Gama Aviation (Management), Inc. v. Senbahar

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Gama Aviation (Management), Inc. v. Senbahar

GAMA AVIATION (MANAGEMENT), INC. v.
IZAK SENBAHAR
(AC 46852)
Alvord, Seeley and Palmer, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting the plain-
tiff’s motion for summary judgment in its action to recover from the defen-
dant for his breach of an agreement to guarantee payment of a promissory
note executed by a third-party borrower. The defendant claimed that the
trial court erred in rejecting his statute of limitations special defense. Held:

The trial court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,
as the undisputed evidence established the defendant’s breach of the guar-
anty agreement and clearly demonstrated that the defendant had acknowl-
edged the debt prior to the expiration of the limitation period, thereby
resetting the limitation period.
Argued September 17, 2024—officially released March 18, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for breach of contract,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, where the court,
Frechette, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which
the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Nathan C. Zuzula, for the appellant (defendant).
Michael J. Donnelly, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

PALMER, J. The plaintiff, Gama Aviation (Manage-
ment), Inc., commenced this action against the defen-
dant, Izak Senbahar, alleging breach of the defendant’s
agreement to personally guarantee payment of a prom-
issory note that had been executed in favor of the plain-
tiff by a third-party borrower. The trial court rendered
summary judgment for the plaintiff and, in so doing,
rejected the defendant’s statute of limitations defense,
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Gama Aviation (Management), Inc. v. Senbahar

concluding that, although the plaintiff’s action was not
brought within the original six year limitation period,
the action was not time barred because the defendant
acknowledged the debt owed under the guaranty agree-
ment, thereby resetting that six year period. On appeal,
the defendant challenges the trial court’s determination
that he could not prevail on his statute of limitations
defense as a matter of law because, the defendant con-
tends, he never acknowledged the debt and, conse-
quently, the plaintiff’s action is barred by the original
limitation period. We disagree with the defendant and,
accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On
July 13, 2021, the plaintiff filed a one count complaint
claiming breach of a guaranty agreement by the defen-
dant and alleging in relevant part as follows.1 On or
about January 30, 2012, the plaintiff, as the lender, and
Zulu Air Service, LLC (Zulu), as the borrower, entered
into a commercial loan evidenced by a promissory note
(note) in the principal loan amount of $1,100,000 with
a maturity date of December 31, 2013.2 On January 30,
2012, the defendant executed a guaranty agreement in
favor of the plaintiff as additional security for the note,
guaranteeing the prompt satisfaction of Zulu’s indebted-
ness to the plaintiff in the event of Zulu’s default of its
payment obligation under the terms of the note. Zulu
made one payment of $500,000 to the plaintiff but failed
to tender the balance due to the plaintiff by December
1
Previously, on March 11, 2021, the plaintiff filed an application for a
prejudgment remedy, which the court, Hon. Arthur A. Hiller, judge trial
referee, granted on July 9, 2021, in the amount of $1,675,000.
2
The complaint alleges that the defendant was affiliated with Zulu, which
is not a party to this case. The record further reflects that the defendant
and a friend purchased a Falcon 2000 jet aircraft from the plaintiff and
formed Zulu as a single purpose entity to own the aircraft. Both the defendant
and his friend were to pay Zulu for the maintenance and usage of the plane,
and, in turn, Zulu was responsible for paying the plaintiff.
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Gama Aviation (Management), Inc. v. Senbahar

