant to . . . § 46b-56c,
and the parties hereby agree that the [c]ourt has jurisdiction to enter
orders accordingly.” Paragraph 6.2 of the agreement further provides:
“Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, neither
the [p]laintiff nor the [d]efendant shall be responsible for the payment
of the child’s undergraduate college educational expenses incurred past
the child’s [twenty-third] birthday.”
Zheng v. Xia

parties have filed numerous motions for orders of con-
tempt and motions to modify child support.” Zheng v.
Xia, supra, 304.
In 2014, the plaintiff remarried. The plaintiff has a
daughter with his current wife and two stepchildren
from his wife’s prior marriage. They currently reside in
New Jersey. On May 1, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion
for contempt with respect to the issue of the child’s
elementary school education, asserting that the defen-
dant had violated the separation agreement by making
a uniliteral decision regarding the child’s education at a
private school. Specifically, the defendant had enrolled
the child in prekindergarten at Waterside School, a pri-
vate elementary school in Stamford for students from
prekindergarten to fifth grade. Thereafter, on June
29, 2017, the defendant filed a motion for modifica-
tion requesting a court order requiring the plaintiff
to contribute to the cost of the child’s attendance and
extracurricular activity expenses at Waterside School.
On December 6, 2017, the parties appeared before the
court, Heller, J., for a hearing on the plaintiff’s motion
for contempt. At that hearing, the plaintiff testified that
he did not agree with the defendant to have the child
attend private school and was unaware of the defendant’s
plan to send the child to Waterside School until August,
2016, when he received a package in the mail concerning
the child’s enrollment information. In a memorandum
of decision dated April 4, 2018, the court found the
defendant in contempt, concluding that she wilfully
had violated the provision of the separation agreement
precluding the parties from making unilateral decisions
regarding, inter alia, the child’s education by enrolling
the child in Waterside School without conferring with
the plaintiff in advance. The court ordered the defen-
dant not to enroll the child, who was in kindergarten at
Waterside School at that time, “in elementary school
for the 2018–19 academic year without conferring in
advance with the plaintiff pursuant to paragraph 2.7
of the July, 2013 separation agreement,” and for the
Zheng v. Xia

parties to consult with a parenting coordinator if they
were unable to agree on the elementary school that would
be best for the child.
On April 22, 2018, the plaintiff sent an email to the
defendant in which he stated: “First, I make it clear that
I do not prefer private schools, including Waterside
[S]chool, for [the child] . . . [who] is starting elemen-
tary education a year later than kids of [the] same age
that go to public schools. It is only because Waterside
[S]chool has [a] different age cutoff for enrollment. In
order to keep [the child’s] school continuity, which is
actually the only reason, I will compromise to let his
education remain at Waterside School. It also provides
you convenience. Because you made this school decision
unilaterally more than two years ago and did not com-
municate with me until recently, you should continue to
be responsible for all the expense[s] incurred from this
school. As [the child’s] elementary study is delayed by
one year, he is also expected to graduate from high school
a year later. I will agree to pay child support until the
child’s [eighteenth] year . . . only.” In light of this email,
the parties, in effect, reached an agreement about the
place of the child’s elementary school education but not
as to whom would bear the cost, and the child continued
to attend Waterside School for most of his elementary
school education.
On the issue of payment for that education, the court,
Heller, J., held a hearing on the defendant’s June 29,
2017 motion for modification, at which it heard testi-
mony from the parties, admitted exhibits into evidence,
and took judicial notice of the contents of the court file.
On June 29, 2018, the court denied the motion (2018
order), citing Hardisty v. Hardisty, 183 Conn. 253,
439 A.2d 307 (1981),2 as being controlling precedent
2
In Hardisty, our Supreme Court held that “courts have the power to
direct one or both parents to pay for private schooling, if the circum-
stances warrant. It is a matter to be determined in the sound discretion
of the court on consideration of the totality of the circumstances includ-
ing the financial ability of the parties, the availability of public schools,
the schools attended by the children prior to the divorce and the special
Zheng v. Xia

