In re Juliany T.

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In re Juliany T.

IN RE JULIANY T.*
(AC 47376)
Alvord, Cradle and Harper, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the judgment of the trial court terminat-
ing his parental rights as to his minor child. He claimed, inter alia, that his
counsel provided ineffective assistance that constituted reversible error, as
the deficient performance was of such a magnitude that it created structural
error pursuant to United States v. Cronic (466 U.S. 648). Held:

This court declined to presume that the respondent father was prejudiced
by his counsel’s performance, as the presumption of prejudice standard set
forth in Cronic does not extend to child protection matters.

The respondent father could not prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, as he inadequately briefed the issue of prejudice.

This court rejected the respondent father’s claim that he had a constitutional
right to a hybrid habeas fact-finding proceeding in the trial court to more
fully develop the record in support of his claim that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel, citing the precedent of the Supreme Court
in In re Jonathan M. (255 Conn. 208) that there were other means of
vindicating the right to the effective assistance of counsel through which
an indigent parent may challenge a termination judgment, and this court
declined to exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of
justice to afford the father a right to such a fact-finding proceeding.
Argued September 10, 2024—officially released February 3, 2025**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford, Juvenile Mat-
ters, and tried to the court, Nguyen-O’Dowd, J.; judg-
ment terminating the respondents’ parental rights, from
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
** February 3, 2025, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Juliany T.

which the respondent father appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent father).
Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom,
on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

HARPER, J. The respondent father, Julio T., appeals
from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor
of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families, terminating his parental rights with respect
to his minor child, Juliany.1 The respondent raises three
claims on appeal, each of which emanates from his
contention that he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel at trial, in violation of his due process rights
under the fourteenth amendment to the federal consti-
tution2 and article first, § 10, of the Connecticut consti-
tution.3 First, he claims that his counsel’s allegedly defi-
cient performance ‘‘was of such magnitude that it
created structural error as set forth in United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657
(1984),’’ and is therefore per se reversible error. Second,
he claims that he has a due process right to a hybrid
1
The court also terminated the parental rights of Juliany’s mother, Melanie
R. Because she has not appealed from that judgment, we refer to Julio T.
as the respondent and to Melanie R. by name throughout this opinion. Unless
necessary to our analysis of the claims raised by the respondent, in this
opinion we need not and do not address the court’s findings and conclusions
with respect to Melanie R.
2
The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, § 1, pro-
vides in relevant part: ‘‘No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law . . . .’’ U.S. Const., amend. XIV.
3
Article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution provides: ‘‘All courts
shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right
and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.’’
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habeas fact-finding proceeding in the trial court to fur-
ther develop the record as to his ineffective assistance
of counsel claim because ‘‘the procedures available to
him to vindicate his right to effective assistance of coun-
sel are inadequate.’’ He further claims that, if he does
not have a due process right to a hybrid habeas fact-
finding proceeding, this court should exercise its super-
visory authority to create one.4 We affirm the judgment
of the trial court and decline the respondent’s request
that we exercise our supervisory authority.
The following facts, which the court found by clear
and convincing evidence or which are otherwise undis-
puted, and procedural history are relevant to our resolu-
tion of this appeal. Juliany was born in December, 2010.
Shortly thereafter, in January, 2011, the respondent was
arrested and charged with murder. In October, 2013,
the respondent was found guilty of murder and, in
December, 2013, he was sentenced to fifty years of
incarceration. The respondent’s maximum release date
is January, 2061.
Because he was incarcerated, the respondent was
not able to provide care for Juliany, who remained in
the care of her mother, Melanie R. See footnote 1 of
this opinion. Melanie R. suffered from mental health
and substance abuse issues and had ‘‘a child protection
history dating back to 2011, for medical neglect, educa-
tional neglect, physical neglect, physical abuse, and lack
of supervision.’’5 Juliany ‘‘is a special education student
4
The attorney for the minor child has filed a statement adopting the
‘‘factual statements set forth in the [petitioner’s] brief’’ but takes no position
as to whether the respondent has a constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel or a hybrid habeas fact-finding proceeding. She main-
tains, nonetheless, that, if such rights exist, any violations thereof are ‘‘not
so prejudicial as to require a reversal of the termination petition as set forth
in the [petitioner’s] brief’’ and argues that any further delay in the process
of securing a permanent home and legal status would not be in Juliany’s
best interest.
5
Melanie R. has two other minor children, Precious R. and Joshua R. The
court terminated her parental rights as to them, as well. The respondent is
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In re Juliany T.

