State v. Angel A.

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State v. Angel A.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANGEL A.*
(AC 47294)
Moll, Westbrook and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, following a jury trial, of attempt to commit murder and other
crimes, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court
violated his right to jury unanimity by discharging the jury after accepting
its verdict but before disclosing to the parties that one of the jurors had
made an ex parte comment to the court in the deliberation room that she
felt ‘‘a little guilty about the attempted murder charge.’’ Held:

The defendant’s unpreserved claim that the trial court violated his right to
jury unanimity failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn.
233), as the juror’s comment was simply a statement about how she felt
about the verdict that could not reasonably be construed as an equivocation
or expression of reservation about it and did not indicate that she or any
other juror had not agreed to the verdict, and, because this court could not
infer that the juror intended her comment to inform the trial court that the
jury’s verdict was not unanimous, that court’s failure to disclose the comment
to the parties before discharging the jury did not amount to a constitu-
tional violation.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by conducting a limited inquiry
during a posttrial hearing about the juror’s comment and denying the defen-
dant’s request to inquire into why she made that comment, as the court’s
actions did not deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial but, rather,
satisfied the preliminary inquiry into possible juror misconduct required
under State v. Brown (235 Conn. 502), the juror having affirmed her verdict
and the court, on the basis of the juror’s testimony, having determined that
there was no indication that the jury’s verdict lacked unanimity or that juror
misconduct had occurred, and further questioning of the juror would have
constituted improper inquiry into the mental processes by which the verdict
was determined.
(One judge concurring and one judge dissenting in separate opinions)

Argued February 10—officially released October 7, 2025

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as
amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person
protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
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State v. Angel A.

Procedural History

Two part substitute information charging the defen-
dant, in the first part, with the crimes of attempt to
commit murder, assault in the first degree and criminal
violation of a protective order, and, in the second part,
with having committed an offense while on release,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Windham, geographical area number eleven, and tried
to the jury before Swords, J.; verdict and judgment of
guilty, from which the defendant appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Lisa J. Steele, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
Jonathan M. Sousa, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Anne F. Mahoney, state’s
attorney, and Louis Luba, Jr., supervisory assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. The defendant, Angel A., appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury
trial, of attempt to commit murder in violation of Gen-
eral Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-54a, assault in
the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
59 (a) (1), and criminal violation of a protective order
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-223 (c) (2).1 The
defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1)
violated his right to jury unanimity by discharging the
jury before disclosing to the parties a postverdict com-
ment made to the court by a member of the jury, C.A.,2
following the acceptance of the verdict that she ‘‘[felt]
a little guilty about the attempted murder charge,’’ and
1
On appeal, the defendant challenges only his conviction of attempt to
commit murder in violation of §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-54a.
2
‘‘The jurors are referred to by their initials to protect their privacy inter-
ests.’’ State v. Hughes, 341 Conn. 387, 406 n.13, 267 A.3d 81 (2021).
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State v. Angel A.

(2) violated his right to a fair trial by denying his request
to question C.A. at a posttrial hearing about why she
made that postverdict comment. We disagree and,
accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could
have found, and procedural history are relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. In August and September,
2016, the defendant was in a romantic relationship with
the victim, R.3 On August 30, 2016, the defendant and
R got into an argument, the police were called, and
protective orders were issued against both parties. On
September 24, 2016, the defendant and R again got into
a heated argument, which, this time, culminated in the
defendant’s approaching R from behind and stabbing
her in the back three times with a knife. R was able to
escape from her apartment and call the police. The
defendant, who followed R out of the apartment build-
ing, admitted to neighbors who were aiding R that he
had stabbed her. When the police arrived, he raised his
hands and yelled: ‘‘[I]t was me, Papi! It was me!’’ The
defendant was arrested and charged with attempt to
commit murder in violation of §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-
54a, assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59
(a) (1) and criminal violation of a protective order in
violation of § 53a-223 (c) (2).
The case was tried to a panel of six jury members
on November 28, 29 and 30, and December 3 and 4,
2018. On December 5, 2018, the jury found the defendant
In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
3

victims of family violence, we decline to identify the victim or others through
whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order or a restraining order that was issued or applied for,
or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
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State v. Angel A.

guilty on all counts. After the jury foreperson announced
the verdict, the following colloquy took place:
‘‘[The Court]: Well, first I’d like to ask, do the other
five members of the jury agree with the foreperson’s
verdict?
‘‘[The Jurors]: Yes.
‘‘[The Court]: Okay. And the record may reflect that
all of the jurors responded affirmatively. As a result of
that, the court orders that the jury verdict be accepted
and recorded. And with that . . . [a]nything further
from counsel at this point?
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: No, Your Honor.
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Nothing, Your Honor.
‘‘[The Court]: Okay. . . . Ladies and gentlemen, I
want to let you know that your jury service is ended.
You’re free from your oath at this point. . . . So, with
that, I thank you and ask you to go back into the jury
deliberation room for a short period of time. The clerk
has some paperwork that she needs to give you, and
after that, we’ll release you to go home. Thank you.’’
Thereafter, the members of the jury returned to the
deliberation room. The court, Swords, J., elected to
speak with the jurors prior to their dismissal and later
stated on the record: ‘‘When I first walked in, I told the
jurors I was there to answer any questions they might
have about the trial, or about the Connecticut court
system, or about the criminal justice system. I also told
them that I did not want to discuss their verdict or
anything about their deliberations. Several of the jurors
asked me questions about the court system. After
approximately five to seven minutes, one of the jury
members [C.A.] said, ‘I feel a little guilty about the
attempted murder charge.’ This jury member did not
indicate why she felt a little guilty, and I did not ask
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State v. Angel A.

