M. W. v. G. C.

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M. W. v. G. C.

M. W. v. G. C.*
(AC 47189)
Alvord, Seeley and Flynn, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his
marriage to the plaintiff. He claimed that the court abused its discretion in
making its property distribution orders because the court’s factual findings
were clearly erroneous. Held:

The trial court’s factual finding as to the defendant’s income was not clearly
erroneous, as the defendant’s evidence as to his income was internally
inconsistent and incomplete, and the court’s findings regarding the plaintiff’s
testimony and the defendant’s representations made in his applications to
mortgage lenders were supported by the record.

The trial court’s factual finding as to the value of the parties’ marital home
was not clearly erroneous, as the court’s determination was based in part on
exhibits the defendant entered into evidence at trial, including an appraisal
of the property, a hypothetical real estate closing statement created by the
defendant’s counsel for the purpose of aiding the court, and a tax assessor’s
card, and the court was not required to credit the defendant’s testimony
regarding the fair market value of the property.
Argued December 10, 2024—officially released May 20, 2025

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Stamford-Norwalk, where the defendant filed a
cross complaint; thereafter, the case was tried to the
court, Vizcarrondo, J.; judgment dissolving the mar-
riage and granting certain other relief, from which the
defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Igor G. Kuperman, for the appellant (defendant).
* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as
amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person
protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
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M. W. v. G. C.

Opinion

ALVORD, J. The defendant, G. C., appeals from the
judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to
the plaintiff, M. W.1 On appeal, the defendant challenges
the court’s property distribution orders on the basis
that the court made clearly erroneous factual findings
as to (1) the defendant’s net income and (2) the value
of the marital home. We affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history. The parties were married on March
17, 2018, and no children were born of the marriage.
The plaintiff initiated the dissolution proceeding in
November, 2021, and the defendant filed a cross com-
plaint in December, 2021. The matter was tried to the
court, Vizcarrondo, J., over several days.2 Both parties
testified, in addition to other witnesses, and submitted
a number of exhibits into evidence. Both parties were
represented by counsel and filed posttrial briefs. In its
November 30, 2023 memorandum of decision, the court
found that each of the parties had children from a prior
relationship. The court found that the defendant
engaged in domestic violence during the marriage,
including physical abuse and coercive control. The
court recounted an incident on June 23, 2020, in which
the defendant punched the plaintiff’s daughter, then a
teenager, in the face after she attempted to intercede
in an argument between the parties. The defendant
pleaded guilty to assault in the third degree, and a
restraining order was entered against him. The court
found the defendant’s misconduct to be the principal
cause for the breakdown of the marriage and that he
1
The plaintiff did not file an appellee’s brief. As a result, this court ordered
the appeal to be considered on the basis of the defendant’s brief and the
record, as defined by Practice Book § 60-4, and oral argument by the defen-
dant.
2
A related civil action was consolidated with the dissolution trial.
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M. W. v. G. C.

‘‘controlled the household finances and acted to restrict
the plaintiff and her daughters’ interactions with others
to a degree consistent with coercive control.’’
The court found the plaintiff’s net weekly income to
be $650 as a financial advisor selling life insurance and
the defendant’s net annual income to be $90,000 as a
construction contractor. The court made findings with
respect to the marital home, which the parties had pur-
chased for $515,000 in 2019. The court found that the
defendant sold the marital home during the pendency
of the litigation in violation of the court’s automatic
orders. The court issued a remedial property distribu-
tion order requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff
$91,600.
With respect to its remaining financial orders, the
court denied the plaintiff’s claim for alimony, noting
‘‘the relatively short duration of the marriage, the plain-
tiff’s active employment, her good health, and the finan-
cial orders made pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-
81.’’ The court ordered, inter alia, that the defendant
would retain his 100 percent interest in his business.
The court declined to award attorney’s fees. This appeal
followed. Additional facts and procedural history will
be set forth as necessary.
Both of the defendant’s claims in this appeal chal-
lenge the factual findings underlying the court’s distri-
bution of marital property. Section 46b-81 provides in
relevant part: ‘‘(a) At the time of entering a decree . . .
dissolving a marriage . . . the Superior Court may
assign to either spouse all or any part of the estate of
the other spouse. . . . (c) In fixing the nature and value
of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after
considering all the evidence presented by each party,
shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes
for the . . . dissolution of the marriage . . . the age,
health, station, occupation, amount and sources of
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M. W. v. G. C.

income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education,
employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of
the parties and the opportunity of each for future acqui-
sition of capital assets and income. The court shall also
consider the contribution of each of the parties in the
acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of
their respective estates.’’
‘‘The standard of review in family matters is well
settled. An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s
orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has
abused its discretion or it is found that it could not
reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts pre-
sented. . . . In determining whether a trial court has
abused its broad discretion in domestic relations mat-
ters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor
of the correctness of its action. . . . Appellate review
of a trial court’s findings of fact is governed by the
clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court’s
findings are binding upon this court unless they are
clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the plead-
ings in the record as a whole. . . . A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the
record to support it . . . or when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed. . . . Therefore, to
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we
must find that the court either incorrectly applied the
law or could not reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Ferraro v. Ferraro, 168
Conn. App. 723, 727, 147 A.3d 188 (2016).
I
The defendant’s first claim on appeal is that the
court’s factual finding as to his income was clearly
erroneous. Specifically, he contends that the ‘‘plaintiff’s
unfounded claims could not form the basis for the trial
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M. W. v. G. C.