with her primary disability as emotional disturbance
due to changes in her mood and low frustration levels.’’
Juliany has ‘‘specialized mental health needs,’’ ‘‘has had
between eight to nine foster care placements,’’ and has
been ‘‘qualified for placement in a therapeutic foster
home.’’6
‘‘On November 1, 2019, [the Department of Children
and Families (department)] received a referral from
Juliany’s school due to her emotional and behavioral
challenges.’’ Melanie R. did not cooperate with the
department by engaging in services following this refer-
ral, and, on January 21, 2020, the petitioner filed a
neglect petition as to Juliany. On March 30, 2020, the
petitioner sought and was granted an ex parte order of
temporary custody as to Juliany and the court, Lobo,
J., issued preliminary specific steps for the respondent.
On September 30, 2020, the court, Dannehy, J., adjudi-
cated Juliany neglected, committed her to the care and
custody of the petitioner and issued final specific steps
for the respondent.7 The respondent ‘‘stood silent as to
the neglect adjudication.’’
After Juliany was removed from Melanie R.’s care in
2020, the department offered the respondent reunifica-
tion services by encouraging his participation in pro-
grams or services available through the Department of
not the father of Precious and Joshua, and his claims in this appeal do not
pertain to them.
6
At the time of trial, Juliany had been residing in a therapeutic foster
home since April, 2023.
7
‘‘Specific steps provide notice and guidance to a parent as to what
should be done to facilitate reunification and prevent termination of rights.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Amias I., 343 Conn. 816, 822 n.6,
276 A.3d 955 (2022). The final specific steps the court issued for the respon-
dent included, among other things, participating in services provided by the
Department of Correction (DOC) regarding parenting, substance abuse and
mental health and signing ‘‘releases allowing [the department] to communi-
cate with service providers to check on your attendance, cooperation and
progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings with
this court.’’
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Correction (DOC), and it facilitated phone calls and
8