and stating: “The court will not order the plaintiff to
contribute to [the child’s] private school education where
there is no family tradition of attending private school,
there is no evidence that the local Stamford schools
are inadequate or unsuitable for [the child], the plain-
tiff’s stepchildren attend public school, the defendant
enrolled [the child] in . . . Waterside School without the
plaintiff’s consent, and the plaintiff is opposed to [the
child’s] attending private school.”3 No appeal was taken
from Judge Heller’s decision.
On August 31, 2022, the defendant sent the plaintiff
an email concerning “some unexpected changes [for the
child’s] school education for 2022–23.” In the email, she
explained that their child had applied to private middle
schools but was the only child from Waterside School
not to be accepted anywhere. As a result, she explained
that the child’s feelings were “severely hurt,” that he
was “very upset,” and that, after careful consideration,
the child would not be returning to Waterside School
for fifth grade during the 2022–23 academic year and,
instead, would be attending public school in Stamford.
needs and general welfare of the children.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Hardisty v. Hardisty, supra, 183 Conn. 262.
3
With respect to the cost of extracurricular activities, the court noted
that the parties’ separation agreement, which was executed when the
child was twenty-one months old, “provided that until the defendant
obtained employment, the plaintiff would be responsible for 80 percent of
the cost of [the child’s] extracurricular activities, up to a total contribu-
tion of $1200 per calendar year, and the defendant would be responsible
for 20 percent. . . . Nothing in the July, 2013 separation agreement
addressed how the cost of [the child’s] extracurricular activities was to
be divided after the defendant became employed.” After noting that the
defendant at that time was employed, the court found that there had
been “a substantial change in the financial circumstances of the parties
since the orders allocating responsibility for the cost of [the child’s]
extracurricular activities was entered. Modification of the orders pur-
suant to General Statutes § 46b-86 is warranted, although not to the
extent sought by the defendant. The court finds that it is in [the child’s]
best interest that both of the parties . . . contribute to the cost of his
extracurricular activities.” Accordingly, the court ordered the parties
to share in those costs, with the plaintiff paying 80 percent of agreed
upon extracurricular activities and the defendant paying 20 percent
of the cost, with “no cap on the amount that either party shall pay.”
Zheng v. Xia

The defendant explained further that the child planned
to reapply to private middle schools for the 2023–24 aca-
demic year. The plaintiff contends in his appellate brief
that the defendant, again, made this decision regarding
the child’s education unilaterally, in violation of the
separation agreement.
On February 15, 2023, the defendant sent the plaintiff
an email stating that the child was in fifth grade and
that the issue of his middle school education needed to be
resolved. The plaintiff replied in an email stating that,
as they had discussed with a family coordinator, he still
had the same position that the child should attend public
school, but that if the defendant wanted and was “able to
solely afford the financial responsibility of private school,
[she was] free to do so.” Subsequently, in an email dated
May 24, 2023, the defendant notified the plaintiff that
the child would be attending middle school at Whitby
School, a private school in Greenwich.
On August 21, 2023, the defendant filed the operative
motion for modification that is the subject of this appeal
(operative motion for modification). In her operative
motion for modification, she sought a modification of
the 2018 order denying her request to have the plaintiff
contribute toward the cost of private school education for
their child. Specifically, she sought a court order requir-
ing the plaintiff to pay 100 percent of their child’s private
school tuition fees and costs. In support of this request,
she contended that the circumstances had changed in
that the plaintiff had recognized the importance of the
child’s continuity with private school education when he
agreed to the child’s attendance at Waterside School and
to allowing the child to attend a private middle school,
so long as the defendant bore the financial responsibil-
ity of private school. The defendant also distinguished
Hardisty as factually inapposite to the present case and
argued that there was a family tradition of attending
private schools. Finally, she asserted that the plaintiff
had refused to discuss with her alternative options of a
comparable public middle school for the child and that
Zheng v. Xia

