In re S. F.

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In re S. F.

IN RE S. F. ET AL.*
(AC 47517)
Alvord, Cradle and Harper, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the judgments of the trial court termi-
nating his parental rights with respect to his minor children. The father
claimed that he was denied due process because his trial counsel had
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the admission into
evidence of hearsay contained in testimony and exhibits submitted by the
petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. Held:

The father did not demonstrate that his counsel rendered ineffective assis-
tance, as there were one or more possible strategic reasons that were
objectively reasonable for not objecting to the exhibits and testimony.

The father did not show that his counsel’s vigorous cross-examination of a
social worker for the Department of Children and Families in lieu of objecting
to hearsay in the department’s social study was not objectively reasonable.

Argued September 10—officially released October 30, 2024**

Procedural History

Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor children, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, Juvenile
Matters, and tried to the court, Conway, J.; judgments
terminating the respondents’ parental rights, from
which the respondent father appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent father).
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
** October 30, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re S. F.

Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom,
on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and
Monica O’Connell, assistant attorney general, for the
appellee (petitioner).

Opinion

ALVORD, J. The respondent father, Perry F., appeals
from the judgments of the trial court, rendered in favor
of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families, terminating his parental rights with respect
to his children, A, B, and C.1 On appeal, the respondent
claims that he was denied his due process right to the
effective assistance of counsel.2 We affirm the judg-
ments of the trial court.

A was born in December, 2016, B was born in Septem-
ber, 2018, and C was born in April, 2020. The family’s
involvement with the Department of Children and Fami-
lies (department) dates back at least to April, 2017,
when A was adjudicated neglected and committed to
the petitioner’s custody. In December, 2018, B was adju-
dicated neglected and committed to the petitioner’s
custody. In October, 2019, the court revoked the com-
mitment as to both A and B, and the children were
reunified with the respondent under a six month order
of protective supervision, ‘‘with an explicit mandate
that [the children’s mother, Bernisha] not have unsuper-
vised contact with the children, nor was she to reside
with the children. Unbeknownst to [the department],
1
The court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s mother,
Bernisha R. Because she has not appealed from those judgments, we refer
to Perry F. as the respondent and to Bernisha by name throughout this
opinion. Unless necessary to our analysis of the claims raised by the respon-
dent, in this opinion we need not and do not address the court’s findings
and conclusions with respect to Bernisha.
2
The attorney for the minor children has filed a statement adopting the
appellate brief of the petitioner.
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In re S. F.

throughout the period of the court-ordered protective
supervision continuing through the time when [the
department] administratively closed its case in Septem-
ber, 2020,3 and beyond, [Bernisha] covertly resided with
the respondent . . . and [the] children, and [the
respondent] left the children in [Bernisha’s] unsuper-
vised care.’’ (Footnote in original.)

‘‘In the early morning hours of December 12, 2020,
[the department] . . . assumed temporary custody of
[A, B, and C] after police found the three children alone
in a Days Inn hotel room, a room [the respondent]
checked into with the three children just hours before
[Bernisha] was shot in the leg as she was returning to
her separate Days Inn room after having purchased
cigarettes at a nearby gas station.’’

On December 15, 2020, the petitioner obtained ex
parte orders of temporary custody. The following day,
on December 16, 2020, the petitioner filed neglect peti-
tions as to the children.

‘‘The alleged shooter [of Bernisha], Jaymar Kelly, an
acquaintance of [the respondent], was arrested and
incarcerated in January, 2021. In April, 2021, [the
respondent] was arrested on various charges, including
conspiracy [to commit] assault, risk of injury [to a
child], and threatening . . . stemming from the
December 11 shooting and its aftermath. From April to
August, 2021, [the respondent] was held on bond by
the Department of Correction . . . . In October, 2022,
[the respondent] pleaded [guilty] to possession of nar-
cotics with the intent to sell (in November, 2020, [the
respondent] had been arrested for possession of one
‘‘The court-ordered protective supervision period ran from October, 2019,
3

