In re Andrew C.

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Andrew C.

IN RE ANDREW C.*
(AC 47268)
(AC 47368)
Alvord, Cradle and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The intervening foster parents and the minor child separately appealed from
the judgment of the trial court granting the motion of the respondent father
to open and vacate the court’s judgment granting the foster parents’ motion
to transfer guardianship of the minor child to themselves. They claimed,
inter alia, that the trial court erred in retroactively applying In re Ryan C.
(220 Conn. App. 507), in which this court explained that the right of a foster
parent to intervene in neglect proceedings is limited by statute (§ 46b-129
(p)) to the right to be heard, to its determination that the foster parents did
not have the right to intervene. Held:

The trial court properly granted the respondent father’s motion to open and
vacate the guardianship judgment, as the foster parents’ lack of standing
to intervene in this action and, thus, the court’s lack of subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate their motion to transfer guardianship of the minor
child, was so entirely obvious that the court’s judgment granting the motion
to transfer guardianship was void ab initio.
Argued September 4—officially released November 4, 2024**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to adjudicate the respondents’ minor child
neglected, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of New Britain, Juvenile Matters, where the
court, Hon. Barbara M. Quinn, judge trial referee, ren-
dered judgment adjudicating the minor child neglected
and committing the minor child to the custody of the
petitioner; thereafter, the court, C. Taylor, J., granted
the motion filed by the foster parents of the minor
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
** November 4, 2024, the date this decision was released as a slip opinion,
is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
In re Andrew C.

child to intervene; subsequently, the court, C. Taylor,
J., granted the intervenors’ motion to transfer guardian-
ship of the minor child to themselves and denied the
respondent father’s motion to revoke the commitment;
thereafter, the court, Daniels, J., granted the respon-
dent father’s motion to open and vacate the judgment
granting the intervenors’ motion to transfer guardian-
ship, and the minor child and the foster parents filed
separate appeals with this court. Affirmed.
Dana M. Hrelic, with whom was Stacie L.
Provencher, for the appellants in Docket No. AC 47268
and appellees in Docket No. AC 47368 (intervenors).
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant in Docket No. AC 47368 (minor child).
Evan O’Roark, assistant solicitor general, with
whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, for the appellee in Docket Nos. AC 47268 and AC
47368 (petitioner).
Benjamin M. Wattenmaker, for the appellee in
Docket Nos. AC 47268 and AC 47368 (respondent
father).
Opinion

CRADLE, J. These appeals arise from a child protec-
tion matter concerning the care and custody of the
minor child, Andrew C. Andrew and his intervening
foster parents separately appeal, in Docket Nos. AC
47368 and AC 472681 respectively, from the judgment
1
The foster parents also filed a writ of error, Docket No. AC 47292, that
challenged the same judgment as their appeal and on the same grounds. A
‘‘primary distinction between appeals and writs of error’’ is that ‘‘[a] writ
of error is the means by which a nonparty may seek review of a final
judgment,’’ whereas ‘‘[a]n appeal is the means by which a party may seek
review of a final judgment.’’ Redding Life Care, LLC v. Redding, 331 Conn.
711, 726, 207 A.3d 493 (2019). The foster parents were parties to the underly-
ing action—both the neglect matter and the motion to open. In the neglect
matter, the court permitted them to intervene, after which they participated
in the trial by prosecuting their motion to transfer guardianship and opposing
the respondent father’s motion to revoke the commitment of Andrew. Based
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Andrew C.

of the trial court, granting the motion, filed by the
respondent father of Andrew, Chester C. (respondent),
to open and vacate the court’s judgment, rendered
almost two years earlier, granting the foster parents’
motion to transfer guardianship of Andrew to them-
selves.2 We agree with the trial court that the foster
parents did not have standing to intervene in this action
and, thus, that the court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate their motion to transfer guard-
ianship of Andrew. We therefore affirm the judgment
of the trial court.3
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of these appeals. The respondent and
Andrew’s mother have three children, Madison, Ryan,
and Andrew. Madison and Ryan were living with the
respondent mother in 2017 when the petitioner, the
Commissioner of Children and Families, obtained
on the foregoing, party status was established for purposes of General
Statutes § 52-263. See In re Leo L., 191 Conn. App. 134, 135, 214 A.3d 430
(2019) (entertaining intervenor grandfather’s appeal from judgment denying
his motion to transfer guardianship). ‘‘No writ of error may be brought in
any civil or criminal proceeding for the correction of any error where (1)
the error might have been reviewed by process of appeal . . . .’’ Practice
Book § 72-1 (b). Accordingly, ‘‘[i]f there is a right to appeal, a writ of error
should not be brought . . . .’’ Vasquez v. Superior Court, 102 Conn. App.
394, 404, 925 A.2d 1112, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 915, 931 A.2d 935 (2007).
Because we have jurisdiction to hear the foster parents’ appeal, we have
dismissed the writ of error.
2
Although an order granting a motion to open generally is not an appeal-
able final judgment, the present order is immediately appealable in that it
implicates the custody of Andrew and ‘‘the important rights surrounding
the parent-child relationship.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Shamika F., 256 Conn. 383, 404, 773 A.2d 347 (2001).
3
The guardian ad litem, the Law Offices of Attorney Jason Goddard, is
also a party to all three appellate matters. The attorney for the guardian ad
litem has not filed a brief, a statement adopting the brief of a party, or a
detailed statement that the factual and legal issues on appeal do not implicate
the child’s interest, as required by Practice Book § 67-13. Because the attor-
ney for Andrew filed an appeal on his behalf, we are informed as to the
manner in which the factual and legal issues on appeal implicate the
child’s interest.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
In re Andrew C.

