M. C. v. A. W.

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M. C. v. A. W.

M. C. v. A. W.*
(AC 46223)
Alvord, Moll and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court
dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff and entering certain financial
orders. Held:
1. This court declined to review the defendant’s unpreserved claim that the
trial court committed error by failing to recuse itself and by demonstra-
ting judicial bias as the record was not adequate for review: the defendant
failed to file a motion to disqualify the judge presiding over the action
at any time prior to the dissolution judgment; moreover, contrary to the
defendant’s claim that he preserved the issue by virtue of his trial counsel
raising it to the judge in chambers, there was no record of such conversa-
tion, and the defendant failed to file a motion for rectification to preserve
any such conversation; furthermore, the claim could not be reviewed for
plain error because there was no evidence indicating that the purported
colloquy between the parties and the judge in chambers in relation to
the recusal issue actually occurred nor was there any evidence of bias
by the judge.
2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court made
clearly erroneous factual findings in support of its financial and property
distribution orders; the court’s findings as to the plaintiff’s health and
how the plaintiff conducted her business were supported by evidence
in the record.
3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court did
not adequately consider the plaintiff’s noncompliance with the court’s
discovery orders in entering its financial and property distribution
orders: the court expressly found that the plaintiff was uncooperative
vis-à-vis discovery and that she delayed, or wholly withheld, financial
information, and the decision further reflected that the court considered
the plaintiff’s discovery noncompliance to the detriment of the plaintiff,
as the court awarded no alimony to either party, which aligned with the
defendant’s operative proposed orders and which reflected a rejection
of the plaintiff’s request in her proposed orders to award alimony; more-
over, there was no merit to the defendant’s contention that the court

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as
amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person
protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
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M. C. v. A. W.
improperly declined to rule on three motions for contempt, as the record
demonstrated that the defendant expressly withdrew those motions.
4. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court inequitably
distributed the parties’ assets: the court did not abuse its discretion in
allocating the parties’ assets as, contrary to the defendant’s assertions,
a review of his operative proposed orders and the court’s final orders
reflected that many of the defendant’s requested orders were awarded
in full or in part; moreover, the court was not obligated to apply any
set formula when dividing the parties’ assets so long as it considered the
required factors under the statute (§ 46b-81) governing the distribution
of assets in a dissolution case, which, as was expressly set forth in its
decision, the court did.

Argued January 31—officially released July 2, 2024

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of New Haven, where the defendant filed a counter-
claim; thereafter, the matter was tried to the court,
Grossman, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and
granting certain other relief, from which the defendant
appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Terence J. Gallagher, with whom was A. W., self-
represented, for the appellant (defendant).
Meagan A. Cauda, with whom was Dana M. Hrelic,
for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

MOLL, J. The defendant, A. W., appeals from the
judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to
the plaintiff, M. C. On appeal, we distill the defendant’s
claims to be that the court (1) failed to recuse itself on
the basis of an alleged conflict of interest, (2) made
clearly erroneous factual findings in support of its finan-
cial and property distribution orders, (3) failed to con-
sider adequately the plaintiff’s noncompliance with the
court’s discovery orders in entering its financial and
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M. C. v. A. W.

property distribution orders, and (4) improperly distrib-
uted the parties’ assets.1 We affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
The following facts, which are not in dispute, and
procedural history are relevant to our resolution of
this appeal. The plaintiff and the defendant are both
attorneys admitted to practice law in Connecticut. The
parties were married on January 4, 1995. Two children
were born of the marriage, both of whom were over
the age of twenty-three at the time of the dissolution
judgment. On April 8, 2020, the plaintiff commenced
the present dissolution action against the defendant on
the ground that the parties’ marriage had broken down
irretrievably. On May 7, 2020, the defendant filed an
answer and a counterclaim for dissolution of marriage
on the same ground.
The matter was tried to the trial court, Grossman,
J., over the course of five days in March, September,
and November, 2022. The court heard testimony from
the parties and other witnesses and admitted several full
exhibits. The parties also submitted proposed orders.
At the conclusion of trial on November 7, 2022, the
parties requested an immediate dissolution of their mar-
riage, which the court granted, subject to the court
issuing orders at a later date relating to the parties’
finances and marital property.
On December 22, 2022, the court issued a memoran-
dum of decision in connection with the judgment of
dissolution. At the outset, the court stated that it made
its factual findings ‘‘[u]pon careful consideration of the
evidence presented, the court file, and the pertinent
statutory law, in particular, General Statutes §§ 46b-82,
The defendant raises six claims on appeal, which we boil down to the
1

claims described in this opinion. For the purpose of clarity, we address
these claims in a different order than they are set forth in the defendant’s
principal appellate brief.
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M. C. v. A. W.

