L. F. v. S. F.

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
L. F. v. S. F.

L. F. v. S. F.*
(AC 47318)
Alvord, Suarez and Palmer, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff mother appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying her
request for leave pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 25-26 (g)) to file a motion
to modify custody of the parties’ minor child. The plaintiff claimed that the
court, without holding a hearing, improperly denied her request for leave,
which alleged that the custody and visitation order in place contained an
impermissible delegation of judicial authority. Held:

The trial court improperly denied the plaintiff’s request for leave to file a
motion for modification and, on the basis of R. H. v. M. H. (350 Conn. 432),
the plaintiff was entitled to a hearing on her motion for modification, as she
properly raised the claim of impermissible delegation of judicial authority
in her motion for modification appended to her request for leave, consistent
with the requirements of Practice Book § 25-26 (g).

Argued May 20—officially released August 26, 2025

Procedural History

Application for custody of the parties’ minor child,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Middlesex, where the court,
Diana, J., awarded the parties joint legal custody of
the minor child; thereafter, the court, Albis, J., granted
the defendant’s motion for modification of custody and
his request to issue an order pursuant to Practice Book
§ 25-26 (g), requiring the plaintiff to file a request for
leave prior to filing any motion for modification; subse-
quently, the court, Sanchez-Figueroa, J., denied the
plaintiff’s request for leave to file a motion for modifica-
* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as
amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person
protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
L. F. v. S. F.

tion, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed;
further proceedings.
L. F., self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The self-represented plaintiff, L. F.,
appeals following the court’s denial of her request for
leave pursuant to Practice Book § 25-26 (g).1 The plain-
tiff sought permission to file a motion for modification
of custody with respect to the minor child, issue of the
marriage between the plaintiff and S. F., the defendant
in these postdissolution proceedings.2 On appeal, the
plaintiff claims that the court, without holding a hearing,
improperly denied her request for leave, which primar-
ily alleged that the custody and visitation order in place
contained an impermissible delegation of judicial
authority.3 See R. H. v. M. H., 350 Conn. 432, 444, 324
1
Practice Book § 25-26 (g) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon or after entry
of judgment of a dissolution of marriage . . . the judicial authority may
order that any further motion for modification of a final custody or visitation
order shall be appended with a request for leave to file such motion and
shall conform to the requirements of subsection (e) of this section. The
specific factual and legal basis for the claimed modification shall be sworn
to by the moving party or other person having personal knowledge of the
facts recited therein. If no objection to the request has been filed by any
party within ten days of the date of service of such request on the other
party, the request for leave may be determined by the judicial authority
with or without hearing. If an objection is filed, the request shall be placed
on the next short calendar, unless the judicial authority otherwise directs.
At such hearing, the moving party must demonstrate probable cause that
grounds exist for the motion to be granted. . . .’’
2
The defendant did not file a brief in this court. On February 24, 2025,
this court ordered that this appeal shall be considered on the basis of the
plaintiff’s brief and appendix, the record, as defined by Practice Book § 60-
4, and oral argument by the plaintiff.
3
The plaintiff raises several other claims on appeal, all of which are
untimely and constitute collateral attacks on prior orders of the court. Many
of the plaintiff’s untimely claims challenge an October, 2022 decision of the
trial court. That decision was a final judgment, from which the plaintiff had
twenty days to appeal. See Practice Book § 63-1 (appeal must be filed within
twenty days of date notice of decision was given); see also, e.g., Martowska
v. White, 149 Conn. App. 314, 321–22, 87 A.3d 1201 (2014) (plaintiff could
not collaterally attack visitation orders when time to appeal such orders
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
L. F. v. S. F.