orders of temporary custody and filed petitions alleging
that Madison and Ryan had been neglected. As a result,
Madison and Ryan were placed with a foster parent.
On November 20, 2017, shortly after Andrew was born,
the petitioner obtained an order of temporary custody
and filed a neglect petition with respect to Andrew,
who was placed with different foster parents. On
November 30, 2017, all three children were adjudicated
neglected and committed to the care of the petitioner.
On February 1, 2019, the petitioner filed a petition
to terminate the parental rights of both parents as to
Andrew. On August 16, 2019, the petitioner withdrew
the termination petition as to the respondent.4
On August 14, 2019, the petitioner filed a motion to
review a permanency plan providing for reunification
of Andrew with the respondent. On December 4, 2019,
the respondent filed a motion to revoke the commit-
ment of Andrew and for the return of custody and
guardianship of Andrew to him.
On December 30, 2019, Andrew’s foster parents filed
a motion to intervene in the proceedings pursuant to
Practice Book § 35a-4.5 In their motion, the foster par-
ents alleged, inter alia, that they ‘‘have a direct and
4
The respondent mother’s parental rights were terminated with respect
to all three children on November 13, 2019, which was affirmed on appeal.
In re Madison C., 201 Conn. App. 184, 241 A.3d 756, cert. denied, 335 Conn.
985, 242 A.3d 480 (2020). She has not participated in this appeal.
5
Practice Book § 35a-4 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(c) Other persons unre-
lated to the child or youth by blood or marriage, or persons related to the
child or youth by blood or marriage who are not seeking to serve as a
placement, temporary custodian or guardian of the child may move to inter-
vene in the dispositional phase of the case, and the judicial authority may
grant said motion if it determines that such intervention is in the best interest
of the child or youth or in the interests of justice.
‘‘(d) In making a determination upon a motion to intervene, the judicial
authority may consider: the timeliness of the motion as judged by the circum-
stances of the case; whether the movant has a direct and immediate interest
in the case; whether the movant’s interest is not adequately represented by
existing parties; whether the intervention may cause delay in the proceedings
or other prejudice to the existing parties; the necessity for or value of
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Andrew C.

immediate interest in this matter. Specifically, [the
respondent has never cared for Andrew and that] they
have cared for [him] since [his] birth and consider him
to be a part of their family. The [foster parents] have
an interest in keeping their family intact . . . .’’ They
further alleged that their ‘‘interest is not adequately
represented by the existing parties to this matter’’ and
that they ‘‘have an interest in maintaining their family’s
integrity.’’6 On January 23, 2020, the trial court, C. Tay-
lor, J., granted the foster parents’ motion to intervene
‘‘[f]or dispositional purposes only,’’ noting that their
‘‘[l]evel of participation [was] to be decided by the
court’’ and that the ‘‘foster parents will not be allowed
to present evidence [regarding the motion to review
the permanency plan], but [they] may state [their] posi-
tion.’’7 Also on January 23, 2020, the court approved a
permanency plan to revoke Andrew’s commitment and
reunify him with the respondent.
On July 11, 2020, the petitioner filed another motion
to review a permanency plan providing for the reunifica-
tion of Andrew with the respondent.8 On July 20, 2020,
the foster parents objected to that plan on the ground
the intervention in terms of resolving the controversy before the judicial
authority; and the best interests of the child. . . .’’
6
In their motion, the foster parents also alleged that allowing them to
intervene would not delay the proceedings, would not prejudice any of the
existing parties to this matter and would benefit the court and assist in
resolving the controversy. They asserted that ‘‘there is no party currently
involved in this matter who knows or is more familiar with [Andrew] and his
needs, [which] makes [them] uniquely able to inform the court of [Andrew’s]
health, welfare and best interest . . . .’’
7
There were no written objections filed to the motion to intervene. The
memorandum of the January 23, 2020 permanency plan hearing, at which
the court considered the motion, however, reflects that the respondent, the
petitioner and Andrew’s attorney objected to the foster parents’ intervention.
The memorandum of the hearing does not reflect that the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction was raised at that time.
8
It appears from the record that the initial plan was to reunify Andrew
with the respondent on April 24, 2020. That plan seems to have been delayed
by the COVID-19 pandemic.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
In re Andrew C.

