Hallock v. Hallock

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Hallock v. Hallock

TIMOTHY J. HALLOCK v.
JENNIFER L. HALLOCK
(AC 46014)
Seeley, Westbrook and Pellegrino, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her
marriage to the plaintiff and issuing various orders. The defendant claimed,
inter alia, that the trial court failed to address her pendente lite motions
for alimony and counsel fees in a separate and distinct manner prior to
considering the final financial orders. Held:

The trial court properly considered all of the plaintiff’s pendente lite motions
for alimony and counsel fees, independently adjudicated those motions, and
incorporated its ruling on those motions in its final financial orders as part
of the dissolution of the parties’ marriage, and it declined to award alimony
or attorney’s fees pendente lite.

This court concluded that the defendant’s claim that the trial court applied
an improper legal standard to her claim for alimony and the division of the
marital property was without merit, as the trial court properly cited to and
applied the relevant statutes (§§ 46b-81 and 46b-82) in issuing its finan-
cial orders.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award attorney’s
fees to the defendant.

Contrary to the defendant’s assertion, the trial court did not take judicial
notice of facts regarding the defendant’s employment opportunities and
future earnings as part of its determination that the defendant had the ability
to support herself following the dissolution judgment and financial orders.
The trial court rejected the defendant’s testimony regarding the cause of
the dissolution of the marriage as not credible, and, contrary to the defen-
dant’s claim, it did not discredit that testimony due to a lack of corroborat-
ing evidence.

Argued May 14—officially released September 17, 2024

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the court, Mou-
kawsher, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
Hallock v. Hallock

granting certain other relief, from which the defendant
appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Alexander J. Cuda, for the appellant (defendant).
Dyan M. Kozaczka, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

PELLEGRINO, J. The defendant, Jennifer L. Hallock,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving
her marriage to the plaintiff, Timothy J. Hallock, and
entering certain financial orders. On appeal, the defen-
dant claims that the court (1) failed to properly consider
her pendente lite motions for alimony and counsel fees,
(2) applied an improper legal standard to her claim for
alimony and the division of the marital property, (3)
applied an improper legal standard to deny her claim
for attorney’s fees, (4) improperly took judicial notice of
facts regarding her employment prospects and earning
capacity, and (5) improperly discredited her testimony
that the plaintiff’s consumption of alcohol caused the
marriage to end. We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our consideration of the issues raised in this
appeal. The parties were married on June 17, 2017, in
Greenwich and do not have any children together. The
plaintiff has two adult children from his prior marriage,
and the defendant has three children from her prior
marriage, two of whom were adults and one of whom
was age sixteen at the time of the dissolution judgment.
The plaintiff commenced this dissolution action in
March, 2020, alleging that the marriage had broken
down irretrievably. During the pendency of the action,
the defendant filed pendente lite motions for attorney’s
fees and alimony, which were not acted on prior to the
dissolution trial.
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Hallock v. Hallock

The court, Moukawsher, J., held a trial on October
24, 2022, and, three days later, issued a memorandum
of decision. At the outset, the court noted that, during
the parties’ marriage of approximately three years, their
lives did not ‘‘intertwine enough to merit seismic shifts
in the parties’ finances.’’ It then found that the plaintiff
had purchased a home for the merged family to live in.
The plaintiff’s income exceeded $500,000 per year,
while the defendant earned ‘‘very little’’ and did not
contribute to the purchase or upkeep of the marital
home.
The court next rejected the defendant’s claim that
she had an ‘‘automatic claim on at least the assets [the
plaintiff] realized during the marriage.’’ Specifically, the
court stated: ‘‘The real question here is whether [the
defendant] contributed to acquiring, preserving, or add-
ing to any of the property in [the plaintiff’s] possession.
The problem for her is that she didn’t. By moving her
family in with [the plaintiff, the defendant] improved
her financial situation and her children’s lifestyle. She
did make nonmonetary contributions, but nothing
about them can be seen as enabling the financial suc-
cesses [the plaintiff] enjoyed during the period.’’
The court declined to award alimony to the defen-
dant. It also rejected the defendant’s assertion that the
plaintiff’s drinking was the cause of the breakdown of
the marriage. It ordered the plaintiff to make a single
payment of $40,000 and to transfer $60,000 from his
401 (k) account to the defendant. The parties otherwise
retained their respective bank and retirement accounts.
The court awarded the plaintiff sole ownership of the
marital home. The court further ordered each party
to be responsible for their respective attorney’s fees.
Finally, the court stated that it ‘‘has considered all pend-
ing motions in making this decision. It resolves all of
them.’’ This appeal followed.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
Hallock v. Hallock

