Gleason v. Atkins

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Gleason v. Atkins

MARY GLEASON ET AL. v. PAUL ATKINS
(AC 46321)
Bright, C. J., and Moll and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court
rendered for the defendant in the plaintiffs’ action to quiet title to a
certain strip of land to the south of Lake Waramaug in New Preston
and to obtain damages for trespass. The property of the plaintiffs and
the property of the defendant were both part of a subdivision of a parcel
of land created by way of an approved subdivision map filed in 1969
and subsequently revised in 1970. In 1971, the owners of the subdivided
land conveyed Lot #3 as shown on the 1970 subdivision map to P by
warranty deed. That deed contained a description of Lot #3, which did
not include any frontage on Lake Waramaug. The deed also contained
language granting the exclusive right to use, ‘‘in common with owner
or owners of Lots #1, #2, #4 and #5 as shown on [the 1970 subdivision
map], a certain piece or parcel of land situated on the shore of Lake
Waramaug and also shown on said map . . . .’’ The grantee and the
other owners entitled to use the lakefront premises were required to
maintain the premises and to pay their pro-rata share of taxes that
accrue on the lakefront premises. V owned a lot immediately adjacent
to the easterly boundary of the lakefront premises and, as depicted on
the 1970 subdivision map, the southerly boundary of V’s lot was the
edge of the unpaved portion of West Shore Road. West Shore Road
contained a paved way of approximately twenty-five feet in width with
unpaved unimproved shoulders approximately 12.5 feet in width on
each side of the pavement. The chain of title for Lot #3 and the exclusive
right to the use of the lakefront premises ultimately led from P’s deed
to a warranty deed to the plaintiffs using the same descriptions of both
parcels as contained in P’s deed. The defendant acquired Lot #10 of
the subdivision by warranty deed. Lot #10 was a contiguous parcel
encompassing land on either side of West Shore Road, including the
lakefront premises and the strip of land abutting the southerly boundary
of V’s property and West Shore Road itself. The defendant’s deed stated
that the conveyance of Lot #10 was subject to the rights of others to
use the lakefront premises. The unpaved shoulders of the road were
not shown on the 1970 subdivision map in the area where the lakefront
premises were situated, although the shoulder was shown to the south
of V’s lot and at other places on the map. The state of Connecticut did
not own the fee interest in the improved or unimproved portion of the
public highway easement, but the general public maintained a right-of-
way over the improved and unimproved portions of West Shore Road
pursuant to the state’s highway easement. The defendant, with the
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Gleason v. Atkins
approval of the state, constructed a three foot high picket fence approxi-
mately in the middle of the northerly unpaved shoulder of West Shore
Road. The fence was located on the defendant’s property within the
state’s highway easement. Several years later, with the approval of the
state, the defendant planted a hedge along the northerly side of the
picket fence. As a result, a dispute arose between the plaintiffs and the
defendant as to the exact location of the southerly boundary of the
lakefront premises. The plaintiffs alleged that the picket fence and hedge
had been installed on the lakefront premises, over which they claimed
to have exclusive use rights, and that such action constituted trespass.
At the trial before the court, the plaintiffs argued that the language of
P’s deed should be interpreted so that the words ‘‘the state highway
known as West Shore Road,’’ describing the southerly boundary of the
lakefront premises, meant only the paved portion of the entire highway
easement. In support of their position, the plaintiffs offered factual
evidence from the defendant’s disclosed expert surveyor, N, who had
drawn a map showing the defendant’s property, including the lakefront
premises. The defendant argued that the plain language of the descrip-
tion of the lakefront premises in P’s deed was clear and did not include
the shoulder of the road. In support of this argument, the defendant
relied on the testimony of N about the boundaries of the lakefront
premises. N testified that he was able to determine with a reasonable
degree of scientific certainty that the fence and hedgerow were not
located within the lakefront premises. N opined that that the lakefront
premises ended at the highway easement line, at the edge of the unpaved
shoulder of West Shore Road. He testified that the location of the high-
way on the 1970 subdivision map was consistent with its location on
his survey map, except that the 1970 subdivision map appeared to show
only the paved road and not the highway easement line. The court
credited, in particular, N’s testimony that he found a vehicle axle in the
northerly line of the state’s highway easement and that sometimes a
small vehicle axle is used for noting property corners. N explained that,
when marking property boundaries near a state highway, surveyors
place markers along the edges of the highway easement, but they would
place a marker within the state’s highway easement if there was an
easement within the property of the highway for some other purpose.
According to the survey map, N concluded that, in this case, the vehicle
axle in the northerly line of the highway easement marked both the
southwestern corner of the lakefront premises and the northerly bound-
ary of the highway easement. Following trial, the court issued a memo-
randum of decision, concluding that the words ‘‘the state highway known
as West Shore Road’’ as used in P’s deed meant the entire easement
held by the state and not just the paved portion. The court also rejected
the plaintiffs’ alternative argument that their right to exclusive use was
the equivalent of a fee simple title that entitled them to a rebuttable
presumption that they owned to the center of West Shore Road and
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Gleason v. Atkins
concluded, on the basis of the plain language of P’s deed, that the
grantors’ intention was to have the lakefront premises remain as part
of Lot #10 subject to the plaintiffs’ right of exclusive use. Held:
1. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the language in P’s
deed describing the boundaries of the lakefront premises, when consid-
ered with the 1970 subdivision map referenced therein, was unambigu-
ous and that, therefore, the legal interpretation of the location of the
southerly boundary of the lakefront premises was a legal question for
this court subject to plenary review: this court concluded that P’s deed
was ambiguous as to the meaning of the phrase ‘‘the state highway
known as West Shore Road’’ that defined the southerly boundary of the
lakefront premises because, although the 1970 subdivision map showed
three physical monuments referenced in P’s deed, namely Lake Wara-
maug, West Shore Road, and V’s lot, it did not include the boundaries
of the lakefront premises because the 1970 subdivision map was pre-
pared prior to the creation of the lakefront premises, and, given the
depiction of the boundaries of V’s lot on the 1970 subdivision map and
the fact that the lakefront premises were not separately defined on that
map, it was unclear based on P’s deed and the map referenced therein
whether the parties to P’s deed intended that ‘‘the state highway known
as West Shore Road’’ would refer to only the paved portion of the
highway depicted on the map, such that the lakefront premises extended
to the edge of the paved road, or to the entirety of the state’s highway
easement, including both the paved and unpaved portions, such that,
like V’s lot shown on the 1970 subdivision map, the lakefront premises
extended only to the edge of the unpaved shoulder; moreover, because
both interpretations were reasonable based on P’s deed and the incorpo-
rated 1970 subdivision map, P’s deed was ambiguous and, accordingly,
the trial court properly considered extrinsic evidence to resolve the
ambiguity.
2. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their argument that, because P’s deed
described the lakefront premises as abutting the public highway and
because their interest in the lakefront premises was akin to fee simple,
they were entitled to the rebuttable presumption that the lakefront
premises ran to the center of the paved portion of the highway: it was
clear from the plain language of P’s deed that the grantor intended to
convey only an easement over the lakefront premises rather than an
unlimited interest akin to fee simple title, and the Supreme Court has
interpreted almost identical language as conveying an easement; more-
over, although the plaintiffs described their right to use and possess
the property as unlimited, the plaintiffs’ use was in fact subject to several
restrictions, including that the plaintiffs’ use of the property was limited
to their private use, the plaintiffs were limited to only one dock and
one float, they were prohibited from placing any fence or building on
the lakefront premises, and the plaintiffs were required to pay their pro-
rata share of taxes that accrued on the lakefront premises, with the
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Gleason v. Atkins
failure to pay such taxes acting as a termination of the plaintiffs’ right
to use, and such limitations, and the possibility that the plaintiffs’ use
would terminate if they failed to pay taxes, was inconsistent with the
grant of a whole or unlimited interest embracing all the elements of
complete ownership; accordingly, the plaintiffs were therefore not enti-
tled to the presumption of ownership to the center line of West
Shore Road.
3. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the trial court’s finding
that the southerly boundary of the lakefront premises ended at the
highway easement was clearly erroneous for three separate reasons:
a. The trial court’s conclusion that, if the lakefront premises extended
to the edge of the paved road, the southerly boundary of the lakefront
premises would not close with the westerly boundary of V’s lot was not
clearly erroneous: there was ample evidence in the record to support
the court’s finding that V’s lot extended only to the unpaved shoulder
of West Shore Road, as opposed to the paved edge of the road, as the
1970 subdivision map incorporated into P’s deed clearly depicted V’s lot
as extending to a point short of the paved road, the court was entitled
to rely on this map feature as though it were expressly recited in P’s
deed, N testified that he found an iron pin in the southwestern corner
of V’s lot, coinciding with the highway easement line, and N’s survey
map depicted V’s lot as extending only to the location of that iron pin
at the unpaved shoulder of the highway; moreover, although the plaintiffs’
argument that the iron pin at the corner of V’s lot and the southerly
boundary line of V’s lot shown on the 1970 subdivision map did not mark
the boundaries of that lot but instead merely designated the location of
the highway easement line was one possible interpretation of the 1970
subdivision map and the existence of the iron pin, it was not the only
one, and the plaintiffs offered little evidence in support of their argument
and ignored the fact that the court had evidence to the contrary, including
what appeared to be clearly drawn property boundaries of V’s lot on
the 1970 subdivision map and N’s unrebutted survey map and testimony;
furthermore, to the extent that the plaintiffs challenged the court’s reli-
ance on the vehicle axle that N found in the southwestern corner of the
lakefront premises, this court rejected that argument for the same reason;
additionally, although the plaintiffs argued that the deed for V’s lot stated
that V’s lot was bounded southerly by the highway, and there is a rebutta-
ble presumption that, when a deed contains such a description, the
landowner owns the fee to the center of the highway, the court was
entitled to disregard that presumption and instead credit the evidence
supporting a contrary conclusion.
b. The trial court’s conclusion that the boundaries of the lakefront prem-
ises closed at the southwestern corner of V’s lot only when the court
adopted the defendant’s position was supported by the record and was
not clearly erroneous: given that P’s deed described the lakefront prem-
ises as both beginning and ending at V’s lot, the court properly relied
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Gleason v. Atkins
on the boundaries of that lot as shown on the 1970 subdivision map;
moreover, because accepting the plaintiffs’ interpretation of P’s deed
that the southerly boundary of the lakefront premises was the paved
portion of West Shore Road would mean that there would be a 12.5 foot
gap between the southwestern corner of V’s property and the southeast-
ern corner of the lakefront premises, this court could not say that it was
unreasonable for the trial court to reject the plaintiffs’ interpretation in
favor of one that both resulted in a closed plot of land and gave effect
to all of the monuments called out in P’s deed; furthermore, the court
credited N’s testimony and survey map, which indicated that the south-
erly boundary of the lakefront premises extended only to the unpaved
shoulder of the highway and closed with the westerly boundary of V’s
lot and, to the extent that the plaintiffs challenged N’s survey method,
N’s survey properly tracked the monuments referred to in P’s deed,
which he identified and located by reference to the vehicle axles and
iron pins in the field; additionally, the trial court found that N was highly
credible and rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments challenging his testimony,
and this court would not second-guess those determinations on appeal.
c. The plaintiffs’ argument that there was no legal or logical basis for
the trial court’s conclusion that the strip of land south of V’s lot would
be useless to the grantors unless they also retained the unpaved shoulder
abutting the lakefront premises was unavailing; the unpaved shoulder
of the highway abutting V’s lot, although perhaps not entirely useless to
the grantors if they did not own the unpaved shoulder abutting the
lakefront premises, would nonetheless have had more value to the grant-
ors if they also retained ownership of the neighboring strip of land, and
the court reasonably inferred on the basis of the evidence that the
grantors’ intention to retain ownership of the unpaved shoulder abutting
V’s lot, which was apparent from the 1970 subdivision map, made it
more likely that they also intended to retain ownership of the unpaved
shoulder abutting the lakefront premises so as to retain for themselves
a single contiguous parcel subject only to the public right-of-way over
the highway, and this court could not say that the inferences drawn
by the trial court in reaching its conclusion were either unreasonable
or illogical.
4. The plaintiffs’ argument that any ambiguity as to the location of the
southerly boundary of the lakefront premises must be construed against
the grantor and not the grantee was unavailing: although it is true that
ambiguous language in a grant is ordinarily construed against the grantor
and in favor of the grantee, the trial court was not required to apply
that principle in this case because that rule is one of last resort, and
courts have applied the principle advanced by the plaintiffs only where
the evidence already favored construing the deed in the grantee’s favor
or when, even after considering extrinsic evidence and other rules of
construction, doubt remained as to the intention of the parties to an
ambiguous deed such that the ambiguity was irreconcilable; moreover,
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Gleason v. Atkins
in the present case, the court properly considered extrinsic evidence
to resolve the ambiguity and determine the intent of the parties to P’s
deed and, because the court was able to resolve the ambiguity on the
basis of that evidence, it was unnecessary for the court to resort to the
rule advanced by the plaintiffs.
Argued January 17—officially released June 4, 2024

