Lafferty v. Jones

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Lafferty v. Jones

ERICA LAFFERTY ET AL. v. ALEX
EMRIC JONES ET AL.
(AC 48621)
Cradle, C. J., and Suarez and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff in error, counsel of record for the defendants in underlying
consolidated tort actions, filed a writ of error challenging the trial court’s
order suspending him from the practice of law for a period of two weeks
for violating the Rules of Professional Conduct. He claimed that the court’s
disciplinary order constituted an abuse of its discretion. Held:

The trial court acted within its discretion in suspending the plaintiff in error
from the practice of law for a period of two weeks, as the record revealed
that the court carefully considered the facts relevant to its determination
of an appropriate sanction, including various aggravating and mitigating
factors, and, contrary to the plaintiff in error’s contention, for which he
cited no appellate authority, the court was not obligated to follow the
American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, guide-
lines that have not been formally adopted by the judges of this state.

Argued October 23—officially released December 16, 2025

Procedural History

Writ of error from the order of the Superior Court
in the judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation
Docket, Wilson, J., suspending the plaintiff in error
from the practice of law for a period of two weeks.
Writ denied.
Christopher T. DeMatteo, for the appellant (plaintiff
in error Norman A. Pattis).
Brian B. Staines, chief disciplinary counsel, for the
appellee (defendant in error Office of Chief Disciplinary
Counsel).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The plaintiff in error, Norman A. Pattis,
a Connecticut attorney and counsel of record for the
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Lafferty v. Jones

defendants, Alex Emric Jones and Free Speech Sys-
tems, LLC,1 in the underlying consolidated tort actions2
arising out of the mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elemen-
tary School, filed the present writ of error challenging
the order of the trial court suspending him from the
practice of law for a period of two weeks for violating
the Rules of Professional Conduct (rules). Pattis claims
that the court’s disciplinary order constituted an abuse
of its discretion. We reject this claim and, accordingly,
deny the writ of error.3
The following facts and procedural history, as set
forth by the trial court in its decision, as set forth by
this court in prior decisions, or as are undisputed in
the record, are relevant to our resolution of this writ
of error. ‘‘On December 14, 2012, Adam Lanza entered
Sandy Hook Elementary School (Sandy Hook), and
thereafter shot and killed twenty first-grade children
and six adults, in addition to wounding two other vic-
tims who survived the attack. In the underlying consoli-
dated actions, the plaintiffs, consisting of a first
responder, who was not a victim of the Sandy Hook
shooting but was depicted in the media following the
shooting, and the immediate family members of five of
the children, one educator, the principal of Sandy Hook,
1
Although there were additional defendants who participated in the under-
lying actions, Jones and Free Speech Systems, LLC, were the only remaining
defendants at all times relevant to the present appeal. We therefore refer
in this opinion to Jones and Free Speech Systems, LLC, as the defendants.
2
The consolidated actions are Lafferty v. Jones, Superior Court, judicial
district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-
S; Sherlach v. Jones, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex
Litigation Docket, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S; and Sherlach v. Jones, Supe-
rior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket
No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S.
3
The present writ of error was filed against the defendant in error, the
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. This court previously determined that
the defendant in error was a proper party to defend the trial court’s disciplin-
ary order. See Lafferty v. Jones, 220 Conn. App. 724, 729–30, 299 A.3d
1161 (2023).
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Lafferty v. Jones

and a school psychologist who were killed in the shoot-
ing,4 brought these separate actions . . . .
‘‘In the complaints, the plaintiffs alleged that [Jones]
hosts a nationally syndicated radio program and owns
and operates multiple Internet websites that hold them-
selves out as news and journalism platforms. The plain-
tiffs further alleged that [Jones] began publishing con-
tent related to the Sandy Hook shooting on his radio
and Internet platforms and circulated videos on his
YouTube channel. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged
that, between December 19, 2012, and June 26, 2017,
[Jones] used his Internet and radio platforms to spread
the message that the Sandy Hook shooting was a staged
event to the millions of his weekly listeners and sub-
scribers. The complaints each consisted of five counts,
including causes of action sounding in invasion of pri-
vacy by false light, defamation and defamation per se,
4
‘‘There are three underlying actions. In the first action, the plaintiffs are
Erica Lafferty, David Wheeler, Francine Wheeler, Jacqueline Barden, Mark
Barden, Nicole Hockley, Ian Hockley, Jennifer Hensel, Jeremy Richman,
Donna Soto, Carlee Soto-Parisi, Carlos Soto, Jillian Soto, and William Alden-
berg. On November 29, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to consolidate the second
and third cases . . . with their action pursuant to Practice Book § 9-5.
William Sherlach is a plaintiff in the second and third cases and Robert
Parker is a plaintiff in the third case. On December 17, 2018, the court
granted the motion to consolidate the cases. Jeremy Richman died while
this action was pending, and, on June 7, 2021, the court granted the plaintiffs’
motion to substitute Jennifer Hensel, executrix of the estate of Jeremy
Richman, as a plaintiff in his place; however, on June 8, 2021, Jennifer Hensel,
in her capacity as executrix of the estate of Jeremy Richman, withdrew her
claims against the defendants. On October 20, 2021, the court granted Erica
Lafferty’s motion to substitute Richard Coan, trustee of the bankruptcy
estate of Erica L. Garbatini, in her place as a plaintiff in this case. Lafferty
v. Jones, 222 Conn. App. 855, 858 n.1, 307 A.3d 923 (2023). On December
14, 2023, the court granted a motion to substitute Erica Ash, also known
as Erica Lafferty, as a plaintiff in place of Richard Coan, trustee of the
bankruptcy estate of Erica L. Garbatini. All references in this opinion to
the plaintiffs are to the remaining plaintiffs and do not include Jeremy
Richman, Jennifer Hensel, as executrix of the estate of Jeremy Richman,
or Richard Coan, trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Erica L. Garbatini.’’
Lafferty v. Jones, 225 Conn. App. 552, 558–59 n.3, 316 A.3d 742 (2024).
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Lafferty v. Jones

intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, and a violation of the
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Stat-
utes § 42-110a et seq. . . .