46b-81, and 46b-87, and the relevant case law, and hav-
ing observed the demeanor and assessed the credibility
of the parties and witnesses . . . .’’ The court found
that most of the testimony adduced at trial was credible,
including testimony provided by the defendant and the
fact witnesses. In addition, the court stated that the
plaintiff’s testimony was not wholly reliable and stated
that at times it did not find her credible. The court
then entered several financial and property distribution
orders as part of the dissolution judgment. This appeal
followed. Additional facts and procedural history will
be set forth as necessary.
I
We begin with the defendant’s claim that the Honor-
able Jane K. Grossman committed error by failing to
recuse herself from presiding over the present dissolu-
tion action and by demonstrating judicial bias. Specifi-
cally, the defendant argues that ‘‘[Judge Grossman’s]
long-term personal and professional relationship with
the plaintiff’’ biased the court in favor of the plaintiff,
including in issuing the financial and property distribu-
tion orders. We decline to review this unpreserved claim
because the record is not adequate for review.
As a preliminary matter, we deem the defendant’s
recusal claim to be unpreserved. The defendant did not
file a motion to disqualify Judge Grossman at any time
prior to the dissolution judgment.2 See State v. Cane,
193 Conn. App. 95, 133, 218 A.3d 1073 (‘‘[i]t is a well
settled general rule . . . that courts will not review a
claim of judicial bias on appeal unless that claim was
2
On August 29, 2023, after having filed this appeal, the defendant filed a
motion seeking to recuse Judge Grossman from hearing any posttrial
motions in the present action, including the plaintiff’s motion to terminate
the automatic appellate stay. The defendant’s filing of the postjudgment
motion to recuse has no bearing on the question of whether the defendant
preserved the recusal issue prior to the judgment of dissolution, from which
the defendant has appealed.
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M. C. v. A. W.

properly presented to the trial court via a motion for
disqualification or a motion for mistrial’’ (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 901, 219
A.3d 798 (2019). Nevertheless, in his principal appellate
brief, the defendant maintains that he preserved this
issue by virtue of his trial counsel raising it to Judge
Grossman in chambers.3 We disagree, as there is no
record of the purported conversation in chambers, and
the defendant has failed to file a motion for rectification
to preserve any such conversation. See Moyher v.
Moyher, 198 Conn. App. 334, 341, 232 A.3d 1212 (motion
for rectification could have been filed pursuant to Prac-
tice Book § 66-5 to attempt to preserve discussions in
chambers), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 965, 240 A.3d 284
(2020).
The defendant requests that we review his recusal
claim, if unpreserved, for plain error.4 The recusal claim
cannot be reviewed for plain error, however, because
the defendant has failed to present us with an adequate
record.5 See State v. Kyle A., 348 Conn. 437, 446, 307
3
The defendant’s appellate counsel stated during oral argument that the
issue of Judge Grossman’s recusal was ‘‘raised with the court in chambers
on the morning of the first day of the trial.’’ However, counsel represented
that (1) ‘‘there was no transcript’’ of this discussion, (2) the in-chambers
request was denied, and (3) following the court’s denial of the in-chambers
request, the defendant did not raise the issue on the record because it
purportedly was rendered moot by the denial.
4
‘‘[The plain error] doctrine, codified at Practice Book § 60-5, is an extraor-
dinary remedy used by appellate courts to rectify errors committed at trial
that, although unpreserved, are of such monumental proportion that they
threaten to erode our system of justice and work a serious and manifest
injustice on the aggrieved party. . . . [T]he plain error doctrine is reserved
for truly extraordinary situations [in which] the existence of the error is so
obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence
in the judicial proceedings. . . . Plain error is a doctrine that should be
invoked sparingly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taveras,
219 Conn. App. 252, 269, 295 A.3d 421, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 903, 301 A.3d
527 (2023).
5
During oral argument, reference was made to review of the defendant’s
unpreserved claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567
A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120
A.3d 1188 (2015). Insofar as the defendant seeks Golding review as well,
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M. C. v. A. W.

A.3d 249 (2024) (‘‘An appellate court addressing a claim
of plain error first must determine if the error is indeed
plain in the sense that it is patent [or] readily discernable
on the face of a factually adequate record, [and] also
. . . obvious in the sense of not debatable. . . . [A]
complete record and an obvious error are prerequisites
for plain error review . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.)); see also Practice Book § 61-
10 (a) (‘‘[i]t is the responsibility of the appellant to
provide an adequate record for review’’). The defendant
has not cited in the record, and our review of the record
has not revealed (1) any evidence indicating that the
purported colloquy between the parties and Judge
Grossman in chambers in relation to the recusal issue
actually occurred6 or (2) any evidence of bias by Judge
Grossman otherwise. The only support offered by the
defendant is counsel’s representations, which are insuf-
ficient.7 See Magana v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 164
Conn. App. 729, 734, 138 A.3d 966 (2016) (‘‘representa-
tions of counsel are not evidence and are certainly not
proof’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). We con-
clude, therefore, that the record is inadequate to review
this claim and, accordingly, we decline to review it.
the lack of an adequate record also prevents such review. See S. A. v. D.
G., 198 Conn. App. 170, 196 n.21, 232 A.3d 1110 (2020) (first prong of Golding
requires adequate record to review alleged claim of error).
6
The defendant states in his principal appellate brief that ‘‘the court was
made aware of the appearance [of] impropriety in hearing this case at
trial at the outset. [The defendant’s trial counsel] discussed this matter in
chambers with Judge Grossman, reminding her of a discussion she had with
both of the litigants at a party at her home, which both the plaintiff and
the defendant were invited [to] as guests, as were their then minor children
. . . . Judge Grossman . . . advised both parties that she could not hear
any cases in which they represented parties.’’ The defendant further states
that Judge Grossman commented in chambers that she was ‘‘ ‘fond’ ’’ of
both parties.
7
The defendant also asserts that Judge Grossman’s adverse rulings against
him reflected bias. This assertion is untenable. See Batista v. Cortes, 203
Conn. App. 365, 373, 248 A.3d 763 (2021) (‘‘[a]dverse rulings do not them-
selves constitute evidence of bias’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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M. C. v. A. W.