Procedural History

Action, inter alia, seeking to quiet title to certain real
property, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Litchfield and tried to
the court, Hon. John W. Pickard, judge trial referee;
judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiffs
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Kenneth R. Slater, Jr., for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Jonathan B. Nelson, with whom was Venesha White,
for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. The plaintiffs, Mary Gleason and Keavy
Ann Gleason, appeal from the judgment of the trial
court rendered in favor of the defendant, Paul Atkins,
in the plaintiffs’ action to quiet title to a strip of land
in the town of New Preston and to obtain damages
for trespass. The disputed strip of land is the unpaved
shoulder of a public highway, which extends across the
defendant’s property and lies to the south of a lakefront
parcel (lakefront premises) that the plaintiffs have the
exclusive right to use in common with other property
owners who are not parties to this action. On appeal,
the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded
that the lakefront premises is bounded by the unpaved
shoulder rather than the paved portion of the highway.
We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
The court’s memorandum of decision sets forth the
following facts and procedural history. ‘‘The property
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Gleason v. Atkins

of the plaintiffs and the property of the defendant were
both part of a subdivision of a parcel of land created
by Thomas F. and Marian Quinlan (Quinlan land). The
Quinlan land was divided into building lots by way of
an approved subdivision map filed on November 12,
1969, and subsequently revised on August 16, 1970, by
a new subdivision map (1970 subdivision map). [See
appendix to this opinion.] The 1970 subdivision map,
as well as [each] of the other relevant maps in this case,
was drawn by Charles F. Osborne Associates.
‘‘In 1971, Thomas F. and Marian Quinlan conveyed
Lot #3 as shown on the 1970 subdivision map to Bonnie
J. Peoples by warranty deed (Peoples deed). That deed
contained a description of Lot #3, which does not
include any frontage on Lake Waramaug. However, the
deed also contained the following language (exclusive
use language):
‘‘ ‘Together with the exclusive right to use, in common
with owner or owners of Lots #1, #2, #4 and #5 as shown
on [the 1970 subdivision map], a certain piece or parcel
of land situated on the shore of Lake Waramaug and
also shown on said map, running in a westerly direction
for a distance of 125 feet from the land of Nancy Velardi
along the shore of Lake Waramaug, thence running in
a southerly direction for a distance of about 90 feet to
the state highway known as West Shore Road, thence
running in an easterly direction along said highway for
a distance of about 125 feet to land of Nancy Velardi.
‘‘ ‘Said use to be limited to the private use of grantee
and friends with no commercial activities to be con-
ducted thereon and also limited in that only one dock
and one float be permitted and that no fence or building,
permanent or otherwise, be permitted on said parcel.
‘‘ ‘The grantee and other owners entitled to use of
aforesaid lake-front premises shall maintain said prem-
ises as their sole cost and expense and shall assume all
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responsibilities as to any damage or injuries sustained
thereon.
‘‘ ‘The grantee and other owners of Lots #1 through
#5 shall pay their pro-rata share of taxes that accrue
on said lakefront premises and such tax payments shall
be paid during July of each year. Failure to pay the
proportionate share of said taxes thirty (30) days after
receiving written notice from grantors shall act as termi-
nation of said right to use.’
‘‘Thus, the Peoples deed conveyed title to Lot #3 as
well as an exclusive right to use, in common with the
owners of Lots #1, #2, #4, and #5, a second parcel
described above. The court will refer to this parcel as
the ‘lakefront premises’ because it is called that in the
Peoples deed. The chain of title for Lot #3 and the
exclusive right to the use [of] the lakefront premises
ultimately led from the Peoples deed to a November
17, 2015 warranty deed to the plaintiffs using the same
descriptions of both parcels as contained in the Peo-
ples deed.1
‘‘Lot #10 as shown on the 1970 subdivision map was
the subject of a resubdivision in 1973 and is shown on
a plot plan in 1975. Although the evidence [at trial] [did]
not contain a copy of the first conveyance of Lot #10 out
of the subdivision, there [was] circumstantial evidence
that it was a deed to Richard C. Kleinburg soon after
the plot plan in 1975. By warranty deed from Richard
C. Kleinburg dated August 5, 2011, the defendant
1
The parties and the court quote the relevant deed language from the
Peoples deed rather than from the plaintiffs’ deed. We note that the plaintiffs’
deed differs only in that Velardi is misspelled as ‘‘Vilardi,’’ the term ‘‘grantee’’
is replaced with ‘‘grantees,’’ the term ‘‘grantors’’ is replaced with ‘‘Quinlans,’’
and it provides that the grantees are entitled ‘‘to use aforesaid lakefront
premises’’ instead of ‘‘to use of aforesaid lakefront premises.’’ (Emphasis
added.) Because none of these differences is material to the plaintiffs’ claims,
in the interest of simplicity we refer only to the language of the Peoples
deed throughout this opinion.
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Gleason v. Atkins

acquired Lot #10 of the subdivision (defendant’s prop-
erty). The warranty deed states that the conveyance of
Lot #10 to the defendant is ‘[s]ubject to rights to use a
portion of the lake frontage more particularly described
in Warranty Deeds recorded in Volume 76, Page 260,
Volume 76, Page 262, and Volume 76, page 396, and
Volume 218, Page 214 of the Washington Land Records.’2
The Peoples deed is recorded in Volume 76, Page 262,
of the Washington Land Records. As a result of this
title history, the defendant’s property is subject to the
plaintiffs’ exclusive right to use the lakefront premises
together with the owners of Lots #1, #2, #4 and #5.
‘‘A public highway known as West Shore Road extends
across the defendant’s property. The portion of West
Shore Road extending across the defendant’s property
is a three rod3 highway which is approximately fifty
feet in width containing a paved way of approximately
twenty-five feet in width with unpaved unimproved
shoulders approximately 12.5 feet in width on each side
of the pavement. The state of Connecticut does not
own the fee interest in the improved or unimproved
portion of the public highway easement. The general
public maintains a right-of-way over the improved and
unimproved portion[s] of West Shore Road pursuant to
the state of Connecticut’s highway easement.
‘‘The only other relevant title history concerns two
lots which are adjacent to the easterly boundary of the
lakefront premises. These lots were also created by
Thomas F. Quinlan acting on behalf of The Quinlan
Corporation. The immediately adjacent lot was con-
veyed to Nancy Ann Velardi in April, 1970, and is shown
on a map also drawn by Charles J. Osborne Associates
2
The defendant’s deed incorporates the 1975 plot plan, which does not
differ from the 1970 subdivision map in any way that is material to this appeal.
3
‘‘A rod is a unit of measurement equal to 16.5 feet.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Marchesi v. Board of Selectmen, 328 Conn. 615, 644 n.22,
181 A.3d 531 (2018).
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Gleason v. Atkins

and will be referred to as the ‘Velardi lot.’ The adjoining
lot to the east was conveyed by The Quinlan Corpora-
tion in 1969 and will be referred to as the ‘Lafata lot.’
‘‘Within a few days after July 23, 2014, the defendant,
with the approval of the state of Connecticut, con-
structed a three foot high picket fence approximately
in the middle of the northerly unpaved shoulder of West
Shore Road. The fence is located on the defendant’s
property within the state’s right-of-way. During the
spring or summer of 2019, with the approval of the state
. . . the defendant planted a hedge along the northerly
side of the picket fence.’’ (Footnotes added.) As a result,
a dispute arose between the plaintiffs and the defendant
as to the exact location of the southerly boundary of
the lakefront premises.