her any questions about her comment. While I was with
the jury, no other jurors made any comments about
their verdict.’’
Two days after conversing with the jury, on Decem-
ber 7, 2018, the trial court held a telephone conference
with defense counsel and the prosecutor during which
it disclosed that, after the verdict was recorded but
before the jury left the deliberation room, C.A. had told
the court that she felt ‘‘a little guilty about the attempted
murder charge.’’ The trial court, sua sponte, scheduled
a posttrial hearing with the parties and C.A. to ‘‘make
further inquiry’’ into C.A.’s comment. At the hearing,
which took place on December 12, 2018, the following
colloquy took place between the court and C.A.:
‘‘[The Court]: Now, you will recall last Wednesday
that, at the conclusion of your deliberations, the jury
came out, and your foreperson . . . reported the ver-
dict . . . upon questioning from the clerk.
‘‘[C.A.]: Yes.
‘‘[The Court]: The clerk asked him what the verdict
was as to count one, attempted murder, [and] he said
guilty. As to count two, assault in the first degree, he
said guilty. As to count three, violation of a protective
order, he said guilty.
‘‘[C.A.]: Correct.
‘‘[The Court]: Do you recall that?
‘‘[C.A.]: Yes.
‘‘[The Court]: Okay. And then, immediately thereafter,
the clerk asked the jury as a whole, collectively, whether
they agreed with the verdict as reported by the foreper-
son.
‘‘[C.A.]: Yes.
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State v. Angel A.

‘‘[The Court]: Do you remember that? And did you
say yes when the clerk asked that question?
‘‘[C.A.]: I absolutely did.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Thereafter, outside the presence of C.A., defense
counsel made the following request: ‘‘Your Honor, I
would just ask if the court would inquire of the juror
. . . if her comments to the court after the verdict was
recorded were based on any reasons she may have
to believe that any juror may have not followed the
instructions given by the court.’’ The prosecutor objected
to any additional questioning on the ground that it is
not appropriate to inquire into the jury’s deliberative
process. Defense counsel countered: ‘‘[T]he reason why
I phrased the requested question the way I did was to
perhaps get close, but not to cross that line. I understand
the state’s position that it would be inappropriate for
the court to ask why the juror said that, but I think it
would be appropriate for the court to ask if there’s any
reason this juror may have to believe that any juror
failed to follow the instructions.’’
The trial court stated: ‘‘I will deny [defense counsel’s]
request. There is absolutely no indication from . . .
that sole comment that the juror said to me, that this
involved any misconduct on the part of anybody, either
as part of the jury or someone outside the jury. So, I
don’t think that your request is appropriate under the
limited scope of the hearing that the Supreme Court
has set out in State v. Brown [235 Conn. 502, 668 A.2d
1288 (1995)] and other cases. . . . So . . . [C.A.] is
free to leave.’’ The court explained that, in deciding the
scope of the posttrial hearing, it considered, inter alia,
Practice Book § 42-33, State v. Johnson, 288 Conn. 236,
951 A.2d 1257 (2008), State v. Gary, 273 Conn. 393, 869
A.2d 1236 (2005), and State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn.
416, 481 A.2d 56 (1984). The court concluded: ‘‘[T]he
court cannot find that there’s any evidence that this
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State v. Angel A.

juror did not vote guilty in the jury room [and] affirm
the verdict as entered by all of . . . her fellow jury
members. Any further inquiry would invade the deliber-
ative process and the state of mind of this juror. And
the court finds [that this] is not appropriate under the
circumstances.’’
On May 15, 2019, the trial court sentenced the defen-
dant to a total effective term of thirty years of incarcera-
tion, five years of which are a mandatory minimum.4
This appeal followed.
I
The defendant claims that the trial court violated his
right to jury unanimity by discharging the jury before
disclosing C.A.’s postverdict comment to the parties. He
argues that the court should have immediately disclosed
C.A.’s comment to the parties while the jury remained
in the deliberation room so that the defendant had an
additional opportunity to request a poll of the jurors.
The state, on the other hand, argues that the defendant’s
claim is unpreserved and fails to satisfy the test for
determining whether a defendant can prevail on a claim
of unpreserved constitutional error under State v. Gold-
ing, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as
modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d
1188 (2015). We agree with the state that the defendant’s
claim is unpreserved and fails under the third prong of
Golding.
We first consider whether the defendant preserved
his claim that the trial court improperly failed to dis-
close C.A.’s postverdict comment before discharging
the jury. With respect to preservation, the defendant
4
Specifically, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty years of
incarceration on the attempted murder charge; five years of incarceration
on the assault charge, which was mandatory minimum time; and five years
of incarceration on the charge of violation of a protective order. The court
ordered all sentences to run consecutively to one another.
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State v. Angel A.