that reunification was not in Andrew’s best interest.
The foster parents also moved to revoke Andrew’s com-
mitment and to transfer guardianship to themselves.
On July 27, 2020, the foster parents filed an emergency
motion to stay the reunification of Andrew with the
respondent. The court granted that motion.
On October 22, 2020, the respondent filed a motion
to revoke Andrew’s commitment, to which the foster
parents objected. Thereafter, the foster parents’ motion
to transfer guardianship, the motion to review the per-
manency plan and the respondent’s motion to revoke
commitment were consolidated for trial.
After several days of trial, which commenced on Jan-
uary 28 and concluded on August 6, 2021, at which the
foster mother testified and the foster parents presented
numerous exhibits and the testimony of several wit-
nesses, the court, C. Taylor, J., filed a written decision
on December 2, 2021, in which it denied the respon-
dent’s motion to revoke commitment and granted the
foster parents’ motion to transfer guardianship to them,
finding that it was in Andrew’s best interest. The respon-
dent did not appeal from that judgment.
Meanwhile, matters pertaining to the respondent’s
other two children also proceeded. On July 8, 2020,
Madison was returned to the respondent’s care. On July
28, 2020, which was two days before the petitioner had
planned to reunify the respondent and Ryan, his foster
mother moved to intervene in the dispositional phase
of the neglect petition in order to seek a transfer of
guardianship to her. She was granted permission to
intervene, and her motion to transfer guardianship to
her was granted. The respondent appealed, and, in July,
2023, this court determined that Ryan’s foster mother
had been improperly allowed to intervene, as it was
not authorized by Practice Book § 35a-4 and General
Statutes § 46b-129 (p). See In re Ryan C., 220 Conn.
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Andrew C.

App. 507, 523, 299 A.3d 308, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 901,
300 A.3d 1166 (2023). Specifically, this court concluded
that the general language of Practice Book § 35a-4 ‘‘can-
not be interpreted in a manner that enlarges a foster
parent’s rights under § 46b-129 (p).’’ Id., 526. This court
determined that the erroneous intervention resulted in
the trial court ‘‘improperly adjudicat[ing] the motion to
transfer guardianship’’ because it ‘‘applied an improper
standard and evaluated improper factors . . . .’’ Id.,
532. Consequently, the judgment was reversed, and the
case was remanded with direction to deny the foster
mother’s motion to intervene and dismiss her motion
to transfer guardianship and for a new trial on the
motions to revoke commitment.9 Id., 533.
On October 2, 2023, in light of the decision in In re
Ryan C., the respondent filed a motion to open and
vacate the trial court’s December 2, 2021 judgment
granting the foster parents’ motion to transfer guardian-
ship of Andrew to them. He argued that ‘‘foster parents
do not have standing to intervene in the dispositional
phase of neglect proceedings as a matter of law,’’ and,
as a result, the trial court ‘‘did not have jurisdiction to
consider the foster parents’ motion to transfer guardian-
ship’’ such that the ‘‘order granting that motion is void
ab initio.’’ The respondent argued that the holding in
In re Ryan C. applied retroactively here because the
issue of the foster parents’ standing was jurisdictional,
which can be raised at any time. The foster parents
objected, claiming that the respondent’s motion to open
was untimely and that the motion was an improper
collateral attack on the judgment transferring guardian-
ship to them. They further argued that In re Ryan C.
did not apply retroactively to this case because the
issue of the guardianship of Andrew was no longer
pending. In his reply to the foster parents’ objection,
the respondent argued, in addition to the arguments
9
We note that Ryan has been reunified with the respondent.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
In re Andrew C.

that he previously asserted in support of his motion to
open, that the court maintained continuing jurisdiction
to open the judgment pursuant to General Statutes
§ 52-212a.10