II
We next address the defendant’s remaining claims,
which, in essence, challenge the court’s financial and
property distribution orders. The defendant contends
that the court (1) made clearly erroneous factual find-
ings, (2) failed to account adequately for the plaintiff’s
noncompliance with the court’s discovery orders, and
(3) inequitably allocated the parties’ assets. These
claims are unavailing.
Before turning to the defendant’s claims, we set forth
‘‘[t]he standard of review in domestic relations cases
[which] is well established. [T]his court will not disturb
trial court orders unless the trial court has abused its
legal discretion or its findings have no reasonable basis
in the facts. . . . As has often been explained, the foun-
dation for this standard is that the trial court is in a
clearly advantageous position to assess the personal
factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .
Appellate review of a factual finding, therefore, is lim-
ited both as a practical matter and as a matter of the
fundamental difference between the role of the trial
court and an appellate court. . . . A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the
record to support it . . . or when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed. . . . In determin-
ing whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion
in domestic relations matters, we allow every reason-
able presumption in favor of the correctness of its
action. . . . Simply put, we give great deference to the
findings of the trial court because of its function to
weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass
upon the credibility of witnesses.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Buchenholz v.
Buchenholz, 221 Conn. App. 132, 142–43, 300 A.3d 1233,
cert. denied, 348 Conn. 928, 304 A.3d 860 (2023).
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A
The defendant asserts that the court made factual
findings in support of its financial and property distribu-
tion orders that were clearly erroneous. We disagree.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of this claim. In entering its finan-
cial and property distribution orders, the court made
several findings regarding the plaintiff. As to her health,
the court found that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff is fifty-eight years
old . . . [and] in poor health. For most of the marriage,
she struggled with alcoholism; this impaired her judg-
ment and her memory. She is experiencing serious med-
ical complications. Only an organ transplant can extend
her life and the likelihood of such a transplant is low.’’
With respect to her income, the court found in relevant
part that ‘‘[t]he evidence demonstrated that [the plain-
tiff] spends beyond her stated income without increas-
ing her debt and that she conducts business in cash,
which goes unreported.’’
The defendant argues that the court committed clear
error in finding that (1) ‘‘[o]nly an organ transplant can
extend [the plaintiff’s] life and the likelihood of such a
transplant is low,’’ and (2) the plaintiff ‘‘conducts busi-
ness in cash, which goes unreported.’’ With respect
to the plaintiff’s health, the defendant asserts that the
court’s findings are unsupported by the record. With
respect to the plaintiff’s income, the defendant asserts
that, ‘‘[w]hile the information to support that [finding]
may exist by inference, it was . . . not a stated [find-
ing] or admission in the record of the trial.’’ We conclude
that these findings are supported by the evidence in
the record.
With respect to the court’s findings concerning the
plaintiff’s health, the plaintiff testified that (1) she has
had many medical problems and requires a liver trans-
plant, (2) she has ‘‘end stage liver disease,’’ which is a
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M. C. v. A. W.

‘‘terminal illness,’’ (3) at the time of her testimony during
trial in March, 2022, she was ‘‘put on pause’’ with respect
to a liver transplant list, although she would ‘‘be going
back on the list,’’ and (4) ‘‘there haven’t been many
livers available during [the COVID-19 pandemic]
. . . .’’ Although the court noted in its decision that it
‘‘was unable to rely on all of the plaintiff’s testimony
and at times did not find [the plaintiff] credible,’’ it also
determined that ‘‘[m]ost of the testimony received by
the court was credible . . . .’’ As we have explained,
the court’s decision ‘‘may include implicit findings that
it resolved any credibility determinations and any con-
flicts in testimony in a manner that supports its ruling.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buchenholz v.
Buchenholz, supra, 221 Conn. App. 147; see also Delena
v. Grachitorena, 216 Conn. App. 225, 231, 283 A.3d 1090
(2022) (‘‘[i]t is the exclusive province of the trier of
fact to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of witnesses and determine whether to
accept some, all or none of a witness’ testimony’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). We will not disturb the
court’s credibility determinations on appeal. See id.
Moreover, the defendant acknowledged the plaintiff’s
health problems in his testimony, including that the
plaintiff had been seeking a liver transplant. We con-
clude, therefore, that the court’s finding as to the plain-
tiff’s health is not clearly erroneous.8
8
The defendant asserts that the plaintiff did not submit any medical
evidence to support her testimony regarding her medical issues. Insofar as
the defendant claims error on this basis, we construe the defendant’s argu-
ment, in essence, to seek that we retry the facts and evaluate the plaintiff’s
credibility, which we decline to do. See Anketell v. Kulldorff, 207 Conn.
App. 807, 848, 263 A.3d 972 (‘‘The defendant essentially requests that we
reweigh [the] evidence in his favor. [W]e do not retry the facts or evaluate
the credibility of witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert.
denied, 340 Conn. 905, 263 A.3d 821 (2021).
In addition, the defendant appears to question on appeal the ‘‘terminal’’
nature of the plaintiff’s medical issues, observing that she remained alive at
the time that he filed his principal appellate brief. We decline the defendant’s
apparent invitation to take the plaintiff’s current health status into consider-
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M. C. v. A. W.