states in his brief that he ‘‘preserved this issue by his
request to have [C.A.] questioned further to determine
whether her remark to the judge reflected juror miscon-
duct, which might include the inability to disregard a
news story she was exposed to during voir dire.5 If this
court disagrees, and to the extent that [the defendant]
did not explicitly base his request on his constitutional
rights, the risk that the jury’s verdict on the attempted
murder charge was not unanimous, or was tainted by
misconduct, is a constitutional issue which can be
reviewed by this court under [Golding].’’ (Footnote
added.) The state responds that the defendant’s claim
is unpreserved because the defendant (1) waived his
right to poll the jury and (2) did not raise any jury
unanimity issue to the court during the posttrial hearing.
Although the defendant did not exercise his right to
have the jury polled by making a timely request to do
so before the jurors separated or dispersed; see State
v. Pare, 253 Conn. 611, 621, 755 A.2d 180 (2000); the
defendant did not learn about C.A.’s postverdict com-
ment until after the time to request a poll had passed.
Nevertheless, the defendant never raised any issues to
the trial court concerning polling or lack of unanimity
of the verdict during the posttrial hearing or in a motion
for a new trial. See State v. Franklin, 162 Conn. App.
78, 93, 129 A.3d 770 (2015) (‘‘defendant did not preserve
[his challenge to the verdict] by moving for a new trial
pursuant to Practice Book § 42-53’’), cert. denied, 321
Conn. 905, 138 A.3d 281 (2016). Because the defendant
failed to raise this claim with the court, it is unpre-
served. Therefore, we next consider whether the claim
meets the requirements of Golding.
5
During voir dire, some venirepersons, including C.A. and the jury foreper-
son, A.B., were exposed to a brief news report on television showing a clip
about the case. During voir dire examination, however, both C.A. and A.B.
told the court that they could put the news report aside and decide the case
solely on the evidence they would hear in the courtroom. Aware that C.A.
and A.B. had been exposed to the news report, the prosecution and defense
counsel both accepted them to serve as members of the jury.
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State v. Angel A.

‘‘Pursuant to Golding, a [defendant] can prevail on
a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial
only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the
record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error;
(2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging
the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged
constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived
the [defendant] of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harm-
less error analysis, the [state] has failed to demonstrate
harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation
beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . The first two steps in
the Golding analysis address the reviewability of the
claim, [whereas] the last two steps involve the merits
of the claim.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Daniels, 228 Conn. App. 321,
342, 324 A.3d 820, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 926, 326 A.3d
248 (2024). ‘‘In the absence of any one of these condi-
tions, the defendant’s claim will fail. The appellate tribu-
nal is free, therefore, to respond to the defendant’s claim
by focusing on whichever condition is most relevant
in the particular circumstances.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Andaz, 181 Conn. App. 228,
232, 186 A.3d 66, cert. denied, 329 Conn. 901, 184 A.3d
1214 (2018); see also State v. Mejia, 233 Conn. 215, 232,
658 A.2d 571 (1995) (resolving defendant’s claim under
third prong of Golding without deciding whether claim
was of constitutional magnitude). We conclude that
the defendant’s claim—premised on his assertion of a
violation of his right to jury unanimity—fails under the
third prong of Golding.6
6
The parties disagree about whether the defendant’s claim satisfies the
second prong of Golding, i.e., whether the claim is of constitutional magni-
tude. Specifically, the defendant argues that ‘‘the risk that the jury’s verdict
on the attempted murder charge was not unanimous . . . is a constitutional
issue . . . .’’ See State v. Douglas C., 345 Conn. 421, 438, 285 A.3d 1067
(2022) (‘‘federal constitutional right to jury unanimity clearly applies in both
state and federal courts’’). The state, however, argues that the defendant
alleges only a violation of his right to have the jury polled, which is not of
constitutional magnitude. See, e.g., State v. J.R., 69 Conn. App. 767, 773 n.2,
797 A.2d 560 (‘‘the right to poll the jury is not of constitutional dimension’’),
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State v. Angel A.