to April, 2020. Given that [C was] discharged to [the respondent’s] care in
April, 2020, [the department] administratively, but without court involve-
ment, remained involved with the family until September, 2020.’’
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hundred packets of cocaine/fentanyl) and to threaten-
ing [Bernisha]. The alleged conspiracy [to commit]
assault and risk of injury charges were not pursued
due, at least in part, to [Bernisha’s] refusal to testify and/
or her recantation of [the respondent’s] involvement in
the planning and carrying out of the shooting.’’ (Foot-
note omitted.)
On March 11, 2021, the respondent entered pleas
of nolo contendere as to all three children’s neglect
petitions, and the children were adjudicated neglected
and committed to the petitioner’s custody. On March
28, 2022, the petitioner filed petitions to terminate the
respondent’s parental rights with respect to the children
on the grounds that the children previously had been
adjudicated neglected and that the respondent had
failed to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation
pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B).
A trial on the petitions for the termination of parental
rights was held over the course of several days in
November, 2023, and January, 2024, before the court,
Conway, J. The petitioner presented the testimony of
two witnesses, department social worker Julie Dixon
and Dr. Jessica Biren Caverly, an expert in clinical and
forensic psychology who performed a psychological
evaluation with respect to the respondent. The respon-
dent testified and presented the testimony of David
Melchionne, an employee of ’r Kids Family Center. Mel-
chionne supervised visitation between the respondent
and the children.4
On February 2, 2024, the court issued a memorandum
of decision in which it terminated the respondent’s
parental rights. The court found by clear and convincing
evidence that the department had made reasonable
4
Bernisha also testified and presented the testimony of Lisa Milone, who
was assigned to work with Bernisha through Milone’s role as a multidimen-
sional family recovery specialist with Communicare.
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efforts to reunify the minor children with the respon-
dent and that the respondent was unable or unwilling
to benefit from reunification efforts.
The court also found that the respondent had failed
to achieve an appropriate degree of personal rehabilita-
tion as would encourage the belief that, within a reason-
able time, considering the ages and needs of the minor
children, he could assume a responsible position in
their lives. Specifically, the court found that intimate
partner violence (IPV) has permeated the respondent’s
relationship with Bernisha, dating back to approxi-
mately 2017. The court found that the respondent
‘‘remains woefully ignorant as to how his controlling
and threatening interactions toward [Bernisha] not only
define their relationship but is a textbook example of
controlling, coercive IPV behavior. . . . [The respon-
dent’s] deep denial about his pathological behaviors
toward [Bernisha], and his persistent refusal/unwilling-
ness to substantively engage in and successfully benefit
from mental health and IPV treatment (to meaningfully
alter his intolerably unbalanced and dangerous relation-
ship with [Bernisha]), forecloses him from being a safe
and competent caregiver to [A, B, and C].’’5 (Citation
omitted; footnote omitted.) In addition to the IPV behav-
ior, the court noted the respondent’s ‘‘entrenched, loud
5
In a footnote, the court explained: ‘‘Undoubtedly, the December 11th
shooting factored heavily into [the department’s] decision to remove the
children from [the respondent’s] care in the early morning hours of Decem-
ber 12th and presumably in the parties’ agreement to sustain the [order of
temporary custody] and in the eventual March, 2021 agreement (wherein
the [respondent and Bernisha] entered nolo contendere pleas and the chil-
dren were adjudicated neglected and committed to the petitioner’s care).
Aside from permitting the children to be left alone in the hotel room, what-
ever role, if any, [the respondent] played in the planning and execution
of the December 11th shooting is not relevant to this termination trial.’’
Subsequently, the court again noted that, although any role the respondent
may have played in the shooting was not relevant to the termination trial,
‘‘the fact that the children were found by authorities alone in the hotel room
is. [The respondent’s] contention that the children were not found alone in
the hotel room, postshooting, is not credible.’’
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and authoritative parenting style,’’ and found that the
respondent was not capable of providing ‘‘the nuanced
parenting style’’ that A and B require because of their
trauma. The court also found that ‘‘credible testimony
and evidence reveal that, if given the opportunity, the
respondent . . . would, as he has done in the past,
relegate some or much of the daily parenting responsi-
bilities to [Bernisha], and he would not comply with
court orders barring [Bernisha’s] unsupervised access
to the three children.’’
In the dispositional phase of the proceedings, the
court made findings as to each of the criteria set forth
in § 17a-112 (k) and concluded that the termination
of the respondent’s parental rights was in the minor