31, 2013, or thereafter, thereby breaching the terms of
its obligation under the note. As a result, the defendant
was required, pursuant to the terms of the guaranty
agreement, to tender all sums due and owing to the
plaintiff under the note. On October 31, 2018, the plain-
tiff made demand upon the defendant, in accordance
with the terms of the guaranty agreement, for payment
of the amount owed under the note. The defendant did
not pay the plaintiff.
Throughout 2019, the plaintiff’s president and the
defendant engaged in email communications in which
the former sought payment. As set forth more fully
hereinafter, these communications included represen-
tations by the defendant referring to the debt and a
proposed payment plan. The plaintiff, however, never
received any payments from the defendant.3
In his response to the plaintiff’s action, the defendant
filed an answer and, inter alia, a special defense alleging
that the plaintiff’s claim of breach of the guaranty agree-
ment was barred by the six year limitation period set
forth in General Statutes § 52-576.4 Thereafter, the plain-
tiff moved for summary judgment. In support of its
motion, the plaintiff maintained that the undisputed
facts established that the defendant had breached the
terms of the guaranty agreement because it was uncon-
tested that the plaintiff was owed a debt from Zulu, the
defendant executed a guaranty agreement to pay that
3
The plaintiff also never received any additional payments on the note
from Zulu.
4
General Statutes § 52-576 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) No action for
an account, or on any simple or implied contract, or on any contract in
writing, shall be brought but within six years after the right of action
accrues . . . .’’
It is undisputed that the six year limitation period of § 52-576 applies to
actions for breach of a guaranty agreement. See, e.g., Associated Catalog
Merchandisers, Inc. v. Chagnon, 210 Conn. 734, 746 n.6, 557 A.2d 525 (1989)
(limitation period of § 52-576 is applicable to claim of breach of guaranty
agreement).
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debt when due in the event Zulu failed to do so, and the
debt had not been paid.5 The plaintiff further maintained
that its claim was not barred by the statute of limitations
because the undisputed facts, as reflected in certain
email communications between the defendant and the
plaintiff’s president, as well as the defendant’s deposi-
tion testimony, established conclusively that the defen-
dant acknowledged the debt prior to the expiration
of the limitation period and, consequently, that period
began anew with the acknowledgement. In opposing the
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the defendant
asserted that the statute of limitations barred the plain-
tiff’s claim and that that bar had not been removed
because, contrary to the plaintiff’s claim, he had not
acknowledged the debt.
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court, Frech-
ette, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judg-
ment.6 The court agreed with the plaintiff that the undis-
puted evidence established the defendant’s breach of
the guaranty agreement. With respect to the defendant’s
statute of limitations defense, the court also concluded
that the undisputed evidence—in particular, three emails
between the plaintiff’s president and the defendant, and
certain deposition testimony of the defendant—clearly
demonstrated that the defendant had acknowledged the
debt, thereby resetting the limitation period.7 In the
first such email, dated January 10, 2019, the defendant
informed the plaintiff’s president as follows: ‘‘I am
5
See, e.g., Tolland Meetinghouse Commons, LLC v. CXF Tolland, LLC,
211 Conn. App. 1, 6, 271 A.3d 1118 (2022) (reciting elements of breach of
guaranty agreement).
6
We note that the defendant previously had filed his own motion for
summary judgment, which the trial court denied in its memorandum of deci-
sion.
7
The defendant also filed two additional special defenses, laches and
unclean hands, both of which the trial court rejected as a matter of law.
The defendant has not appealed from the court’s judgment with respect to
either of those defenses.
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working on a $250,000 payment. I anticipate [thirty] to
[forty-five] days for the first installment.’’ Further, when
questioned at his deposition concerning his reference
in that email to the $250,000 payment, the defendant
stated: ‘‘You know, another payment—they claim 1.1
million. There’s a note against it. And I said I’ll—I guess
I said I’ll send—I’m working on sending you another
$250,000.’’8
In a second email sent to the plaintiff’s president on
January 14, 2022, the defendant stated: ‘‘I am working
on a payment of $250,000 in the next [thirty] to [forty-
five] days. I will know better towards the end of the
week. I anticipate starting a program of monthly pay-
ments starting in June. I am around if you want to meet
or talk on the phone.’’ In a third email to the plaintiff’s
president dated January 15, 2022, the defendant repeated
verbatim what he had stated in his email to the plaintiff’s
president the day before. In addition, when asked in
his deposition to explain the statement in his email
correspondence that he would pay the plaintiff $250,000
in the next thirty to forty-five days, the defendant con-
firmed the statement as follows: ‘‘I’m seeing that I’m
saying I’ll make a 250 payment with some installments.’’
Questioned further in his deposition as to whether he
was stating that he would make payments toward the
$250,000 in installments, the defendant replied, ‘‘I think
so, yeah.’’
In its decision, the trial court observed that the defen-
dant had repeatedly and unequivocally acknowledged
the debt, concluding that there was no genuine issue
of material fact with respect to that issue ‘‘based on
the defendant’s plain acknowledgment of the debt, in
writing, and his deposition testimony affirming his
There was no prior payment of $250,000. In stating that he was working
8