On March 14, 2023, the defendant filed a motion for
articulation, requesting the court to provide further
details regarding (1) the nonmonetary contributions she
made, (2) how the court arrived at the amounts of the
cash payment and retirement account transfer, (3) the
reasoning for its denial of an award of counsel fees,
and (4) the specific pending motions it had resolved,
as well as the reasoning and outcome of these motions.
On July 11, 2023, the court granted the defendant’s
motion and issued its articulation. As to the first request,
the court explained that the defendant’s nonmonetary
contributions ‘‘included caring for the children includ-
ing [the plaintiff’s] from a prior marriage and for the
household in general. Making meals and shopping. She
contributed by supporting [the plaintiff] by participating
in social occasions that might benefit his career such
as fundraisers and dinners with friends and acquain-
tances.’’ As to the second request, the court stated that
the basis for the single cash payment and transfer from
the retirement account was its consideration of her
contributions to the household, her age, her employ-
ment prospects, and her time when she was not
employed. ‘‘The court’s overall purpose was to provide
a way forward for [the defendant] without granting
her a windfall based solely on being married to [the
plaintiff]. The decision was a matter of the court’s judg-
ment of the case overall and what would be needed to
carry out its views.’’ As to the third request for articula-
tion, the court explained that it ‘‘saw no reason under
the applicable statutes to award [the defendant] attor-
ney’s fees or to award them outside of the statutes for
bad faith. . . . Having reviewed all the factors in Gen-
eral Statutes § 46b-82, the court believed that [an attor-
ney’s] fee award to [the defendant] was not appropriate
considering its financial orders, nor would those orders
be frustrated by a failure to grant it.’’ As to the fourth
request, it stated: ‘‘The court resolved pending motions
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Hallock v. Hallock

not by independently resolving them but by rolling all
issues into the trial. The phrasing used was intended
to indicate this. It was not a way of indicating that it
had separately adjudicated any particular motions.’’
Before considering the specific claims raised by the
defendant in this appeal, we recite the relevant legal
principles with respect to the financial orders in a disso-
lution action. ‘‘We review financial awards in dissolu-
tion actions under an abuse of discretion standard. . . .
In order to conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion, we must find that the court either incorrectly
applied the law or could not reasonably conclude as it
did. . . . In determining whether the trial court’s broad
legal discretion is abused, great weight is due to the
action of the trial court and every reasonable presump-
tion should be given in favor of its correctness. . . .
We apply that standard of review because it reflects
the sound policy that the trial court has the unique
opportunity to view the parties and their testimony, and
is therefore in the best position to assess all of the
circumstances surrounding a dissolution action, includ-
ing such factors as the demeanor and the attitude of the
parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson-
Harris v. Harris, 221 Conn. App. 222, 246–47, 301 A.3d
1090 (2023); see also Varoglu v. Sciarrino, 185 Conn.
App. 84, 91–92, 196 A.3d 856 (2018).
I
The defendant first claims that the court failed to
properly consider her pendente lite motions for alimony
and counsel fees. Specifically, she argues that the court
did not address these motions in a separate and distinct
manner prior to considering the final financial orders
contrary to controlling precedent. We disagree.1
1
We note that ‘‘[p]endente lite orders are temporary orders of the court
that are necessarily extinguished once a final judgment has been rendered.
. . . Once a final judgment has been rendered, an issue with respect to a
pendente lite order is moot because an appellate court can provide no
practical relief. . . . As a result, an appellate court lacks subject matter
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
Hallock v. Hallock