children’s best interests. Accordingly, the court ren-
dered judgments terminating the respondent’s parental
rights and appointing the petitioner as the minor chil-
dren’s statutory parent. This appeal followed.
On April 23, 2024, the respondent filed a motion for
articulation, asking the trial court to articulate the fac-
tual basis for its determination that the respondent had
left his three children alone and unsupervised in a hotel
room. On April 24, 2024, the trial court granted the
motion for articulation and issued a memorandum of
decision, which stated: ‘‘This court’s factual finding that
the children were found alone in the Days Inn room on
the night of December 11, 2020, arises, at least in part,
from the November 22, 2023 credible trial testimony of
[department] social worker Julie Dixon, specifically her
testimony during the respondent father’s cross-exami-
nation . . . . The court also credited what was stated
in exhibit C, pp. 7–8: ‘On December 11, 2020, Social
Work Investigator Shaun Williams spoke with . . .
[New Haven Police Department] Officer Rivellini about
the incident at the Days Inn Motel. The officer reported
that [the respondent] had fled the scene, leaving behind
[A, B, and C] in a hotel room he had rented that same
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day.’ [The respondent’s] assertion [that] the children
were found in a car with his grown son, Perry Jr.,
(exhibit I, p. 20) is not credible.’’ (Footnote omitted.)
The court stated in a footnote that exhibits C and I
were admitted as full exhibits without objection.
On appeal, the respondent claims that he was denied
his due process right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel during the termination of parental rights proceeding.
Specifically, he contends that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance in failing to object to hearsay
evidence contained in testimony and exhibits submitted
by the petitioner. We are not persuaded.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to this claim. At the commencement of the trial,
the petitioner identified her proposed exhibits, includ-
ing but not limited to the department’s social study,6
which was identified as exhibit C, and its addenda,
identified as exhibits D, E, and F (addenda). The respon-
dent’s counsel did not object to the introduction into
evidence of exhibit C or its addenda, and the documents
were admitted as full exhibits.
As the court stated in its articulation, exhibit C
includes the following: ‘‘On December 11, 2020, Social
Work Investigator Shaun Williams spoke with . . .
Officer Rivellini about the incident at the Days Inn
Motel. The officer reported that [the respondent] had
fled the scene, leaving behind [A, B, and C] in a hotel
room he had rented that same day.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)
The respondent identifies other statements in exhibit
C that he contends constitute hearsay, including: ‘‘[The
6
‘‘A social study is a document prepared by the department that compiles
relevant information regarding the respondent’s history with the department,
including notes from caseworkers, medical professionals, visit supervisors,
and other relevant parties.’’ In re A. H., 226 Conn. App. 1, 7 n.4, 317 A.3d
197, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 918, 317 A.3d 784 (2024).
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respondent] was guarded and provided conflicting
information with his answers compared to [a] previous
intake [at Grant Street Partnership] in January, 2021.
He also refused to complete the trauma assessment or
discuss any legal involvement.’’ The respondent also
identifies the following: ‘‘Currently, [the respondent] is
participating in Fathers for Change, at Yale Child Study
Center. A referral was made by [the department] for this
program on September 30, 2021. At [the respondent’s]
intake on October 26, 2021, he informed Dr. Carla Sto-
ver, lead investigator of the Yale study, that the program
was too long, and he needed to finish the program
within ninety days to get his children back. Social
Worker Dixon clarified with Dr. Stover that this was
not true. His attendance was sporadic for a period, and
he never mentioned the shooting incident at intake.’’
Finally, the respondent identifies the following: ‘‘Ms.
[Brittany] Bauer [of the Family Centered Services par-
enting program] reported that [the respondent] believes
he is a very good parent and there is little room for
improvement. He seems to have had a lax parenting
style and not a lot of follow-through. Ms. Bauer reported
that [the respondent] seems to have left the kids to do
whatever they want to.’’
We next set forth the principles that guide our review.
‘‘Our Supreme Court has recognized that, [i]n Connecti-
cut, a parent who faces the termination of his or her
parental rights is entitled, by statute, to the assistance
of counsel. General Statutes § 45a-717 (b). . . . The
Supreme Court further has held, consistent with that
statutory right, that a parent in a termination of parental
rights hearing has the right not only to counsel but to
the effective assistance of counsel. . . .
‘‘In State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 160, 425 A.2d
939 (1979), our Supreme Court set forth the following
standard for determining whether counsel has been
ineffective in a termination proceeding: The range of
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In re S. F.