court’s finding.’’ The defendant further argues that,
because the court did not credit his representations of
his income to third parties, the court could not have
concluded that ‘‘the same representations were an accu-
rate picture of the defendant’s actual income.’’ We are
not persuaded.
The court had before it the following evidence as to
the defendant’s income. The plaintiff introduced into
evidence a 2022 application for the emergency mortgage
assistance program signed by the defendant, in which
he represented his income to be $12,479 gross per
month. Attached to that application was a profit and
loss statement for the time period of January 1 through
August 31, 2022, which, according to the defendant’s
testimony and the date on the document, the defendant
signed in September, 2022. The profit and loss statement
reflected monthly income of $12,479.50 over the eight
month period of January 1 through August 31, 2022.3
When questioned regarding the profit and loss state-
ment, the defendant testified that, despite having signed
the statement at the conclusion of the eight month
period, his recollection was that the document was
prepared using an estimate of what he would be making
if he had his company working. Upon further ques-
tioning, the defendant testified that ‘‘everything that I
was doing with this paperwork was in order to avoid
losing the property.’’
The plaintiff testified that, although she did not know
exactly how much money the defendant was making
at the time of trial, she knew that he had a ‘‘big contract,’’
funded by insurance proceeds, to ‘‘redo’’ his uncle’s
house after a fire. She also testified that he had made
$120,000 one year and that ‘‘he always works probably
The statement reflected a total income of $116,465 for that time period.
3

It identified deductions for car and truck expenses, contract and labor,
insurance, a professional service fee, office expenses, supplies, licenses and
fees, and other expenses, for a net profit of $99,836 over the eight months.
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M. W. v. G. C.

70 percent cash and 30 percent in checks just because
he has to declare something and pay his workers. He
only had one worker with Social Security. Everybody
else he pays cash and that’s why when he makes his
contracts, he always be sure that he gets [a] big chunk
of cash on the side.’’
The defendant’s evidence as to his income was inter-
nally inconsistent and incomplete. On one occasion, he
testified that the most he had earned in any year was
$70,000. On another occasion, he testified that the most
he had earned in any year was $50,000. On each of the
defendant’s financial affidavits filed in this action, he
identified a gross weekly income and used the same
figure as his net weekly income; he did not identify any
mandatory deductions. For example, his February 3,
2022 financial affidavit reflected $120 in gross weekly
income, $0 in mandatory deductions, and $120 in net
weekly income. His July 19, 2023 financial affidavit
reflected $600 in gross weekly income, $0 in mandatory
deductions, and $600 in net weekly income.
The court made the following factual findings with
respect to the defendant: ‘‘Throughout the marriage he
was a construction contractor. At trial, the defendant
testified that his gross earnings never exceeded $60,000
in any given year; though he concedes that he deliber-
ately misrepresented his income as $144,000 in connec-
tion with his efforts to refinance the marital home.
‘‘The court finds that the defendant’s trial testimony
has been self-serving and not credible. The defendant’s
testimony concerning his income is no exception. Based
on the plaintiff’s personal observations, the court finds
that the defendant received a significant portion of his
income as undisclosed cash. Based in part o[n] the
defendant’s representations to mortgage lenders, the
court finds that his yearly gross income is at least
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M. W. v. G. C.

$120,000, and that his net annual income after taxes and
mandatory deductions is properly valued at $90,000.’’
We cannot conclude that the court’s findings as to
the defendant’s income are clearly erroneous. First, we
note that the defendant’s submissions to the court were
both lacking in candor and incomplete. ‘‘We have often
said that a party who fails to provide information to
the court will not later be heard to complain that the
court made orders without sufficient information.’’
Fronsaglia v. Fronsaglia, 202 Conn. App. 769, 785, 246
A.3d 1083 (2021); see also Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 115
Conn. App. 570, 581, 974 A.2d 40 (2009) (‘‘[w]here a
party’s own wrongful conduct limits the financial evi-
dence available to the court, that party cannot complain
about the resulting calculation of a monetary award’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, the court’s
findings regarding the plaintiff’s testimony and the
defendant’s representations made in his applications to
mortgage lenders were supported by the record. ‘‘The
trial court, as trier of fact, determined who and what
to believe and the weight to be accorded the evidence.
The sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the
function of the trier.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Nunez v. Nunez, 85 Conn. App. 735, 738, 858 A.2d
873 (2004). Accordingly, the defendant’s claim fails.
II
The defendant’s second claim on appeal is that the
court’s factual finding as to the value of the marital
home was clearly erroneous. We are not persuaded.
The court made the following findings with respect
to the marital home. Although title to the home was
exclusively in the defendant’s name, the plaintiff con-
tributed more than one half of the $77,237.97 down
payment and substantial sums toward the mortgage.
These contributions would have entitled her to a sub-
stantial share of any proceeds from the sale. The marital
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M. W. v. G. C.