With respect to the court’s finding that the plaintiff
conducted business in cash, which went unreported,
the court heard testimony from the defendant stating
that, while the parties were married, the plaintiff would
have him ‘‘do bank deposits for her . . . .’’ The defen-
dant’s testimony described how, ‘‘if [business checks]
were made payable to [the plaintiff], [she] would . . .
sign the back of the check and ask [him] to cash it and
then bring her the cash.’’ The court also heard testimony
from a client of the plaintiff stating that she addressed
several payment checks to the plaintiff personally,
rather than to the law firm, and that, although she had
not paid the plaintiff since September, 2021, the plaintiff
represented her and/or performed legal work for her
sometime after September, 2021. In addition, several
exhibits purporting to chart the plaintiff’s various
sources of income discrepancies from 2019 to 2021, as
derived from her bank statements, were admitted in
full. The exhibit charting her ‘‘2021 bank and credit card
statements,’’ for example, indicates that certain sums
of funds appearing on the statements were deposited
from sources ‘‘unknown.’’ As the defendant concedes
in his principal appellate brief, the court reasonably
may have drawn inferences on the basis of the evidence
to reach its findings relating to the plaintiff’s business
and income. See Giordano v. Giordano, 203 Conn. App.
652, 657, 249 A.3d 363 (2021) (‘‘[i]t is within the province
of the trial court to find facts and draw proper infer-
ences from the evidence presented’’ (emphasis added;
internal quotation marks omitted)).
In sum, we conclude that the court’s findings are
supported by the record and, therefore, not clearly erro-
neous.9
ation in determining whether the court committed error in entering its
financial and property distribution orders.
9
The defendant suggests that, in light of the alleged lack of evidence in
the record to support the court’s findings, the court must have based its
findings on ex parte communications. In light of our determination that
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M. C. v. A. W.

B
The defendant also asserts that the court did not
adequately consider the plaintiff’s noncompliance with
the court’s discovery orders in entering its financial and
property distribution orders. Additionally, in connec-
tion with this assertion, the defendant contends that
the court improperly declined to rule on three contempt
motions that he had filed.10 We are not persuaded.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant. On March 29, 2021, the court entered orders, with-
out prejudice to either party, adjudicating discovery
disputes between the parties and requiring the parties
to produce various discovery materials. Pursuant to
Practice Book § 25-32B,11 the court subsequently
appointed a discovery special master to assist the par-
ties with resolving discovery disputes.
Prior to the third day of trial on September 20, 2022,
both parties filed motions for contempt. Specifically,
on September 14, 2022, the defendant filed a motion
for contempt claiming that the plaintiff had failed to
comply with the court’s discovery orders. On Septem-
ber 19, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt
predicated on the defendant’s alleged noncompliance
the court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, we find no merit to this
contention.
10
We note that the defendant filed his principal appellate brief as a self-
represented party. His appellate counsel subsequently filed an appearance
prior to oral argument.
In the defendant’s principal appellate brief, which is not a model of clarity,
the defendant refers to several motions that he filed in the present action.
We construe comments made by the defendant’s appellate counsel during
oral argument to limit the defendant’s claim concerning the court’s refusal
to rule on his motions to three contempt motions, which we discuss later
in this portion of the opinion.
11
Practice Book § 25-32B provides: ‘‘The judicial authority may appoint
a discovery special master to assist in the resolution of discovery disputes.
When such an appointment is made, the judicial authority shall specify the
duties, authority and compensation of the discovery special master and how
that compensation shall be allocated between the parties.’’
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with discovery. On September 19, 2022, the defendant
filed a motion for contempt asserting that the plaintiff
had violated the court’s automatic orders by withdraw-
ing $50,000 from a retirement account without the
defendant’s consent.
At the outset of the proceedings on September 20,
2022, the parties and the court discussed the defen-
dant’s September 14, 2022 motion for contempt claim-
ing discovery noncompliance by the plaintiff. During
the discussion, the court commented that ‘‘[t]his case
has been dragging on. The parties have an obligation
to continue to exchange discovery while it drags on.
At some point soon, I think I’m going to have to consider
some remedies for not disclosing discovery. . . . So,
look, at some point, [the plaintiff] might be precluded
from putting on this evidence. I might make some
adverse inferences if discovery’s not produced. . . .
I’ve got a case that’s, I don’t know, three years old. So
I think all those options are on the table . . . . So [the
plaintiff] can decide how she wants to handle it. She
risks those penalties. She certainly risks some counsel
fees for . . . payment of these motions if I find her in
contempt for . . . violating discovery rules. But I’m
certainly not gonna hold up trial. . . . [W]e have to
move on. There can’t be a lot between [the parties] that
. . . isn’t clear other than maybe what the current
income is for [the plaintiff’s] practice. And if she doesn’t
disclose it, then I guess some assumptions will be made
by the court about why it wasn’t disclosed.’’ The court
further noted that the defendant’s September 14, 2022
motion remained before it and inquired whether there
were any other motions to be addressed before the
evidentiary portion of trial resumed. The plaintiff’s trial
counsel responded ‘‘[n]o,’’ while the defendant’s trial
counsel suggested that the court address the defen-
dant’s other motions ‘‘if and when we readdress [the
defendant’s September 14, 2022] motion for contempt.’’
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During the fourth day of trial on September 21, 2022,
referencing the discussion from the prior day, the court
commented that, ‘‘if [the plaintiff] doesn’t produce the
documents pursuant to valid requests and a number of
orders . . . the court has a number of options available
to it, including adverse inferences and including preclu-
sion. And we haven’t gotten into any of that yet because
. . . I haven’t heard from [the plaintiff] about those
items. But . . . in my view, it has not changed.’’ The
court further commented that it was ‘‘disappointing and
distressing’’ to see ‘‘two members of the bar who are
credibly accused of not following all of the rules of
practice regarding the exchanging of discovery . . . .’’