The following additional facts and procedural history
are necessary for the resolution of this claim. On March
6, 2020, the defendant filed a motion for attorney’s fees
pendente lite in which she asserted that the plaintiff
controlled all the marital assets and that she lacked
sufficient income and funds to defend this action. On
July 2, 2020, the defendant filed a motion for alimony
pendente lite,2 and this motion was served on the plain-
tiff six days later. On November 6, 2020, the defendant
filed a request for the court to hold a hearing on, inter
alia, her pendente lite motions. In this request, the
defendant claimed that the plaintiff had removed her
access to the marital credit cards and had not provided
her with any financial support following the commence-
ment of this action, resulting in an immediate need for
jurisdiction over a pendente lite order after the trial court has rendered a
final judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Netter v. Netter, 220
Conn. App. 491, 494–95, 298 A.3d 653 (2023); R. S. v. E. S., 210 Conn. App.
327, 330, 269 A.3d 970 (2022). This rule, however, does not apply under the
facts and circumstances of the present case.
In the present case, the trial court addressed and denied the defendant’s
pendente lite motions seeking attorney’s fees and alimony at the time it
rendered the final judgment of dissolution. As a result, the defendant did
not have an opportunity to challenge the court’s denial of her pendente lite
motions until the rendering of the final dissolution judgment. We also are
mindful that the court could have, but did not, order pendente lite attorney’s
fees or alimony, and, if it had done so, such unpaid obligations would be,
in effect, debts that became vested rights of property that the court cannot
take away, regardless of the final financial orders. See Papa v. Papa, 55
Conn. App. 47, 53, 737 A.2d 953 (1999); Elliott v. Elliott, 14 Conn. App. 541,
545, 541 A.2d 905 (1988). For these reasons, we conclude that this claim is
not moot.
2
‘‘The purpose of alimony pendente lite is to provide support to a spouse
[whom] the court determines requires financial assistance pending the disso-
lution litigation and the ultimate determination of whether that spouse is
entitled to an award of permanent alimony. . . . [T]he fundamental purpose
of alimony pendente lite is to provide the [recipient spouse], during the
pendency of the divorce action, with current support in accordance with
[the recipient spouse’s] needs and the [obligor spouse’s] ability to meet
them. . . . [A]limony is not designed to punish, but to ensure that the former
spouse receives adequate support.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Dumbauld v. Dumbauld, 163 Conn. App. 517, 525–26, 136
A.3d 669 (2016).
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Hallock v. Hallock

such support. The court issued an order granting the
defendant’s request on December 2, 2020.
On December 22, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion
for a continuance of the next hearing date, which was
granted that same day. On February 4, 2021, the plaintiff
filed a motion for a second continuance. The defendant
objected, arguing that her motion for alimony pendente
lite had been pending for more than seven months,3
during which time ‘‘the plaintiff has provided no support
and the defendant has had no access to marital funds,
except for her very limited self-employment income.’’
The court denied the plaintiff’s second motion for a
continuance.
On February 8, 2021, the defendant filed updated
proposed orders for alimony pendente lite, in which
she requested $11,000 per month, retroactive to July 8,
2020, the date of service of her motion for alimony
pendente lite. As to the issue of attorney’s fee pendente
lite, the defendant requested the court to order the
plaintiff to pay $32,714.78. On July 6, 2021, the court
referred the case to the Stamford Special Masters Pro-
gram.4 Following further discovery, the court, Mou-
kawsher, J., issued a trial management order on August
22, 2022. The parties then submitted proposed orders,5
3
In her objection, the defendant represented that her motion for alimony
pendente lite had been scheduled to be heard on September 29, 2020, but
was continued to February 9, 2021, at the request of the plaintiff.
4
Special Masters are part of the Judicial Branch’s alternative dispute
resolution program and may be used to settle limited contested and con-
tested family cases. See State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch, Alternative
Dispute Resolution, available at https://www.jud.ct.gov/external/super/alt-
disp.htm (last visited September 6, 2024).
5
In the defendant’s proposed orders filed on October 19, 2022, she
requested the court to order the plaintiff to pay her pendente lite alimony
of $9500 per month retroactive to July 8, 2020, for a total of $256,500. She
further requested that neither party pay permanent alimony and she sought
an order requiring the plaintiff to pay all of her outstanding attorney’s fees.
In the plaintiff’s proposed orders, also filed on October 19, 2022, he requested
that alimony not be awarded to either party and that each party be solely
responsible for his or her attorney’s fees.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
Hallock v. Hallock