The court, Daniels, J., held a hearing on the motion
to open and, on January 3, 2024, issued a memorandum
of decision in which it granted the respondent’s motion
to open, vacated the prior order granting the foster
parents’ motion to intervene, ordered that the foster
parents’ motion to intervene be denied, and dismissed
their motion to transfer guardianship. The court further
ordered that a new trial be held on the respondent’s
motion to revoke the commitment of Andrew. The court
held that the respondent’s motion to open was timely
because the respondent was challenging the foster par-
ents’ standing to intervene, which implicated the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction and could be raised at any
time. The court also agreed with the respondent that
it maintained continuing jurisdiction over the matter.
The court rejected the foster parents’ arguments that
the motion to open constituted an impermissible collat-
eral attack on the guardianship judgment and that In
re Ryan C. did not apply retroactively. On January 8,
2024, the court denied the foster parents’ motion to
reargue. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the foster parents and Andrew claim, inter
alia, that the court improperly granted the motion to
open on the ground that the foster parents lacked stand-
ing to intervene and that the court lacked subject matter
10
Meanwhile, the foster parents had filed a motion to vacate the court’s
orders pertaining to the respondent’s visitation of Andrew on the ground
that the parties were ‘‘capable of communicating and scheduling visitation
on their own without court supervision.’’ The respondent objected to the
foster parents’ motion and disagreed with the representations made therein.
The respondent also filed a motion to modify the visitation orders seeking
increased visitation without the involvement of the foster parents.
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Andrew C.

jurisdiction to adjudicate their motion to transfer guard-
ianship of Andrew to themselves almost two years ear-
lier. We are not persuaded.11
Although we typically review the granting of a motion
to open a judgment for an abuse of discretion; see
Wethington v. Wethington, 223 Conn. App. 715, 724,
309 A.3d 356 (2024); our review of a court’s decision
pertaining to jurisdiction presents a question of law
over which our review is plenary. See Sousa v. Sousa,
322 Conn. 757, 770, 143 A.3d 578 (2016).
‘‘[I]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and
review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any
time. . . . Subject matter jurisdiction involves the
authority of the court to adjudicate the type of contro-
versy presented by the action before it. . . . [A] court
lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over
which it is without jurisdiction . . . .
‘‘The issue of standing implicates [the] court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. . . . Standing is the legal right to
set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully
invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she]
has, in an individual or representative capacity, some
real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable
right, title or interest in the subject matter of the contro-
versy. . . . When standing is put in issue, the question
is whether the person whose standing is challenged is
a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue
11
The foster parents and Andrew also challenge the court’s determinations
that it had continuing jurisdiction to open and vacate the guardianship
judgment and that the motion to open was not an impermissible collateral
attack on that judgment. The petitioner similarly challenges the court’s
determination that it maintained continuing jurisdiction to open the guard-
ianship judgment. Because we agree with the court’s determination that the
respondent’s motion to open was timely in that it raised a challenge to the
subject matter jurisdiction of the court that entered the judgment that was
the issue of the motion to open, we need not address the additional bases
on which the court relied in adjudicating the respondent’s motion.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
In re Andrew C.

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Bank of New York Mellon v. Tope, 345 Conn.
662, 677–78, 286 A.3d 891 (2022). Generally, ‘‘[a]s a
matter of law, in the absence of jurisdiction over the
parties, a judgment is void ab initio and is subject to
both direct and collateral attack.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Schoenhorn v. Moss, 347 Conn. 501,
514, 298 A.3d 236 (2023); see also Argent Mortgage Co.,
LLC v. Huertas, 288 Conn. 568, 576, 953 A.2d 868 (2008)
(‘‘No principle is more universal than that the judgment
of a court without jurisdiction is a nullity. . . . Such
a judgment, whenever and wherever declared upon as
a source of a right, may always be challenged.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)).

‘‘[E]ven litigation about subject matter jurisdiction
[however] should take into account the importance of
the principle of the finality of judgments, particularly
when the parties have had a full opportunity originally
to contest the jurisdiction of the adjudicatory tribunal.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Investment Associ-
ates v. Summit Associates, Inc., 309 Conn. 840, 855, 74
A.3d 1192 (2013). ‘‘[T]he principle of finality rests on
the premise that the proceeding had the sanction of law,
expressed in the rules of subject matter jurisdiction.
As long as the possibility exists of making error in a
determination of the question of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the principles of finality and validity cannot be
perfectly accommodated. . . . If the question is
decided erroneously, and a judgment is allowed to stand
in the face of the fact that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction, then the principle of validity is com-
promised. On the other hand, if the judgment remains
indefinitely subject to attack for a defect of jurisdiction,
then the principle of finality is compromised. The essen-
tial problem is therefore one of selecting which of the
two principles is to be given greater emphasis.’’ 1
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Andrew C.