Later in the day, the defendant’s trial counsel
requested that the court order a deadline by which the
plaintiff had to comply with outstanding discovery. The
plaintiff’s trial counsel responded that the plaintiff was
working on discovery compliance and that counsel
would attempt to assure compliance by the following
week. The court then stated that ‘‘[there have been]
[o]utstanding discovery requests [i]n a case that is many
years old and there are multiple orders for people to
produce. So, as far as I’m concerned, all the motions
to compel, all the motions for sanctions, and all the
motions for remedy regarding the failure to produce
documents are before the court. . . . I’m not delaying
this trial or issuing any more deadlines. . . . If [the
plaintiff] doesn’t produce them, all remedies are avail-
able to [the defendant]. I may still, because they are
produced late, make some adverse inferences or . . .
issue some sanctions or shift some fees in either direc-
tion . . . . So, all the options are available. . . . If [the
defendant’s trial counsel doesn’t] have enough time to
go through [the production] . . . I will certainly hear
[him] out about how that should impact my order for
sanctions.’’
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On November 1, 2022, the defendant filed an amended
motion for contempt, ostensibly in relation to his Sep-
tember 14, 2022 motion for contempt, asserting that,
notwithstanding some recent discovery compliance, the
plaintiff had failed to comply fully with the court’s dis-
covery orders. The defendant requested as relief that
the court order the plaintiff to provide full discovery
compliance immediately and to pay reasonable attor-
ney’s fees and costs pursuant to General Statutes
§ 46b-87.
At the outset of the final day of trial on November
7, 2022, the court inquired whether there was anything
to address before the evidentiary portion of trial
resumed. The defendant’s trial counsel made reference
to pending motions for contempt, but there was no
request to address the motions at that time.
During closing arguments, prior to the start of the
plaintiff’s rebuttal, the court noted that ‘‘the plaintiff’s
[operative] proposed orders are not asking for any rul-
ing on any of [the] pendente lite motions’’ whereas the
defendant’s operative proposed orders suggested that
there were pending motions to resolve.12 The defen-
dant’s trial counsel responded that the court could con-
sider the motions on the papers. The plaintiff’s trial
counsel, in turn, stated that she ‘‘thought [the parties]
were not proceeding on the motions . . . .’’ The follow-
ing colloquy then occurred:
12
On November 3, 2022, the defendant filed an amended list of pending
motions. The motions that were referenced therein included (1) the defen-
dant’s motion for contempt dated June 24, 2020, (2) the defendant’s motion
for sanctions dated September 17, 2020, (3) the defendant’s motion for
sanctions dated October 5, 2020, (4) the defendant’s motion for sanctions
and finding of per se bad faith dated November 14, 2020, (5) the defendant’s
November 1, 2022 amended motion for contempt, along with the defendant’s
September 14, 2022 motion for contempt, (6) the defendant’s September 19,
2022 motion for contempt, (7) the plaintiff’s September 19, 2022 motion
for contempt, along with the defendant’s objection thereto, and (8) the
defendant’s motion for order of compliance dated November 1, 2022.
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‘‘The Court: I thought . . . I’d heard one of the law-
yers say nobody was pursuing these motions for sanc-
tions or contempt regarding discovery . . . . Are you
pursuing those motions? Do I need to rule on them or
not? Because one set of proposed orders . . . looks
like I don’t, and one set of proposed orders makes it
look like I do.
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: I’ve put my testimony
on about them; I certainly have no objection to [the
plaintiff’s trial counsel] doing whatever she’d like to do
to oppose those.
‘‘The Court: Okay. . . . That sounds like a change
in understanding from earlier. . . . I’ll give you time
to get back to me about it or talk to me about it . . . .
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I started the day saying I
won’t claim [the plaintiff’s] motion for contempt if [the
defendant is not] claiming [his].’’ Following a pause in
the proceedings, the defendant’s trial counsel repre-
sented to the court that ‘‘we’re going to not have you
rule on those [motions] . . . and hope that you instead
concentrate on defendant’s [exhibit] CCC,’’ consisting
of a spreadsheet titled ‘‘spreadsheet of marital waste,’’
along with accompanying documents, which purported
to show the total amount of ‘‘waste of [marital] assets’’
by the plaintiff, including the accumulation of legal fees.
During the plaintiff’s rebuttal argument, the following
colloquy occurred:
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Discovery has not—[the
plaintiff] filed [a] motion for contempt that [she] did
not proceed on . . . and argument is made to Your
Honor about . . . how there was no discovery; there
was lots of discovery here. . . .
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Your Honor . . . I with-
drew the motions for contempt. Why are we talking
about this?
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‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Well, because you talked
about it. . . . Counsel’s asked [the court] to take that
into account in—
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Oh, I definitely—
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: —fashioning [the
court’s] orders.