financial affidavits, witness lists, exhibits and a state-
ment of facts. The court did not hold a pretrial hearing
on the defendant’s pendente lite motions.
The court conducted the dissolution trial on October
24, 2022. At the outset, the defendant’s counsel
informed the court that there were some outstanding
pendente lite motions regarding alimony and attorney’s
fees. In its memorandum of decision, the court declined
to award alimony to either party and stated that each
party would be responsible for their own attorney’s
fees. It also noted: ‘‘The court has considered all pend-
ing motions in making this decision. It resolves all of
them.’’ In the articulation as to its resolution of the
pendente lite motions, the court explained that it had
‘‘resolved pending motions not by independently resolv-
ing them but by rolling all issues into the trial. The
phrasing used was intended to indicate this. It was not
a way of indicating that it had separately adjudicated
any particular motions.’’
On appeal, the defendant contends that the court
failed to make an independent determination of her
pendente lite claims for alimony and attorney’s fees
before entering the final financial orders as part of the
dissolution judgment. We disagree that the approach
utilized by the court in the present case constituted
reversible error.
In support of her claim, the defendant argues that,
pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision Ahneman v.
Ahneman, 243 Conn. 471, 482, 706 A.2d 960 (1998), the
trial court lacked authority to refuse to consider her
pendente lite motions. She also directs our attention
to Milbauer v. Milbauer, 54 Conn. App. 304, 309–10,
733 A.2d 907 (1999), in which this court approved the
process used by the trial court to first resolve the issues
raised in a pendente lite motion and then, at the same
proceeding, moved on to the final hearing and ultimate
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Hallock v. Hallock

dissolution of the marriage. Specifically, we noted that
‘‘[i]t is clear from an examination of the record . . .
that two separate hearings were held and that those
hearings were conducted by the same judge sitting as
two separate courts. The trial court initially took evi-
dence regarding the defendant’s motion to modify the
pendente lite award and then moved on to the final
hearing concerning the ultimate dissolution of the par-
ties’ marriage. So . . . it is clear that the trial court in
this case sat both as a pendente lite court and as a final
court of dissolution and was not precluded, therefore,
from entering orders as to both the alimony pendente
lite award and the final dissolution.’’ (Emphasis omit-
ted; footnote omitted.) Id. Although we agree that the
procedure used in Milbauer was proper, there is no
requirement that the trial court conduct separate hear-
ings to address the pendente lite claims first before
moving on to deciding those issues in its permanent
orders.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the court failed
to independently adjudicate her pendente lite motions,
contrary to Ahneman and Milbauer. Underlying the
defendant’s argument is her view that the court did not
consider her pendente lite motions independently and
distinctly from the final financial orders made in con-
junction with the dissolution judgment. On the basis
of our interpretation of the court’s memorandum of
decision and articulation, we disagree with the defen-
dant’s interpretation of the court’s actions. In our view,
the court, during the course of a single hearing, sepa-
rately and distinctly considered all of the requests for
pendente lite orders of attorney’s fees and alimony and
declined to make such an award in issuing its final
financial orders as part of the dissolution judgment.
We further conclude that the court’s actions were not
improper.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
Hallock v. Hallock

‘‘The interpretation of a trial court’s judgment pre-
sents a question of law over which our review is plenary.
. . . As a general rule, judgments are to be construed
in the same fashion as other written instruments. . . .
The determinative factor is the intention of the court
as gathered from all parts of the judgment. . . . Effect
must be given to that which is clearly implied as well
as to that which is expressed. . . . The judgment
should admit of a consistent construction as a whole.
. . . [W]e are mindful that an opinion must be read as
a whole, without particular portions read in isolation,
to discern the parameters of its holding.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Buchenholz v. Buchenholz, 221
Conn. App. 132, 138, 300 A.3d 1233, cert. denied, 348
Conn. 928, 304 A.3d 860 (2023); see also In re Paulo
T., 213 Conn. App. 858, 878, 279 A.3d 766 (2022) (opinion
of trial court must be read in its entirety and it is pre-
sumed to have acted properly in performance of its
duties), aff’d, 347 Conn. 311, 297 A.3d 194 (2023).

After reviewing the record before us, including the
trial transcript, the court’s memorandum of decision
and its subsequent articulation, we conclude that the
court independently considered the claims made in the
pendente lite motions filed by the defendant and incor-
porated its ruling on those motions in its final financial
orders as part of the ultimate dissolution of the parties’
marriage following the trial held on October 24, 2022.
At the outset of the trial, the court was aware of the
pending pendente lite motions. In its memorandum of
decision, the court specifically stated that it had consid-
ered and resolved all of the pending motions. Although
the court did not expressly set forth its reasoning for
doing so, the court declined to award alimony or attor-
ney’s fees pendente lite. In its articulation, the court
explained that it did not address the pendente lite
motions in a separate hearing, but rather considered
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Hallock v. Hallock