Restatement (Second), Judgments § 12, comment a, pp.
116–17 (1982).
Faced with competing principles of the finality of a
judgment and the validity of a judgment, our Supreme
Court has held that, ‘‘[u]nless a litigant can show an
absence of subject matter jurisdiction that makes the
prior judgment of a tribunal entirely invalid, he or she
must resort to direct proceedings to correct perceived
wrongs, rather than to a collateral proceeding. . . .
[T]o sustain a collateral attack on a judgment, the lack
of jurisdiction must be entirely obvious and . . . the
alleged deficiency must amount to a fundamental mis-
take that is so plainly beyond the court’s jurisdiction
that its entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of
authority.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Schoenhorn v. Moss,
supra, 347 Conn. 515.
‘‘[W]here the lack of jurisdiction is not entirely obvi-
ous, the critical considerations are whether the com-
plaining party had the opportunity to litigate the ques-
tion of jurisdiction in the original action, and, if he did
have such an opportunity, whether there are strong
policy reasons for giving him a second opportunity to
do so. . . .
‘‘Litigation about whether subject matter jurisdiction
exists should take into account whether the litigation
is a collateral or direct attack on the judgment, whether
the parties consented to the jurisdiction originally, the
age of the original judgment, whether the parties had
an opportunity originally to contest jurisdiction, the
prevention of a miscarriage of justice, whether the sub-
ject matter is so far beyond the jurisdiction of the court
as to constitute an abuse of authority, and the desirabil-
ity of the finality of judgments.’’ (Citation omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Stones Trail, LLC v. Wes-
ton, 174 Conn. App. 715, 736–37, 166 A.3d 832, cert.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13
In re Andrew C.

denied, 327 Conn. 926, 171 A.3d 60 (2017), and cert.
dismissed, 327 Conn. 926, 171 A.3d 59 (2017).
Here, for the reasons that follow, we conclude that
the foster parents’ lack of standing to intervene in this
action, and thus the court’s lack of subject matter juris-
diction to adjudicate their motion to transfer guardian-
ship of Andrew to themselves, was entirely obvious so
as to render its judgment entirely invalid.
In In re Ryan C., supra, 220 Conn. App. 507, this
court explained that ‘‘Section 46b-129 (p) and Practice
Book § 35a-5 specifically limit the rights of foster par-
ents to participate in neglect proceedings. Section 46b-
129 (p) provides: ‘A foster parent, prospective adoptive
parent or relative caregiver shall receive notice and
have the right to be heard for the purposes of this
section in Superior Court in any proceeding concerning
a foster child living with such foster parent, prospective
adoptive parent or relative caregiver. A foster parent,
prospective adoptive parent or relative caregiver who
has cared for a child or youth shall have the right to
be heard and comment on the best interests of such
child or youth in any proceeding under this section
which is brought not more than one year after the last
day the foster parent, prospective adoptive parent or
relative caregiver provided such care.’ . . .
‘‘Prior to the legislature’s adoption of No. 01-142, § 8,
of the 2001 Public Acts (P.A. 01-142), § 46b-129 stated
that ‘[a] foster parent shall have standing for the pur-
poses of this section in Superior Court in matters con-
cerning the placement or revocation of commitment of
a foster child living with such parent.’ General Statutes
(Rev. to 2001) § 46b-129 (o). Significantly, in 2001,
‘standing’ was replaced with ‘the right to be heard
. . . .’ P.A. 01-142, § 8.
‘‘The language of § 46b-129 (p) is reflected in Practice
Book § 35a-5. Practice Book § 35a-5 provides in relevant
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Andrew C.

part: ‘(a) Any foster parent, prospective adoptive parent
or relative caregiver shall be notified of and have a
right to be heard in any proceeding held concerning a
child or youth living with such foster parent, prospec-
tive adoptive parent or relative caregiver . . . .’ ’’
(Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) In re Ryan
C., supra, 220 Conn. App. 522–23. ‘‘There is no language
in § 46b-129 (p) or Practice Book § 35a-5 that authorizes
a foster parent to intervene in the dispositional phase
of neglect proceedings.’’ Id., 523.
The foster parents and Andrew argue that the trial
court improperly retroactively applied In re Ryan C.,
which was issued in 2023, to the guardianship court’s
decision in 2021. The foster parents contend that ‘‘the
lack of jurisdiction was not apparent or obvious until
the In re Ryan C. decision came out in 2023, more
than two years’’ after the court granted their motion to
transfer guardianship. Notably, in so arguing, the foster
parents acknowledge that the court’s lack of jurisdic-
tion to hear their motion to transfer guardianship
became entirely obvious after In re Ryan C. was issued
in 2023. Their argument is misplaced, however, in that,
as the trial court found, In re Ryan C. ‘‘[did] not estab-
lish a new precedent, and it did not decide an issue of
first impression,’’ as expressly stated in that case. In
re Ryan C. was arguably novel only in that it reconciled
the inconsistent language of Practice Book § 35a-4,
which applies generally to unrelated persons who are
not seeking to serve as a placement or guardian for the
minor child, with § 46b-129 (p) and Practice Book § 35a-
5, which apply specifically to foster parents.
In In re Ryan C., this court noted that its holding
was consistent with earlier case law and recounted: ‘‘In
In re Baby Girl B., [224 Conn. 263, 278, 618 A.2d 1
(1992)], our Supreme Court discussed the importance
of restricting preadoptive parents’ intervention in child
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
In re Andrew C.