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: —have asked [the court]
to take that into account. I agree.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Yeah. And so that’s why
I’m commenting about it.
‘‘The Court: And . . . there is a request for counsel
fees at least from the plaintiff’s side; so . . . I think I
need to at least give it some thought.’’
In its decision issuing its financial and property distri-
bution orders, the court did not expressly refer to any
motions filed by the parties. The court did, however,
address the plaintiff’s discovery violations, stating: ‘‘The
plaintiff is admitted to practice law in Connecticut. She
is self-employed in her own practice and continued
to practice and take on clients while this action was
pending. The plaintiff reported a gross annual income
of $30,680 from annuities. She was not cooperative dur-
ing the discovery process. She delayed production of, or
withheld entirely, information related to her earnings
and spending. The evidence demonstrated that she
spends beyond her stated income without increasing
her debt and that she conducts business in cash which
goes unreported. In 2019, her personal gross annual
income was more than $90,000. Accordingly, the court
finds that the plaintiff has sufficient income to support
herself.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court proceeded to
order, inter alia, that (1) neither party was to pay ali-
mony to the other party and (2) each party was responsi-
ble for his or her own attorney’s fees and costs.
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At this juncture, we briefly address the defendant’s
contention that the court improperly declined to rule
on his September 14, 2022, September 19, 2022, and
November 1, 2022 motions for contempt. We reject this
claim because the record demonstrates that the defen-
dant expressly withdrew these motions on the record
on November 7, 2022. As the November 7, 2022 trial
transcript reflects, following confusion expressed by
the parties’ respective trial counsel regarding the status
of the contempt motions, the court stated that it had
‘‘heard one of the lawyers say nobody was pursuing
these motions for sanctions or contempt regarding dis-
covery’’ and asked directly whether it ‘‘need[ed] to rule
on them or not.’’ (Emphasis added.) The defendant’s
trial counsel later informed the court that ‘‘we’re going
to not have [the court] rule on those [motions] . . .
and hope that [the court] instead concentrate[s] on
defendant’s [exhibit] CCC.’’ (Emphasis added.) More-
over, during the plaintiff’s closing argument, the defen-
dant’s trial counsel confirmed that he ‘‘withdrew the
motions for contempt.’’ (Emphasis added.) Further, in
his principal appellate brief, the defendant makes it
clear that, ‘‘[i]n discussions with the court, the defen-
dant’s [trial] counsel, based upon [the court’s] prior
admonishment of the parties [during trial], requested
that the court deal with the issues of the contempts by
focusing on the defendant’s exhibit CCC . . . .’’ Upon
the defendant’s withdrawal of the motions for con-
tempt, those motions were no longer before the court
for adjudication. Accordingly, there is no merit to the
defendant’s claim.13
13
During oral argument before this court, the defendant’s appellate coun-
sel asserted that the defendant did not withdraw any motions on November
7, 2022, because his trial counsel was not specific enough as to which motions
the defendant intended to withdraw during that discussion. Alternatively,
the defendant’s appellate counsel argued that, to the extent that the defen-
dant’s trial counsel may have represented to the trial court that the defendant
was withdrawing any of his outstanding motions, it was only with respect
to his September 19, 2022 motion relating to the court’s automatic orders,
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The crux of the defendant’s remaining assertion is
that the court did not adequately consider the plaintiff’s
noncompliance with discovery in entering its financial
and property distribution orders. The defendant main-
tains that the court ‘‘failed to hold the plaintiff account-
able for her intentional and [wilful] actions frustrating
the orderly process of this dissolution action.’’ The
court’s decision, however, reflects that the court
expressly found that the plaintiff was uncooperative
vis-à-vis discovery and delayed, or wholly withheld,
financial information. The decision further reflects that
the court considered the plaintiff’s discovery noncom-
pliance to the detriment of the plaintiff, as the court,
notwithstanding the plaintiff having a reported gross
income of $30,680, determined that the plaintiff had
sufficient income to support herself. We construe that
determination, in turn, implicitly to have guided the
court in awarding no alimony to either party, which
aligned with the defendant’s operative proposed orders
and rejected the plaintiff’s request, as reflected in her
operative proposed orders, to award her alimony in the
amount of $1653 per month until either party’s death
or the plaintiff’s remarriage. Insofar as the defendant
posits that the court should have relied further on the
plaintiff’s discovery noncompliance to enter additional
orders adverse to her, we do not deem the court to
have abused its broad discretion in declining to do so.
Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s claim.
C
The defendant next asserts that the trial court inequi-
tably distributed the parties’ assets. We disagree.
‘‘[Section] 46b-81 governs the distribution of the
assets in a dissolution case. . . . That statute autho-
rizes the court to assign to either spouse all, or any
but not any of the motions relating to the discovery issues. In light of the