‘‘The plaintiffs . . . brought this case against the
defendant . . . [on November 5, 2019] and [they] filed
a two count amended complaint on December 20, 2021.4
The first count ask[ed] the court to quiet title to [the
lakefront premises]. The second count [was] based on
trespass on that property.’’ (Footnote added.) In their
amended complaint, ‘‘[t]he plaintiffs allege[d] that the
defendant installed . . . [the] picket fence and . . .
hedge on [the lakefront premises] over which they claim
to have exclusive use rights. The defendant respond[ed]
that he installed the picket fence and hedge on his own
property over which the plaintiffs have no rights. The
defendant also allege[d] several special defenses,
including that the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the
statute of limitations.

‘‘This case was tried to the court on May 17, 2022.
The court viewed the property on June 2, 2022.’’
4
The plaintiffs’ original complaint also included a third count alleging
public nuisance. The court struck this claim from the plaintiffs’ complaint
on November 30, 2021, and it is not at issue on appeal.
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Gleason v. Atkins

During trial, ‘‘[t]he plaintiffs argue[d] that the lan-
guage of the [Peoples deed] should be interpreted so
that the words ‘the state highway known as West Shore
Road’ mean only the paved portion of the entire highway
easement. The plaintiffs point[ed] out that the paved
portion of West Shore Road is a known and fixed monu-
ment [that] is shown on the 1970 subdivision map and
must prevail over the distance call of ‘about 90 feet’ in
the description of the westerly length of the lakefront
premises. The unpaved shoulders of the road are not
shown on the 1970 subdivision map in the area where
the lakefront premises is situated, although the shoul-
der is shown to the south of the Velardi and Lafata
lots and at other places on the map. Alternatively, the
plaintiffs argue[d] that the Peoples deed actually con-
veyed a fee interest in the lakefront premises because it
conveyed only possessory rights and not nonpossessory
rights associated with an easement. The plaintiffs
argue[d] that as fee owners they are entitled to the well
established rebuttable presumption that when a public
highway is not owned by a state or municipality, the
landowner that abuts the highway owns up to the cen-
ter line.’’5
‘‘In support of their position, the plaintiffs offered
factual evidence from the defendant’s disclosed expert
5
During trial, the defendant called Attorney Gerald Garlick to testify
regarding this issue as an expert in real estate law. Over the objection of
the plaintiffs’ counsel, the court allowed Garlick’s testimony, including his
opinion that the defendant owned the lakefront premises in fee simple
subject to the rights of the plaintiffs and the other property owners referred
to in the Peoples deed to exclusively use the property. The plaintiffs’ counsel
also objected to a question about Garlick’s opinion as to who owned the
unpaved shoulder of the highway, to which Garlick responded that, in his
opinion, the defendant owned the shoulder area. In its memorandum of
decision, the court stated that it ‘‘now sustain[ed] the plaintiffs’ objection
and str[uck] [Garlick’s] opinion as to the ownership of the shoulder of West
Shore Road . . . [because] the issue of the ownership of the shoulder of
West Shore Road is an ultimate issue in the case and calls for a legal
conclusion which the court must make. [Therefore] [t]he court [did] not
consider the opinion given by [Garlick].’’
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surveyor named Bryan Nesteriak, who had drawn a
map showing the defendant’s property including the
lakefront premises. He testified as a fact witness to
many of the underlying facts set forth in [the court’s
memorandum of] decision.’’
‘‘The defendant argue[d] that the plain language of
the description of the lakefront premises in the Peoples
deed is clear and does not include the shoulder of the
road.’’ In support of this argument, the defendant relied
on the testimony of Nesteriak, whom he called as an
expert witness to offer Nesteriak’s opinion about the
boundaries of the lakefront premises. The plaintiffs stip-
ulated to Nesteriak’s qualifications as an expert in land
surveying.
Nesteriak testified that he was able to determine with
a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the fence
and hedgerow are not located within the lakefront
premises. He testified that ‘‘the definition of a highway
includes the unimproved portions on the side [and]
the improved portions.’’ He also testified that the state
highway known as West Shore Road is 49.5 feet wide,
and to determine the total area designated for the high-
way, he measured one half of that width from the center
of the highway on either side. He concluded that the
lakefront premises ends at the highway easement line—
that is, at the edge of the unpaved shoulder. He testified
that the location of the highway on the 1970 subdivision
map is consistent with its location on his survey map,
except that the 1970 subdivision map appears to show
only the paved road and not the highway easement line.
Nesteriak further testified that the southerly bound-
ary of the Velardi lot ‘‘coincides with the highway [ease-
ment] line,’’ which he believed also is consistent with
the 1970 subdivision map. He stated that he extended
that same highway easement line to create the southerly
boundary of the lakefront premises. The court credited,
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in particular, Nesteriak’s testimony that he found a vehi-
cle axle in the northerly line of the state’s highway
easement and that sometimes ‘‘a small vehicle axle’’ is
‘‘used for noting property corners.’’ He explained that,
when marking property boundaries near a state high-
way, surveyors place markers ‘‘along the edges’’ of the
highway easement, but they would place a marker
within the state’s highway easement ‘‘[i]f there was an
easement over the highway, that’s within the property
of the highway, for some other purpose.’’ According to
the survey map, Nesteriak concluded, however, that in
this case the vehicle axle in the northerly line of the
highway easement marks both the southwestern corner
of the lakefront premises and the northerly boundary
of the highway easement.