custody proceedings. In that case, the preadoptive par-
ents argued that the trial court improperly denied their
motion to intervene as a matter of right or, alternatively,
abused its discretion in denying them permissive inter-
vention in the termination proceedings. Id., 274. Our
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the
preadoptive parents’ motion to intervene and held that
the preadoptive parents were not entitled to intervene
as a matter of right and that the court did not abuse
its discretion in denying them permissive intention. Id.
‘‘In holding that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion by denying the preadoptive parents’ request for
permissive intervention, the court in In re Baby Girl
B. stated: With respect to the intervention of foster
parents in termination proceedings, this court has deter-
mined that [t]he intervention of foster parents as parties
at the termination stage will permit them to shape the
case in such a way as to introduce an impermissible
ingredient into the termination proceedings. Petitions
for termination of parental rights are particularly vul-
nerable to the risk that judges or social workers will
be tempted, consciously or unconsciously, to compare
unfavorably the material advantages of the child’s natu-
ral parents with those of prospective adoptive parents
and therefore to reach a result based on such compari-
sons rather than on the statutory criteria. . . . Simi-
larly, the intervention of the preadoptive parents in the
termination proceeding might have led to the introduc-
tion of impermissible and prejudicial factors. Moreover,
because the termination proceeding was concerned
only with the statutory criteria alleged as grounds for
terminating the mother’s parental rights, the preadop-
tive parents’ intervention would have been of little or
no value to the court’s decision on whether the grounds
for termination had been proved. . . . Id., 278.
‘‘The policy considerations articulated in In re Baby
Girl B. that weighed against allowing a preadoptive
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Andrew C.

parent permissive intervention in the adjudicatory
phase of a termination of parental rights proceeding
are similarly relevant to a foster parent’s permissive
intervention in the dispositional phase of neglect pro-
ceedings. In both the adjudicatory phase of termination
proceedings and the dispositional phase of neglect pro-
ceedings, the biological parents’ rights to their children
have not yet been terminated. Therefore, the biological
parents’ rights must be protected by limiting a foster
parent’s participation in neglect proceedings to ensure
that improper and prejudicial factors are not considered
by a court. This is especially important in instances in
which the court must determine whether the causes
that led to a child’s commitment to the petitioner no
longer exist and whether the child should be returned
to the care and custody of the biological parent.
‘‘We have also recognized a distinction between a
foster parent’s right to be heard and right to intervene.
In In re Vincent D., 65 Conn. App. 658, 664, 783 A.2d
534 (2001), this court upheld the trial court’s decision
to permit foster parents to participate, in a limited man-
ner, in the dispositional phase of a termination of paren-
tal rights proceeding. The trial court, rather than grant-
ing the foster parents’ motion to intervene, recognized
that standing to comment is not the same thing as inter-
vention and permitted the foster parents to observe and
. . . comment . . . on disposition. . . . Id., 667. This
court upheld the trial court’s decision and concluded
that the trial court had properly protected the rights of
the respondent parents by limiting the foster parents’
participation in the proceedings. See id.
‘‘In In re Joshua S., [127 Conn. App. 723, 730, 14 A.3d
1076 (2011)], this court held that a child’s foster parents
did not have a colorable claim to intervene as a matter of
right in the dispositional phase of a neglect proceeding,
and, therefore, the foster parents were not parties to
the proceeding and were not entitled to appeal the
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
In re Andrew C.

court’s denial of their motion to intervene. In coming
to this conclusion, this court stated: [F]oster parents
have a right under . . . § 46b-129 [p] to receive notice
and be heard in any proceeding concerning their foster
child. Although this statute explicitly gives foster par-
ents a right to be heard during a proceeding regarding
the foster child, neither this statute, nor any other stat-
ute, confers on foster parents a right to intervene in a
proceeding related to their foster child. . . . Id.’’ (Foot-
note omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Ryan C., supra, 220 Conn. App. 527–29. In In re Joshua
S., this court reasoned that ‘‘[i]t is well established that
[f]oster families do not have the same rights as biologi-
cal families or adoptive families. . . . It is unques-
tioned that [b]iological and adoptive families have a
liberty interest in the integrity of their family unit which
is part of the fourteenth amendment’s right to familial
privacy. . . . Foster parents, on the other hand, do not
enjoy a liberty interest in the integrity of their family
unit. . . . Rather, [t]he rights of foster parents are
defined and restricted by statute . . . [and] the expec-
tations and entitlements of foster families can be limited
by the state. . . . The statutory scheme provides to
foster parents a limited and narrow set of rights regard-
ing foster children. Such a limited and narrow set of
rights is consistent with the premise that [f]oster par-
ents are entrusted with foster children on a temporary
basis only.’’ (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) In re Joshua S., supra,
127 Conn. App. 729–30; see also Eason v. Welfare Com-
missioner, 171 Conn. 630, 635, 370 A.2d 1082 (1976)
(foster parent did not have standing to file motion to
revoke commitment), cert. denied sub nom. Eason v.
Maloney, 432 U.S. 907, 97 S. Ct. 2953, 53 L. Ed. 2d
1079 (1977).
On the basis of the foregoing case law, and the lan-
guage of § 46b-129 (p) and Practice Book § 35a-5, it is
Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Andrew C.