she complied with the parties’ separation agreement
by providing the plaintiff with abundant notice of her
desire and intention to send the child to private middle
school via numerous emails exchanged between the par-
ties discussing the issue. The defendant asserted that
“the [evidence] clearly show[s] that none of the children
from [the plaintiff’s] household has ever enrolled into
a public school as similar as Stamford Public School[s].
[The plaintiff’s] decision to force [their child] to go to the
local public school is not for the best interest of [their
child] . . . but will only hurt [the child’s] interest and
destroy his future. Even though later on [the plaintiff]
agreed with [the child’s] continuity of private schooling
for secondary school education, his avoiding financial
responsibility to [the child’s] education is unreasonable
and illegal, and his refusing to consult with a family
coordinator to resolve the issues has violated Judge
Heller’s [2018 order].”
The court, Regan, J., held a hearing on the defendant’s
operative motion for modification over the course of
two days on July 23 and August 29, 2024.4 During that
hearing, both parties appeared in a self-represented
capacity and were sworn in. The court admitted a number
4
The record shows that, on July 15, 2024, the defendant filed a supple-
mental memorandum in support of her operative motion for modification,
in which she made various assertions regarding the precollege and college
education that she and the plaintiff had received in China, including that
the plaintiff was “the product of elite schools that were established as
private institutions in China . . . .” She further asserted that the plaintiff
should have anticipated that the child would continue his education at
a private school following his private education at Waterside School,
that Stamford public schools fail to the meet the academic needs of the
child, as demonstrated by the child’s time attending public school in fifth
grade, and that the plaintiff had refused to contribute to any expenses
involving the child’s schooling and extracurricular activities. This
memorandum was filed just prior to the commencement of the hearing
on the defendant’s operative motion for modification, and the record
is unclear as to whether the court was aware of it. Nevertheless, the
assertions raised in the memorandum are similar to those raised in the
operative motion for modification and addressed during the hearing.
Zheng v. Xia

of exhibits into evidence.5 The parties’ positions at the
hearing can be summarized as follows.
The defendant asserted that there had been a substan-
tial change in circumstances since the 2018 order. In
particular, she stated in her opening remarks that the
plaintiff “does not oppose [sending the child] to private
school as long as he does not pay any tuition fee,” that
all of the children in the plaintiff’s household attend
“highly acclaimed” schools in New Jersey, and that the
plaintiff “was the product of elite schools” in China. The
defendant testified that the schools that the plaintiff’s
daughter and stepchildren attend in New Jersey are
not comparable to public schools in Stamford, in which
a majority of the students who attend do not meet the
minimum state standards for academics.6 In contrast,
she further testified that the parties’ child excels in
mathematics and that Whitby School offers an advanced
curriculum tailored to the personal needs of the students.
The defendant testified further that another reason why
the public schools in Stamford do not meet the child’s
5
We note that the parties submitted updated financial affidavits, which
the court admitted into evidence, although the focus of the hearing
was not on the parties’ finances. In her principal appellate brief, the
defendant contends that the financial circumstances of the parties have
changed significantly, necessitating a modification of the 2018 order.
The court made no findings concerning the financial circumstances of
the parties. Nonetheless, this factor alone, would not be sufficient to
warrant a modification to the 2018 order to require the plaintiff to pay
for private schooling for the child. See Hardisty v. Hardisty, supra,
183 Conn. 262; see also footnote 2 of this opinion.
6
In support of this contention, the defendant offered into evidence
as exhibits reports from a website concerning an educational grading
system of various schools, including the ones attended by the plaintiff’s
children, which had much higher scores than the Stamford public school
in the defendant’s assigned school district. She acknowledged, however,
that the school attended by the plaintiff’s daughter is a public school.
The court admitted the reports but stated that it was not admitting
them “as any official report,” and that it was reserving what probative
weight it would afford to the evidence. The parties also stipulated that
their child is a smart, intelligent boy.
Zheng v. Xia

needs is because they do not offer Mandarin Chinese
classes, and the child speaks Mandarin.7
The defendant offered into evidence a document con-
taining emails exchanged between the parties concern-
ing the issue of the child attending a private middle
school. She contended that the emails demonstrated
two things: first, that the plaintiff did not object to the
child attending private school, only to paying for it,
and second, that she adequately informed the plaintiff
regarding the decision for the child to attend a private
middle school. Although the plaintiff objected, making
clear his preference that the child attend public school,
the court admitted the evidence, stating that it would
review the document. During the course of the discus-
sion regarding the exhibit, the defendant acknowledged
that the child is currently enrolled in Whitby School on a
full merit scholarship, which covers tuition but excludes
fees. She asserted, nonetheless, that it was important
for her to file the motion for modification, as the child
was in seventh grade at that time and the following year
he would have to apply to private high schools because
Whitby School ends after eighth grade. Later in her tes-
timony, the defendant confirmed that the child planned
to attend private high school, stating, “That’s why I’m
here for this motion.”8 The court inquired further about
7
On February 20, 2025, the defendant filed a motion requesting that
this court take judicial notice that Millburn High School, a public high
school in Millburn Township, New Jersey, where the plaintiff resides,
offers courses in Mandarin Chinese. This court denied the motion on
April 30, 2025.
8
In light of this statement, it appears that the defendant, to some
extent, was seeking an order from the court requiring the plaintiff to
contribute toward the child’s future education at a private high school,
should he be accepted to one. Any such claim for an order requiring the
defendant to pay for the expenses of a private high school to which the
child has yet to be accepted was not ripe for adjudication by the court.
See Pelc v. Southington Dental Associates, P.C., 232 Conn. App. 393,
409, 337 A.3d 50 (“[T]he rationale behind the ripeness requirement
is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudica-
tion, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . . [I]n
determining whether a case is ripe, a [trial] court must be satisfied that
the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim
Zheng v. Xia