‘‘[O]n February 22, 2019, the court granted [a] motion
for protective order filed by the Jones defendants,
which allowed, inter alia, the plaintiffs’ medical and/or
mental health records to be designated as confidential.5
The court order limited the use of such confidential
information.6 On June 16, 2021, the court granted, with-
out objection, the plaintiffs’ motion to modify the pro-
tective order to create a Highly Confidential-Attorneys
5
‘‘The order limited access to confidential information to the following
individuals in this case and all cases consolidated with this case: All counsel
of record, including staff persons employed by such counsel; the parties,
but only to the extent reasonably necessary to the litigation of this case;
any consultant, investigator or expert (collectively Expert) who is assisting
in the preparation and/or trial of this action, but only to the extent reasonably
necessary to enable such Expert to render such assistance; any deponent
or witness who is reasonably believed to have been eligible to have access
to Confidential Information by virtue of his or her employment or other
affiliation with the Designating Party, and other non-party witnesses deposed
in this case but only for the time reasonably necessary to question the
witness; court reporters, videographers and outside vendors performing
litigation support services for parties in this case; counsel who are presently
representing clients in a case against any one or more of the [Jones] Defen-
dants, which arises out of the same or similar set of facts, transactions or
occurrences, provided that before disclosing Confidential Information to
such counsel, such Defendant (1) must receive notice of the intention to
disclose Confidential Information to such counsel; (2) must have the oppor-
tunity to move for a protective order in the case in which counsel is involved;
and (3) a ruling on the motion for protective order must be issued; and the
Court and its personnel.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v.
Jones, 225 Conn. App. 552, 560 n.6, 316 A.3d 742 (2024).
6
‘‘The protective order stated as follows: Except to the extent expressly
authorized by this Protective Order, Confidential Information shall not be
used or disclosed for any purpose other than the preparation and trial of
this case, all cases consolidated with this case, and in any appeal taken
from any order or judgment herein. This Limitations on Use provision can
be found in the subsequent modifications to the protective order.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, 225 Conn. App. 552, 560 n.7,
316 A.3d 742 (2024).
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Eyes Only designation.7 Finally, on June 15, 2022, the
court granted by consent a final modification to the
order of protection, adding sensitive information of par-
ties or witnesses, which is ordinarily kept confidential
as a category of information which could be designated
as confidential.8 All . . . versions of the protective
order required that (a)ll persons having access to Confi-
dential Information to maintain it in a safe and secure
7
‘‘The modified protective order limited access to Highly Confidential-
Attorneys Eyes [Only] information to counsel of record, and staff persons
employed by such counsel who reasonably need to handle such information;
outside consulting experts or testifying expert witnesses, but only to the
extent reasonably necessary; any deponent or witness who is reasonably
believed to have been eligible to have access to Confidential Information
by virtue of his or her employment or other affiliation with the Designating
Party, and other non-party witnesses deposed in this case but only for the
time reasonably necessary to question the witness, and only to the extent
such questioning is reasonably necessary; court reporters, videographers
and outside vendors performing litigation support services for parties in
this case; and the court and its personnel. The only sharing provision in the
order allowed (c)ounsel who are presently representing clients in a case
against any one or more of the [Jones] defendants to share confidential
information with each other, that is, counsel representing plaintiffs in cases
against a Jones defendant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v.
Jones, 225 Conn. App. 552, 560–61 n.9, 316 A.3d 742 (2024).
8
‘‘The order limited access to Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only
information to the same individuals as the prior order, adding the words in
this action to further define counsel of record: a. Counsel of record in this
action, and staff persons employed by such counsel who reasonably need
to handle such information; b. Outside consulting experts or testifying expert
witnesses, but only to the extent reasonably necessary. Any Party choosing
to show such material to such expert shall have the duty to reasonably
ensure that such person observes the terms of this Protective Order and
shall be responsible upon breach of such duty for the failure of such person
to observe the terms of this Protective Order; c. Any deponent or witness who
is reasonably believed to have been eligible to have access to Confidential
Information by virtue of his or her employment or other affiliation with the
Designating Party, and other non-party witnesses deposed in this case but
only for the time reasonably necessary to question the witness, and only to
the extent such questioning is reasonably necessary; d. Court reporters,
videographers and outside vendors performing litigation support services
for parties in this case; and The Court and its personnel. No such information
shall be disclosed to any other party or person.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, 225 Conn. App. 552, 561 n.12, 316 A.3d 742 (2024).
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Lafferty v. Jones