offered him virtual and in person visits with Juliany.9
The department’s ‘‘social workers regularly contacted
[the respondent] and his counselor to discuss his partic-
ipation in services while incarcerated. He completed
the VOICES program in June, 2020, which is a victim
impact program.’’ The department did not know
whether the respondent completed any other programs,
however, because he failed to sign a release of informa-
tion in accordance with the court-ordered specific
steps. See footnote 7 of this opinion.
On December 22, 2022, the petitioner filed a petition
to terminate the respondent’s parental rights on the
grounds that (1) Juliany had been abandoned by the
respondent ‘‘in the sense that the [respondent] failed
to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern,
or responsibility as to the welfare of the child,’’ (2)
Juliany previously had been adjudicated neglected and
the respondent had failed to achieve a sufficient degree
of rehabilitation, and (3) the respondent had no ongoing
parent-child relationship with Juliany. A trial on the
petition for the termination of parental rights was held
on June 6, 2023, before the court, Nguyen-O’Dowd, J.
The petitioner presented the testimony of two wit-
nesses, department social workers Mary Daries and
Paola Tierinni, and entered eighteen exhibits. After con-
sulting with his counsel, the respondent testified. He
did not call any other witnesses or enter any exhibits.
8
Because the respondent was incarcerated, the department was unable
to directly provide him with services.
9
Since 2020, the respondent had some contact with Juliany, predominantly
by telephone. The record reflects one in person visit in June, 2021. Between
August, 2021, and February, 2023, however, Juliany refused to have any
contact with the respondent, and the department kept him updated about
her. Juliany agreed to resume contact with the respondent in 2023, provided
the contact was facilitated by relatives, and this contact had occurred
approximately monthly as of the time the court issued its decision. The
record does not specify whether this resumed contact has been telephonic,
in person, or both.
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After the respondent rested his case, the petitioner’s
counsel advised that the petitioner was withdrawing
two of the three alleged grounds for termination of
parental rights and was proceeding solely on the ground
set forth in General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i),
which provides in relevant part that Juliany ‘‘has been
found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected,
abused or uncared for and the . . . [respondent] has
. . . failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilita-
tion that would encourage the belief that within a rea-
sonable time, considering the age and needs of [Juliany]
. . . he . . . could assume a responsible position in
the life of [Juliany] . . . .’’ The petitioner’s counsel then
argued, in closing argument, that the petitioner had
satisfied her burden to prove this ground with evidence
that established that the respondent failed to comply
with the court-ordered specific steps by providing
releases to confirm his engagement in, or successful
completion of, DOC services regarding parenting, sub-
stance abuse and mental health. The petitioner’s coun-
sel also argued that the petitioner made reasonable
efforts to reunify the respondent with Juliany and had
proven the respondent’s inability or unwillingness to
benefit from those efforts. Finally, the petitioner’s coun-
sel argued that the evidence established that termina-
tion of the respondent’s parental rights was in Juliany’s
best interest.
The respondent’s counsel then made the following
closing argument: ‘‘On behalf of [the respondent], I do
believe the [petitioner] has appropriately adopted the
grounds, ground B, failure to rehabilitate. I think the
others are not appropriate.
‘‘As to failure to rehabilitate, [the respondent is] in an
unfortunate situation where he’s not able to rehabilitate
because he is incarcerated. So, his actions or inactions
are not wilful, they’re consequential, and I don’t want
to belabor that.
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‘‘There is enough today to hear that the child may seek
to have a relationship with the [respondent] through
the [respondent’s] family. It’s very difficult to predict
the future, but as she matures perhaps she can work
out some relationship regardless of the decision of this
court. Whether the court decides to terminate the rights
of [the respondent] to his child, it doesn’t mean the
court can terminate any affection or any desire to be
a part of the [respondent’s life] at some point in time.
So, there’s enough there to say that Juliany may seek
some relationship with [the respondent] at some point
in time regardless of the outcome. So, I just wanted to
emphasize that [the respondent’s] behavior is not wilful.
‘‘His testimony today echoes the reality when you’re
sentenced for a long time, for practical reasons the
[DOC] tends to favor those inmates who have lesser
time to serve. And where the time to serve is greater,
for efficacy it’s distributed inequitably. So, I just want
to emphasize what [the respondent] made clear: It’s not
that he doesn’t want to. It’s not wilful. He did the best
that he could on what was provided, and he’s not in
complete control of the [DOC].’’
On August 21, 2023, the court issued a memorandum
of decision in which it terminated the respondent’s
parental rights. The court found by clear and convincing
evidence that the department had made reasonable
efforts to reunify Juliany with the respondent and that
the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from
reunification efforts.
The court also found that the respondent had failed
to achieve an appropriate degree of personal rehabilita-
tion as would encourage the belief that, within a reason-
able time, considering the age and needs of Juliany,
he could assume a responsible position in her life. In
reaching this conclusion, the court observed that the
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respondent ‘‘has been incarcerated throughout the pen-
dency of this case’’ and that he had been on notice
since early 2020 ‘‘as to the expectations of him in the
specific steps ordered by the court.’’ To this end, the
court acknowledged that the respondent ‘‘took advan-
tage of the programs that were available to him’’ but
determined that ‘‘this is not enough given Juliany’s age10
and needs and the length of time she has been in [the
department’s] care. There is still more work to do to
ensure that the respondent . . . understands Juliany’s
emotional and mental health needs.’’ (Footnote added.)
Noting that the respondent’s maximum release date ‘‘is
well beyond when Juliany will reach the age of major-
ity,’’ the court concluded that the respondent ‘‘would
be unable to rehabilitate in time for Juliany.’’ It specified
that ‘‘the only reasonable conclusion to be made from
the credible testimony and evidence is that the respon-
dent . . . has failed to attain a level of rehabilitation
given Juliany’s age and needs’’ and determined ‘‘that
the petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the respondent . . . has failed to rehabili-
tate pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i).’’ (Emphasis
added.)
In the dispositional phase of the proceedings, the
court made findings as to each of the seven statutory
factors set forth in § 17a-112 (k) and concluded that
the termination of the respondent’s parental rights was
in Juliany’s best interest. Accordingly, the court ren-
dered judgment terminating the respondent’s parental
rights and appointing the petitioner as Juliany’s statu-
tory parent. This appeal followed.
Each of the respondent’s claims on appeal derives
from his contention that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel at trial. See In re Jonathan M.,
255 Conn. 208, 235, 764 A.2d 739 (2001) (confirming
10
Juliany was twelve years old at the time of trial.
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that parent may challenge adequacy of trial counsel in
parental rights termination proceedings by way of direct
appeal). The respondent argues that his counsel’s per-
formance was deficient because he conceded that the
petitioner had proven the case for termination when he
stated during his closing argument that ‘‘the [petitioner]
has appropriately adopted the grounds, ground B, fail-
ure to rehabilitate.’’ The following principles, therefore,
guide our review.
‘‘In Connecticut, a parent who faces the termination
of his or her parental rights is entitled, by statute, to the
assistance of counsel. . . . Because of the substantial
interests involved, a parent in a termination of parental
rights hearing has the [statutory] right not only to coun-
sel but to the effective assistance of counsel. . . .
Moreover, a parent whose rights have been terminated
may assert, on direct appeal, that he or she was deprived
of the right to the effective assistance of counsel at
trial. . . . In determining whether counsel has been
ineffective in a termination proceeding, [this court has]
enunciated the following standard: The range of compe-
tence . . . requires not errorless counsel, and not
counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel
whose performance is reasonably competent, or within
the range of competence displayed by lawyers with
ordinary training and skill in [that particular area of the]
law. . . . The respondent must prove that [counsel’s
performance] fell below this standard of competency
and also that the lack of competency contributed to
the termination of parental rights. . . . A showing of
incompetency without a showing of resulting preju-
dice . . . does not amount to ineffective assistance of
counsel.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Peter L., 158 Conn.
App. 556, 563, 119 A.3d 23 (2015). ‘‘Even where a parent
in a termination proceeding has a constitutional, rather
than merely statutory, right to counsel, the parent must
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show resulting prejudice to prevail on a claimed viola-
tion of that right.’’ In re Jaelynn K.-M., 229 Conn. App.
371, 382, 327 A.3d 1013 (2024).
‘‘In making such a claim, it is the responsibility of
the respondent to create an adequate record pointing
to the alleged ineffectiveness and any prejudice the
respondent claims resulted from that ineffectiveness.
. . . In the absence of findings by the trial court in
this regard, we directly review the trial court record.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Wendy G.-R., 225 Conn. App. 194, 205, 314 A.3d
1029, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 916, 316 A.3d 357 (2024).
I
The respondent’s first claim on appeal is that he had
a federal and state constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel during the termination proceed-
ings and that his ‘‘[t]rial counsel’s deficient performance
represented structural error’’ requiring an automatic
reversal of the judgment and an order for a new trial.
He acknowledges that, ‘‘[i]n most cases, a respondent
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in a termina-
tion hearing must prove both that the trial counsel’s
performance was deficient and that the lack of compe-
tency contributed to the termination of parental rights’’
but argues that, ‘‘[i]n this case . . . trial counsel’s con-
cession that the [petitioner] had proven that the respon-
dent had failed to rehabilitate represents a breakdown
in the adversarial process such that the process itself
should be deemed unreliable.’’ As such, he maintains
that we should presume that he was prejudiced by his
counsel’s alleged incompetency and reverse the judg-
ment in accordance with the standard set forth in
United States v. Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. 658.
The petitioner claims, in response, that the respon-
dent’s right to the effective assistance of counsel is not
constitutional in nature and that, even it if was, this
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In re Juliany T.