Turning to the merits of the defendant’s claim, we
consider whether the trial court violated the defendant’s
right to jury unanimity by discharging the jury before
disclosing C.A.’s postverdict comment to the parties.
The defendant argues that, ‘‘[w]hen, during a postver-
dict, ex parte discussion with the jury, a trial judge
inadvertently learns anything that calls the unanimity
of the jury’s verdict into question, or suggests potential
misconduct, the trial judge has a duty to ask the jury
to remain in the deliberation room and immediately put
this information on the record so that the parties can
take whatever steps they deem appropriate . . . .’’ He
contends that, ‘‘[h]ad the trial court asked the jury to
remain in the deliberation room and told the parties
about [C.A.’s] remarks, the defense could have exer-
cised its rights under Practice Book § 42-31 . . . to
individually poll the jurors to determine whether their
verdict was truly unanimous.’’
The state argues that, even if the trial court had
informed the parties of C.A.’s postverdict statement
immediately, any subsequent polling request would
have been untimely because, after the verdict was
recorded and before the court sent the jury back to the
deliberation room, the court released the jurors from
their oath and thereafter engaged in ex parte conversa-
tion with them about the case. Thus, the state contends
that the jury already had been ‘‘discharged’’ for the
purposes of Practice Book § 42-31.
cert. denied, 260 Conn. 935, 802 A.2d 89 (2002). Because we choose to focus
on the third prong of Golding, we do not need to resolve whether the
defendant’s claim invokes only his right to have the jury polled or, more
broadly, alleges a violation of his constitutional right to jury unanimity and,
therefore, satisfies the second prong of Golding.
Furthermore, even if we were to agree with the defendant and the dis-
senting judge that the defendant preserved his claim before the trial court
or was not required to do so such that resort to Golding review is unneces-
sary, such a conclusion would not change the outcome of this appeal because
we reject the defendant’s claim on its merits.
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State v. Angel A.

Practice Book § 42-31 provides in relevant part: ‘‘After
a verdict has been returned and before the jury has
been discharged, the jury shall be polled at the request
of any party or upon the judicial authority’s own motion.
. . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Our Supreme Court has stated
that a jury is not discharged for the purposes of § 42-
31 until its members have separated or dispersed. See
State v. Pare, supra, 253 Conn. 621 (‘‘[A] trial court’s
obligation to poll the jury upon a timely request from
either party is mandatory. . . . [A] jury is not dis-
charged for the purpose of § 42-31 until its individual
members separate or disperse and, therefore, a request
submitted prior thereto is timely.’’). The court in Pare,
however, also favorably cited federal case law
instructing that, if ‘‘a jury remains as an undispersed
unit within the control of the court and with no oppor-
tunity to mingle with or discuss the case with others, it
is undischarged and may be recalled.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Id., 630.

Although the jury in the present case remained in the
deliberation room under the effective supervision of
the trial court when C.A. made her postverdict comment
to the judge, whether the jury had been ‘‘discharged’’
at that time for the purposes of Practice Book § 42-
31 is not entirely clear. Under Pare, once jurors are
effectively discharged from their obligations and free
to discuss the case with nonjurors, any subsequent poll
would be ineffective. The trial judge is a nonjuror, and
the prohibition against a judge talking ex parte with
one or more jurors had been violated. Nothing in § 42-
31 speaks to the situation here, in which the judge
already has gone into the deliberation room and con-
versed with the jurors. In Pare, the trial court had not
spoken to the jurors after they left the courtroom and,
thus, that decision provides only limited guidance
regarding the circumstances at issue in the present case.
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State v. Angel A.

Nevertheless, even if we assume, without deciding,
that the jurors in the present case had not been dis-
charged for purposes of polling, despite the ex parte
discussion with the trial judge, we would conclude that,
under the facts of this case, the judge was not required
to disclose C.A.’s comment before allowing the jury to
disperse.

As a threshold matter, we set forth the standard of
review. ‘‘The scope of our appellate review depends
upon the proper characterization of the [actions taken]
by the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 281, 864 A.2d 666 (2004),
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848, 126 S. Ct. 102, 163 L. Ed. 2d
116 (2005). In the present case, the issue is whether
the trial court violated the defendant’s right to jury
unanimity by discharging the jury after C.A. told the
judge that she felt ‘‘a little guilty about the attempted
murder charge.’’ Whether the trial court properly dis-
charged the jury presents a question of law over which
our review is plenary. See State v. Colon, supra, 282.
Therefore, ‘‘we must decide whether [the trial court’s]
conclusions are legally and logically correct and find
support in the facts that appear in the record.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. Nevertheless, the court’s
findings as to the circumstances surrounding the dis-
charge of the jury and C.A.’s comment are findings of
fact that will not be disturbed unless they are clearly
erroneous. See id. ‘‘A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
when there is no evidence in the record to support it
. . . or when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

The defendant argues that the trial court had a duty to
inform the parties of C.A.’s comment before discharging
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State v. Angel A.