manner.’’ (Citation omitted; footnotes in original; foot-
notes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Laf-
ferty v. Jones, 225 Conn. App. 552, 558–61, 316 A.3d
742 (2024).
The following abbreviated recitation of the factual
and procedural background relating to Pattis’ disclo-
sure of the plaintiffs’ confidential information, as set
forth previously by this court, is relevant. ‘‘Utilizing a
database management firm to ensure that discovery
materials were protected and secure, the plaintiffs,
beginning in October of 2021, began a rolling [discovery]
production. . . . Medical records, deposition tran-
scripts, and employment, financial, and professional
records were among the records of the plaintiffs that
were designated [pursuant to the protective order] as
Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only. . . .
‘‘The concerns of the court with protecting the plain-
tiffs’ medical and confidential information were made
painfully clear to [Pattis] early in the discovery process,
when [on July 1, 2021] he filed a motion to depose
Hillary Clinton, improperly using information desig-
nated as Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only. . . .
Beginning in June of 2021, both the court and the plain-
tiffs clearly expressed their concerns with respect to
protecting the plaintiffs’ mental health and other medi-
cal and confidential information.
‘‘In late February of 2022, [Pattis] contacted [Federico
Andino] Reynal, a Texas attorney, regarding Reynal’s
potential representation of Jones and related defen-
dants in five cases pending in Texas. The expectation
was that Reynal would also be working on the three
consolidated Connecticut cases, and that the two would
collaborate on the Texas and Connecticut cases. In
March of 2022, approximately six weeks prior to the
then trial date in Texas, Reynal filed an appearance in
the Texas Sandy Hook defamation lawsuit brought by
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Scarlett Lewis and Neil Heslin (Texas case). Reynal was
the tenth lawyer for the Jones defendants in the Texas
case, initially appearing as cocounsel with Jacquelyn
Blott. Blott gave Reynal the files for all five of the Jones
defendants’ pending Texas cases. . . . Neither Reynal
nor his office ever requested from [Pattis], or from
anyone else, the . . . plaintiffs’ medical, tax, employ-
ment or financial records. . . .
‘‘On April 13 [and] 14, 2022, emails were exchanged
between [Pattis], Texas attorney [Kyung S.] Lee, and
[prior counsel for the Jones defendants in the underly-
ing consolidated actions, Jay] Wolman, regarding Ran-
dazza emails.9 On April 17, 2022, on the eve of trial in
the Texas case, Lee filed a petition for bankruptcy on
behalf of [Infowars, LLC, Infowars Health, LLC, and
Prison Planet TV, LLC] in the [United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of Texas] . . . .
‘‘On May 2, 2022, Lee emailed Wolman and [Marc]
Randazza . . . reporting that Reynal and [Shelby] Jor-
dan had provided him with the discovery in the Texas
case, and stating that, when he had asked [Pattis] and
[his associate Cameron] Atkinson about the Connecti-
cut discovery, Atkinson recommended that Lee contact
Wolman and Randazza directly, as the transfer [of the
Connecticut discovery] from Wolman and Randazza to
[Pattis] and Atkinson was corrupted. Lee asked Wolman
to provide him with all the Connecticut discovery by
and for each side, in light of the changing number of
lawyers representing the Jones defendants and the sta-
tus of discovery in both Texas and Connecticut. . . .
‘‘Half an hour later, Wolman responded to Lee by
email, stating that, on March 28, 2022, he had given
‘‘Marc Randazza is an attorney admitted in Nevada whose application
9

for pro hac vice [admission] in the Connecticut cases was denied by the
court on July 7, 2020. Randazza and a Shelby Jordan were copied on the
emails.’’ Lafferty v. Jones, supra, 225 Conn. App. 582 n.34.
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Lafferty v. Jones

Atkinson a new [hard] drive with several hundred giga-
bytes, which Atkinson confirmed worked. Wolman sug-
gested that Atkinson’s office FedEx the hard drive to
Lee and noted that Lee would need to get the . . .
plaintiffs’ recent compliance from [Pattis’] team. . . .
Wolman emailed Lee again, copying the same five indi-
viduals, including [Pattis] and Atkinson, warning that,
in light of th[e] court’s protective order, Lee might not
be authorized to access the . . . plaintiffs’ confidential
documents.
‘‘Lee responded to Wolman five minutes later, copy-
ing the same five individuals, including [Pattis] and
Atkinson, thanking Wolman and confirming that he
would look into the confidentiality situation in the Con-
necticut litigation. A few minutes later, Lee emailed
[Adam] Rodriguez, asking him to locate the confidenti-
ality order, and asking [Pattis] and Atkinson if they
knew what Wolman was referring to. Shortly thereafter,
Lee responded to Wolman’s email, confirming that he
would follow through with Atkinson and [Pattis]. Later
that morning, Rodriguez emailed Lee, (copying Atkin-
son, [Pattis], [Marc] Schwartz, [Robert J.] Shannon,
[Raymond] Battaglia, and Jordan), attaching the Con-
necticut protective orders and highlighting the Highly
Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only language.
‘‘Neither [Pattis] nor anyone from his firm advised
of the existence of the protective order, asked Lee to
sign a confidentiality order, or responded to Wolman’s
warning or Lee’s inquiry about the protective order.
Similarly, neither [Pattis] nor anyone from his firm
informed Lee that they were sending him the . . .
plaintiffs’ mental health records, medical records, or
other such sensitive information. Instead, shortly after
this May 2, 2022 email exchange, Lee received at his
Houston [Texas] office a white external hard drive in
a bubble wrap envelope, along with an undated cover
letter from Atkinson to Lee, enclosing the hard drive—
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Lafferty v. Jones