court should not ‘‘import Cronic . . . into the child
protection context,’’ given that ‘‘our Supreme Court has
declined to adopt an automatic reversal rule that would
forgo a harmlessness analysis in child protection
cases.’’ The petitioner maintains, therefore, that the
respondent must demonstrate both his counsel’s incom-
petence and prejudice resulting therefrom to prevail on
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and that
he has failed to do so. We agree with the petitioner
and conclude that, assuming that the respondent had
a constitutional right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel at the termination hearing; see In re Jonathan M.,
supra, 255 Conn. 225 (noting that parent ‘‘is constitu-
tionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel
only if he had a constitutional right to appointed counsel
in the termination proceeding’’);11 Cronic’s presumption
11
The parties agree that whether the respondent had a constitutional right
to the effective assistance of counsel under the fourteenth amendment to
the federal constitution depends on the outcome of the balancing test set
forth in Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27–32, 101 S. Ct.
2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981), and its progeny. ‘‘[I]n Lassiter . . . the United
States Supreme Court considered and rejected a claim that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the appointment of counsel
for indigent parents in every parental status termination proceeding. . . .
The court read its prior cases as establishing a presumption that an indigent
litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when his or her physical liberty
is at stake. . . . The court then applied the due process balancing test set
forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d
18 (1976)—weighing the competing private and governmental interests at
stake and the risk of an erroneous decision in the absence of appointed
counsel—to determine whether an indigent parent’s interest in obtaining
the assistance of counsel is sufficiently compelling to overcome that pre-
sumption. . . .
‘‘Despite [marshaling] a number of potentially convincing arguments in
favor of recognizing a right to counsel . . . the court ultimately declined
to hold that due process requires the appointment of counsel whenever a
state seeks to terminate the parental rights of an indigent parent. . . .
Instead, the court held that whether the federal constitution requires the
appointment of counsel is a fact specific determination that must be made
by balancing the Mathews factors on a case-by-case basis. . . . The court
further cautioned that, in light of the presumption against the right to
appointed counsel in the absence of a potential deprivation of physical
liberty, such a right would exist only [i]f, in a given case, the parent’s interests
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of prejudice standard does not extend to ‘‘this case and
other child protection cases where there is a complete
breakdown in the adversarial system,’’ as the respon-
dent urges.12
Because the respondent’s claim is strictly predicated
on the applicability of the ‘‘standard used by our
reviewing courts in Cronic,’’ we begin there. In Cronic,
the United States Supreme Court considered a defen-
dant’s appeal from his conviction of mail fraud based on
his claim that his sixth amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel13 had been violated during his
criminal trial. United States v. Cronic, supra, 466 U.S.
651, 658. The court recognized in Cronic that ‘‘[a]n
accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a funda-
mental component of our criminal justice system’’; id.,
653; and that that right ‘‘is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id.,654. The court expressed concern that,
‘‘[u]nless the accused receives the effective assistance
[are] at their strongest, the [s]tate’s interests [are] at their weakest, and the
risks of error [are] at their peak . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Amias I.,343 Conn. 816, 833 n.18, 276 A.3d 955 (2022).
With these principles in mind, we assume without deciding that the respon-
dent had a federal constitutional right to the effective assistance counsel. We
need not further assume, therefore, that article first, § 10, of the Connecticut
constitution independently confers such a right. See In re Taijha H.-B., 333
Conn. 297, 327, 216 A.3d 601 (2019).
12
The petitioner also argues that, even if the presumption of prejudice
standard set forth in Cronic is extended to child protection matters, that
standard is not implicated by the circumstances of this case. Because we
conclude that this standard is not applicable in the context of this child
dependency proceeding, we do not address this argument.
13
The sixth amendment to the United States constitution provides in
relevant part: ‘‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.’’ U.S. Const., amend.
VI. We note that our Supreme Court ‘‘has held that, in termination of parental
rights proceedings, parents have no right to counsel under the sixth amend-
ment . . . which [applies] only to criminal defendants,’’ and the respondent
does not argue otherwise in this appeal. In re Amias I., 343 Conn. 816, 832
n.17, 276 A.3d 955 (2022), citing State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 159–60,
425 A.2d 939 (1979).
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In re Juliany T.