A.3d 720 (2024). We reverse the judgment of the trial
court denying the plaintiff’s request for leave and we
remand the matter for a hearing on the plaintiff’s motion
for modification.
The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history. The parties’ marriage was dissolved
in Utah in 2018. The parties have one minor child, who
was born in March, 2008. In May, 2021, the plaintiff
commenced proceedings in the Connecticut Superior
Court by filing, inter alia, an application for custody of
the minor child. The court, Diana, J., awarded the par-
ties joint legal custody of the minor child and set a
parenting time schedule whereby the parties exercised
parenting time on a weekly rotation. Subsequently, the
defendant filed a motion for modification of custody
and parenting time, alleging a substantial change in
circumstances on the basis that the child had been
refusing to participate in the weekly parenting time
with the plaintiff.
On October 25, 2022, the court, Albis, J., granted the
defendant’s motion for modification and entered orders
in which it left unchanged the order of joint legal cus-
tody but awarded the defendant primary physical cus-
tody and final decision-making authority with respect
to the child (October, 2022 decision). The court entered
the following orders regarding visitation between the
plaintiff and the child: ‘‘The [plaintiff] shall have reason-
able contact with the child by telephone call, text mes-
sage, and or video call. If the [plaintiff] makes a reason-
able request of the [defendant] to facilitate such
had expired). The plaintiff did not file the present appeal until January,
2024, and she appeals only from the order of the court denying her request
for leave to file a motion for modification. Accordingly, to the extent the
plaintiff seeks in this appeal to challenge the orders contained within the
October, 2022 decision, such a challenge constitutes an untimely and imper-
missible collateral attack. See Hebrand v. Hebrand, 216 Conn. App. 210,
225, 284 A.3d 702 (2022).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
L. F. v. S. F.

contact, then the [defendant] shall take reasonable mea-
sures to do so. The child shall be free to initiate contact
with the [plaintiff] on her part, and [the defendant] shall
do nothing to discourage or impede such contact at the
child’s initiative. The [plaintiff] shall have only such in-
person visitation with the child as the parties may agree.
[The defendant] shall not unreasonably withhold agree-
ment to a visit, but in making his decision on whether
to agree, he shall be entitled to take into account, among
other factors that he deems relevant, the advice of the
child’s mental health providers.’’4 Additionally, the court
granted the defendant’s request to issue a Practice Book
§ 25-26 (g) order, pursuant to which the plaintiff would
be required to file a request for leave prior to filing any
motion for modification. The plaintiff did not appeal
from the October, 2022 decision.5
In March and July, 2023, the plaintiff filed three
requests for leave to file motions for modification, all of
which were denied.6 On December 13, 2023, the plaintiff
4
The court also ordered the plaintiff to take a Breathalyzer test prior to
the start of, and after the conclusion of, any in-person visitation.
5
In November, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion to open the judgment,
which was denied in January, 2023.
6
In March, 2023, the plaintiff filed a request for leave to file a motion for
modification, to which the defendant objected. The court, Albis, J., denied
the plaintiff’s request for leave. On July 11, 2023, the plaintiff filed a second
request for leave to file a motion for modification. Therein, she requested
that the court remove the request for leave requirement, expressing her
understanding that the provision should have been removed following the
termination of the parties’ participation in the Intensive Case Management
program. The defendant filed an objection to the request for leave. The
court, Albis, J., denied the request for leave, explaining that no hearing was
necessary because, inter alia, the request for leave failed to comply with
the requirements of Practice Book § 25-26 (g). On July 25, 2023, the plaintiff
filed an application for an emergency ex parte order of custody, which was
denied that same day, and a third request for leave to file a motion for
modification, to which the defendant did not file an objection. The court,
Albis, J., denied the request for leave on August 10, 2023.
On August 14, 2023, the plaintiff filed an appeal with this court, identifying
on the appeal form that the decision being appealed was issued on July 25,
2023. The only decision issued on that date was the court’s denial of the
plaintiff’s application for an emergency ex parte order of custody. On August
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
L. F. v. S. F.

filed a fourth request for leave to file a motion for
modification, in which she identified the October, 2022
decision as the order that she was requesting to be
modified. In her appended Judicial Branch motion for
modification form, she indicated, inter alia, that the
order provided visitation ‘‘at the discretion of [the
defendant].’’ She checked the box to indicate that a
substantial change in circumstances had occurred and
attached a written motion for modification. Therein,
she alleged, inter alia, that the court, in its October,
2022 decision, improperly had delegated its judicial
authority in permitting the defendant to decide the
nature and scope of the plaintiff’s visitation with the
minor child. The plaintiff cited R. H. v. M. H., 219 Conn.
App. 716, 296 A.3d 243 (2023), which was issued by this
court in June, 2023.
In R. H., this court concluded that the trial court
impermissibly had delegated its judicial authority when
it issued an order that authorized the father to suspend
visitation between the child and the mother in the event
that the father, after consultation with the child’s thera-
pist, reasonably determined that visitation was causing
negative behavioral or emotional consequences for the
child. Id., 740. In July, 2023, this court granted the plain-
tiff’s motion for reconsideration en banc. Prior to oral
argument en banc before this court, the appeal was
transferred to our Supreme Court. See R. H. v. M. H.,
supra, 350 Conn. 438. Our Supreme Court, in its decision
released in August, 2024, concluded that the challenged
order constituted an impermissible delegation of judi-
cial authority on the basis that ‘‘the trial court’s visita-
tion order effectively removes the court entirely from
24, 2023, the plaintiff filed two motions for articulation, seeking articulation
of the court’s denials of the plaintiff’s three requests for leave and her
application for an emergency ex parte order of custody. On October 31,
2023, the court issued two articulations. On December 12, 2023, the plaintiff
withdrew the appeal.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
L. F. v. S. F.