home was in foreclosure at the time of trial, and a
foreclosure auction date had been set. In the context
of the foreclosure action, the marital home was valued
at no less than $715,000. The defendant had attempted
to refinance the property to avoid the foreclosure and
had requested that the court grant him exclusive posses-
sion of the premises, in part because residency in the
home was one of several requirements to be stated to
obtain modification of the mortgage obligation. The
defendant acted with knowledge of the home’s value
and with the intention of preserving that value. On Feb-
ruary 22, 2023, the defendant unilaterally sold the home,
at a claimed sale price of $540,000. This amount equaled
the debt related to the property, including unpaid mort-
gage principal, interest, real estate taxes, and unpaid
homeowners insurance. The defendant denied receiv-
ing any additional compensation beyond the claimed
sale price.4
The plaintiff filed a motion for contempt of the auto-
matic orders. After a hearing, the court found that the
automatic orders were clear and unambiguous and that
the defendant sold the marital home without notice to
his counsel, the plaintiff, or the court. The court found
not credible ‘‘the defendant’s claim that the value of
the transaction resulted merely in satisfaction of the
mortgage debt, taxes, interest, liens, and other costs,
such that the sale did not yield any net proceeds. The
defendant is not unsophisticated. To the contrary,
throughout the proceedings, he demonstrated a keen
awareness of the value of all property he deemed his.
But, even if the sale did not in fact result in proceeds,
the court finds that the defendant’s actions were, at a
minimum, spiteful and intended to deprive the plaintiff
of any financial benefit, and to undermine this court’s
authority to order and effectuate an equitable property
4
The defendant did not introduce any documentary evidence in support
of his testimony that he sold the property for $540,000.
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M. W. v. G. C.

settlement. In so finding, the court concurs with the
plaintiff’s assessment that the unilateral sale can ‘only
be viewed as a final act of retaliation towards the plain-
tiff . . . .’ ’’
Accordingly, the court found the defendant in con-
tempt on the basis that he had wilfully violated the
court’s automatic orders. The court considered ‘‘[t]he
defendant’s contumacious conduct, and the economic
harm suffered by the plaintiff,’’ in its property award
issued pursuant to § 46b-81. Specifically, the court
found that an open market sale would have yielded
proceeds in the amount of $175,000, with closing costs
of approximately $37,000, resulting in total net proceeds
after costs of $138,000. The court expressly considered
the defendant’s history of domestic violence throughout
the marriage and his deliberate litigation misconduct
in awarding the plaintiff 70 percent of the imputed net
value of the marital home’s proceeds. The court ordered
that amount to be reduced by $5000, the value of the
furnishings remaining within the home at the time of
trial. Accordingly, the court ordered the defendant to
pay to the plaintiff a property settlement of $91,600, to
be paid in sixty monthly installments of $1527.
We are not persuaded by the defendant’s claim that
the court could not reasonably have concluded as it
did in valuing the property at $715,000. At trial, the
defendant entered into evidence as a full exhibit the
August 31, 2021 appraisal valuing the property at
$715,000. The defendant also entered into evidence a
real estate closing statement, created by the defendant’s
counsel for the purpose of aiding the court, showing
that a hypothetical sale of the property at a price of
$715,000 would yield approximately $150,000 in net pro-
ceeds as of December 31, 2022. Finally, the defendant
entered into evidence the 2018 tax assessor’s card,
which identified an appraised value of $708,230.
Although the defendant testified that he believed the
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M. W. v. G. C.

fair market value of the property based on the property’s
condition to be between $650,000 and $680,000,5 the
court was not required to credit his testimony. See
Cimino v. Cimino, 155 Conn. App. 298, 301–302, 109
A.3d 546 (‘‘[a]lthough there was other evidence, includ-
ing testimony from the parties, that the home’s fair
market value was higher, the court was not required
to accept those figures’’ (footnote omitted)), cert.
denied, 316 Conn. 912, 111 A.3d 886 (2015).
We conclude that the court’s determination regarding
the value of the marital home, based on an appraisal
admitted into evidence, was proper. See Bevilacqua v.
Bevilacqua, 201 Conn. App. 261, 274–76, 242 A.3d 542
(2020) (where defendant failed to provide financial affi-
davit and denied owning property in Bahamas during
deposition, court did not abuse its discretion in award-
ing such property to defendant and valuing it based on
estimate defendant had provided in prenuptial disclo-
sure); Porter v. Porter, 61 Conn. App. 791, 800, 769 A.2d
725 (2001) (court’s valuation, which was less than both
parties requested, was not clearly erroneous where nei-
ther party provided court with expert testimony as to
value of home and, as a result, court was left with claims
of parties and general knowledge to establish value).
Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse
its discretion in rendering its property division order.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

5
In his November, 2022 financial affidavit, the defendant also estimated
the fair market value of the marital home to be $680,000. After subtracting
the mortgage current principal balance and equity line of credit and other
liens, the defendant identified equity in the amount of $108,000.