whether Whitby School had made a decision regarding
the child’s upcoming school year, after which the defen-
dant acknowledged that Whitby School, again, would
provide the child with a full merit scholarship covering
the $50,000 cost of tuition but that the field trip fees
were not covered. As a result, she was seeking to have
the defendant contribute to the $2700 in such fees.
With respect to the issue of a family history of private
school, the defendant testified about the parties’ educa-
tion at elite schools in China and asserted that her child
should receive comparable education. She offered into
evidence the Laws of the People’s Republic of China
regarding compulsory education, which she claimed
showed that high school and secondary education was
not free. The plaintiff objected on the ground that, from
elementary grade level to college, he had attended pub-
lic schools and never went to elite private schools, as
the defendant contended. The court, after question-
ing the relevance of the proffered evidence, admitted
the document. On cross-examination, the defendant
acknowledged that the plaintiff’s other child and two
stepchildren attend public school.
During the hearing, the plaintiff did not testify or offer
the introduction of any exhibits into evidence regard-
ing his side of the issue. Rather, through the various
objections he raised and the colloquies that ensued,9 and
through his closing remarks, he conveyed his position
that the child should attend public school and that he
had agreed to allow the child to stay in private school
as long as the defendant covered the cost so as not to
disrupt the child’s education, which was consistent with
the emails offered into evidence by the defendant. The
plaintiff argued that there had been no changes in cir-
cumstances since the 2018 order denying the defendant’s
request for the plaintiff to pay for private school for
contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never tran-
spire.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 352 Conn.
910, 336 A.3d 84 (2025).
9
As we stated previously in this opinion, the parties were placed under
oath at the commencement of the hearing.
Zheng v. Xia

the child and finding that there was no family tradition
of private school. Since the time of the 2018 order, his
other child and two stepchildren had attended public
school and continue to do so. The plaintiff also pointed
out that their child still lives in the same school zone
with respect to Stamford Public Schools, which Judge
Heller found in 2018 were not unfit for the child. Finally,
the plaintiff refuted the defendant’s contention that
they had a family history of attending private school,
and he explained to the court that the public schools in
New Jersey do not offer Mandarin Chinese classes and
that his children, instead, “take Sunday school for their
Mandarin study . . . .”
At the conclusion of the hearing on August 29, 2024,
the court denied the defendant’s operative motion for
modification, stating: “After viewing the exhibits and
listening to the testimony of the parties, I find that your
son . . . is obviously a very bright, young man who’s
applied himself, and whose dedicated mother has come
here today seeking an order that his father pay for a
private school. [The child] is currently an honor roll stu-
dent at . . . Whitby School and appears to be flourishing.
In reviewing the motion for modification, the largest
criteria the court needs to use is if there’s a substantial
change in circumstances, which would necessitate this
sort of a change. In so doing, the court reviewed the
[2018] decision and memorandum of decision by Judge
Heller. In . . . [Judge Heller’s] decision . . . of June 29,
2018, she cites the case of Hardisty v. Hardisty, which
appears at 183 Conn. [253] . . . . It’s a 1981 decision
where the Supreme Court of Connecticut found that it
was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to modify
an order to require [a] father to pay a child’s expenses at
a private secondary school. In the memorandum of deci-
sion of Judge Heller, she cites the Hardisty decision, and
I will quote her: ‘Hardisty is controlling here. The court
will not order the plaintiff to contribute to [the child’s]
private school education when there is no family tradi-
tion of attending private school, no evidence that the
local Stamford schools are inadequate or unsuitable for
Zheng v. Xia