on sending the plaintiff ‘‘another’’ payment of $250,000, the defendant is
referring to the only payment, which was in the amount of $500,000, that
previously was made to the plaintiff by Zulu.
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Gama Aviation (Management), Inc. v. Senbahar

acknowledgment of the debt.’’ Accordingly, the court
further concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to pre-
vail as a matter of law on the defendant’s statute of
limitations claim.9 After granting the plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment, the court entertained the plain-
tiff’s claim for damages, attorney’s fees and interest,
and rendered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount
of $2,140,760.95. Subsequently, the court also awarded
the plaintiff offer of compromise interest in the amount
of $354,253.55.10 This appeal followed.
The defendant maintains that the court improperly
concluded that the plaintiff’s action for breach of the
guaranty agreement was not time barred by the applica-
ble six year statute of limitations.11 Specifically, he con-
tends that, as the plaintiff alleged in its complaint, Zulu
defaulted on the note in December, 2013, and the plain-
tiff did not file its action until 2021, more than seven
years after its cause of action accrued. The defendant
further contends that the original six year limitation
period was not reset because, despite the trial court’s
contrary determination, he never acknowledged the
debt. We are not persuaded.
The following legal principles guide our resolution
of this appeal, beginning with the well established stan-
dard governing our review of a trial court’s decision to
9
We note that, in the trial court, the plaintiff also claimed that the defen-
dant could not prevail as a matter of law on his statute of limitations defense
because the guaranty agreement itself contains an express blanket waiver
of that defense. In reliance on Haggerty v. Williams, 84 Conn. App. 675,
680, 855 A.2d 264 (2004), the trial court rejected the plaintiff’s claim on the
ground that the purported waiver violated public policy and, therefore, was
unenforceable. The plaintiff raises its claim of a blanket waiver on appeal
as an alternative ground for affirmance. In view of our determination that
the trial court properly rejected the statute of limitations defense because the
defendant acknowledged the debt, thereby resetting the limitation period,
we need not address the plaintiff’s claim of a blanket waiver under the
guaranty agreement.
10
The amounts of the judgment and the award are not the subject of
this appeal.
11
On appeal, the defendant does not challenge the trial court’s determina-
tion that he breached the guaranty agreement.
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grant a motion for summary judgment. ‘‘Practice Book
[§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be ren-
dered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other
proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a
motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmov-
ing party. . . . The party seeking summary judgment
has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine
issue [of] material facts [that], under applicable princi-
ples of substantive law, entitle [it] to a judgment as a
matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a
motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to dem-
onstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact. . . . A material fact . . . [is] a fact [that] will
make a difference in the result of the case. . . . Finally,
the scope of our review of the trial court’s decision to
grant the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is
plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Day v.
Seblatnigg, 341 Conn. 815, 825, 268 A.3d 595 (2022).
This case implicates our law governing the tolling of
a statute of limitations by virtue of an acknowledgment
of a debt. ‘‘The statute of limitations creates a defense
to an action. It does not erase the debt. Hence, the
defense can be lost by an unequivocal acknowledgment
of the debt, such as a new promise, an unqualified
recognition of the debt, or a payment on account. . . .
A general acknowledgment of an indebtedness may be
sufficient to remove the bar of the statute. The govern-
ing principle is this: The determination of whether a
sufficient acknowledgment has been made depends
upon proof that a defendant has by an express or
implied recognition of the debt voluntarily renounced
the protection of the statute. . . . But an implication
of a promise to pay cannot arise if it appears that
although the debt was directly acknowledged, this
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acknowledgment was accompanied by expressions
which showed the defendant did not intend to pay it,
and did not intend to deprive himself of the right to
rely on the [s]tatute of [l]imitations . . . . [A] general
acknowledgment may be inferred from acquiescence
as well as from silence, as where the existence of the
debt has been asserted in the debtor’s presence and he
did not contradict the assertion.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Ajluni v. Chainani, 184 Conn. App.
650, 655–56,195 A.3d 694 (2018). Ordinarily, whether
statements or conduct by a defendant constitute an
acknowledgment of a debt sufficient to toll the statute
of limitations is a question for the trier of fact. See
id., 656.
With the foregoing considerations in mind, we con-
clude that the trial court properly determined that the
plaintiff produced undisputed evidence, specifically
email communications between the defendant and the
plaintiff’s president, as well as the defendant’s deposi-
tion testimony, that the defendant unequivocally acknowl-
edged the existence of the debt. In his emails, the defen-
dant never indicated that he would not pay the debt.
Rather, he repeatedly stated that he intended to make
payments on the debt in installments, the first of which
he planned to make within thirty to forty-five days. In
his deposition testimony, the defendant confirmed that
the payment to which he was referring in these email
communications pertained to the debt he owed under
the guaranty agreement, which expressly referenced
the $1,100,000 note, and he further confirmed the state-
ment in his email that he was working on sending the
plaintiff $250,000. This evidence definitively established
that the defendant acknowledged the debt and was
taking steps to pay it. As this court has previously stated
in a case also involving email communications, ‘‘[w]e
thus agree with the [trial] court’s determination that
there was nothing equivocal about the reaffirmation of
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Gama Aviation (Management), Inc. v. Senbahar