competence . . . requires not errorless counsel, and
not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel
whose performance is reasonably competent, or within
the range of competence displayed by lawyers with
ordinary training and skill in [that particular area of
the] law. . . . The [respondent] must, moreover, dem-
onstrate that the lack of competency contributed to
the termination of parental rights. . . . A showing of
incompetency without a showing of resulting prejudice
. . . does not amount to ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. . . . In making such a claim, it is the responsibility
of the respondent to create an adequate record pointing
to the alleged ineffectiveness and any prejudice the
respondent claims resulted from that ineffectiveness.
. . . In the absence of findings by the trial court in this
regard, we directly review the trial court record. . . .
‘‘We are mindful that [a] fair assessment of attorney
performance requires that every effort be made to elimi-
nate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct
the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and
to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at
the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making
the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presump-
tion that [the] conduct [of trial counsel] falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that
is, [an appellant] must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action might
be considered sound trial strategy.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Wendy G.-R.,
225 Conn. App. 194, 204–205, 314 A.3d 1029, cert. denied,
349 Conn. 916, 316 A.3d 357 (2024).
The respondent claims on appeal that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to
the introduction into evidence of exhibit C and hearsay
testimony from the department’s worker.7 Specifically,
7
Exhibit I was the report of the psychological evaluation of the respondent
prepared by Dr. Caverly, who was qualified as an expert witness in the field
of clinical and forensic psychology. At the commencement of Dr. Caverly’s
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he contends that the statement in exhibit C that social
work investigator Williams spoke with Officer Rivellini,
who reported that the respondent had fled the scene,
leaving the children in the hotel room, constituted dou-
ble hearsay, because Williams is not the author of the
social study, and Williams reported the hearsay state-
ments of Officer Rivellini. The respondent further con-
tends that ‘‘[n]obody from the department was present
at the Days Inn on December 11, 2020. All testimony
related to the incident was, by definition, hearsay and
should have been excluded upon a proper objection.’’
This court recently has reaffirmed that ‘‘counsel for
a respondent parent may object to the admission of
testimony, the petitioner offered into evidence the evaluation, and it was
admitted without objection.
In the respondent’s principal appellate brief, he makes brief reference to
exhibit I, noting that ‘‘exhibit C and exhibit I (which repeats the hearsay)
were not objected to by trial counsel.’’ The only other references to exhibit
I are contained within the prejudice section of the respondent’s brief. In
the petitioner’s brief, she maintains that the respondent ‘‘does not claim
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the court-ordered
evaluator’s report, exhibit I.’’ In his reply brief, the respondent does not
maintain that such statement is inaccurate, and he otherwise does not
address exhibit I. At oral argument before this court, however, the respon-
dent’s counsel maintained that the respondent’s claim of ineffective assis-
tance of trial counsel did encompass the failure to object to exhibit I.
Because the respondent has failed to identify particular statements in
exhibit I that he contends constituted inadmissible hearsay, we conclude
that any claim with respect to exhibit I is inadequately briefed. ‘‘We repeat-
edly have stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that have been
improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analy-
sis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandon-
ing an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court
judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . .
the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.
. . . The parties may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the
relationship between the facts of the case and the law cited.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re A. H., 226 Conn. App. 1, 31 n.23, 317 A.3d
197, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 918, 317 A.3d 784 (2024); see id. (because
respondent failed to brief how he was harmed by hearsay from evaluation
related to mother of children, any claim in relation thereto was deemed
abandoned). Consequently, any such claim of ineffective assistance with
respect to the failure to object to exhibit I is deemed abandoned.
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material contained within a social study on evidentiary
or other grounds . . . .’’ In re A. H., 226 Conn. App.
1, 25, 317 A.3d 197, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 918, 317 A.3d
784 (2024). One such evidentiary basis for objection
is that the material constitutes inadmissible hearsay.
‘‘[O]ut-of-court statements offered to establish the truth
of the matter asserted are hearsay. Such statements
generally are inadmissible unless they fall within an
exception to the hearsay rule.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Tayler F., 296 Conn. 524, 536,
995 A.2d 611 (2010).
As noted previously, the respondent’s counsel did
not object to the challenged evidence during trial, and
the record does not contain evidence of counsel’s actual
trial strategy underlying the decision to forgo an objec-
tion. ‘‘[W]e, as a reviewing court, are mindful of the
presumption that counsel acted reasonably, and we
must contemplate possible strategic reasons that might
have supported counsel’s challenged actions before
considering whether those actions were objectionably
reasonable. This is the proper analytical path that gov-
erns claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in
habeas corpus proceedings in which the record does
not contain evidence of the actual trial strategy, if any,
underlying trial counsel’s challenged conduct.’’ In re
Wendy G.-R., supra, 225 Conn. App. 208. In order to
prevail on his claim, the respondent ‘‘must demonstrate
that counsel’s failure to object cannot be explained by
one or more possible strategic reasons that are objec-
tively reasonable.’’ Id., 211.
We conclude that the respondent has not satisfied
his burden of demonstrating that his counsel’s decision
not to object cannot be explained by one or more possi-
ble strategic reasons that are objectively reasonable. In
her appellate brief, the petitioner asserts that the social
study would have been admissible under the business
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records exception to the rule against hearsay.8 With
respect to the hearsay statements contained in the
social study, specifically, social work investigator Wil-
liams’ reporting of Officer Rivellini’s statement, the peti-
tioner contends that such statements are admissible
because both Williams and Officer Rivellini had a duty
to report the information. See Jenzack Partners, LLC
v. Stoneridge Associates, LLC, 334 Conn. 374, 392, 222
A.3d 950 (2020) (‘‘regardless of whether supporting doc-
umentation or testimony from the third party is
offered—it is the third party’s ‘duty to report [the infor-
mation] in a business context which provides the relia-
8
General Statutes § 52-180 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any writing or
record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a
memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, shall
be admissible as evidence of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, if
the trial judge finds that it was made in the regular course of any business,
and that it was the regular course of the business to make the writing or
record at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event or within a
reasonable time thereafter.
‘‘(b) The writing or record shall not be rendered inadmissible by (1) a
party’s failure to produce as witnesses the person or persons who made the
writing or record, or who have personal knowledge of the act, transaction,
occurrence or event recorded or (2) the party’s failure to show that such
persons are unavailable as witnesses. Either of such facts and all other
circumstances of the making of the writing or record, including lack of
personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect the
weight of the evidence, but not to affect its admissibility. . . .’’
‘‘The business record exception is derived from the recognition that the
trustworthiness of such documents comes from their being used for business
purposes and not for litigation. . . . Business records are excepted from
the hearsay rule when three conditions are met: (1) the records are made
in the regular course of business, (2) it is the regular course of the business
to make such records and (3) the records were made at the time of the
incident described in the record or shortly thereafter.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ellis V., 120 Conn. App. 523, 536–37,
992 A.2d 362 (2010).
The respondent argues in his reply brief that a ‘‘social study is statutorily
mandated to be used in litigation,’’ and, thus, it would not have been admissi-
ble as a business record. This court previously has determined that a trial
court properly admitted a social study on the ground that the petitioner
had satisfied the requirements of the business record exception. See In re
Ellis V., supra, 120 Conn. App. 537.
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In re S. F.