Nesteriak testified that, when determining the bound-
aries of the lakefront premises, he considered the dis-
tance of ‘‘about 90 feet’’ stated in the Peoples deed. He
acknowledged, however, that distances are less reliable
than physical monuments as a method of locating
boundary lines. According to Nesteriak, ‘‘[t]he ninety
feet is a measurement that is put in the [Peoples] deed,
it says ‘about 90,’ which means, it’s more or less [than]
ninety. The eastern side of the easement did end up
being approximately ninety, it was 89.9 feet. The west-
ern section did not end up being exactly ninety, it was
82.46, which still, in surveying terms, is about ninety
feet.’’ He also testified that if the westerly boundary of
the lakefront premises were ninety feet instead of only
82.46 feet, although it would be ‘‘[a]bout eight feet’’
closer to the pavement than where he determined that
the westerly boundary line ends, it nonetheless would
end ‘‘short of the hedgerow, approximately,’’ such that
the fence and hedgerow would still be on the defen-
dant’s property and not within the lakefront premises.
Nesteriak did not agree that the boundary should be
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extended in that manner ‘‘[b]ecause the [state’s] ease-
ment was there before this exclusive right to use [the
lakefront premises] was given, and the description says,
specifically, that it goes to the highway.’’
On the basis of his survey, Nesteriak concluded that
the four boundaries of the lakefront premises are as
follows: (1) the easterly boundary runs in a northerly
direction for 89.9 feet, from an iron pin6 found at the
southwestern corner of the Velardi lot to the edge of
Lake Waramaug, passing through another iron pin near
the northwestern corner of the Velardi lot, (2) the north-
erly boundary runs in a westerly direction along the
edge of Lake Waramaug for approximately 125 feet, (3)
the westerly boundary runs in a southerly direction
for 82.46 feet from Lake Waramaug, passing through a
vehicle axle found a short distance from the edge of
the lake and ending at another axle that coincides with
the highway easement line, and (4) the southerly bound-
ary runs from the axle at the highway easement line in
6
During oral argument before this court, there was some confusion as to
whether the vehicle axles and the iron pins that Nesteriak found in the field
were one and the same. Counsel for the defendant asserted that, other than
the lake and the highway, the only physical monument that Nesteriak found
in the field was an iron pin in the southwestern corner of the Velardi lot.
Counsel for the plaintiffs initially disputed that Nesteriak found a vehicle axle
in the field but, after reviewing the record, the plaintiffs’ counsel asserted
that Nesteriak found ‘‘an object’’ not ‘‘on the Velardi side’’ of the lakefront
premises but ‘‘on the distance between the road and the lake where there
was no line shown on the 1970 [subdivision] map.’’ The plaintiffs’ counsel
changed his position again during his rebuttal argument, when he agreed
with the defendant’s counsel that the references to an axle in the record
are to a marker ‘‘near the Velardi line.’’ Nonetheless, counsel’s expressed
understanding at oral argument before us is inconsistent with the court’s
factual findings and with Nesteriak’s testimony and survey map, which
indicate that Nesteriak found two vehicle axles and two iron pins during
his survey of the lakefront premises. The court credited Nesteriak’s testi-
mony that he found a vehicle axle in the southwestern corner of the lakefront
premises, which he used to locate the boundary lines. Moreover, Nesteriak’s
survey map shows that he found a second axle in the northwestern corner
of the lakefront premises and found an iron pin in the southwestern corner
of the Velardi lot and another in the northwestern corner.
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an easterly direction for approximately 125 feet and
closes with the easterly boundary at the iron pin found
at the southwestern corner of the Velardi lot. Thus, it
was Nesteriak’s opinion that the southerly boundary
of the lakefront premises is located at the highway
easement line, that is, at the edge of the unpaved shoul-
der of West Shore Road.
‘‘The plaintiffs filed their posttrial brief on August
[8], 2022, the defendant filed his posttrial brief on Sep-
tember 7, 2022, and the plaintiffs filed their posttrial
reply brief on September 19, 2022. On December 19,
2022, the parties filed a written stipulation that the
court’s time to enter judgment would be extended to
February 28, 2023.’’
On February 22, 2023, the court issued a memoran-
dum of decision rendering judgment for the defendant.
On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the court
concluded that ‘‘the words ‘the state highway known
as West Shore Road’ as used in the Peoples deed means
the entire easement held by the state and not just the
paved portion.’’ The court explained: ‘‘The court’s find-
ing is influenced, in part, by the opinions of the defen-
dant’s expert surveyor, [Nesteriak]. The court found
him to be highly credible and convincing. He conducted
a thorough review of the available deeds and maps,
performed field work and produced a clear and detailed
map of his own. . . .
‘‘The plaintiffs did not have a surveyor to contradict
the testimony of [Nesteriak], but this does not mean
that the court is bound to accept it. . . . Here, the
court accepts the testimony of [Nesteriak], along with
other evidence to be discussed weighing in favor of the
defendant.
‘‘The plaintiffs point out three principal reasons why
[Nesteriak] is wrong. The court will address those rea-
sons in turn. The first reason can be summarized as
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follows: the lakefront premises [are] described in the
Peoples deed as being ‘shown on said map.’ ‘Said map’
is the 1970 subdivision map. The effect of the reference
to the map is to incorporate the 1970 [subdivision] map
into the Peoples deed. . . . The plaintiffs argue that
the 1970 subdivision map only depicts the paved portion
of West Shore Road; it does not include a demarcation
of the shoulder of the road in the area of the lakefront
premises, although such a demarcation is shown at
other places on the 1970 [subdivision] map.
‘‘The weakness of this argument is that the lakefront
premises is not depicted as a separate property on the
1970 subdivision map. The defendant’s property, Lot
#10, is depicted as including the highway and the entire
area north of the pavement and south of the lake. The
1970 subdivision map was drawn before the lakefront
premises was created in 1971 by the Peoples deed and
the deeds to Lots #1, #2, #4 and #5. There would have
been no reason for the surveyor to have drawn the
shoulders of the highway because it was all included
within Lot #10 and would have had no significance at
the time the 1970 subdivision map was drawn.
‘‘The plaintiffs’ next reason to doubt [Nesteriak’s]
opinion is that, although the Peoples deed describes
the lakefront premises as having a westerly side of
‘about 90 feet,’ [Nesteriak’s] map shows the westerly
side as being only 82.46 feet. This is because [Nesteri-
ak’s] map shows the westerly side of the . . . lakefront
premises ending at an axle he found in the northerly
line of the state’s easement, not at the edge of the
highway pavement. [Nesteriak] testified that a small
vehicle axle placed on its end is sometimes used for
noting property corners. [Nesteriak] admitted that the
westerly side of the lakefront premises would have been
closer to ninety feet if it ended at the pavement but
that a distance of exactly ninety feet would still place
the fence and hedge outside the lakefront premises.
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The plaintiff[s] [argue] that this discrepancy is a reason
to reject [Nesteriak’s] map. The court does not find
this point to be significant because the language of the
[Peoples] deed is ‘about 90 feet.’ [Nesteriak] testified
that in surveying terms ‘about’ means the same thing
as ‘more or less’ and that 82.46 feet is ‘about 90 feet.’
Words such as ‘more or less’ are to be taken in connec-
tion with all other features in any transaction; they are
words of caution, denoting some uncertainty in the
mind of one using them and a desire not to misrepresent.
. . . It is clear that the westerly side of the lakefront
premises had not been surveyed when the Peoples deed
description was written. ‘About 90 feet’ represented an
approximation of the distance to West Shore Road. The
approximation is 91.6 percent of the stated distance.
The court does [not] find this small discrepancy deter-
minative of the intention of the parties to the Peo-
ples deed.
‘‘The plaintiffs’ next argument is that the meaning of
the words ‘the state highway known as West Shore
Road’ must be the paved surface of the highway because
of a principle that physical monuments have a higher
priority than distance calls. [Nesteriak] admitted this
to be an established principle in surveying. He also
admitted that the paved portion of the state highway
is a man-made physical monument, but he did not
believe that this principle would change his ultimate
conclusion that the fence and hedges were not within
the lakefront premises. . . .
‘‘[The plaintiffs argue that] ‘[a] highway has always
been regarded as a fixed monument.’ Frank Towers
Corp. v. Laviana, 140 Conn. 45, [51, 97 A.2d 567] (1953).
But the principle as stated in our appellate cases is
actually, ‘[w]here the boundaries of land are described
by known and fixed monuments which are definite and
certain, the monuments will [control] over courses and
distances.’ [Id., 50.]
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‘‘This statement is slightly different from the one
advanced by the plaintiff[s] in that ‘known and fixed
monuments’ are not necessarily physical monuments.
It is true that ‘[t]he land of an adjoining proprietor
whose boundaries can be fixed by known monuments
is also considered to be a monument to establish a
boundary.’ [Id., 51.] Thus, if the pavement of a three
rod state highway easement is a known and fixed monu-
ment, the shoulders of the highway are also known and
fixed monuments which can easily be calculated and
mapped. The court does not believe that the physical
pavement of the highway is any more ‘known and fixed’
than the shoulders.