[the child], and if the plaintiff is opposed to [the child’s]
attending private school.’
“In listening to the testimony of both parties, it seems
clear that the plaintiff—the plaintiff has made clear
that he is opposed to private education and believes very
strongly in public education; in fact . . . all of his chil-
dren . . . are enrolled in public education. Therefore, I
find that, there not being a substantial change in the
circumstances of either party, the court will deny the
motion for modification, and that’s the decision.” This
appeal followed.
We first set forth our standard of review and applicable
legal principles. “[General Statutes §] 46b-86 governs
the modification or termination of an alimony or support
order after the date of a dissolution judgment. When,
as in this case, the disputed issue is . . . [child support],
the applicable provision of the statute is § 46b-86 (a),
which provides that a final order for . . . [child support]
may be modified by the trial court upon a showing of a
substantial change in the circumstances of either party. .
. . Under that statutory provision, the party seeking the
modification bears the burden of demonstrating that such
a change has occurred. . . . To obtain a modification, the
moving party must demonstrate that circumstances have
changed since the last court order such that it would be
unjust or inequitable to hold either party to it. Because
the establishment of changed circumstances is a condi-
tion precedent to a party’s relief, it is pertinent for the
trial court to inquire as to what, if any, new circumstance
warrants a modification of the existing order.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Czunas v. Mancini, 226 Conn.
App. 256, 263, 317 A.3d 843 (2024). “[W]hen presented
with a motion for modification, a court must first deter-
mine whether there has been a substantial change in the
financial circumstances of one or both of the parties.
. . . Second, if the court finds a substantial change in
circumstances, it may properly consider the motion and
. . . make an order for modification.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Laffin v. Laffin, 231 Conn. App.
Zheng v. Xia

855, 860–61 n.5, 334 A.3d 565 (2025); see also Olson v.
Mohammadu, 310 Conn. 665, 673, 81 A.3d 215 (2013).
“[I]n determining the threshold inquiry of a substan-
tial change in circumstances, the trial court is limited to
considering events arising after the dissolution decree or
the most recent modification thereof. Olson v. Moham-
madu, [supra, 310 Conn. 675]; see also Borkowski v.
Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729, 737–38, 638 A.2d 1060
(1994) ([t]o obtain a modification, the moving party
must demonstrate that circumstances have changed
since the last court order such that it would be unjust
or inequitable to hold either party to it . . .).” (Emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Laffin v.
Laffin, supra, 231 Conn. App. 865.
“[W]e will not disturb the trial court’s ruling on a
motion for modification of . . . child support unless the
court has abused its discretion or reasonably could not
conclude as it did, on the basis of the facts presented. .
. . In determining whether a trial court has abused its
broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow
every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness
of its action. . . . To the extent that the trial court has
made findings of fact, our review is limited to decid-
ing whether such findings were clearly erroneous. . .
. Birkhold v. Birkhold, 343 Conn. 786, 808–809, 276
A.3d 414 (2022).” (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Lenczewski v. Lenczewski, 229
Conn. App. 752, 760, 328 A.3d 718 (2024). “A finding
of a substantial change in circumstances [or the lack of
a substantial change in circumstances] is subject to the
clearly erroneous standard of review. . . . A finding of
fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the
record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence
to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Czunas v. Mancini, supra, 226 Conn. App. 263.
We are also “mindful that [i]t is the established
policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of
Zheng v. Xia

[self-represented] litigants and when it does not interfere
with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of
practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party.
. . . Nonetheless, [a]lthough we allow [self-represented]
litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation
provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant
rules of procedural and substantive law.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628,
630, 273 A.3d 271 (2022). With these principles in mind,
we turn to the defendant’s claims on appeal.
The defendant first claims that the court improperly
failed to find the existence of a substantial change in
circumstances warranting a modification. We disagree
and conclude, for the following reasons, that the court’s
finding of no substantial change in circumstances was
not clearly erroneous.
First, we note that Judge Heller’s 2018 order was
based on her determination that Hardisty was control-
ling, and the trial court in the present case deferred to
that determination in reaching its decision to deny the
operative motion for modification. In Hardisty, our
Supreme Court addressed the issue of “whether a parent
may be compelled to provide private school education
for his child.” Hardisty v. Hardisty, supra, 183 Conn.
262. It concluded that “courts have the power to direct
one or both parents to pay for private schooling, if the
circumstances warrant. It is a matter to be determined
in the sound discretion of the court on consideration of
the totality of the circumstances including the financial
ability of the parties, the availability of public schools,
the schools attended by the children prior to the divorce
and the special needs and general welfare of the children.”
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id. Our Supreme Court noted, however, that it “found
no case . . . in which a parent has been compelled to pay
the total cost of private schooling to which he objects
because of a principled preference for public primary
and secondary schooling.” Id., 263. It concluded, under
the totality of the circumstances of that case, that the
Zheng v. Xia