record, we do not find these arguments persuasive.
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part of, the estate of the other spouse. . . . In fixing
the nature and value of the property, if any, to be
assigned, the court, after considering all the evidence
presented by each party, shall consider the length of
the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution
of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health,
station, occupation, amount and sources of income,
earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employ-
ability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties
and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of
capital assets and income. The court shall also consider
the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition,
preservation or appreciation in value of their respective
estates. . . . Moreover, [w]e have iterated that there
is no set formula the court is obligated to apply when
dividing the parties’ assets and . . . the court is vested
with broad discretion in fashioning financial orders.
. . . As a panel of this court once expressed, the court
has vast discretion in fashioning its orders. . . . Gener-
ally, we will not overturn a trial court’s division of
marital property unless it misapplies, overlooks, or
gives a wrong or improper effect to any test or consider-
ation which it was [its] duty to regard.’’ (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wethington v.
Wethington, 223 Conn. App. 715, 734–35, 309 A.3d
356 (2024).
‘‘Although the trial court must consider those factors
delineated by § 46b-81 when distributing assets, no sin-
gle criterion is preferred over others, and the court is
accorded wide latitude in varying the weight placed
upon each item under the peculiar circumstances of
each case. . . . [Additionally, the court] need not give
each factor equal weight . . . or recite the statutory
criteria that it considered in making its decision or
make express findings as to each statutory factor.’’
(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Anderson-Harris v. Harris, 221 Conn. App. 222,
248, 301 A.3d 1090 (2023).
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In its decision, the court found that the plaintiff (1)
is in poor health, (2) struggled with alcoholism for most
of the parties’ marriage, which impaired her judgment
and memory, (3) ‘‘is experiencing serious medical com-
plications,’’ (4) requires an organ transplant to extend
her life, ‘‘the likelihood [of which] is low,’’ and (5) had
sufficient income to support herself. The court also
found that the plaintiff (1) since 2019 has lived exclu-
sively in the parties’ marital residence in Wallingford,
which is valued at approximately $725,000 and which
has no mortgage, but is subject to a home equity line
of credit (HELOC) in the defendant’s name alone with
a balance of approximately $50,000, and has paid the
property taxes14 and utilities since then, and (2) used
to own with her father a certain limited liability com-
pany (real estate LLC), as well as company owned real
property upon which an office building is situated (but
for which she has not paid rent or contributed to its
upkeep for many years and which she, ‘‘in fact, deliber-
ately damaged . . . at significant costs to the defen-
dant [who now owns the company]. The defendant is
closing his practice and has no need for this office any
longer. . . . The approximate net value of the property
is $130,000.’’). As to the defendant, the court found that
he (1) lives in a West Hartford property co-owned with
his sister, (2) is entitled to 75 percent of a trust with
an approximate corpus value of $600,000, subject to
certain distributions and obligations, (3) has paid car
insurance, homeowners insurance, and motor vehicle
taxes for both parties and their children during the
pendency of the present action, and (4) has sufficient
income to support himself.
On the basis of its findings, the court ordered that
the plaintiff (1) was awarded (a) the marital residence,
14
With respect to property taxes with regard to the marital residence, the
court found that, in response to a foreclosure action, the plaintiff paid
$42,000 in delinquent property taxes accrued from 2018 to 2021.
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with the defendant obligated to pay the HELOC debt,
as well as the homeowners insurance on the home until
February 1, 2023, (b) certain real property in Hamden,
(c) all interest in a certain limited liability company,
(d) several vehicles, with the defendant required to pay
car insurance on the parties’ vehicles until February 1,
2023, (e) certain jewelry, and (f) certain furnishings and
furs, and (2) would retain her retirement account and
annuity accounts. The court further ordered that the
defendant (1) would retain (a) the real estate LLC, sub-
ject to the requirement that he sell the real property
that it owned and use the proceeds to pay off certain
debts and (b) any interest in the trust, and (2) was
awarded (a) his interest in the West Hartford property,
(b) all interest in two other, identified limited liability
companies, (c) certain vehicles, and (d) certain jewelry.
Additionally, the court ordered that the parties (1) were
to divide equitably the furnishings in the marital home,
(2) would retain any personal property in their posses-
sion or financial accounts in their name or listed in
their respective financial affidavits, not otherwise
assigned by the court, and (3) were responsible for
(a) their personal debts not otherwise assigned by the
court, (b) their personal health insurance, and (c) their
personal attorney’s fees and costs.