the same hard drive that [Pattis] and Atkinson had
obtained from Randazza and Wolman. Neither the enve-
lope nor the hard drive was designated or marked in
any way as confidential or protected by court order,
despite the fact that the hard drive contained the . . .
plaintiffs’ [confidential information]. . . .
‘‘Sometime between June 1 [and] 15, 2022 . . . Lee
handed the hard drive, unmarked, unaltered, and with
no envelope, to Reynal. It did not occur to Lee to inform
Reynal that the hard drive contained the . . . plaintiffs’
[confidential information], and Reynal was not asked
to sign any confidentiality agreement. . . . [A]bso-
lutely no care was taken to safeguard the information
or to document the details of the transfer of the hard
drive. . . . On June 15, 2022, Atkinson emailed Lee,
asking Lee to make the [hard drive] available to Reynal.
Lee responded by saying that he had already given it
to Reynal. A day or two later, at the request of [Pattis’]
office, Reynal had the hard drive shipped back to
[Pattis]. Thus, the . . . plaintiffs’ sensitive information,
which should have been safeguarded and which was
also protected by the court order, was carelessly passed
around from one unauthorized person to another, with-
out regard for the protective order, and with no effort
to safeguard the . . . plaintiffs’ sensitive, confidential
documents. The confidential, court-protected medical
and other records of the . . . plaintiffs were improp-
erly and unsafely transmitted at the direction of [Pattis]
to Lee, and then improperly and unsafely transferred
by Lee to Reynal, with [Pattis’] approval.
‘‘On July 6, 2022, [Pattis] filed an application for Rey-
nal to appear pro hac vice in the Connecticut cases. The
application was granted on July 20, 2022, with certain
restrictions and the requirement that Reynal file an
appearance by July 30, 2022. On July 26, 2022, the court
granted [Pattis’] oral motion to withdraw Reynal’s pro
hac admission, before Reynal filed his appearance.
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Lafferty v. Jones

‘‘In the meantime, on July 22, 2022, Reynal’s assistant,
at his request, emailed Mark Bankston, lead counsel
[for the plaintiffs] in the Texas case, with a link to a
gofile.me archive containing supplemental production.
However, the link that was sent mistakenly provided
access to other materials, including Jones’ previously
undisclosed text messages, as well as the . . . plain-
tiffs’ Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only medical
records and discovery. The directory consisted of an
unusually large number of highly disorganized folders
and files. Bankston, having concluded that the materials
contained the . . . plaintiffs’ confidential documents,
as well as [Pattis’] work product, stopped his review
and emailed Reynal, alerting Reynal that the documents
appeared to include records of the . . . plaintiffs and
confidential and work product documents.’’ (Footnote
in original; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 579–86.

On August 3, 2022, the plaintiffs’ counsel in the Con-
necticut action, Christopher M. Mattei, ‘‘ ‘emailed Rey-
nal regarding Reynal’s disclosure to Bankston . . .
requesting that Reynal provide him with an itemized
list of the documents, the date he received them, the
identity of anyone who had access to them, and confir-
mation of their destruction. An hour after that email,
[Pattis] texted Mattei, stating, ‘‘Chris. Give me a call. I
learned moments ago that my office may have violated
protective order. Norm.’’ ’ ’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id.,
587–88.

On January 5, 2023, after a show cause hearing, the
court, Bellis, J., issued a memorandum of decision,
determining, by clear and convincing evidence, that
Pattis had violated rules 1.1, 1.15 (b), 3.4 (3), 5.1 (b),
5.1 (c), and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Id., 563. As discipline, the court suspended Pattis from
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Lafferty v. Jones

the practice of law for a period of six months.10 Id.
The plaintiff filed a writ of error (first writ of error)
contesting the court’s findings. Id.

On appeal, this court granted in part the first writ of
error. Id., 611. This court held that the trial court cor-
rectly concluded that Pattis violated rules 1.1, 5.1 (b),
5.1 (c) in part, and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.11 Id., 579. This court concluded, however, that
the trial court incorrectly determined that Pattis vio-
lated rules 1.15 (b), 3.4 (3), and 5.1 (c) in part, of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.12 Id. Accordingly, this
court ordered that the case be remanded with direction
to vacate the trial court’s findings that Pattis violated
rules 1.15 (b), 3.4 (3), and 5.1 (c) in part, as well as the
court’s disciplinary order, and remanded the case for
a new hearing on sanctions before a different judge.
Id., 611.
10
The court’s January 5, 2023 suspension order was stayed pending the
resolution of Pattis’ first writ of error. Lafferty v. Jones, 220 Conn. App.
724, 726–27 n.4, 299 A.3d 1161 (2023).
11
This court concluded that the trial court properly applied (1) rule 1.1
of the Rules of Professional Conduct in concluding that Pattis did not
appropriately safeguard sensitive discovery materials; Lafferty v. Jones,
supra, 225 Conn. App. 595–96; (2) rule 5.1 (b) and rule 5.1 (c) in part in
concluding that Pattis did not make reasonable efforts to supervise Atkinson;
id., 607; and (3) rule 8.4 (4) in concluding that Pattis’ misconduct ‘‘unilaterally
imposed a significant cost on the plaintiffs in their attempt to obtain justice
in this matter.’’ Id., 610.
12
Specifically, this court determined that the trial court improperly applied
(1) rule 1.15 (b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct because discovery
materials, like the plaintiffs’ confidential records, were not encompassed
by rule 1.15 (b); Lafferty v. Jones, supra, 225 Conn. App. 598; (2) rule 3.4
(3) because the evidence did not support the court’s finding by clear and
convincing evidence that Pattis ‘‘knowingly’’ violated the protective order;
id., 604; and (3) rule 5.1 (c) in part because this court concluded that, as
to the claim that Pattis violated rule 5.1 (c) in acting as Reynal’s sponsoring
attorney in Connecticut, there was no evidence demonstrating that Pattis
either gave Reynal any directions regarding the plaintiffs’ confidential
records, or that he had ‘‘ratified Reynal’s conduct with knowledge thereof.’’
Id., 608.
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Lafferty v. Jones