trial court abused its discretion in modifying the child
support order to require the father to pay for the child’s
private school education when there was “no showing of
[the] child’s special educational or psychological need
for private schooling or of the inadequacy, in general
or for this child, of the local public schools. There [also
was] no showing that, but for this divorce, this child
would probably have attended a private school; in fact,
the defendant’s family history indicates the opposite.
There is no showing that the defendant ever agreed to
private schooling for his son. To the contrary, the trial
court has found, as a fact, that the defendant believes
that his son’s enrollment at the [private school was]
unnecessary and undesirable.” Id., 264–65.
In the present case, relying on Hardisty, Judge Heller
provided three primary grounds for her 2018 order,
namely, there was no family history of private schools,
the defendant did not demonstrate that the public schools
in Stamford are inadequate to meet the needs of the
child, and the plaintiff opposed private education for
the child. To obtain a modification of the 2018 order,
it was incumbent on the defendant to demonstrate a
substantial change in circumstances since that court
order. See Czunas v. Mancini, supra, 226 Conn. App.
263. It appears from the record, however, that the defen-
dant, instead, essentially sought to relitigate the bases
for Judge Heller’s 2018 order, rather than show that
circumstances had changed since the time of that order
such that a modification was warranted. See Thomasi
v. Thomasi, 181 Conn. App. 822, 842, 188 A.3d 743
(2018) (“the present overall circumstances of the par-
ties must be compared with the circumstances existing
at the time of the original award to determine if there
has been substantial change” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Also, in doing so, she did not, in large part,
rely on events arising after the 2018 order. See Laffin
v. Laffin, supra, 231 Conn. App. 865. For example, in
attempting to demonstrate a family history of private
schooling, she provided evidence and testimony concern-
ing the plaintiff’s prior education in China, Laws of the
Zheng v. Xia

People’s Republic of China regarding compulsory educa-
tion, and school grading reports for the schools attended
by the plaintiff’s daughter and stepchildren and for
the school district in Stamford in which the defendant
resides with the child. The defendant also did not offer
any official documentation establishing that the public
schools in Stamford lagged behind other school systems.
Moreover, the defendant acknowledged at the hearing
that the plaintiff’s daughter and stepchildren attend
public schools and that, for the one year that the child
attended public school in Stamford, he received “the
highest of score[s].”
The defendant sought to show a change in circum-
stances by demonstrating that the plaintiff is no longer
opposed to the child attending private school, as evi-
denced through emails exchanged between the parties.
Those emails, however, show that the plaintiff wanted
the child to attend public school and that he acquiesced
to the child’s attending private elementary and middle
school so as not to disrupt the child’s education, in light
of the fact that the defendant already had enrolled the
child in those schools without a prior agreement from the
plaintiff and because he recognized a need to maintain
continuity in the child’s education. The emails further
demonstrate that the plaintiff remained steadfast in his
position that, if the defendant wanted the child to attend
private school, she would have to pay for it. Finally, the
defendant has confused her desire for her child, who is
an intelligent young man as the parties have stipulated,
to have the best educational opportunities with a special
need for the child to attend private school.
In conclusion, the defendant failed to provide the trial
court with evidence demonstrating that, since the 2018
order, circumstances had changed such that the plain-
tiff’s support obligation should be modified to require
him to contribute to the costs of private school education
Zheng v. Xia