them during the trial itself.6 This approach differs from
the procedure used in Milbauer v. Milbauer, supra, 54
Conn. App. 309–10, but is not improper. We iterate that
Milbauer does not require a court to conduct separate
hearings with respect to pendente lite issues if it consid-
ers these issues in deciding the permanent orders as
was done in this case. In light of the totality of the
memorandum of decision and the court’s articulation,7
and our presumption that the court acted properly in
the performance of its duties, we conclude, contrary
to the argument of the defendant, that it independently
adjudicated the pendente lite motions, albeit as part of
its final financial orders. Although our law provides a
process to order temporary or pendente lite orders of
alimony and support, it does not require that the court
consider these motions as a condition precedent to
making final orders. In this matter, the court did not
refuse to consider the defendant’s pendente lite motions
nor did the defendant object to the court addressing
the final requests for support and alimony before it
considered her pendente lite motions. Moreover, the
defendant has not presented us with any persuasive
argument that the consideration of these motions at
the dissolution trial was improper. Accordingly, we con-
clude that this claim is without merit.
6
We note that the trial court has broad discretion in managing its docket,
but still is required to consider and decide all motions properly placed
before it. See Kammili v. Kammili, 197 Conn. App. 656, 661, 232 A.3d 102,
cert. denied, 335 Conn. 947, 238 A.3d 18 (2020).
7
To the extent that the defendant now suggests that the court’s response
to her motion for articulation was incomplete or nonresponsive, we note
that she failed to request further articulation or to file a motion for review
with this court pursuant to Practice Book § 66-7. ‘‘[W]here a party is dissatis-
fied with the trial court’s response to a motion for articulation, he may, and
indeed under appropriate circumstances he must, seek immediate appeal
. . . to this court via the motion for review.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Emrich v. Emrich, 127 Conn. App. 691, 706, 15 A.3d 1104 (2011);
see, e.g., Trumbull v. Palmer, 123 Conn. App. 244, 251 n.8, 1 A.3d 1121, cert.
denied, 299 Conn. 907, 10 A.3d 526 (2010), and cert. denied, 299 Conn. 907,
10 A.3d 526 (2010).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13
Hallock v. Hallock

II
The defendant next claims that the court applied an
improper legal standard to her claim for alimony and
the division of the marital property. Specifically, she
argues that the court failed to consider the plaintiff’s
duty to support the defendant as part of the dissolution
proceeding. We disagree that the court utilized an
improper legal standard.
The following additional facts are necessary for the
resolution of this claim. In the defendant’s proposed
financial orders, dated October 19, 2022, she requested
that the court grant her motion for retroactive pendente
lite alimony, which had been served on the plaintiff on
July 8, 2020, in the amount of $9500 per month for a
total of $256,500. This payment was to be in the form
of a lump sum transfer from the plaintiff’s retirement
account. She further requested that neither party
receive any further alimony payments. The defendant
also proposed that the plaintiff pay her $500,000 as a
lump sum property distribution. In his proposed finan-
cial orders, also dated October 19, 2022, the plaintiff
indicated that no alimony should be awarded to either
party, although he offered to make a single payment of
$10,000 to the defendant and to transfer $42,500 from
his retirement account to the defendant.
In its memorandum of decision, the court stated: ‘‘In
Connecticut, no one gains a right to support or property
solely by marrying someone capable of providing sup-
port or owning property. . . . General Statutes §§ 46b-
81 and 46b-82 create a fact flexible scheme for consider-
ing alimony and property distribution that focuses on
what the parties contributed to the marriage, the length
of the marriage, the parties’ needs, their ages, their
health, along with their prospects of making money and
acquiring property as shaped by their opportunities,
their education, and their work experience. Connecticut
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Hallock v. Hallock