On October 24, 2024, the court, Wilson, J., held a
disciplinary hearing on sanctions in accordance with
this court’s remand order. At the hearing, the court
heard testimony from Pattis and admitted into evidence
several documentary exhibits, which included, inter
alia, a letter signed by Brittany Paz, Pattis’ law partner,
as well as transcripts of testimony from several charac-
ter witnesses who testified at the previous show cause
hearing. The parties thereafter filed posthearing briefs.13
On March 12, 2025, the court issued a memorandum
of decision in which it ordered that the plaintiff be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two
weeks. The court reasoned that the duties implicated
to the plaintiffs and the legal system are ‘‘important’’
ones. The court stated that, given the highly litigious
nature of the present case, Pattis should have been on
‘‘heightened alert and duty’’ that the plaintiffs’ confiden-
tial information had to be handled with the utmost care.
In addition to the actual harm the plaintiffs suffered,
the court noted that the potential harm was ‘‘stunning,’’
as the unauthorized disclosures were revealed on the
record in a public trial in Texas and ‘‘easily could have
been made part of the record in the Texas case, or
otherwise disseminated . . . .’’
In issuing its order of suspension, the court found
the following as aggravating factors: (1) a prior attorney
grievance14 that was filed against Pattis arising out of
the present litigation; (2) the vulnerability of the victims,
which the court considered to be the ‘‘most compelling’’
aggravating factor; and (3) Pattis’ substantial experi-
ence in the practice of law. As mitigating factors, the
13
In its posthearing brief, the defendant in error recommended a suspen-
sion of thirty days.
14
This grievance complaint was ultimately dismissed. The Statewide Griev-
ance Committee found that Pattis’ conduct did not amount to an ethical
violation, however, it found that his execution of an affidavit on behalf of
Jones in relation to the underlying cases was ‘‘sloppy’’ and that he ‘‘exercised
bad judgment.’’
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Lafferty v. Jones