entirely obvious that the foster parents did not have
standing to intervene in this matter and, consequently,
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to allow
them to do so and to hear their motion to transfer
guardianship of Andrew to themselves. Although we
are mindful that ‘‘[o]ur cases demonstrate that it is
extraordinarily rare for a tribunal’s jurisdiction to be
so plainly lacking that it is entirely obvious’’; (internal
quotation marks omitted) Reinke v. Sing, 328 Conn.
376, 387, 179 A.3d 769 (2018); this case is distinguishable
from those cases in which the lack of jurisdiction was
not entirely obvious. This is not a case in which the
authority relied on by the party seeking to raise a juris-
dictional issue did not implicate the court’s jurisdiction.
See Schoenhorn v. Moss, supra, 347 Conn. 516 (jurisdic-
tion was not lacking due to error in applying rules
of practice). It is axiomatic that standing implicates a
court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
Similarly, this is not a case in which the lack of juris-
diction could not be ascertained from a review of the
record. See Investment Associates v. Summit Associates,
Inc., supra, 309 Conn. 860–61 (lack of jurisdiction was
not entirely obvious where record demonstrated eviden-
tiary issue as to whether plaintiff was partnership or joint
venture and thus lacked standing); In re Shamika F.,
256 Conn. 383, 394–97, 773 A.2d 347 (2001) (lack of
jurisdiction was not entirely obvious where respondent
parents resided in New York but children were in Con-
necticut); Gibson v. Jefferson Woods Community, Inc.,
206 Conn. App. 303, 311, 260 A.3d 1244 (lack of jurisdic-
tion was not entirely obvious when record was silent
as to whether plaintiff had met statutory jurisdictional
prerequisites to maintaining foreclosure action on com-
mon charge lien), cert. denied, 339 Conn. 911, 261 A.3d
747 (2021). Rather, this case is more akin to the deci-
sions in Stones Trail, LLC v. Weston, supra, 174 Conn.
App. 737–38 (principle of finality of judgments did not
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 19
In re Andrew C.

bar trial court from reconsidering ripeness of plaintiff’s
claims and its jurisdiction over them after acceptance
of jury’s verdict where new facts developed at trial that
were unknown to court when previously considering
ripeness issue), and Daley v. Hartford, 215 Conn. 14,
26–27, 574 A.2d 194 (principles of finality did not fore-
close claim that court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
where plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative reme-
dies pursuant to collective bargaining agreement), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 982, 111 S. Ct. 513, 112 L. Ed. 2d 525
(1990), in which the lack of jurisdiction was ascertain-
able from a review of the record. The jurisdictional issue
in this case is readily ascertainable from the record in
that it arises from the status of the foster parents as
intervenors, which is improper as a matter of law.
This also is not a case in which a conflict or uncer-
tainty in the law rendered the court’s lack of jurisdiction
unclear. See Sousa v. Sousa, supra, 322 Conn. 777–79
(lack of jurisdiction was not entirely obvious where
‘‘Connecticut’s case law is in conflict regarding whether
the modification of a property distribution postdissolu-
tion implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction
or merely its statutory authority’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Rider v. Rider, 200 Conn. App. 466,
480, 239 A.3d 357 (2020) (purported lack of subject
matter jurisdiction was not entirely obvious where no
applicable case law or other authority provided guid-
ance on novel issue). To the contrary, as discussed
herein, § 46b-129 (p), formerly subsection (o), expressly
provides, as it has since 2001, that foster parents do
not have party standing in child protection hearings
but, rather, have only the right to be heard. The 2001
amendment, where ‘‘standing’’ was changed to ‘‘right
to be heard,’’ evinced a deliberate choice by the legisla-
ture to limit the role of foster parents in child protection
proceedings, and our courts have consistently applied
that principle.
Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Andrew C.