is not a community property state. . . . [O]ur courts
consider all property and divide it based upon the bal-
ancing of equitable factors. Nothing in right or statute
requires any use of any percentage division as a starting
point or for anything else.’’ (Citation omitted.)
We begin with the standard of review and relevant
legal principles. ‘‘[W]hether the court applied the cor-
rect legal standard is a question of law subject to plenary
review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferri v.
Powell-Ferri, 200 Conn. App. 63, 73, 239 A.3d 1216, cert.
denied, 335 Conn. 970, 240 A.3d 285 (2020); see also In
re Christina C., 221 Conn. App. 185, 211, 300 A.3d 1188,
cert. denied, 348 Conn. 907, 301 A.3d 1056 (2023). Our
Supreme Court has stated that ‘‘[o]ur alimony statute
does not recognize any absolute right to alimony. . . .
By statute, neither husband nor wife acquires any right
in the property of the other, except for certain survivor-
ship rights . . . whether such property is acquired
before or after the marriage.’’ (Citations omitted.)
Thomas v. Thomas, 159 Conn. 477, 486, 271 A.2d 62
(1970); see also Valante v. Valante, 180 Conn. 528, 530,
429 A.2d 964 (1980); Wilson v. Di Iulio, 192 Conn. App.
101, 109, 217 A.3d 3 (2019). The decision of whether to
award alimony to a party rests in the discretion of the
trial court after consideration of the statutory factors
set forth in § 46b-82. See Weinstein v. Weinstein, 18
Conn. App. 622, 637, 561 A.2d 443 (1989). Stated differ-
ently, ‘‘§ 46b-82 governs awards of alimony. That sec-
tion requires the trial court to consider the length of
the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution
of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health,
station, occupation, amount and sources of income,
earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employ-
ability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the
award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to
section 46b-81 . . . . In awarding alimony, [t]he court
must consider all of these criteria. . . . It need not,
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
Hallock v. Hallock

however, make explicit reference to the statutory crite-
ria that it considered in making its decision or make
express findings as to each statutory factor. . . . The
trial court may place varying degrees of importance on
each criterion according to the factual circumstances
of each case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wil-
son v. Di Iulio, supra, 109.
We next consider the court’s role in distributing the
marital property. ‘‘In fashioning orders that distribute
marital property . . . § 46b-81 (c) directs the court to
consider numerous separately listed criteria. . . .
[Section] 46b-81 (a) permits the farthest reaches from
an equal division as is possible, allowing the court to
assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of
the estate of the other. On the basis of the plain language
of § 46b-81, there is no presumption in Connecticut
that marital property should be divided equally prior to
applying the statutory criteria.’’ (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Kammili v. Kam-
mili, 197 Conn. App. 656, 664, 232 A.3d 102, cert. denied,
335 Conn. 947, 238 A.3d 18 (2020); see also Pencheva-
Hasse v. Hasse, 221 Conn. App. 113, 130, 300 A.3d
1175 (2023).
After a thorough review of the court’s memorandum
of decision, we disagree with the defendant’s assertion
that the court utilized an improper standard with
respect to the issues of alimony and distribution of
the marital property. The court properly cited to and
applied the relevant statutes in issuing its financial
orders regarding alimony and the distribution of prop-
erty. ‘‘Because the court stated that it had considered
all the relevant statutory factors, it is presumed to have
performed its duty unless the contrary appears from
the record.’’ Walker v. Walker, 222 Conn. App. 192, 196,
304 A.3d 523 (2023). We conclude, therefore, that this
claim is without merit.
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Hallock v. Hallock

III
The defendant next claims that the court applied an
improper legal standard to her claim for attorney’s fees
in this dissolution matter. Specifically, she argues that
the court’s denial of her request for attorney’s fees
undermined its other financial orders with respect to
the issues of alimony and property distribution. The
plaintiff counters, inter alia, that the court employed the
correct legal standard and its order denying payment
of attorney’s fees to the defendant did not constitute
an abuse of its discretion. We agree with the plaintiff.
The following additional facts are relevant to this
issue. The plaintiff testified that he paid the defendant
$15,000 for her attorney’s fees. He also stated that, in
his opinion, the legal fees in this case were excessive,
particularly when compared to his 2011 divorce in New
York. During cross-examination, he indicated that he
had paid between $50,000 and $75,000 to his attorney
during this dissolution of marriage action. The defen-
dant testified that she owed $80,555 in legal fees for
this dissolution action.
In its memorandum of decision, the court stated: ‘‘The
parties will be solely responsible for their respective
attorney’s fees.’’ In its articulation, the court explained
that it ‘‘saw no reason under the applicable statutes to
award [the defendant] attorney’s fees or to award them
outside the statutes for bad faith. The court found no
bad faith in its ruling. It found no contempt against
[the plaintiff] meriting an award under General Statutes
§ 46b-87. The court also rejected an award under Gen-
eral Statutes § 46b-62. Having reviewed all the factors
in . . . § 46b-82, the court believed that a fee award
to [the defendant] was not appropriate considering its
financial orders, nor would those orders be frustrated
by a failure to grant it. This was so because the court’s
financial award was adequate to account for what it
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
Hallock v. Hallock