bility to justify [the business records exception to the
hearsay rule] . . . .’ ’’); cf. State v. Milner, 206 Conn.
512, 520–21, 539 A.2d 80 (1988) (holding that one page
police report detailing contents of telephone call was
inadmissible as business record when caller was anony-
mous and had no duty to report). Thus, we agree with
the petitioner that the respondent has not established
that the evidence was inadmissible.

Second, the respondent has not shown that his coun-
sel’s pursuit of a vigorous cross-examination in lieu of
objecting to any hearsay statements contained within
the social study was not objectively reasonable. The
respondent’s counsel extensively questioned Dixon on
cross-examination regarding the incident at the hotel.
Specifically, he highlighted that Dixon had received the
case in January, 2021, after the incident occurred. He
questioned whether the respondent had left the children
alone or whether he had left the children with his adult
son. He further questioned Dixon: ‘‘[S]o, you have . . .
no personal knowledge of whether these children were
alone or not, correct?’’ Dixon responded: ‘‘No. I was not
there. . . . No personal knowledge.’’9 In conclusion on
this point, the respondent’s counsel asked Dixon
9
Cross-examination continued between the respondent’s counsel and
Dixon:
‘‘Q. . . . [W]e don’t know if [the children] were there before, during [the
shooting]. Correct? We don’t know how long they were there.
‘‘A. Well, there’s a video of [the respondent] going down the motel hallway,
putting his ear against each door. It’s . . . all written on this.
‘‘Q. Okay. But that has nothing to do with where the children were. Cor-
rect?
‘‘A. Well, the children were with him.
‘‘Q. But you—okay. So, the children were with [the respondent]?
‘‘A. At the hotel. Yes.
‘‘Q. Okay. So, the children weren’t left alone by [the respondent]. Correct?
‘‘A. No. That he later left them alone.
‘‘Q. But you don’t know if he left them alone or whether [the respondent’s
older son] had the kids. Correct?
‘‘A. They were by themselves when they were removed . . . .’’
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whether she was ‘‘basing [her] testimony on that inci-
dent in December of 2020, where the facts are very
fuzzy.’’
In addition to the targeted cross-examination regard-
ing the incident at the hotel, the respondent’s counsel
also broadly cross-examined Dixon regarding other
issues in the case. Specifically, the respondent’s counsel
questioned Dixon as to the respondent’s compliance
with certain specific steps, Grant Street Partnership’s
determination that the respondent did not need sub-
stance abuse treatment, and the respondent’s recent
engagement with Thomas Daniels with respect to a
Fatherhood Engagement program.
Because there are one or more possible strategic
reasons that are objectively reasonable for counsel’s
failure to object to exhibit C and hearsay testimony,
the respondent has not demonstrated that his counsel’s
performance was deficient.10 Consequently, we reject
the respondent’s claim that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance at the termination of parental
rights trial.11
10
Because we conclude that the respondent has not proven that his coun-
sel’s performance was deficient, we need not reach the respondent’s argu-
ment with respect to prejudice.
11
The respondent raises two additional claims on appeal. First, he claims
that he has a due process right to a hybrid-habeas procedure within the
context of a termination of parental rights trial. The respondent acknowl-
edges that our Supreme Court, in In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 227–28,
764 A.2d 739 (2001), concluded that ‘‘due process does not dictate that the
[party whose parental rights have been terminated] must be permitted to
utilize the writ of habeas corpus as a procedural means of attacking collater-
ally the termination judgment.’’ The court further explained that it saw ‘‘no
need to utilize [its] supervisory authority to supplement the evidentiary
record in direct appeals from such judgments in an effort to create an
alternative to the habeas relief sought in this case.’’ Id., 236. As the respon-
dent acknowledges, this court is bound by our Supreme Court precedent.
See In re Wendy G.-R., supra, 225 Conn. App. 201 (rejecting request to
reconsider appropriate options available to respondents seeking to supple-
ment record to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims, as In re Jona-
than M. is binding authority). Accordingly, we reject the respondent’s claim.
Finally, the respondent requests that this court exercise its supervisory
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re S. F.