the decision-making process and delegates its authority
to the plaintiff to suspend visitation.’’ Id., 445.
In the present case, the plaintiff, in her fourth request
for leave, asked the court to modify the existing orders
pursuant to this court’s decision in R. H. v. M. H., supra,
219 Conn. App. 716. The defendant filed an objection
to the request for leave. On January 7, 2024, the court,
Sanchez-Figueroa, J., summarily denied the request for
leave. This appeal, challenging the court’s denial of the
December, 2023 request for leave, followed.
Following the filing of this appeal, the plaintiff filed
a motion for articulation. On February 29, 2024, the
court issued an order articulating its denial of the
request for leave. The court stated, inter alia, that the
request was denied without the necessity of a hearing
on the basis that the plaintiff should have raised her
claim that the court’s October, 2022 visitation order
constituted an improper delegation of judicial authority
either by a motion for reconsideration or ‘‘an appeal of
that decision at the appropriate time.’’ The court found
that the request for leave constituted an improper chal-
lenge to the court’s October, 2022 decision.7
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improp-
erly denied her request for leave to file a motion for
modification, citing our Supreme Court’s decision in R.
H. v. M. H., supra, 350 Conn. 432. We conclude, under
the circumstances of this case, that the plaintiff is enti-
tled to a hearing on her motion for modification.8
7
The court also stated that it had denied the request for the following
reasons: the request failed to comply with the requirements of Practice
Book § 25-26 (e) and (g), the plaintiff’s representation that the defendant
had cancelled and modified visits several times was not properly addressed
with a motion for modification, and the request for leave failed to allege a
sufficient factual and legal basis for the requested modification of the court’s
October, 2022 decision.
8
The plaintiff had been ordered to comply with Practice Book § 25-26,
which ‘‘governs a litigant’s ability to file a postdissolution motion for modifi-
cation of a custody or visitation order.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
J. Y. v. M. R., 215 Conn. App. 648, 669, 283 A.3d 520 (2022). See footnote
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
L. F. v. S. F.

The plaintiff properly raised the claim of impermissi-
ble delegation of judicial authority in a motion for modi-
fication appended to a request for leave, consistent with
the requirements of Practice Book § 25-26 (g). She cited
pending appellate proceedings, in which the substantial
issues raised therein subsequently were resolved by
our Supreme Court in its decision concluding that a
visitation order similar to that issued in the present
case constituted an impermissible delegation of judicial
authority. The plaintiff, on the basis of R. H. v. M. H.,
supra, 350 Conn. 432, is entitled to a hearing on her
motion for modification. See also Milot v. Milot, 234
Conn. App. 473, 477–79, A.3d (2025).
The judgment denying the plaintiff’s December, 2023
request for leave to file a motion for modification is
reversed and the case is remanded for a hearing on the
plaintiff’s motion for modification.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 of this opinion. This court previously has held that ‘‘[t]he plain language
of Practice Book § 25-26 (g) establishes that a hearing is mandatory when
a timely objection to the request for leave has been filed . . . .’’ (Emphasis
added.) Morera v. Thurber, 162 Conn. App. 261, 267, 131 A.3d 1155 (2016).
Ordinarily, a court’s improper denial of an opposed motion for leave
without holding a hearing would result in a remand to the trial court for a
belated probable cause hearing on the request for leave. See id. The appro-
priate remand under the circumstances of the present case, however, is to
direct the trial court to hold a hearing on the motion for modification. See
Practice Book § 60-1 (‘‘[t]he design of these rules being to facilitate business
and advance justice, they will be interpreted liberally in any appellate matter
where it shall be manifest that a strict adherence to them will work surprise
or injustice’’). The circumstances here include the passage of almost three
years following the entry of the challenged visitation order, the child’s
approaching the age of majority, and the release of significant and potentially
highly relevant Supreme Court precedent during the pendency of these
proceedings.