believed would be a reasonable attorney’s fee for hand-
ing the case reflected on the docket and the evidence
before it.’’
‘‘In dissolution and other family court proceedings,
pursuant to § 46b-62 (a), the court may order either
[party] to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees of the other
in accordance with their respective financial abilities
and the equitable criteria set forth in § 46b-82, the ali-
mony statute. That statute provides that the court may
consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the
. . . dissolution of the marriage . . . the age, health,
station, occupation, amount and sources of income,
earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employ-
ability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the
award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to
section 46b-81 for the assignment of property. . . .
‘‘Courts ordinarily award counsel fees in divorce
cases so that a party . . . may not be deprived of [his
or] her rights because of lack of funds. . . . Where,
because of other orders, both parties are financially
able to pay their own counsel fees they should be per-
mitted to do so. . . . An exception to the rule . . . is
that an award of attorney’s fees is justified even where
both parties are financially able to pay their own fees
if the failure to make an award would undermine its
prior financial orders . . . . [A]n award of attorney’s
fees in a marital dissolution case is warranted only
when at least one of two circumstances is present: (1)
one party does not have ample liquid assets to pay for
attorney’s fees; or (2) the failure to award attorney’s
fees will undermine the court’s other financial orders.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Dolan v. Dolan, 211 Conn. App. 390, 404–405, 272 A.3d
768, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 924, 275 A.3d 626 (2022);
see also Zakko v. Kasir, 209 Conn. App. 619, 625–26,
269 A.3d 220 (2022).
Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Hallock v. Hallock

At the outset, we note our agreement with the plaintiff
that the proper standard of review for this claim is an
abuse of discretion.8 The court identified and applied
the proper legal test for an award of attorney’s fees in
a dissolution matter. The issue, therefore, is whether
the denial of such an award amounted to an abuse of
the court’s discretion. See Leonova v. Leonov, 201 Conn.
App. 285, 327, 242 A.3d 713 (2020) (‘‘Whether to allow
counsel fees, [under § 46b-62 (a)], and if so in what
amount, calls for the exercise of judicial discretion.
. . . An abuse of discretion in granting counsel fees
will be found only if [an appellate court] determines
that the trial court could not reasonably have concluded
as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert.
denied, 336 Conn. 906, 244 A.3d 146 (2021); Lynch v.
Lynch, 153 Conn. App. 208, 247, 100 A.3d 968 (2014)
(same), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 923, 108 A.3d 1124,
cert. denied, 577 U.S. 839, 136 S. Ct. 68, 193 L. Ed. 2d
66 (2015).
After reviewing the record before us, including the
trial transcript, memorandum of decision, and the artic-
ulation, we conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to award the defendant attor-
ney’s fees. As it explained in its articulation, the court
considered the factors set forth in § 46b-82 and deter-
mined that an award of attorney’s fees was not war-
ranted given its other financial orders and that those
orders would not be frustrated in the absence of such
an award. The court expressly stated that its ‘‘financial
award was adequate to account for what it believed
would be a reasonable attorney’s fee for handling the
case reflected on the court’s docket and the evidence
before it.’’ (Emphasis added.) Although she may have
incurred significant attorney’s fees in this dissolution
action, the court was free to determine that the total
8
We disagree, therefore, with the defendant’s claim that this claim is
subject to plenary review.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 19
Hallock v. Hallock

claimed by the defendant was not reasonable.9 ‘‘Courts
have a general knowledge of what would be a reason-
able attorney’s fee for services which are fairly stated
and described. . . . [C]ourts may rely on their general
knowledge of what has occurred at the proceedings
before them to supply evidence in support of an award
of attorney’s fees. . . . The court [is] in a position to
evaluate the complexity of the issues presented and the
skill with which counsel had dealt with these issues.
. . . While the decision as to the liability for payment
of such fees can be made in the absence of any evidence
of the cost of the work performed . . . the dollar
amount of such an award must be determined to be
reasonable after an appropriate evidentiary showing.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) M. S. v. P. S., 203
Conn. App. 377, 403, 248 A.3d 778, cert. denied, 336
Conn. 952, 251 A.3d 992 (2021).
Additionally, we note that the trial court, in addition
to the statutory factors, has inherent equitable powers
and may consider other factors appropriate for a just
and fair resolution with respect to a claim for attorney’s
fees in a marital dissolution case. See Clougherty v.
Clougherty, 162 Conn. App. 857, 876, 133 A.3d 886, cert.
denied, 320 Conn. 932, 134 A.3d 621 (2016), and cert.
denied, 320 Conn. 932, 136 A.3d 642 (2016). Finally, we
note that, ‘‘[u]nder the abuse of discretion standard of
review, [w]e will make every reasonable presumption
in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only
upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. We cannot conclude that
such abuse occurred in the present case and, therefore,
9
During closing argument, the plaintiff’s counsel stated: ‘‘This should have
been a simple matter to resolve. It’s a short marriage. However, simply
resolving this matter is not what’s happened. Indeed, the defendant has
incurred more than $100,000 in counsel fees, some of which are not even
related to this case. She has incurred counsel fees without abandon and
has not even made an attempt at paying them.’’
Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Hallock v. Hallock