The defendant maintains on appeal that, ‘‘[i]n this
action, the issue of distribution is what is not equitable.’’
In particular, he contends that the court’s orders allocat-
ing the parties’ assets ‘‘strip[ped] him of . . . the
majority of the family assets earned by the parties dur-
ing the course of the marriage . . . while the non-
compliant . . . [plaintiff] is left with the lion[’s] share
of the jointly built family assets,’’ specifically high-
lighting the court’s allocation of the parties’ marital
residence to the plaintiff. We note that, contrary to
the defendant’s assertions, a review of his operative
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proposed orders and the court’s final orders reflects
15

that many of the defendant’s requested orders were
awarded in full or in part. For example, consistent with
the defendant’s operative proposed orders, the court
declined to award the plaintiff alimony as she requested,
which would have amounted to nearly $20,000 per year.
The court also declined to award the plaintiff the
amounts that she requested relating to the taxes and
penalties on the marital residence; see footnote 14 of
this opinion; and the parties’ health insurance coverage.
In any event, the court was not obligated to apply any
set formula when dividing the parties’ assets so long
as it considered the statutorily required factors of § 46b-
81; see Anderson-Harris v. Harris, supra, 221 Conn.
App. 248; which, as is expressly set forth in its decision,
the court did.16 See id., 250 (‘‘[M]aking every reasonable
presumption in favor of the correctness of the trial
15
In his operative proposed orders, the defendant requested in relevant
part: (1) sole ownership of the parties’ marital residence, subject to a life
estate interest given to the plaintiff, and with the defendant required to pay
the principal payments associated with the HELOC, (2) to retain his interest
in the West Hartford property, (3) sole ownership of the real estate LLC,
with the real property that it owned either (a) being retained by the defendant
or (b) sold, with the defendant entitled up to $200,000 of any net proceeds
following the sale and the plaintiff entitled to any remaining net proceeds,
(4) to retain his interest in two other, identified limited liability companies,
(5) to retain his interest in the trust, (6) that the parties retain the retirement
accounts listed in their names, and (7) the plaintiff pay him $436,359.34 as
compensation for her ‘‘marital waste.’’
16
Moreover, notwithstanding the defendant’s assertions to the contrary,
the court awarded or allowed the defendant to retain substantial assets.
For instance, the court ordered that the defendant (1) would retain his
retirement accounts, which, per his averments in his operative financial
affidavit, were valued at $544,264; (2) was awarded his interest in the West
Hartford property, which, per the defendant’s averments in his operative
financial affidavit, was valued at $250,000; and (3) was awarded certain
jewelry, which, per the defendant’s averments in his operative financial
affidavit, was valued at $20,000. Additionally, the court ordered that the
defendant would retain his 75 percent interest in the trust with a corpus
value of approximately $600,000, less certain distributions and obligations,
although, as the court found, the defendant was uncertain as to when or
how much he would ultimately receive.
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court’s orders, as we are required to do . . . we are
satisfied that the court did consider these factors, even
if it did not state with specificity how it weighed them.
This conclusion is supported by comments made by
the trial court throughout its financial orders, such as,
‘[h]aving considered the statutory criteria,’ and, ‘[t]he
court has closely examined the parties’ financial affida-
vits . . . .’ ’’ (Citation omitted.)).
The defendant further contends that the court erred
because it did not consider how the plaintiff’s miscon-
duct was ‘‘detriment[al] [to] the defendant financially
and emotionally’’ or impute this impact in its financial
orders. In particular, the defendant argues that the final
orders reflect that the court failed to credit the defen-
dant’s evidence purporting to show ‘‘marital waste’’ that
was committed by the plaintiff during the course of the
dissolution action, as well as the evidence contained
in his various prejudgment discovery motions. Insofar
as the defendant invites us to reconsider the evidence
that was before the court, ‘‘[w]e note that it is not
the function of this court to review the evidence to
determine whether a conclusion different from the one
reached could have been reached. . . . Thus, [a] mere
difference of opinion or judgment cannot justify our
intervention.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Anderson-Harris v. Harris, supra, 221 Conn. App. 251.
In sum, after a careful review of the record and the
defendant’s contentions on appeal, we conclude that
the court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the
parties’ assets.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.