‘‘The court finds that the most significant part of the
description of the lakefront [premises] is the southerly
line. That line is described as ‘running along said high-
way for a distance of about 120 feet to the land of Nancy
Velardi.’7 The land of Nancy Velardi is shown on the
1970 subdivision map as a surveyed lot with a westerly
boundary extending 89.5 feet8 in a southerly direction
from the shore of Lake Waramaug. The surveying had
been done by Charles J. Osborne Associates, the same
firm which created the 1970 subdivision map and the
7
The Peoples deed, from which the court purported to quote, actually
states: ‘‘running in an easterly direction along said highway for a distance
of about 125 feet to land of Nancy Velardi.’’ Elsewhere in its memorandum
of decision, the court quoted the language correctly. The court’s misquote
here does not affect its analysis or our conclusions.
8
In their appellate brief, the plaintiffs state that the 1970 subdivision map
shows that the westerly boundary of the Velardi lot is 82.5 feet. At other
points in their brief, however, the plaintiffs refer to this same boundary as
being 89.5 feet, which is consistent with the court’s memorandum of decision,
and the plaintiffs do not otherwise challenge the court’s statement as to
the length of that boundary. We thus presume that the plaintiffs’ statement
that the westerly boundary of the Velardi lot is 82.5 feet is a scrivener’s error.
Although the 1970 subdivision map is unclear as to the exact measurement
of the westerly boundary of the Velardi lot, because neither party has chal-
lenged the court’s statement that the map indicates that the boundary is
89.5 feet, we presume that the court is correct.
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maps showing the resubdivision of the defendant’s land.
The exhibit copy of the 1970 subdivision map is not
clear enough to read all of the courses and distances,
but the common creation of all maps leads the court
to find that the westerly boundary of the Velardi lot is
known and fixed.
‘‘If the plaintiff[s] [are] correct that the southwest[ern]
corner of the lakefront premises is located at the edge
of the road pavement and runs along the pavement in
an easterly direction, it won’t close with the westerly
boundary [of] the Velardi lot. In fact, it will be approxi-
mately 12.5 feet south of the corner of the Velardi lot.
This fact is easily determined just by looking at the
1970 subdivision map and seeing that the southerly
boundary of the Velardi lot is separated from the road
pavement by the entire shoulder of the highway. The
court finds that the plaintiffs’ argument that the pave-
ment is the southerly boundary of the lakefront prem-
ises results in a description of the lakefront premises
which does not close—and not by a small amount. This
problem would have been obvious when the Peoples
deed was written and weighs heavily on finding the
intent of the words in the description. On the other
hand, if [Nesteriak’s] map is accepted as accurate, the
southerly boundary closes perfectly at the southwest
corner of the Velardi lot.
‘‘Close scrutiny of the area south of the Velardi and
Lafata lots as depicted in the 1970 subdivision map
shows that the shoulder of [West] Shore Road separat-
ing the two lots from the pavement of the road is part
of Lot #10, now owned by the defendant. If the plaintiffs
are correct that the plaintiffs own the entire shoulder
south of the lakefront premises, it would separate the
defendant’s small section of the shoulder south of the
Velardi and Lafata lots from the rest of Lot #10. It would
make no sense that Thomas P. and Marian S. Quinlan,
the creators of the entire subdivision, would create such
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a small, useless strip of land with no contact with the
remainder of Lot #10.
‘‘The court has weighed the evidence and has applied
the appropriate law and finds against the plaintiff[s] on
the issue of the ownership of the shoulder of [West]
Shore Road. Thus, the fence and hedge are not located
within the lakefront premises.’’ (Citations omitted; foot-
notes added.)
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ alternative argu-
ment that their right to exclusive use was the equivalent
of a fee simple title that entitled them to a rebuttable
presumption that they owned to the center of West
Shore Road. Instead, the court concluded, on the basis
of the plain language of the Peoples deed, that ‘‘the
intention was to have the lakefront premises remain as
part of Lot #10 subject to the [plaintiffs’] right of exclu-
sive use.’’9 In its memorandum of decision, the court
stated that, ‘‘in the absence of any Connecticut author-
ity, [it] [was] not prepared to find that the plaintiffs’
chain of title from the Peoples deed grants the plaintiffs
fee simple title to the lakefront premises such that they
would be entitled to take advantage of a presumption
that they own fee simple title to the center of West Shore
Road including the shoulder of the highway where the
defendant placed the fence and hedge. . . .
***
‘‘The court does not need to decide the question as
to the exact nature of the plaintiffs’ exclusive right to
9
The court also found it ‘‘significant that the creators of the subdivision
. . . did not obtain resubdivision approval in order to create the lakefront
premises. The 1970 subdivision map . . . was marked ‘Approved by the
Washington Planning Commission at its meeting on January [5], 1971,’ and
is signed by its chairman, all in conformance with General Statutes § 8-25,’’
which provides that a planning commission must approve all plans for
subdivisions of land. The court explained that ‘‘this approved subdivision
does not depict the lakefront premises as a separate lot. If the Peoples deed
had been intended to create a separate lot in fee simple, it would have been
separately depicted. The fact that it is not depicted as a separate lot is
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use the lakefront premises. It is enough to decide that
it is not the equivalent of fee simple title such that it
entitles the plaintiffs to a rebuttable presumption that
they own to the center of West Shore Road.’’ This appeal
followed.
As a preliminary matter, we first set forth the applica-
ble standard of review and relevant legal principles
regarding the construction of a deed. Ordinarily, ‘‘[t]he
construction of a deed . . . presents a question of law
which we have plenary power to resolve. . . . In
determining the location of a boundary line expressed
in a deed, if the description is clear and unambiguous,
it governs and the actual intent of the parties is irrele-
vant.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Mackie v. Hull, 69 Conn. App. 538, 541–42,
795 A.2d 1280, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 916, 806 A.2d
1055 (2002), and cert. denied, 261 Conn. 917, 806 A.2d
1055 (2002). When the description of a boundary line
in a deed is ambiguous, however, ‘‘the question of what
the parties intended that line to be is one of fact for the
trial court. . . . In the construction of an ambiguous
instrument of conveyance, the decisive question of fact
is the intent of the parties to the instrument.’’ (Citation
omitted.) Lake Garda Improvement Assn. v. Battistoni,
160 Conn. 503, 511, 280 A.2d 877 (1971); see also Freid-
heim v. McLaughlin, 217 Conn. App. 767, 782, 290 A.3d
801 (2023) (‘‘[w]here a deed is ambiguous the intention
of the parties is a decisive question of fact’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
‘‘Our basic rule of construction is that recognition
will be given to the expressed intention of the parties
to a deed . . . and that it shall, if possible, be so con-
strued as to effectuate the intent of the parties. . . .
In arriving at the intent expressed . . . in the language
persuasive evidence that no fee simple interest was intended and that no
subdivision approval was required.’’
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used, however, it is always admissible to consider the
situation of the parties and the circumstances con-
nected with the transaction, and every part of the writ-
ing should be considered with the help of that evi-
dence. . . .
‘‘In the construction of a deed or grant, the language
is to be construed in connection with, and in reference
to, the nature and condition of the subject matter of
the grant at the time the instrument is executed, and
the obvious purpose the parties had in view. . . . [I]f
the meaning of the language contained in a deed or
conveyance is not clear, the trial court is bound to
consider any relevant extrinsic evidence presented by
the parties for the purpose of clarifying the ambigu-
ity. . . .
‘‘Furthermore, [a] reference to [a] map in [a] deed,
[f]or a more particular description, incorporates [the
map] into the deed as fully and effectually as if copied
therein. . . . [T]he identifying or explanatory features
contained in maps referred to in a deed become part
of the deed, and so are entitled to consideration in
interpreting the deed as though they were expressly
recited therein.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, 221 Conn.
App. 657, 674, 303 A.3d 13 (2023), cert. denied, 348
Conn. 938, 307 A.3d 273 (2024). We must consider both
the deed and the map as a whole to determine the
parties’ intent. See Rocamora v. Heaney, 144 Conn.
App. 658, 666, 74 A.3d 457 (2013) (‘‘In construing a deed,
a court must consider the language and terms of the
instrument as a whole. . . . This is so not just when
the words in a deed are ambiguous, but also when the
court determines that a map is unclear or ambiguous.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)).
In the present case, the court concluded that the
phrase ‘‘the state highway known as West Shore Road’’
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in the Peoples deed was ambiguous as to whether it
included the unpaved portion of the highway, and the
court considered extrinsic evidence of the meaning of
that phrase in reaching its conclusion. See Mierzejew-
ski v. Laneri, 130 Conn. App. 306, 313, 23 A.3d 82 (‘‘[t]he
court’s finding that the defendants’ southerly boundary
was the stone wall rested on its credibility determina-
tions of the parties’ surveyors, which would be neces-
sary only if there was ambiguity in the deed’’), cert.
denied, 302 Conn. 932, 28 A.3d 344 (2011). Thus, to the
extent that the plaintiffs challenge the court’s factual
findings on appeal, ‘‘our review is limited to deciding
whether such findings were clearly erroneous. . . .
The trial court’s findings are binding upon this court
unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence
. . . . We cannot retry the facts or pass on the credibil-
ity of the witnesses. . . . A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to
support it . . . or when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Mackie v. Hull, supra, 69 Conn. App. 545. By
contrast, to the extent that the plaintiffs challenge the
court’s conclusion that the Peoples deed is ambiguous,
our review is plenary. See Freidheim v. McLaughlin,
supra, 217 Conn. App. 782–83 (‘‘[t]he determination as
to whether language of [an instrument] is plain and
unambiguous is a question of law subject to plenary
review’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
I
The plaintiffs first claim that the court’s conclusion
is contrary to the unambiguous description of the lake-
front premises in the Peoples deed. The plaintiffs assert
that ‘‘the [Peoples] deed used three fixed monu-
ments’’—namely, the Velardi lot, West Shore Road, and
Lake Waramaug—‘‘to establish a clear and unequivocal
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boundary of the [lakefront premises] that could only
be understood by the buyer as extending over the entire
area between the lake and the physical road . . . .’’
According to the plaintiffs, because the 1970 subdivi-
sion map referenced in the Peoples deed depicts only
the paved portion of the highway, the reference in that
deed to ‘‘the state highway known as West Shore Road’’
must mean the paved portion that appears on the map.
Additionally, the plaintiffs argue that the grantor drafted
the Peoples deed ‘‘consistent with [his] understanding,
as reflected in his prior deed to Velardi, that the [south-
erly] Velardi boundary ran to the [paved portion of
the] highway and did not end at the point where [that]
boundary met the [highway] easement line as marked
in the field’’ and as depicted on the 1970 subdivision
map. The plaintiffs assert that the deed to the Velardi
lot states that it is bounded southerly by the highway
and cite the principle that, when a deed contains such
a description, the landowner is presumed to own the
fee to the center of the highway.
In advancing these arguments, the plaintiffs minimize
the significance of both the iron pin in the southwestern
corner of the Velardi lot and the line at the southerly
boundary of that lot on the 1970 subdivision map. As
depicted on the 1970 subdivision map, the southerly
boundary of both the Velardi property and the adjoining
Lafata lot, which was transferred by the Quinlans in
1969, is the edge of the unpaved portion of the West
Shore Road highway easement. Despite what the 1970
subdivision map seems to clearly show, the plaintiffs
argue that, instead of depicting the actual boundary,
those features merely designate ‘‘the location of the
[highway] easement line, [which] would be important
to [the] owners [of the Velardi lot] to assure that they
did not build homes or other accessory structures
within the highway easement line.’’ On the basis of their
understanding of the physical monuments referred to
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in the Peoples deed, the plaintiffs assert that the grantee
would have been able to establish ‘‘all four corners of
the [lakefront premises] based on those monuments
identifiable in the field and shown on the map . . . .’’
Because the plaintiffs argue that the Peoples deed is
unambiguous, they assert that ‘‘the legal interpretation
of the [Peoples] deed to determine whether the south-
erly boundary is the highway easement line drawn on
the survey or the road which was also on the survey
. . . is a legal question for the court’’ that is subject to
plenary review.
We are not convinced that the plaintiffs’ interpreta-
tion of the Peoples deed and incorporated map is the
only reasonable one. Instead, we conclude that the Peo-
ples deed is ambiguous as to the meaning of ‘‘the state
highway known as West Shore Road’’ and that the court
therefore properly considered extrinsic evidence to
resolve the ambiguity.
We begin with the language of the Peoples deed, which
describes the lakefront premises as follows: ‘‘a certain
piece or parcel of land situated on the shore of Lake
Waramaug and also shown on [the 1970 subdivision]
map, running in a westerly direction for a distance of
125 feet from the land of Nancy Velardi along the shore
of Lake Waramaug, thence running in a southerly direc-
tion for a distance of about 90 feet to the state highway
known as West Shore Road, thence running in an east-
erly direction along said highway for a distance of about
125 feet to land of Nancy Velardi.’’
Because the Peoples deed specifies that the 1970
subdivision map describes the parcel of land intended,
that map is controlling as to our interpretation of the
description provided in the deed. See Lake Garda
Improvement Assn. v. Battistoni, supra, 160 Conn. 510
(‘‘[s]ince the deed specifies that the map describes the
roadways intended, that map is controlling’’); see also
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Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221
Conn. App. 674 (features on map referenced in deed
‘‘are entitled to consideration in interpreting the deed
as though they were expressly recited therein’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The 1970 subdivision map
was prepared prior to the creation of the lakefront
premises and thus does not depict the lakefront prem-
ises as a separate parcel with defined boundaries.
Although the 1970 subdivision map does not include
the boundaries of the lakefront premises, it does show
the three physical monuments referenced in the Peoples
deed—Lake Waramaug, West Shore Road, and the adja-
cent Velardi lot. The 1970 subdivision map, though, does
not appear to depict the paved portion of West Shore
Road as a boundary, because the westerly boundary of
the Velardi lot is depicted as extending from the shore
of Lake Waramaug to a point short of the paved portion
of West Shore Road, leaving a strip of land consistent
with the unpaved portion of the highway easement
between the southerly boundary of the Velardi lot and
the paved road.10 The 1970 subdivision map also depicts
the defendant’s property, Lot #10, as a contiguous parcel
encompassing land on either side of West Shore Road,
including the lakefront premises and the strip of land
abutting the southerly boundary of the Velardi lot, and
West Shore Road itself.
Given the depiction of the boundaries of the Velardi
lot on the 1970 subdivision map and the fact that the
lakefront premises is not separately defined on that
map, it is unclear based on the Peoples deed and the
map referenced therein whether the parties to the Peo-
ples deed intended that ‘‘the state highway known as
West Shore Road’’ would refer to (1) only the paved
10
This becomes clear upon comparing the 1970 subdivision map to the
1969 subdivision map, which shows the entire 49.5 foot wide highway,
including both the paved and unpaved portions, abutting the southerly
boundary of the Velardi lot.
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Gleason v. Atkins