On the basis of the foregoing, specifically the clear
language of § 46b-129 (p) and the cases in which we
have applied the language of that statute, we conclude
that the court’s order granting the foster parents’
motions to intervene and to transfer guardianship con-
stituted ‘‘a fundamental mistake that [was] so plainly
beyond the court’s jurisdiction that its entertaining
[those motions] was a manifest abuse of authority.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schoenhorn v.
Moss, supra, 347 Conn. 515. The foster parents’ lack of
standing to intervene in this matter and to file a motion
to transfer guardianship, and, consequently, the court’s
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, was so entirely obvi-
ous that the court’s judgment granting the foster par-
ents’ motion to transfer guardianship was void ab ini-
tio.12
Even if we were to conclude that the lack of jurisdic-
tion was not entirely obvious in this case, there is a
strong policy interest in revisiting the transfer of guard-
ianship. ‘‘[I]n some situations, the principle of protec-
tion of the finality of judgments must give way to the
principle of fairness and equity.’’ Kim v. Magnotta, 249
Conn. 94, 109, 733 A.2d 809 (1999). ‘‘[T]he interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their chil-
dren . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental lib-
erty interests recognized by [the United States
Supreme] Court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
12
We note that the petitioner has stated that she takes no position on the
issue of whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
foster parents’ motion to transfer guardianship of Andrew to themselves.
The petitioner explains that ‘‘the department knows of no other cases like
this one. Courts rarely transfer guardianship to a foster parent. Reunification
with the biological parent is the goal in every case. If reunification is not
possible, termination of parental rights and adoption is the preferred disposi-
tion because it is more permanent than a transfer of guardianship. . . .
Transfers of guardianship on a foster parent’s own motion—rather than a
motion filed by the department or child—are even rarer. So the retroactivity
and subject matter jurisdiction questions . . . are unlikely to impact many
other cases . . . .’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 21
In re Andrew C.

Denardo v. Bergamo, 272 Conn. 500, 511, 863 A.2d 686
(2005); see also id. (interests in finality of judgments
and child’s need for stability cannot trump parent’s
constitutionally protected right to raise child). The
court’s error in permitting the foster parents to inter-
vene and the subsequent hearing and granting of their
motion to transfer guardianship, which, notably, went
beyond the contours of its order in granting interven-
tion, was clear.13 Although it may seem untimely for the
trial court to have revisited the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction almost two years after the foster parents’
motion for guardianship had been granted, it is, as
noted, important to prevent a miscarriage of justice to
ensure that the court did, in fact, have jurisdiction over
the claims at issue, particularly under these unique cir-
cumstances, where it was entirely obvious that the fos-
ter parents did not have standing to intervene in this
matter.14 This court explained in In re Ryan C.: ‘‘In
. . . the dispositional phase of neglect proceedings, the
biological parents’ rights to their children have not yet
been terminated. Therefore, the biological parents’
13
As indicated herein, in granting the foster parents’ motion to intervene,
the court noted that their ‘‘level of participation [was] to be decided by the
court’’ and that the ‘‘foster parents will not be allowed to present evidence
[regarding the motion to review the permanency plan], but they may state
[their] position.’’ The foster parents thereafter filed an objection to the
petitioner’s plan to reunify Andrew with the respondent and moved to revoke
Andrew’s commitment and to transfer guardianship to themselves. They
also filed an objection to the respondent’s motion to revoke commitment.
At the consolidated trial of these matters, the foster parents presented
evidence in support of their position. Their involvement in this matter went
well beyond an opportunity to state their position.
14
Although the foster parents alleged in their motion to intervene that
they had a ‘‘direct and immediate interest’’ in this matter in ‘‘keeping their
family intact’’ and ‘‘maintaining their family’s integrity,’’ we reiterate that it
is axiomatic that foster parents have no such legally cognizable interest.
We recognize that the foster parents have developed a bond with Andrew
and acknowledge the emotional impact separation can have on both the
child and the foster parents. We by no means disparage the salutary role
of foster parents in general and, presumably, the role of the foster parents
in this case. However, we are required to follow and are bound by the law.
Page 20 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

22 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Andrew C.

rights must be protected by limiting a foster parent’s
participation in neglect proceedings to ensure that
improper and prejudicial factors are not considered by
a court. This is especially important in instances in
which the court must determine whether the causes
that led to a child’s commitment to the petitioner no
longer exist and whether a child should be returned to
the care and custody of the biological parent.’’ In re
Ryan C., supra, 220 Conn. App. 528–29. As similarly
decided in In re Ryan C., the foster parents’ interven-
tion in this matter and, more specifically, their motion
to transfer guardianship of Andrew to themselves, likely
caused the court to apply an improper standard and
evaluate improper factors in its consideration of the
motion to transfer guardianship and the respondent’s
motion to revoke commitment. See id., 532. We there-
fore conclude that the court properly granted the
respondent’s motion to open and vacate the guardian-
ship judgment. A new hearing should be held on the
respondent’s motion to revoke commitment, during
which the foster parents should be afforded their statu-
tory right to be heard.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.