for the child. Accordingly, the court’s finding of no sub-
stantial change in circumstances is not clearly erroneous.
In light of this determination, the defendant’s remain-
ing claims on appeal require little discussion. Those
remaining claims are that the court failed (2) “to give
proper weight to the parties’ shared history of priori-
tizing elite, tuition based education,” (3) to find the
plaintiff in violation of his legal obligation to meet with
a parenting coordinator to resolve disputes regarding
educational matters pertaining to the child, and (4) to
consider the regular school field trip costs for the child.
“It is well established that a decision to credit cer-
tain evidence over other evidence is exclusively within
the province of the trial court. . . . Weaver v. Sena,
199 Conn. App. 852, 860, 238 A.3d 103 (2020); see also
Woodbridge Crossing Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Fer-
guson, 229 Conn. App. 99, 104, 325 A.3d 1205 (2024)
([i]t is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to weigh
the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses and determine whether to accept some, all or
none of a witness’ testimony . . .); M. C. v. A. W., 226
Conn. App. 444, 466, 319 A.3d 183 (2024) (Insofar as the
defendant invites us to reconsider the evidence that was
before the court, [w]e note that it is not the function of
this court to review the evidence to determine whether
a conclusion different from the one reached could have
been reached. . . . Thus, [a] mere difference of opinion or
judgment cannot justify our intervention.). Likewise, it
is not the province of this court to reweigh the evidence
before the court or to substitute our judgment in this
matter. F. S. v. J. S., 223 Conn. App. 763, 794, 310 A.3d
961, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 903, 323 A.3d 344 (2024);
see also In re Blake P., 222 Conn. App. 693, 707, 306
A.3d 1130 (2023) ([a]lthough there may be evidence in
the record that would support the [plaintiff’s] position,
it is not the role of [an appellate] court to examine that
evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial
court).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Dynas-
tie D., 233 Conn. App. 662, 683–84, 341 A.3d 331, cert.
Zheng v. Xia

granted on other grounds, 353 Conn. 905, 342 A.3d 239
(2025). Accordingly, the defendant’s claim concerning
the weight the court afforded to the evidence concerning
the parties’ education necessarily fails.
The defendant’s claim that the court improperly failed
to find the plaintiff in violation of his legal obligation
to meet with a parenting coordinator to resolve disputes
regarding educational matters pertaining to the child is
equally unavailing. The defendant did not request that
relief in her operative motion for modification, and the
issue before the court in its consideration of the opera-
tive motion for modification was whether a substantial
change in circumstances had occurred since the 2018
order declining to require the plaintiff to contribute
toward the private school educational costs of the par-
ties’ child. Moreover, a motion for modification is not
the proper procedural vehicle for the defendant to seek
redress for the plaintiff’s alleged failure to comply with
the term of the parties’ separation agreement requiring
the parties to meet with a family coordinator to resolve
disputes. See Practice Book § 25-27; see also O’Bryan v.
O’Bryan, 262 Conn. 355, 358 n.2, 813 A.2d 1001 (2003).
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the
defendant’s claim that the court improperly failed to
consider the regular school field trip costs for the child.
In her operative motion for modification, the defendant
did not seek a modification of the 2018 order in terms of
its allocation of the responsibility for paying the child’s
extracurricular activity fees to which the parties had
agreed in their separation agreement.10 See footnote 3
10
In his appellate brief, the plaintiff contends that he is not responsible
for any field trip fees at a private school that he never agreed to allow
the child to attend. The issues of whether the plaintiff’s responsibil-
ity to contribute toward the extracurricular activity fees of the child,
as set forth in the 2018 order; see footnote 3 of this opinion; extends
to such fees incurred at a private school, or whether the field trip fees
sought by the plaintiff qualify as extracurricular fees under the parties’
agreement, were not decided by the court in light of its finding of no
substantial change in circumstances. Those issues, therefore, are not
properly before this court and we decline to address them. See Forestier
v. Bridgeport, 223 Conn. App. 298, 313, 308 A.3d 102 (2024) (as general
matter, “Connecticut appellate courts will not address issues not decided
by the trial court” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Zheng v. Xia

of this opinion. To the extent that the defendant seeks to
have the plaintiff pay his portion of those fees because
he has failed to do so, a motion for modification is not
the proper procedural vehicle to do so.
As we have stated in this opinion, “before the court may
modify . . . [a child support order] pursuant to § 46b-86, it
must make a threshold finding of a substantial change in
circumstances with respect to one of the parties.” (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Mountain v. Mountain,
189 Conn. App. 228, 232, 206 A.3d 802 (2019). Because
the court in the present case found no substantial change
in circumstances, and that finding is not clearly errone-
ous, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
defendant’s operative motion for modification.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.