court noted (1) Pattis’ lack of disciplinary history; (2)
the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) Pattis’
initial disclosure of the errors to the plaintiffs’ counsel,
with respect to which the court afforded Pattis ‘‘minimal
credit’’; and (4) Pattis’ remorsefulness.15 The court con-
cluded that there was ‘‘simply no excuse for Pattis’
misconduct.’’16
This writ of error followed. In his writ of error, Pattis
does not challenge any of the underlying facts or find-
ings of violations. Rather, Pattis claims that the court,
Wilson, J., abused its discretion when it suspended him
for two weeks for violating rules 1.1, 5.1 (b), 5.1 (c) in
part, and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.17
He argues, inter alia,18 that (1) Judge Wilson’s order of
15
At the October 24, 2024 hearing, Pattis testified that the records disclo-
sure issue was ‘‘personally devastating’’ to him.
16
On March 18, 2025, Pattis filed a motion for clarification in which he
requested that the court clarify its order to state that seven days of his prior
suspension, which he already had served in January, 2023, be credited toward
the current suspension, rendering a remainder of seven days. The court
agreed and ordered that Pattis ‘‘receive credit for seven days already served
against the two week suspension order . . . .’’
Pattis also filed a motion for stay of the court’s disciplinary order, which
the court denied. On July 9, 2025, this court granted Pattis’ motion for review
of the denial of his motion for a stay of his suspension and granted the
relief requested ‘‘in that the March 12, 2025 order suspending . . . Pattis
from the practice of law is stayed pending the final resolution of this writ
of error.’’
17
In arguing that the court’s suspension order was ‘‘arbitrary,’’ Pattis
argues that ‘‘an attorney who is subject to a disciplinary proceeding is
entitled to due process.’’ To the extent that Pattis intended to raise a separate
claim that the court violated his due process rights, that claim is inadequately
briefed. See, e.g., Clark v. Employees’ Review Board, 234 Conn. App. 554,
571 n.18, 344 A.3d 545 (2025) (‘‘[W]e are not required to review issues that
have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief.
. . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to
avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)).
18
Pattis also argues that the court’s ‘‘arbitrariness in deciding to suspend
[him] is evident by the fact that it did not discipline Reynal at all, even
though it found misconduct on [Reynal’s] part for the same course of events,
albeit for different violations.’’ This argument merits little discussion. The
factual basis for the rule violations with respect to Reynal and Pattis was
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suspension improperly deviated from the American Bar
Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
(ABA standards), and (2) the court improperly weighed
the aggravating and mitigating factors delineated in the
ABA standards in concluding that a suspension, rather
than a reprimand, was warranted. We disagree.
‘‘[T]he trial court possesses inherent judicial power,
derived from judicial responsibility for the administra-
tion of justice, to exercise sound discretion to deter-
mine what sanction to impose in light of the entire
record before it. . . . It is well established that in sanc-
tioning an attorney for violations of the [rules], courts
are, as they should be, left free to act as may in each
case seem best in this matter of most important concern
to them and to the administration of justice. . . .
Whether this court would have imposed a different
sanction is not relevant. Rather, we must determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion in
determining the nature of the sanction. . . . We may
reverse the court’s decision [in sanctioning an attorney]
only if that decision was unreasonable, unconscionable
or arbitrary, and was made without proper consider-
ation of the facts and law pertaining to the matter sub-
mitted.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mills v.
Statewide Grievance Committee, 228 Conn. App. 852,
866, 326 A.3d 309 (2024), cert. granted, 351 Conn. 903,
different. In its January 17, 2023 memorandum of decision, issued after a
show cause hearing as to Reynal’s conduct, the court, Bellis, J., noted that
Reynal, unlike Pattis, was ‘‘prohibited from possessing the Connecticut
plaintiffs’ medical records and other Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes
Only materials as he was not an attorney of record in the Connecticut cases.’’
Judge Bellis did not sanction Reynal, noting the ‘‘impressive number of
important mitigating factors that militate[d] in his favor,’’ including the fact
that Reynal had traveled voluntarily from Texas to appear for his show
cause hearing. We cannot conclude, given the distinguishing facts underlying
the alleged rule violations vis-à-vis Pattis and Reynal, and given the broad
discretion afforded to the court in determining an appropriate disciplinary
sanction, that Judge Wilson’s two week suspension order as to Pattis was
arbitrary.
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329 A.3d 240 (2025). If a court disciplines an attorney,
‘‘it does so not to mete out punishment to an offender,
but [so] that the administration of justice may be safe-
guarded and the courts and the public protected from
the misconduct or unfitness of those who are licensed
to perform the important functions of the legal profes-
sion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Disciplinary
Counsel v. Serafinowicz, 160 Conn. App. 92, 98, 123
A.3d 1279, cert. denied, 319 Conn. 953, 125 A.3d 531
(2015).
‘‘The court has discretion to view the totality of the
circumstances when determining the appropriate disci-
pline. Further, under the abuse of discretion standard
of review, [e]very reasonable presumption should be
given in factor of the correctness of the court’s ruling.
. . . Absent a showing that the trial court has acted
arbitrarily, we defer to the trial court’s determination of
the appropriate discipline.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Office of Chief Disciplinary
Counsel v. Vaccaro, 226 Conn. App. 75, 97, 317 A.3d
785, cert. granted, 350 Conn. 907, 323 A.3d 1092 (2024).
‘‘Courts considering sanctions against attorneys mea-
sure the [attorney’s] conduct against the [rules].
Although the rules define misconduct, they do not pro-
vide guidance for determining what sanctions are
appropriate. . . . Connecticut courts reviewing attor-
ney misconduct, therefore, have consulted the . . .
[ABA standards] . . . . Although the [ABA] standards
have not been officially adopted in Connecticut, they
are used frequently by the Superior Court in evaluating
attorney misconduct and in determining discipline
. . . . [A]fter a finding of misconduct, a court should
consider: (1) the nature of the duty violated; (2) the
attorney’s mental state; (3) the potential or actual injury
stemming from the attorney’s misconduct; and (4) the
existence of aggravating or [mitigating] factors. . . .
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‘‘The ABA [s]tandards list aggravating factors as fol-
lows. Aggravating factors include: (a) prior disciplinary
offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive; (c) a pattern
of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; (e) bad faith
obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intention-
ally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disci-
plinary agency; (f) submission of false evidence, false
statements, or other deceptive practices during the dis-
ciplinary process; (g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful
nature of conduct; (h) vulnerability of victim; (i) sub-
stantial experience in the practice of law; (j) indiffer-
ence to making restitution; [and] (k) illegal conduct,
including that involving the use of controlled sub-
stances. A.B.A., Annotated Standards for Imposing Law-
yer Sanctions (2019) standard 9.22, p. 451. The stan-
dards also list the following as mitigating factors: (a)
absence of a prior disciplinary record; (b) absence of
a dishonest or selfish motive; (c) personal or emotional
problems; (d) timely good faith effort to make restitu-
tion or to rectify consequences of misconduct; (e) full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative
attitude toward proceedings; (f) inexperience in the
practice of law; (g) character or reputation; (h) physical
disability; (i) mental disability or chemical dependency
. . . (j) delay in disciplinary proceedings; (k) imposi-
tion of other penalties or sanctions; (l) remorse; [and]
(m) remoteness of prior offenses. . . . A.B.A., Anno-
tated Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (2019)
standard 9.32, p. 487.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Office of Chief
Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro, supra, 226 Conn.
App. 91–93.
Although the ABA standards are frequently used as
a guide for courts in determining appropriate discipline,
‘‘[t]he [ABA] [s]tandards, originally promulgated in
1986, have not formally been adopted by the judges of
this state. . . . Accordingly, although a court should
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consider . . . the existence of aggravating or mitigat-
ing factors . . . there is no express requirement that
it do so. Further, even when a court is provided with
relevant mitigating evidence, it is free to reject that
evidence. . . . The court was free to credit or reject
[the evidence presented] as well as to exercise its dis-
cretion in considering evidence that might be irrelevant
or cumulative. . . . [T]here is no requirement that the
court set forth its express consideration of [specific]
evidence in its memorandum of decision . . . .’’ (Cita-
tion omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Mills v. Statewide Grievance Commit-
tee, supra, 228 Conn. App. 867.
First, Pattis argues that the court should have applied
ABA standards 4.53, 6.23, and 7.3, and issued him only
a reprimand, rather than a two week suspension.19 The
court, however, was not obligated to follow the disci-
plinary recommendations delineated in the ABA stan-
dards, because those guidelines have not formally been
adopted by the judges of this state.20 Mills v. Statewide
19
Standard 4.53 provides in relevant part that reprimand is generally appro-
priate when a lawyer ‘‘(a) demonstrates failure to understand relevant legal
doctrines or procedures and causes injury or potential injury to a client
. . . .’’ A.B.A., Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (2019)
standard 4.53.
Standard 6.23 provides that ‘‘[r]eprimand is generally appropriate when
a lawyer negligently fails to comply with a court order or rule, and causes
injury or potential injury to a client or other party, or causes interference
or potential interference with a legal proceeding.’’ A.B.A., Annotated Stan-
dards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (2019) standard 6.23.
Standard 7.3 provides that ‘‘[r]eprimand is generally appropriate when a
lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as
a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public,
or the legal system.’’ A.B.A., Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (2019) standard 7.3.
20
In his reply brief, Pattis analogizes the ABA standards to the guidelines
relating to child support, and case law applying those guidelines. Those cases
are distinguishable because compliance with the child support guidelines
is mandatory except in the limited circumstances when, pursuant to General
Statutes § 46b-215b, a court orders a deviation from the child support guide-
lines on the basis of ‘‘[a] specific finding . . . that the application of the
guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate in a particular case . . . .’’
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Grievance Committee, supra, 228 Conn. App. 866–67.
Indeed, Pattis has not cited to any appellate authority,
and we are not aware of any, in which this court, or
our Supreme Court, has concluded that a trial court
abused its discretion in issuing a disciplinary order
because the court had departed from the ABA stan-
dards.21 Furthermore, as in Mills, there was no indica-
tion in the present case ‘‘that the court did not take the
By contrast, because, as discussed herein, our legislature has not codified
the ABA standards, and the judges of this state have not adopted them,
compliance with those standards is not mandatory.
21
In his reply brief, Pattis relies on Manookian v. Board of Professional
Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, 685 S.W.3d 744, 808
(Tenn.), cert. denied, U.S. , 145 S. Ct. 160, 220 L. Ed. 2d 23 (2024),
for the proposition that the ABA standards were intended to ‘‘promote . . .
consistency’’ in attorney discipline. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In
that case, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that a downward devia-
tion from the ABA standards was arbitrary and capricious because the Board
of Professional Responsibility hearing panel had not stated its reasoning
for the lesser sanction and because the panel’s decision ‘‘disregard[ed] the
facts and circumstances of [the] case without any basis that would lead a
reasonable person to do the same.’’ Id., 809. Although we agree that the
ABA standards were meant to promote consistency in attorney discipline,
Pattis ignores that the ABA standards are also intended to constitute a
‘‘model, setting forth a comprehensive system for determining sanctions,
permitting flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions in particular
cases of lawyer misconduct.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 808; see A.B.A., Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (2019) standard 1.3.
Manookian also is legally and factually distinguishable. First, the Tennes-
see Supreme Court Rules provide that, ‘‘[i]n determining the appropriate
type of discipline, the hearing panel shall consider the applicable provisions
of the ABA [standards]. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4 (a).’’ (Emphasis added;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Manookian v. Board of Professional
Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, supra, 685 S.W.3d 775
n.42. The judges of this state have not adopted any such rule. Second, in the
present case, unlike in Manookian, the court, Wilson, J., comprehensively
set forth the reasoning of its decision and did not ‘‘disregard’’ the facts of
the present case. To the contrary, Judge Wilson emphasized the unique facts
of the underlying cases, stating that Pattis’ ‘‘breach of [his] duty should be
observed in the context of the litigation,’’ in which the plaintiffs sought
redress for the defendants’ personal attacks in a ‘‘hotly contested’’ case,
and found that the plaintiffs suffered actual and potential harm as a result
of his misconduct.
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ABA standards into account in reaching its decision.’’
(Emphasis in original.) Id., 867. The court, acting within
its broad discretion, cited to the ABA standards and
made specific findings regarding the aggravating and
mitigating factors that it found were most relevant. See,
e.g., id. (‘‘there is no requirement that the court set
forth its express consideration of [specific] evidence in
its memorandum of decision’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)). On the basis of those findings, the court
issued its two week suspension order. Contrary to
Pattis’ argument, the imposition of sanctions ‘‘should be
individualized and tailored to the facts of the particular
case. Indeed, the ABA standards on which [Pattis]
relies, and which serve as a guide for imposing disci-
pline, reflect that goal.’’ Disciplinary Counsel v. Serafi-
nowicz, supra, 160 Conn. App. 102.