the jury so that the defendant had an additional opportu-
nity to request a poll of the jury.7 We conclude that,
under the circumstances of this case, the court did not
have such a duty.
Generally, ‘‘[i]n a criminal trial, ex parte conversa-
tions between the judge and jury are constitutionally
prohibited.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Kamel, 115 Conn. App. 338, 349 n.2, 972 A.2d 780
(2009). It is common practice, however, ‘‘for judges to
enter the jury room after a verdict has been returned
to thank the jury for its service and converse with jurors
about their experience . . . .’’ Id. ‘‘Answering jurors’
questions, to promote good public relations, and solicit-
ing feedback regarding the performance of members
of the bar are within the trial court’s administrative
functions and are permissible . . . as long as the judge
fully discloses his [or her] intention to speak with the
jury and discloses the subject matter to be discussed.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Durant, 94
Conn. App. 219, 231–32, 892 A.2d 302 (2006), aff’d, 281
Conn. 548, 916 A.2d 2 (2007).
Connecticut courts have not yet addressed what duty,
if any, a trial court owes parties when, after the verdict
is recorded but before the jury has dispersed, a member
of the jury makes an ex parte comment related to the
verdict. The United States Supreme Court has stated
the following concerning the disclosure of ex parte
communications: ‘‘When an ex parte communication
7
Although, after the jury foreperson announced the verdict, the courtroom
clerk asked the jurors, collectively, whether they agreed with the verdict,
and they collectively answered affirmatively, that inquiry does not constitute
polling the jury. Pursuant to Practice Book § 42-31, ‘‘[a] poll shall be con-
ducted by the clerk of the court by asking each juror individually whether
the verdict announced is such juror’s verdict.’’ (Emphasis added.); see also
State v. Pare, supra, 253 Conn. 637 (distinguishing between ‘‘the jury’s
collective assent to the verdict,’’ which does not constitute polling, and ‘‘an
individual interrogation,’’ which is required under § 42-31 (emphasis
added)).
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[between judge and juror] relates to some aspect of
the trial, the trial judge generally should disclose the
communication to counsel for all parties. The prejudi-
cial effect of a failure to do so, however, can normally
be determined by a [posttrial] hearing. The adequacy
of any remedy is determined solely by its ability to
mitigate constitutional error, if any, that has occurred.
. . . [Posttrial] hearings are adequately tailored to this
task.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) Rushen v.
Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 119–20, 104 S. Ct. 453, 78 L. Ed.
2d 267 (1983).8 Although the court in Rushen addressed
ex parte communication that occurs during the course
of a trial, we are persuaded that this rule also should
apply if an ex parte communication occurs between
the trial judge and a juror after the verdict is recorded
but before the jury has dispersed because, at that time,
the jury remains under the effective supervision of the
trial court.
In Rushen v. Spain, supra, 464 U.S. 114, evidence
was introduced during trial that a member of the Black
Panther Party, who was neither a party nor a witness
at trial, had previously been convicted of a murder that
was unrelated to the crimes at issue in the case. Id.,
115–16. After the defendant was convicted and sen-
tenced, defense counsel learned of ex parte communi-
cations that occurred during the trial between the trial
judge and a member of the jury, during which the juror
disclosed that she recognized the name of the Black
8
We note that some federal courts have ‘‘recognized that a court’s ex
parte communication with the jury will not require a reversal where substan-
tive rights of parties have not been adversely affected.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) United States v. Mann, 685 F.3d 714, 721 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 568 U.S. 1029, 133 S. Ct. 670, 184 L. Ed. 2d 464 (2012); see also
United States v. Balderas, Docket Nos. 93-1201 and 93-1202, 1994 WL 144449,
*4 (6th Cir. April 21, 1994) (unpublished opinion); United States v. de Her-
nandez, 745 F.2d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 1984). We find this rule to be consistent
with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Rushen v. Spain, supra,
464 U.S. 119–20.
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State v. Angel A.