of counsel, a serious risk of injustice infects the trial
itself’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 656; and
explained that ‘‘the right to the effective assistance of
counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because
of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to
receive a fair trial.’’ Id., 658. As such, although the court
acknowledged the presumption that an accused’s ‘‘law-
yer is competent to provide the guiding hand that the
defendant needs’’ and maintained that ‘‘the burden rests
on the accused to demonstrate a constitutional viola-
tion,’’ it nonetheless identified three situations involving
circumstances ‘‘so likely to prejudice the accused that
the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case
is unjustified.’’ Id., 658. Specifically, where there is a
‘‘complete denial of counsel’’ during a critical stage of
the proceedings, where ‘‘counsel entirely fails to subject
the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial test-
ing’’; id., 659; and where surrounding circumstances
make it unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective
assistance, prejudice resulting from ineffective assis-
tance may be presumed. Id., 659–60; see also Leon v.
Commissioner of Correction, 189 Conn. App. 512, 532,
208 A.3d 296 (explaining that, in Cronic, court ‘‘estab-
lished a narrow exception to the general two part . . .
test for determining whether a petitioner’s [sixth
amendment] right to the effective assistance of counsel
has been violated’’), 14 cert. denied, 332 Conn. 909, 209
A.3d 1232 (2019).
The respondent argues that, by conceding that the
petitioner had proven his failure to rehabilitate, his
14
That two part test, set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), is the same as the two part
test the respondent must satisfy, in the absence of an exception, to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel in the termination proceeding that gives
rise to this appeal. See In re Peter L., supra, 158 Conn. App. 563. Under
Strickland, a petitioner cannot establish a violation of his sixth amendment
right to counsel without first demonstrating that (1) counsel’s performance
was deficient and (2) this deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s defense.
Strickland v. Washington, supra, 687.
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‘‘counsel failed entirely to subject the [petitioner’s] case
to meaningful adversarial testing’’ as contemplated by
Cronic, and that this error ‘‘was of a magnitude signifi-
cant enough that [this court] could conclude that [he]
was, in effect, unrepresented during a critical phase of
the termination trial.’’ He maintains, therefore, that this
court should treat his counsel’s concession as structural
error by deeming ‘‘the process itself . . . presump-
tively unreliable’’ and reversing the judgment. See In
re Amias I., 343 Conn. 816, 840, 276 A.3d 955 (2022)
(‘‘[s]tructural [error] cases defy analysis by harmless
error standards because the entire conduct of the trial,
from beginning to end, is obviously affected’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Our Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in In re Amias I., however, forecloses the respon-
dent’s claim.
In In re Amias I., the respondent mother appealed
from the judgments of the trial court terminating her
parental rights to her three children. Id., 818–19. The
respondent claimed that the trial court violated her
children’s constitutional right to conflict free represen-
tation by failing to inquire into whether the attorney
appointed to represent them had a conflict of interest
and that the court should treat that failure as structural
error subject to automatic reversal. Id., 819–20, 830. Our
Supreme Court explained, however, that, on previous
occasions when it had applied the structural error doc-
trine, it had ‘‘done so sparingly’’ and, more to the point,
that it never had applied structural error in the child
dependency context. Id., 839; see also Banks v. Com-
missioner of Correction, 339 Conn. 1, 29, 259 A.3d 1082
(2021) (‘‘[o]nly a small share of constitutional errors
are structural, that is, so presumptively harmful that
they require automatic reversal’’). The court ‘‘concluded
that the significant differences between child depen-
dency proceedings and other judicial proceedings mili-
tate decisively against applying a per se reversible error
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In re Juliany T.