portion of the highway depicted on the map, such that
the lakefront premises extends to the edge of the paved
road, or (2) the entirety of the state’s highway easement,
including both the paved and unpaved portions, such
that, like the Velardi lot shown on the 1970 subdivision
map, the lakefront premises extends only to the edge of
the unpaved shoulder. Because both interpretations are
reasonable based on the Peoples deed and the incorpo-
rated 1970 subdivision map, we conclude that the Peo-
ples deed is ambiguous. See Freidheim v. McLaughlin,
supra, 217 Conn. App. 788 (‘‘[b]ecause the deed language
is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpreta-
tion, it is ambiguous’’). Accordingly, we reject the plain-
tiffs’ claim that the Peoples deed can only be read to
support their interpretation as a matter of law.
II
Alternatively, the plaintiffs claim that, assuming
arguendo that the Peoples deed is ambiguous as to the
meaning of ‘‘the state highway known as West Shore
Road,’’ the court should have resolved the ambiguity
in their favor. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that,
because the exclusive use grant of the lakefront prem-
ises in the Peoples deed constituted a transfer of a fee
simple interest and not an easement, the court should
have applied a presumption that they are the owners
of the land to the center of West Shore Road. They
further argue that, even without that presumption, the
court’s finding that the southerly boundary of the lake-
front premises ends at the unpaved edge of the highway
easement is clearly erroneous for three separate rea-
sons. We address each of the plaintiffs’ arguments in
turn.11
A
First, the plaintiffs argue that, because the Peoples
deed describes the lakefront premises as abutting the
11
For ease of discussion, we address the plaintiffs’ arguments in a different
order than they are set forth in their principal appellate brief.
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public highway, and because their interest in the lake-
front premises is akin to fee simple, they are entitled to
the rebuttable presumption that the lakefront premises
runs to the center of the paved portion of the highway.12
See Mierzejewski v. Laneri, supra, 130 Conn. App. 315
(‘‘[a]n abutting owner is presumed under the law of this
state, no evidence having been offered to the contrary,
to own the fee of the land to the center of the highway’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)). According to the
plaintiffs, their right to the exclusive use of the lakefront
premises ‘‘is not an easement interest which, by defini-
tion, is not possessory.’’ The plaintiffs assert that ‘‘the
right to exclusive possession of a parcel of land limited
only by the possible reversion to another person if taxes
are not paid is nearly identical to fee simple ownership.’’
Pointing to precedent from other states, the plaintiffs
argue ‘‘that [the conveyance of the right to] exclusive
use is akin to [the conveyance of] fee simple title and
that the rules regarding the boundaries of land [owned]
in fee simpl[e] should apply equally to parcels created
for the exclusive use of owners of that right.’’
The defendant argues that the plaintiffs’ interest in
the lakefront premises is ‘‘plainly and clearly’’ an ease-
ment, that he ‘‘remains the owner in fee’’ of the lakefront
premises, and that the plaintiffs ‘‘have provided no case
law or authority whatsoever from this state which finds
that an easement can or should be treated . . . as title
in fee simple for the application of a presumption
regarding expansion of the boundary lines.’’ We agree
with the defendant and, accordingly, conclude that the
plaintiffs are not entitled to a rebuttable presumption
that they own to the center of West Shore Road.
12
In their appellate brief, the plaintiffs present this as a separate claim,
and the court also addressed it as one in its memorandum of decision.
Because we view it as an argument in support of the plaintiffs’ overall claim
that the court’s conclusion as to the boundaries of the lakefront premises
was improper, we do not address it as a separate claim.
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Because the Peoples deed contains no ambiguity as
to the type of property interest conveyed, ‘‘the determi-
nation of the intent behind [the] language in [the] deed,
considered in the light of all the surrounding circum-
stances, presents a question of law on which our scope
of review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Stefanoni v. Duncan, 282 Conn. 686, 699, 923 A.2d
737 (2007).

The following principles pertaining to fee interests
and easements guide our analysis. ‘‘[F]ee simple owner-
ship [is] a term that merely reflects ownership of a
whole or unlimited estate.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Morton v. Syriac, 196 Conn. App. 183, 202,
229 A.3d 1129, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 915, 229 A.3d
1045 (2020); see also Redevelopment Agency v. Norwalk
Aluminum Foundry Corp., 155 Conn. 397, 401, 233
A.2d 1 (1967) (‘‘[a] fee simple interest with possession
. . . is a whole or unlimited interest embracing all the
elements of complete ownership’’). By contrast, ‘‘[a]n
easement creates a nonpossessory right to enter and
use land in the possession of another and obligates the
possessor not to interfere with the rules authorized by
the easement. . . . [T]he benefit of an easement . . .
is considered a nonpossessory interest in land because
it generally authorizes limited uses of the burdened
property for a particular purpose. . . . [E]asements
are not ownership interests but rather privileges to use
[the] land of another in [a] certain manner for [a] certain
purpose . . . . In determining the character and extent
of an easement created by deed, the ordinary import of
the language will be accepted as indicative of the intention
of the parties, unless there is something in the situation
of the property or the surrounding circumstances that
calls for a different interpretation.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Stefanoni v. Duncan,
supra, 282 Conn. 700.
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Here, it is clear from the plain language of the Peoples
deed that the grantor intended to convey only an ease-
ment over the lakefront premises rather than an unlim-
ited interest akin to fee simple title. The paragraph of
the Peoples deed granting the easement first provides:
‘‘Together with the exclusive13 right to use, in common
with owner or owners of Lots #1, #2, #4 and #5 as shown
on [the 1970 subdivision] map, a certain piece or parcel
of land . . . .’’ (Footnote added.) Our Supreme Court
has interpreted almost identical language as conveying
an easement. See Il Giardino, LLC v. Belle Haven Land
Co., 254 Conn. 502, 506, 757 A.2d 1103 (2000) (by its
express terms, deed conveying various parcels
‘‘ ‘together with the right to use in common with oth-
ers’ ’’ certain roadways conveyed easement). Moreover,
although the plaintiffs describe their right to use and
possess the property as ‘‘unlimited,’’ the plaintiffs’ use
is in fact subject to several restrictions.14 Specifically,
the Peoples deed limits the plaintiffs’ use to ‘‘the private
use of grantee and friends with no commercial activities
to be conducted thereon . . . .’’ The plaintiffs also are
limited to ‘‘only one dock and one float’’ and are prohib-
ited from placing any ‘‘fence or building, permanent
13
Our Supreme Court has stated that, in the context of an exclusive
easement, ‘‘exclusive means that the easement holder[s] ha[ve] the sole
right to engage in the type of use authorized by the servitude.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Zhang v. Omnipoint Communications Enter-
prises, Inc., 272 Conn. 627, 642, 866 A.2d 588 (2005).
14
Contrary to the defendant’s assertion, however, the Peoples deed does
not indicate that the plaintiffs were conveyed an easement only for the
purposes of ingress and egress over the lakefront premises in order to access
the lake. In connection with this assertion, the defendant argues that the
plaintiffs ‘‘attempt to improperly expand’’ the scope of the right conveyed
in the Peoples deed ‘‘to include parking.’’ The court concluded that there
was no evidence presented at trial in support of the defendant’s argument,
and our review of the record has revealed none. Moreover, in their reply
brief, the plaintiffs clarify that they only ‘‘ask the court to interpret the deed
language together with the map reference[d] in the deed to determine its
boundaries.’’ Accordingly, we do not address the defendant’s argument that
the plaintiffs are attempting to expand the scope of their right to use the
lakefront premises.
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or otherwise’’ on the lakefront premises. Finally, the
plaintiffs are required to ‘‘pay their pro-rata share of
taxes that accrue on [the] lakefront premises,’’ and fail-
ure to pay such taxes thirty days after receiving written
notice from the grantors ‘‘shall act as a termination of
[the plaintiffs’] right to use.’’ These limitations, and the
possibility that the plaintiffs’ use will terminate if they
fail to pay taxes, are inconsistent with the grant of a
‘‘whole or unlimited interest embracing all the elements
of complete ownership.’’ Redevelopment Agency v. Nor-
walk Aluminum Foundry Corp., supra, 155 Conn. 401;
see also Eis v. Meyer, 17 Conn. App. 664, 668, 555
A.2d 994 (‘‘[a]n easement may be created which will
terminate upon the happening of an event or contin-
gency, or which may be terminated on the occurrence,
[or] breach . . . of a condition’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)), aff’d, 213 Conn. 29, 566 A.2d 422
(1989). Instead, the Peoples deed expresses an intent
to create only an exclusive easement over a portion of
the defendant’s property, which does not entitle the
plaintiffs to the presumption of ownership to the center
line of West Shore Road.15 Accordingly, the plaintiffs’
argument fails.
B
Second, the plaintiffs argue that the court’s finding
as to the southerly boundary of the lakefront premises
15
The California and Idaho cases cited by the plaintiffs merely recognize
the possibility that an exclusive easement may equate to a fee interest
if, despite being labeled an ‘‘easement,’’ the interest conveyed creates an
unlimited right to use the subject property, which clearly is not the case
here. See Blackmore v. Powell, 150 Cal. App. 4th 1593, 1600, 59 Cal. Rptr.
3d 527 (2007) (easement for parking and garage purposes, with right of
exclusive control over garage, did ‘‘not rise to fee ownership’’ because
(1) rights accorded grantee were expressly circumscribed and (2) right to
exclusive control was intended solely to protect those restricted rights);
Raab v. Casper, 51 Cal. App. 3d 866, 877, 124 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1975) (‘‘[i]f a
conveyance purported to transfer to A an unlimited use or enjoyment of
Blackacre, it would be in effect a conveyance of ownership to A, not of an
easement’’ (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted));
Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 856 n.1, 673 P.2d 1048 (1983) (observing
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is clearly erroneous because it is premised on the incor-
rect conclusion that, if the lakefront premises extends
to the edge of the paved road, the southerly boundary
of the lakefront premises would not close with the
westerly boundary of the Velardi lot. The plaintiffs make
two arguments challenging this conclusion. First, they
argue that the southerly boundary of the lakefront prem-
ises would close ‘‘perfectly’’ with the Velardi lot ‘‘based
on the Velardi deed that . . . state[s] that [the Velardi
lot] was bounded by the road itself . . . .’’ Second, the
plaintiffs argue that, even if the court was correct that
the Velardi lot does not extend to the paved road and
the defendant therefore owns the unpaved shoulder in
front of the Velardi lot, ‘‘that discrepancy would not
result in lack of closure but would only result in the
defendant owning a portion of the land abutting the
[lakefront premises] to the east.’’ We are not persuaded
by either argument.