The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

authority to create a hybrid-habeas procedure. ‘‘Supervisory authority is an
extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly . . . .’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) In re Aisjaha N., 343 Conn. 709, 724, 275 A.3d 1181
(2022). ‘‘Although [a]ppellate courts possess an inherent supervisory author-
ity over the administration of justice . . . [that] authority . . . is not a form
of free-floating justice, untethered to legal principle. . . . Our supervisory
powers are not a last bastion of hope for every untenable appeal. They are
an extraordinary remedy to be invoked only when circumstances are such
that the issue at hand, [although] not rising to the level of a constitutional
violation, is nonetheless of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of
a particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system
as a whole. . . . Constitutional, statutory and procedural limitations are
generally adequate to protect the rights of the [litigant] and the integrity of
the judicial system. Our supervisory powers are invoked only in the rare
circumstance [in which] these traditional protections are inadequate to
ensure the fair and just administration of the courts.’’ (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Our Supreme Court in In re Jonathan M., supra, 255 Conn. 236, declined
a request to exercise its supervisory authority because ‘‘other means of
vindicating the right to effective assistance of counsel exist through which
an indigent parent may challenge a termination judgment.’’ For the reasons
expressed in In re Jonathan M., we likewise decline the respondent’s invita-
tion to exercise our supervisory authority in this case.