rule in dependency cases,’’ and it declined to do so. In
re Amias I., supra, 343 Conn. 840.
In reaching this conclusion, our Supreme Court
‘‘agree[d] fully with the California Supreme Court’s rea-
soning in In re James F., 42 Cal. 4th 901, 915–16, 174
P.3d 180, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 358 (2008), in which that court
concluded that the significant differences between child
dependency proceedings and other judicial proceedings
militate decisively against applying a per se reversible
error rule in dependency cases. See id., 917 (‘[w]e can-
not agree . . . that prejudice is irrelevant in a depen-
dency proceeding when the welfare of the child is at
issue and delay in resolution of the proceeding is inher-
ently prejudicial to the child’). ‘[T]he price that would
be paid for [applying such a rule], in the form of needless
reversals of dependency judgments, is unacceptably
high in light of the strong public interest in prompt
resolution of these cases so that the children may
receive loving and secure home environments as soon
as reasonably possible.’ Id., 918.’’ In re Amias I., supra,
343 Conn. 840–41. The same policy considerations are
implicated in this child dependency proceeding and
thus, we will not presume prejudice here. See id.; see
also In re Jaelynn K.-M., supra, 229 Conn. App. 383
(concluding that Cronic’s presumption of prejudice was
not applicable to constructive deprivation of counsel
claim in child dependency proceeding).
It is therefore incumbent on the respondent to prove
prejudice to prevail on his claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. See In re Peter L., supra, 158 Conn.
App. 563. Apart from arguing that prejudice should be
presumed, however, the respondent has not addressed
the issue of prejudice in his briefs to this court, let
alone proven that his counsel’s alleged incompetency
contributed to the loss of his parental rights. See, e.g.,
In re S. F., 229 Conn. App. 1, 10 n.7, 326 A.3d 609
(‘‘[a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is
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In re Juliany T.