Second, Pattis argues that the court should have
weighed the evidence as to aggravating and mitigating
factors differently than it did. Pattis essentially invites
us to reweigh the evidence so that we might reach a
conclusion that differs from the one reached by the
court. We decline his invitation. See, e.g., In re Kylie
P., 218 Conn. App. 85, 113, 291 A.3d 158 (declining to
reweigh evidence on appeal), cert. denied, 346 Conn.
926, 295 A.3d 419 (2023). This court has previously
stated that ‘‘our opinion as to what should have been
the appropriate sanction for the defendant is not at
issue.’’ Statewide Grievance Committee v. Glass, 46
Conn. App. 472, 479, 699 A.2d 1058 (1997); see also
Briggs v. McWeeny, 260 Conn. 296, 335, 796 A.2d 516
(2002) (‘‘[i]n matters of attorney misconduct, [the trial]
court is free to determine in each case, as may seem
best in light of the entire record before it, whether a
sanction is appropriate and, if so, what the sanction
should be’’ (emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted)). As this court also has explained, ‘‘[t]he
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abuse of discretion standard is such that it usually pre-
cludes the overturning of a trial court’s judgment in
such cases.’’ Statewide Grievance Committee v. Glass,
supra, 479.
In the present case, the record reveals that the court
carefully considered the facts relevant to its determina-
tion of an appropriate sanction. The court noted the
‘‘important’’ duties implicated in the present case with
respect to the underlying plaintiffs and the legal system.
The court agreed with the defendant in error, the Office
of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, that Pattis’ breach
‘‘should be observed in the context of the litigation;
here, the plaintiffs were seeking redress against the
defendants for personal attacks in a hotly contested
case.’’ The court found that there was ‘‘clearly actual
and potential harm stemming from Pattis’ misconduct.’’
As noted previously in this opinion, the court cited to
the ABA standards and weighed the aggravating and
mitigating factors, finding that the vulnerability of the
victims was the ‘‘most compelling aggravating factor
based on the nature of the civil action.’’ The court also
cited as aggravating factors the fact that Pattis was the
subject of a prior grievance arising out of the present
litigation, and the fact that Pattis was an experienced
attorney.22 The court stated that, as a ‘‘well-known attor-
ney who handles high profile cases on a regular basis,’’
22
We are not convinced by Pattis’ argument that the trial court should
not have considered a dismissed grievance complaint, which previously was
filed against him in relation to the underlying consolidated cases, as an
aggravating factor. Pattis argues that ‘‘[t]he dismissed grievance does not
fall within the aggravating factors recommended by the ABA and approved
by our Supreme Court in Burton [v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 835 A.2d 998
(2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073, 124 S. Ct. 2422, 158 L. Ed. 2d 983 (2004)].’’
Our Supreme Court in Burton, however, did not state that the ABA standards
are the exclusive factors that may be relied on by a court in determining
an appropriate disciplinary sanction of an attorney. See id., 55 and n.50. We
cannot conclude that the trial court improperly relied on the Statewide
Grievance Committee’s statement that Pattis exercised ‘‘bad judgment’’ in
relation to the underlying cases, even though the grievance complaint was
ultimately dismissed. See footnote 14 of this opinion. See, e.g., Statewide
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Lafferty v. Jones