Both of the plaintiffs’ arguments essentially challenge
the court’s factual findings. We reiterate that ‘‘our review
is limited to deciding whether such findings were clearly
erroneous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mackie
v. Hull, supra, 69 Conn. App. 545. Under that deferential
standard of review, it is not our role ‘‘to weigh the
evidence and the credibility of the parties and to find
the facts . . . [or to] examine the record to determine
whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclu-
sion other than the one reached. Rather, we focus on
the conclusion of the trial court, as well as the method
by which it arrived at that conclusion, to determine
whether it is legally correct and factually supported.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Chebro v. Audette, 138 Conn. App. 278, 284, 50 A.3d
978 (2012).
that exclusive easement ‘‘ceases to be an easement only where the whole
exclusive use of a thing is conveyed’’ (emphasis altered)).
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First, as to the plaintiffs’ argument challenging the
court’s finding that the Velardi lot extends only to the
unpaved shoulder of West Shore Road, as opposed to
the paved edge of the road, we conclude that there is
ample evidence in the record to support that finding.
The 1970 subdivision map incorporated into the Peoples
deed clearly depicts the Velardi lot as extending to a
point short of the paved road.16 In reaching its conclu-
sion, the court was entitled to rely on this map feature
as though it were expressly recited in the Peoples deed.
See Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra,
221 Conn. App. 674 (‘‘[t]he identifying or explanatory
features contained in maps referred to in a deed become
part of the deed, and so are entitled to consideration
in interpreting the deed as though they were expressly
recited therein’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Nesteriak’s survey lends further support to the court’s
conclusion. He testified that he found an iron pin in
the southwestern corner of the Velardi lot, coinciding
with the highway easement line, and his survey map
depicts the Velardi lot as extending only to the location
of that iron pin at the unpaved shoulder of the highway.

The plaintiffs argue that the iron pin at the corner of
the Velardi lot and the southerly boundary line of the
Velardi lot shown on the 1970 subdivision map do not
mark the boundaries of that lot but instead merely desig-
nate the location of the highway easement line.
Although that is one possible interpretation of the 1970
subdivision map and the existence of the iron pin, it
certainly is not the only one. In fact, the plaintiffs
16
We note that the Velardi deed references another 1970 map that is not
part of the record in this case. The plaintiffs do not argue that the boundaries
of the Velardi lot might be depicted differently on the map referenced in
the Velardi deed than on the 1970 subdivision map. Instead, they appear to
assume that, because the map referenced in the Velardi deed was prepared
by the same firm that prepared the 1970 subdivision map referenced in the
Peoples deed, the maps are substantially the same.
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offered little evidence in support of their argument.17
They also ignore the fact that the court had evidence
to the contrary, including what appears to be clearly
drawn property boundaries of the Velardi lot on the 1970
subdivision map and Nesteriak’s unrebutted survey map
and testimony. ‘‘[I]t is well settled that [t]he weight to
be given the evidence and the credibility of the wit-
nesses are within the sole province of the trial court.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of
Transportation v. ACP, LLC, 221 Conn. App. 708, 722,
302 A.3d 936 (2023). To the extent that the plaintiffs
similarly challenge the court’s reliance on the vehicle
axle that Nesteriak found in the southwestern corner
of the lakefront premises, we reject that argument for
the same reason. Furthermore, although the plaintiffs
argue that the Velardi deed states that the Velardi lot
is bounded southerly by the highway, and there is a
rebuttable presumption that, when a deed contains such
a description, the landowner owns the fee to the center
of the highway, the court was entitled to disregard that
presumption and instead credit the evidence supporting
a contrary conclusion. See In re Blake P., 222 Conn.
App. 693, 707, 306 A.3d 1130 (2023) (‘‘[a]lthough there
may be evidence in the record that would support the
17
At most, counsel for the plaintiffs elicited testimony from Nesteriak
that when surveyors mark property boundaries near a state highway, they
place markers ‘‘along the edges’’ of the highway easement, and that whether
they place markers ‘‘within the area that the state could improve the highway
. . . depends on what [they are] staking out.’’ For instance, Nesteriak testi-
fied that a surveyor would place a marker within the state highway easement
‘‘[i]f there was an easement over the highway, that’s within the property of
the highway, for some other purpose.’’ One possible interpretation of this
testimony is that the iron pin at the southwestern corner of the Velardi lot
was placed there to designate where the state’s highway easement begins,
although the Velardi lot extends beyond that point. Another possible interpre-
tation, however, is that the iron pin serves to designate both the northerly
boundary of the state highway easement and the actual southerly boundary
of the Velardi lot. Ultimately, Nesteriak concluded, as reflected on his survey
map, that he believed the iron pin marked the corner of the Velardi lot itself,
not just the beginning of the highway easement.
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[plaintiffs’] position, it is not the role of this court to
examine that evidence and substitute our judgment for
that of the trial court’’).
Second, the court’s conclusion that the boundaries
of the lakefront premises close at the southwestern
corner of the Velardi lot only when the court adopts
the defendant’s position is supported by the record.
Given that the Peoples deed describes the lakefront
premises as both beginning and ending at the Velardi
lot, the court properly relied on the boundaries of that
lot as shown on the 1970 subdivision map. See Marshall
v. Soffer, 58 Conn. App. 737, 744, 756 A.2d 284 (2000)
(‘‘[a]djacent land may be a monument if the boundary
of it is fixed’’). Thus, accepting the plaintiffs’ interpreta-
tion of the Peoples deed that the southerly boundary
of the lakefront premises is the paved portion of West
Shore Road would mean that there would be a 12.5 foot
gap between the southwestern corner of the Velardi
property and the southeastern corner of the lakefront
premises.18 We cannot say that it was unreasonable for
18
The plaintiffs contend that, by viewing this as the most significant part
of the description in the Peoples deed, the court improperly prioritized
distances over physical monuments. We are not convinced. It is true that,
where there is a conflict between calls in a deed description, ‘‘a default
hierarchy has developed, in which various classifications of monuments are
deemed generally to be of greater dignity than others. Under the prevailing
general hierarchy, other things being equal, resort is to be had first to
natural objects or landmarks, next to artificial monuments, then to adjacent
boundaries (which are considered a sort of monument) and thereafter to
courses and distances.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Mackie v. Hull, supra, 69 Conn. App. 543. Nesteriak’s survey method,
on which the court relied, did not deviate from this principle. His testimony
indicates that he considered the distances set forth in the Peoples deed but
viewed the physical monuments referred to in the deed as controlling. That
Nesteriak’s survey of the lakefront premises resulted in boundaries that,
when measured by reference to the monuments called out in the Peoples
deed, came close to the approximate distances set forth in the deed only
further supports that he properly identified and located those monuments.
Indeed, the court found that the greatest discrepancy between the measure-
ments shown on Nesteriak’s survey map and the distances set forth in the
Peoples deed was insignificant because it was only 8.4 percent short of the
‘‘about 90 feet’’ distance called out in the deed.
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the court to reject the plaintiffs’ interpretation in favor
of one that both resulted in a closed plot of land and
gave effect to all of the monuments called out in the
Peoples deed. See Thurlow v. Hulten, Superior Court,
judicial district of Hartford, Complex Litigation Docket,
Docket Nos. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (Octo-
ber 15, 2014) (reprinted at 173 Conn. App. 698, 164 A.3d
862) (trial court accepted survey that established closed
boundaries by reference to monuments identified in
field over survey that simply drew arbitrary line from
end point of incomplete property description to bound-
ary of adjacent property), aff’d, 173 Conn. App. 694,
164 A.3d 858 (2017); see also Koennicke v. Maiorano,
43 Conn. App. 1, 19, 22, 682 A.2d 1046 (1996) (affirming
trial court’s conclusion as to location of boundary line
where court adopted boundary line ‘‘that track[ed] the
calls set out in [the] deed and [did] not ignore any of
those calls’’).
Moreover, the court credited Nesteriak’s testimony
and survey map, which indicate that the southerly
boundary of the lakefront premises extends only to the
unpaved shoulder of the highway and closes with the
westerly boundary of the Velardi lot. To the extent that
the plaintiffs challenge Nesteriak’s survey method, we
note that Nesteriak’s survey properly tracked the monu-
ments referred to in the Peoples deed, which he identi-
fied and located by reference to the axles and iron pins
in the field.19 The court found that Nesteriak was highly
19
To the extent that the plaintiffs argue that the court improperly relied
on the vehicle axles and iron pins that Nesteriak found in the field despite
those objects not being mentioned in the Peoples deed or shown on the
1970 subdivision map, we are not persuaded. A court may rely on extrinsic
evidence to help ‘‘identify and locate’’ a boundary or monument that is
referred to in the deed. See Tierney v. Second Ecclesiastical Society of
North Canaan, 103 Conn. 332, 334–35, 130 A. 286 (1925) (where deed
described property conveyed to plaintiff as ‘‘bounded [n]orth on highway,
[e]asterly and [s]outherly on highway and [w]est on Lucy Joslin’s land,’’
fence along easterly side of plaintiff’s land adjoining highway, even though
not called out in deed, ‘‘helped identify and locate the easterly boundary
as the monument described in the deed’’); Roberti v. Atwater, 43 Conn. 540,
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Gleason v. Atkins