required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure
to brief the issue properly’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 350 Conn. 932, 326 A.3d 1108
(2024). We conclude that the respondent cannot prevail
on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim because,
as the petitioner argues and we agree, he did not brief
the issue of prejudice and, thus, his claim is inade-
quately briefed. See id.
On the basis of the foregoing, we reject the respon-
dent’s claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance at the termination of parental rights trial.
II
The respondent next claims that he has a due process
right to a hybrid habeas fact-finding proceeding in the
trial court in order to more fully develop the record in
support of his claim that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel at trial. He claims that ‘‘proce-
dures available to him to vindicate his right to effective
assistance of counsel are inadequate.’’ He further claims
that, if due process does not afford him such a right,
this court should exercise its supervisory authority to
afford him that right. These claims warrant little discus-
sion.
As the respondent acknowledges, our Supreme Court
concluded in In re Jonathan M., supra, 255 Conn. 227–
28, that ‘‘due process does not dictate that the petitioner
must be permitted to utilize the writ of habeas corpus
as a procedural means of attacking collaterally the ter-
mination judgment.’’ He further acknowledges that the
court saw ‘‘no need to utilize [its] supervisory authority
to supplement the evidentiary record in direct appeals
from such judgments in an effort to create an alternative
to the habeas relief sought in this case.’’ Id., 236. In
reaching these conclusions, the court explained that
there were ‘‘other means of vindicating the right to
effective assistance of counsel . . . through which an
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In re Juliany T.

indigent parent may challenge a termination judgment
. . . .’’ Id. Specifically, in addition to the right to bring
a direct appeal from the termination judgment, a parent
may seek to ‘‘open the final judgment of termination
and assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel’’;
id., 237; and/or file a petition for a new trial. Id.,239.
Although the respondent argues that the latter two
options are inadequate, he did not attempt to avail him-
self of those options. Moreover, he also correctly
acknowledges that, ‘‘to the extent the claims overlap,
this court is bound by our Supreme Court’s prior ruling’’
in In re Jonathan M.15 We are not at liberty to assess
the propriety of the ‘‘other means’’ that were available
to the respondent to vindicate his right to effective
assistance of counsel under these circumstances. This
court is bound by the precedent of our Supreme Court;
see, e.g., In re Wendy G.-R., supra, 225 Conn. App. 201
n.12 (rejecting request to reconsider propriety of other
means parent has to vindicate right to effective assis-
tance of counsel set forth in In re Jonathan M.); and
we therefore reject the respondent’s claim that he has
a constitutional right to a hybrid habeas fact-finding
proceeding, and we decline to exercise our supervisory
authority to create one in light of our Supreme Court’s
recognition of other available remedies in In re Jona-
than M.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

15
We note that the respondent explains in his brief that ‘‘[t]his claim is
fully briefed to allow this court an ability to fully examine whether In re
Jonathan M. forecloses action by this court and to preserve the argument
in further proceedings.’’