he was required to appreciate the consequences of his
actions when he released the plaintiffs’ discovery. The
court weighed the mitigating factors, affording Pattis
credit for his remorsefulness at the postremand hearing.
The court also credited Pattis’ lack of a prior disciplin-
ary record, the absence of any dishonest motive, and
afforded him ‘‘minimal’’ credit for disclosing the issue
to the plaintiffs’ counsel, although the court determined
that this disclosure ‘‘fell far short.’’
We therefore are not convinced by Pattis’ argument
that ‘‘[t]he aggravating factors, even including the dis-
missed grievance, are outnumbered and outweighed
by the mitigating factors.’’ Pattis has not offered any
authority for the proposition that the number of mitigat-
ing and/or aggravating factors listed by the trial court
should be dispositive. Further, Pattis asserts that his
lack of any prior disciplinary history over the course
of nearly thirty years of practice ‘‘should have been
given enough weight on its own to prevent an upward
disciplinary departure.’’ Pattis also argues that the court
did not consider his character, including the testimony
of his character witnesses, which was in evidence, and
his interim rehabilitation. There is no indication, how-
ever, that the court failed to consider this evidence,
and the court was not required to ‘‘set forth its express
consideration of [specific] evidence in its memorandum
of decision . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Mills v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 228
Conn. App. 867; see also, e.g., Statewide Grievance
Committee v. Spirer, 247 Conn. 762, 788, 725 A.2d 948
(1999) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that trial court
failed to consider evidence when court did not specifi-
cally refer to that evidence in its memoranda of deci-
sion). Given the gravity of the interests involved in the
Grievance Committee v. Shluger, 230 Conn. 668, 677–78, 646 A.2d 781 (1994)
(evidence of prior reprimands was admissible at disciplinary proceeding
because it bore ‘‘reasonable relation to the issues before it’’).
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underlying cases and the vulnerability of the plaintiffs,
which the court found was the most compelling aggra-
vating factor, we cannot say that the court ignored the
evidence of mitigating factors in issuing a two week
suspension. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court acted within its discretion in suspending Pattis
from the practice of law for a period of two weeks.
The writ of error is denied.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.