Panther Party member as the man who had been con-
victed of murdering her childhood friend. Id., 116. ‘‘The
judge [had] asked her . . . whether her disposition of
the case would be affected [and] [s]he assured him that
it would not.’’ Id. Defense counsel, upon learning about
these ex parte communications, ‘‘moved for a new trial.
At a hearing on the motion, [the] juror . . . testified
that she had not remembered her friend’s death during
voir dire and that her subsequent recollection did not
affect her ability impartially to judge [the defendant’s]
innocence or guilt. She admitted telling other jurors
that she personally knew [the Black Panther Party mem-
ber’s] murder victim, but denied making any disparag-
ing remarks about the Black Panther Party. The trial
judge concluded that the ex parte communications
lacked any significance and that [the defendant] suf-
fered no prejudice therefrom. . . . Accordingly, he
denied the motion for new trial.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court con-
cluded: ‘‘The [posttrial] hearing in this case created
more than adequate support for the conclusion that
[the juror’s] presence on the jury did not prejudice [the
defendant]. The [murder of the juror’s friend] was not
related to the crimes at issue in the trial. [The member
of the Black Panther Party who had been convicted of
the murder of the juror’s friend] was not connected
to any of the offenses for which [the defendant] was
convicted and he did not testify at the trial. [The juror]
. . . repeatedly testified that, upon recollection, the
incident did not affect her impartiality. She turned to the
most natural source of information—the trial judge—
to disclose the information she should have but failed
to recall during voir dire. Their ex parte communication
was innocuous. They did not discuss any fact in contro-
versy or any law applicable to the case. The judge simply
assured her that there was no cause for concern. Thus,
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the state courts had convincing evidence that the jury’s
deliberations, as a whole, were not biased by the undis-
closed communication of [the juror’s] recollection. . . .
[T]herefore . . . the alleged constitutional error [was]
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Footnote omit-
ted.) Id., 120–21.
We additionally find instructive United States v. Jef-
ferson, 258 F.3d 405 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
967, 122 S. Ct. 379, 151 L. Ed. 2d 289 (2001), in which
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
addressed the trial court’s handling of a juror’s postver-
dict comment concerning the verdict. In Jefferson, ‘‘the
jury foreperson announced that they had reached a
unanimous decision. The form of the verdict, signed by
all twelve members of the jury was read aloud in open
court. ‘We the jury find the defendant . . . guilty as
charged.’ . . . Upon its own motion, the court then
polled all twelve members of the jury individually, [ask-
ing] ‘whether this is your verdict’ to which all twelve
jurors answered affirmatively. Only after this did a juror
indicate that she had voted guilty but had reservations.
Upon hearing the juror express that she had reserva-
tions, the court inquired of the juror, ‘[i]s this your
verdict?’ whereupon the juror nodded her head affirma-
tively. The court then received, announced and
recorded the verdict.’’ Id., 411. The defendant subse-
quently moved for a new trial on the ground that the
verdict was not unanimous, but the court denied the
motion. Id., 410.
On appeal, the defendant in Jefferson claimed that
the ‘‘juror’s expression of reservations concerning her
verdict during the polling of the jury indicated a lack
of unanimity and the subsequent questioning employed
by the trial judge was in violation of [rule 31 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure].’’9 Id. The Fifth
9
Similar to Practice Book § 42-31, rule 31 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides in relevant part: ‘‘(d) Jury Poll. After a verdict is returned
but before the jury is discharged, the court must on a party’s request, or
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State v. Angel A.

Circuit stated: ‘‘While a juror’s expression of reserva-
tions may indicate the need for further inquiry to ascer-
tain with certainty that the juror assents to the verdict
as rendered, simply expressing reservations in conjunc-
tion with a guilty verdict, in and of itself, is not sufficient
to indicate a lack of unanimity. The standard of beyond
a reasonable doubt does not require a juror to find with
absolutely certainty that a defendant is guilty. A juror
may have reservations and still find the evidence pre-
sented to be sufficient to meet the burden established
by the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
Here, prompted by the juror’s guilty verdict and expres-
sion of reservations, the trial judge’s inquiry to ascertain
with certainty the juror’s assent to the guilty verdict
was an appropriate exercise of control over the trial
proceedings. The trial court correctly denied [the defen-
dant’s] motion for new trial . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.)
Id., 411–12.
In the present case, C.A.’s postverdict, ex parte com-
ment to the trial judge that she ‘‘[felt] a little guilty
about the attempted murder charge’’ relates to an aspect
of the trial, namely, the verdict. Similar to the ex parte
communications in Rushen v. Spain, supra, 464 U.S.
114, however, C.A.’s comment did not raise constitu-
tional concerns. C.A. did not indicate that she, or any
other member of the jury, had not agreed to the verdict.
Her statement cannot reasonably be construed as an
equivocation or expression of reservation about the
verdict. Rather, C.A. simply told the trial judge how she
felt about the verdict to which she had agreed. Similar
to the juror’s comment in Jefferson, C.A.’s expression
of her feelings in conjunction with the guilty verdict,
in and of itself, is not sufficient to indicate a lack of
unanimity. Because the trial court did not inquire about
may on its own, poll the jurors individually. If the poll reveals a lack of
unanimity, the court may direct the jury to deliberate further or may declare
a mistrial and discharge the jury.’’ Fed. R. Crim. P. 31 (d).
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State v. Angel A.

C.A.’s comment at the time it was made or during the
posttrial hearing, any inferences we may draw about
what C.A. meant would be purely speculative. C.A.’s
comment expressed reservations about the verdict, but
reservations do not necessarily mean that she did not
find that the state had met its burden of proving the
attempted murder charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
See United States v. Jefferson, supra, 258 F.3d 411.
Because we cannot infer that C.A. intended her com-
ment to inform the judge that the verdict was not unani-
mous, the judge’s failure to disclose C.A.’s comment to
the parties before discharging the jury does not amount
to a constitutional violation.
Even if C.A.’s comment had indicated a risk that
the verdict lacked unanimity, the trial court’s posttrial
hearing created adequate support for the conclusion
that the verdict was, in fact, unanimous. At the posttrial
hearing, the court, similar to the court in Jefferson,
asked C.A. whether, when the clerk asked the members
of the jury if they agreed with the verdict, she had
answered affirmatively. C.A. replied: ‘‘I absolutely did.’’
(Emphasis added.) Because C.A. affirmed her verdict
at the posttrial hearing and her comment did not reason-
ably implicate any other members of the jury, the post-
trial hearing mitigated any concern that the verdict
lacked unanimity. This is particularly so in light of the
fact that the court had inquired as to whether the jurors
collectively accepted the verdict provided by the fore-
person, and they collectively indicated in the affirmative
that they agreed with the verdict. Even if the judge,
despite relieving the jurors of their oath10 before con-
versing with them, could have elected to disclose C.A.’s
10
The jurors’ oath, as set forth in General Statutes § 1-25, provides: ‘‘You
solemnly swear or solemnly and sincerely affirm, as the case may be, that
you will, without respect of any persons or favor of any person, decide this
case between the state of Connecticut and the defendant (or defendants)
based on the evidence given in court and on the laws of this state, as
explained by the judge; that you will not talk to each other about this case
until instructed to do so; that you will listen to and consider what the other
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State v. Angel A.