the existence of the debt; the defendant merely hedged
on if and when he would be able to repay it.’’ (Emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 658.

Although not disputing that the note and guaranty
agreement both are in the stated amount of $1,100,000,
the defendant asserts that he never acknowledged the
full amount of the debt and, in fact, shortly after the
note and guaranty agreement were executed, he began
questioning whether that amount accurately reflected
the value of the services actually rendered by the plain-
tiff to Zulu, and he requested records to back up the
amount. As the trial court observed, however, the defen-
dant has provided no case law for the proposition that
a statement is insufficient to constitute an acknowledg-
ment of the debt merely because the guarantor has
not explicitly acknowledged the precise total of the
debt owed.

The defendant also claims that the determination of
whether a guarantor has acknowledged a debt and, as
a result, tolled the statute of limitations is a ‘‘classic
example’’ of a decision that should be left to the finder
of fact and not decided by summary judgment. We agree
that that determination usually is one for the fact finder
and, further, that most of this state’s appellate jurispru-
dence on the issue involves claims concerning the evi-
dentiary sufficiency of a factual finding on the issue.12
12
See, e.g., Ajluni v. Chainani, supra, 184 Conn. App. 657–59 (evidence
was sufficient to support finding by trial court that defendant acknowledged
debt, thereby resetting statutory limitation period); Williams Ground Ser-
vices, Inc. v. Jordan, 174 Conn. App. 247, 251–55, 166 A.3d 791 (2017) (same);
Alarmax Distributors, Inc. v. New Canaan Alarm Co., 141 Conn. App. 319,
334, 61 A.3d 1142 (2013) (same); Zatakia v. Ecoair Corp., 128 Conn. App.
362, 369–71, 18 A.3d 604 (same), cert. denied, 301 Conn. 936, 23 A.3d 729
(2011); John H. Kolb & Sons, Inc. v. G & L Excavating, Inc., 76 Conn. App.
599, 610–12, 821 A.2d 774 (same), cert. denied, 264 Conn. 919, 828 A.2d 617
(2003); Cadle Co. v. Errato, 71 Conn. App. 447, 460–65, 802 A.2d 887 (same),
cert. denied, 262 Conn. 918, 812 A.2d 861 (2002).
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Gama Aviation (Management), Inc. v. Senbahar

We also are mindful that ‘‘summary judgment is appro-
priate only if a fair and reasonable person could con-
clude only one way. . . . [A] summary disposition . . .
should be on evidence which a jury would not be at
liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed
verdict for the moving party. . . . [A] directed verdict
may be rendered only where, on the evidence viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier
of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion
than that embodied in the verdict as directed.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Ser-
vices, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003).
Considering, however, the undisputed evidence in
the present case, namely, the email correspondence
between the defendant and the plaintiff’s president, and
the defendant’s deposition testimony concerning that
correspondence, we are satisfied that no reasonable
fact finder could reach any conclusion other than that
the defendant had unconditionally recognized the debt
and that the limitation period was thereby reset by that
acknowledgment. In such circumstances, the plaintiff
is entitled to prevail on the issue as a matter of law.
Consequently, the defendant’s claim must fail.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.