credible and rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments challeng-
ing his testimony. We will not second-guess those deter-
minations on appeal. See Alpha Beta Capital Partners,
L.P. v. Pursuit Investment Management, LLC, 193
Conn. App. 381, 441, 219 A.3d 801 (2019) (‘‘to the extent
that the court’s decision is founded on its credibility
determinations, we cannot second-guess those determi-
nations on appeal’’), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 911, 221
A.3d 446 (2020), and cert. denied, 334 Conn. 911, 221
A.3d 446 (2020).
Accordingly, because the court’s findings as to the
locations of the boundaries of the Velardi lot and the
lakefront premises find support in the record, and there-
fore are not clearly erroneous, we reject the plaintiffs’
arguments challenging those findings.20
C
Third, the plaintiffs argue that ‘‘[t]here is no legal or
logical basis’’ for the court’s conclusion that the strip
of land in front of the Velardi and Lafata lots would be
‘‘useless’’ to the grantor unless he also retained the
547 (1876) (extrinsic evidence that fences ‘‘mark[ed] definitely and visibly
the line of the lots on which the distributed premises were bounded . . .
was admissible, upon the ordinary principle that you may always by such
evidence identify and locate the boundaries or monuments described in the
deed’’); see also Young Men’s Christian Assn. of Meriden v. Zemel Bros.,
Inc., 171 Conn. 310, 311–12, 370 A.2d 937 (1976) (affirming trial court’s
conclusion that boundary of plaintiff’s land described in deed as ‘‘ ‘top of
the mountain’ ’’ was town line, which was clearly designated on mountain
by brownstone monuments). Therefore, the court, by relying on Nesteriak’s
survey map in reaching its conclusion, properly relied on the iron pins and
axles to locate and identify the monuments referred to in the Peoples deed.
20
To the extent that the plaintiffs argue on appeal that, under the court’s
construction of the Peoples deed, the lakefront premises is landlocked
because ‘‘no easement was granted [to the plaintiffs] over the shoulder [of
West Shore Road] to the [lakefront premises],’’ that argument merits little
discussion. It is undisputed that the general public maintains a right-of-way
over both the paved and unpaved portions of the highway and that, despite
the fence and hedge, the plaintiffs can still access the lakefront premises
by traveling farther east on West Shore Road.
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unpaved shoulder abutting the lakefront premises.
According to the plaintiffs, ‘‘the shoulder of the highway
[in front of the Velardi and Lafata lots] . . . would have
no more or less value if [it] adjoined the road shoulder
on the [lakefront premises]. The strip in front of the
Velardi [and Lafata lots] would be fully accessible by
the highway and could be used only as the state would
permit. . . . What does not make sense is why . . . a
grantor establishing a lot fronting on a highway would
retain title to the shoulder of the highway.’’ We disagree.
The unpaved shoulder of the highway abutting the
Velardi lot, although perhaps not entirely useless to
the grantor if he does not own the unpaved shoulder
abutting the lakefront premises, would nonetheless
have more value to the grantor if he also retained owner-
ship of the neighboring strip of land. In other words,
the court reasonably inferred on the basis of the evi-
dence that the Quinlans’ intention to retain ownership
of the unpaved shoulder abutting the Velardi lot—an
intention that is apparent from the 1970 subdivision
map—made it more likely that they also intended to
retain ownership of the unpaved shoulder abutting the
lakefront premises, so as to retain for themselves a
single contiguous parcel subject only to the public right-
of-way over the highway. The court ‘‘is not required to
draw only those inferences consistent with one view
of the evidence, but may draw whatever inferences from
the evidence or facts established by the evidence it
deems to be reasonable and logical.’’ (Emphasis omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cheshire Land
Trust, LLC v. Casey, 156 Conn. App. 833, 852, 115 A.3d
497 (2015). We cannot say that the inferences drawn
by the court in reaching its conclusion are either unrea-
sonable or illogical. Accordingly, we reject the plaintiffs’
argument.
D
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that any ambiguity as to
the location of the southerly boundary of the lakefront
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premises ‘‘must be construed against the grantor, [Quin-
lan], and not Peoples,’’ the grantee. According to the
plaintiffs, ‘‘[a]pplying that rule regarding ambiguities,
the lakefront [premises] would close by running its
[easterly] boundary along the land of Velardi to [the
iron] pin [at the southwestern corner of the Velardi lot]
and continue along the 12.5 feet of land formerly of
[Quinlan] who was the grantor who created the ambigu-
ity.’’ As a result, the lakefront premises would extend
to the edge of the paved road.
It is true that ‘‘[a]mbiguous language in a grant is
ordinarily construed against the grantor, and in favor
of the grantee.’’ Lake Garda Improvement Assn. v. Bat-
tistoni, supra, 160 Conn. 514. We do not believe, how-
ever, that the court was required to apply that principle
in this case. Our case law suggests that this rule is one of
‘‘last resort,’’ similar to the rule of contra proferentum,
which can be used when interpreting ambiguous con-
tracts. See Cruz v. Visual Perceptions, LLC, 311 Conn.
93, 107, 84 A.3d 828 (2014) (describing contra proferen-
tum as rule of construction of contracts that is ‘‘applica-
ble only as a last resort, when other techniques of
interpretation and construction have not resolved the
question of which of two or more possible meanings
the court should choose’’ (emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted)).
In construing deeds, our courts have applied the prin-
ciple advanced by the plaintiffs only where the evidence
already favored construing the deed in the grantee’s
favor21 or when, even after considering extrinsic evi-
dence and other rules of construction, doubt remained
21
Notably, this was true in both cases cited by the plaintiffs. See Lake
Garda Improvement Assn. v. Battistoni, supra, 160 Conn. 513–14 (trial
court’s conclusion that beach area was intended to be conveyed to plaintiff-
grantee as portion of roadway was supported by circumstances at time of
conveyance, including that charter of plaintiff-grantee, which was adopted
only nineteen days before deed was executed, permitted it to control, own,
and care for roadways and beaches and that roadway was not ‘‘substantially
straight’’ such that larger roadway grant than usual might have been neces-
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as to the intention of the parties to an ambiguous deed
such that the ambiguity was ‘‘irreconcilable.’’ See, e.g.,
Mackin v. Mackin, 186 Conn. 185, 189, 439 A.2d 1086
(1982) (‘‘[a]ny ambiguity in the instrument creating an
easement, in a case of reasonable doubt, will be con-
strued in favor of the grantee’’ (emphasis added));
Bueno v. Firgeleski, 180 Conn. App. 384, 405, 183 A.3d
1176 (2018) (‘‘Where a deed is ambiguous the intention
of the parties is a decisive question of fact. . . . In
case of doubt, the grant will be taken most strongly
against the grantor.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.)), quoting Faiola v. Faiola, 156
Conn. 12, 18, 238 A.2d 405 (1968); Mackie v. Hull, supra,
69 Conn. App. 544 (‘‘[T]he search for greater certainty
in one of the calls [in the deed] to prevail over the other
as an expression of the parties’ mutual intent leaves us
at an impasse. In such a case of irreconcilable ambigu-
ity, we are left with the principle that the ambiguity is
to be resolved against the grantor.’’ (Emphasis added.));
see also Clark v. Beloff, 71 Conn. 237, 243–44, 41 A. 801
(1898) (‘‘the rule that the words of a deed shall be
construed most strongly against the grantor . . . only
means that if the words are capable of two or more
meanings, and after all the legitimate aids to the discov-
ery of their meaning have been used, we are still unable
to determine which of those meanings was the one
intended, we must take that one of them which is most
favorable to the grantee’’ (emphasis added)). In the
present case, the court properly considered extrinsic
evidence to resolve the ambiguity and determine the
intent of the parties to the Peoples deed. Accordingly,
sary to allow room to straighten road); Faiola v. Faiola, 156 Conn. 12, 18,
238 A.2d 405 (1968) (affirming trial court’s conclusion that deed conveyed
fee simple title rather than life estate to grantee where trial court had found
that plaintiff-grantor’s testimony as to parties’ intent to convey life estate
was ‘‘ ‘utterly unconvincing’ ’’). Thus, neither of these cases suggest that a
court should construe an ambiguous deed in the grantee’s favor where the
evidence indicates that a different meaning was intended.
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because the court was able to resolve the ambiguity on
the basis of that evidence, it was unnecessary for the
court to resort to the rule advanced by the plaintiffs.
In sum, we conclude that, because there is ample
evidence in the record to support the court’s finding
that the lakefront premises extends only to the unpaved
portion of West Shore Road, that finding is not clearly
erroneous.22
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

22
Given our conclusion, we do not address the defendant’s argument that
the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
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APPENDIX