comment to the parties before the jury dispersed and
granted the defendant an additional opportunity to
request a poll of the jurors, we conclude that the court
did not violate the defendant’s right to jury unanimity
by discharging the jury and holding a posttrial hearing
to confirm C.A.’s verdict.11
Our review of the record reveals that the trial court
mitigated any risk that the verdict was not unanimous
by disclosing C.A.’s comment to the parties and subse-
quently holding a posttrial hearing to confirm her ver-
dict. We therefore conclude that the court did not vio-
late the defendant’s right to jury unanimity by
discharging the jury before disclosing C.A.’s comment
to the parties. Thus, the defendant’s claim fails under
the third prong of Golding because he failed to prove
that the alleged constitutional violation exists.
jurors have to say in deliberations about this case; that you will not speak
to anyone else, or allow anyone else to speak to you, about this case until
you have been discharged by the court; and that when you reach a decision,
you will not disclose the decision until it is announced in court; so help
you God or upon penalty of perjury.’’
11
It is important to note that the record does not disclose what behaviors
the jurors engaged in prior to the judge’s entering the deliberation room.
Having been released from their oath, the jurors were free to speak about
the case and their verdict on their cell phones with nonjurors, potentially
with relatives, friends, the jury alternates, employers, the courtroom clerk
who was ordered to bring some documents to them, courthouse marshals,
and groups comprised of only some, not all, members of the jury. In other
words, the jurors could have discussed the case with ‘‘outsiders’’ other than
the judge. The jurors also were free to look up news and social media
reports concerning the case. Finally, we do not know how many of the
jurors heard C.A.’s comment to the judge. In short, there were a number
of ways that the sanctity of the jurors’ deliberations could have already
been tainted prior to C.A.’s comment that would have rendered the reliability
of any subsequent jury poll problematic.
We share the concerns expressed in the concurring opinion, and we would
strongly encourage the Rules Committee of the Superior Court, which is
the ‘‘appropriate forum in which to fully and fairly consider any potential
amendment to the procedural rules’’; Newland v. Commissioner of Correc-
tion, 322 Conn. 664, 686 n.7, 142 A.3d 1095 (2016); to evaluate current
practices regarding the polling of jurors and to consider whether changes
to Practice Book §§ 42-31 and 42-32 are warranted.
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State v. Angel A.

II
The defendant next claims that the trial court violated
his constitutional right to a fair trial by denying his
request to question C.A. at the posttrial hearing about
why she made a postverdict comment to the judge that
she felt ‘‘a little guilty about the attempted murder
charge.’’ He argues that C.A. may have felt guilty
because juror misconduct had occurred and, further,
that, because the judge did not ask C.A. why she made
that comment, there was ‘‘no evidence upon which the
trial court could rule out the possibility of misconduct.’’
We reject the defendant’s claim that the judge was
required to inquire into why C.A. made the comment.
Our Supreme Court, in State v. Brown, supra, 235
Conn. 502, held that ‘‘a trial court must, when presented
with any allegations of jury misconduct, conduct a pre-
liminary inquiry, sua sponte if necessary, in order to
assure itself that a defendant’s constitutional right to
a trial before an impartial jury has been fully protected.
[This] requirement . . . still leaves the form and scope
of such an inquiry to be determined by the trial court
within the exercise of its discretion. . . . In the proper
circumstances, the trial court may discharge its obliga-
tion simply by notifying the defendant and the state
of the allegations, providing them with an adequate
opportunity to respond and stating on the record its
reasons for the limited form and scope of the proceed-
ings held. In other circumstances, the trial court itself
may need to cause an investigation of the allegations
of jury misconduct to be conducted through informal
or formal means.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 528–29.
The court in Brown articulated the following factors
to guide trial courts in exercising their discretion as to
the form and scope of an inquiry into allegations of
jury misconduct: ‘‘The first factor, the private interest
involved, focuses on the criminal defendant. . . . The
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State v. Angel A.

second factor, the risk of deprivation of a defendant’s
constitutional right to a trial before an impartial jury,
varies with the seriousness and the credibility of the
allegations of jury misconduct. The more obviously
serious and credible the allegations, the more extensive
an inquiry is required; frivolous or incredible allega-
tions may be disposed of summarily. . . . The third
factor focuses on the state’s interest. . . . [A]fter a jury
verdict has been accepted . . . state interests . . .
favor proceedings limited in form and scope. . . . It is
the trial court that must, in the exercise of its discretion,
weigh the relevant factors and determine the proper
balance between them.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 530–32.
‘‘Our review on appeal is limited to the inquiry of
whether the court’s review of the alleged jury miscon-
duct can be characterized fairly as an abuse of discre-
tion.’’ State v. Kamel, supra, 115 Conn. App. 343.
When a trial court holds a postverdict hearing, ‘‘[i]t
is well established that evidence as to the expressions
and arguments of the jurors in their deliberations and
evidence as to their own motives, beliefs, mistakes and
mental operations generally, in arriving at their verdict
is excludable . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Gary, supra, 273 Conn. 415. This rule
comes from Practice Book § 42-33, which provides in
relevant part: ‘‘Upon an inquiry into the validity of a
verdict, no evidence shall be received to show the effect
of any statement, conduct, event or condition upon the
mind of a juror nor any evidence concerning mental
processes by which the verdict was determined. . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) ‘‘That rule has been aptly described
as applying the parol evidence rule to a jury’s verdict,
so that their outward verdict as finally and formally
made, and not their prior and private intentions, is taken
as exclusively constituting the act. . . . That the ver-
dict may have been the result of compromise, or a
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State v. Angel A.

mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But verdicts
cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such
matters.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Gary, supra, 415–16.
In the present case, after the verdict was recorded,
C.A. told the trial judge that she felt ‘‘a little guilty about
the attempted murder charge.’’ The court, sua sponte,
held a posttrial hearing during which it asked C.A.
whether she affirmed that she had agreed to the guilty
verdict. C.A. testified that she ‘‘absolutely’’ did. The
court thereafter did not ask C.A. any additional ques-
tions. The court’s actions clearly satisfied the prelimi-
nary inquiry required by Brown. On the basis of C.A.’s
testimony at the posttrial hearing, the court determined
that there was no indication on the part of C.A. that
the verdict lacked unanimity or that juror misconduct
had occurred. The court further determined that any
further questions about why C.A. made that postverdict
comment would constitute improper inquiry into the
mental processes by which the verdict was determined.
The defendant argues that C.A. may have felt guilty
about the attempted murder charge because juror mis-
conduct occurred such as another juror referencing a
news report,12 racial animus, or other consideration of
extraneous information. He also contends that ‘‘[t]he
state’s interests would not have been harmed by con-
firming what [C.A.] had said and asking, in general
12
The defendant argues that C.A.’s postverdict comment raises concerns
about juror misconduct because C.A. and the jury foreperson, A.B., had
been exposed to the news report about the case during voir dire and,
therefore, C.A.’s comment indicates that either she or A.B. may have improp-
erly referenced that news report during deliberations. See footnote 5 of this
opinion. The trial court addressed concerns regarding the exposure to the
news report before the trial began, and there is no indication that the news
report affected either juror’s impartiality during the trial or deliberations.
Any inference that C.A.’s postverdict comment meant that either she or
A.B. had referenced the news report during deliberations would be purely
speculative. Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s argument.
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State v. Angel A.

terms, if misconduct had occurred.’’ Verdicts, however,
‘‘cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry’’ into the
deliberation process. (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Gary, supra, 273 Conn. 416. At the posttrial
hearing, the trial court confirmed C.A.’s verdict, and
C.A.’s postverdict comment did not ‘‘obviously’’ indicate
juror misconduct such that it required a ‘‘more exten-
sive’’ inquiry. State v. Brown, supra, 235 Conn. 531; see
also State v. Gary, supra, 417 (‘‘the defendant takes
great pains to characterize the thoughts and discussions
described in [the juror’s postverdict] letter as juror mis-
conduct, which is subject to judicial inquiry, rather than
as the mental operations of [that juror] and the other
jurors, into which the courts may not delve’’); State v.
Castonguay, supra, 194 Conn. 437 (‘‘[i]n the absence
of a fair indication to the contrary, the jury is presumed
to have followed the instructions of the court . . .
[and] the inquiry [into juror misconduct] must be nar-
row’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Josephson v.
Meyers, 180 Conn. 302, 310–11, 429 A.2d 877 (1980)
(court may not consider evidence that juror was unduly
influenced by statements of fellow jurors). Thus, we
conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in
conducting a limited inquiry about C.A.’s postverdict
comment and denying the defendant’s request to inquire
into why C.A. made that comment. See State v. Alston,
272 Conn. 432, 454, 862 A.2d 817 (2005) (concluding
that trial court did not abuse its discretion by conduct-
ing limited inquiry into allegation of juror misconduct).
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion KELLER, J., concurred.