we are not persuaded by the defendant’s claim regard-
ing failure to award attorney’s fees.

IV

The defendant next claims that the court improperly
took judicial notice10 of facts regarding her employment
prospects and future earning capacity. Specifically, she
argues that the court improperly took judicial notice
of the labor market for educators and failed to assign
her a specific earning capacity.11 Further, she contends
that, as a result of these improprieties, the court’s finan-
cial orders are flawed. We conclude that, contrary to
the defendant’s claim, the court did not take judicial
notice of facts regarding her employment prospects and
future earnings and, therefore, this claim is without
merit.
10
‘‘The doctrine of judicial notice excuses the party having the burden of
establishing a fact from introducing formal proof of the fact. Judicial notice
takes the place of proof.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Scalora v.
Scalora, 189 Conn. App. 703, 713, 209 A.3d 1 (2019). Section 2-1 (c) of the
Connecticut Code of Evidence provides: ‘‘A judicially noticed fact must be
one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) within the
knowledge of people generally in the ordinary course of human experience,
or (2) generally accepted as true and capable of ready and unquestionable
demonstration.’’ See also Vendrella v. Astriab Family Ltd. Partnership, 311
Conn. 301, 331 n.24, 87 A.3d 546 (2014).
11
‘‘[O]ur case law is clear that a party’s earning capacity is the amount
that he or she realistically can be expected to earn. . . . It is not the amount
the party previously has earned or currently may be earning. . . . In marital
dissolution proceedings, under appropriate circumstances the trial court
may base financial awards on the earning capacity rather than the actual
earned income of the parties . . . when . . . there is specific evidence of
the [party’s] previous earnings. . . . It is particularly appropriate to base
a financial award on earning capacity where there is evidence that the
[party] has voluntarily quit or avoided obtaining employment in [the party’s]
field. . . . Earning capacity, in this context, is not an amount which a person
can theoretically earn, nor is it confined to actual income, but rather it is
an amount which a person can realistically be expected to earn considering
such things as [her] vocational skills, employability, age and health.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mitchell
v. Bogonos, 218 Conn. App. 59, 74, 290 A.3d 825 (2023).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 21
Hallock v. Hallock

In its memorandum of decision, the court found that
the defendant earned ‘‘very little’’ and that due to the
length of the marriage, there ‘‘was [not] time enough for
the parties’ lives to intertwine enough to merit seismic
shifts in the parties’ finances.’’ It further found that, as
a result of the marriage, the defendant ‘‘improved her
financial situation and her children’s lifestyle[s].’’ Her
nonmonetary contributions did not enable the plaintiff’s
financial success and, the court explained that she
would need to support herself following the dissolution
judgment. It then stated: ‘‘And she has the means. She
is fifty-four years old, but she has a teaching certificate
in mathematics and special education during a dra-
matic labor shortage in one of the best labor markets
in the world. She will have to work to support herself,
and fortunately most of her children are adults and
the last soon will be.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court’s
property distribution and decision to not award her
alimony were made on the basis of her contributions
to the household, her age, her employment prospects,12
and her time away from gainful employment.
As we previously have noted in this opinion, the inter-
pretation of a court’s memorandum of decision presents
a question of law subject to plenary review. See In re
Jacquelyn W., 169 Conn. App. 233, 241, 150 A.3d 692
(2016). We iterate that, ‘‘[a]s a general rule, judgments
are to be construed in the same fashion as other written
instruments. . . . The determinative factor is the inten-
tion of the court as gathered from all parts of the judg-
ment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. On the
basis of our review, we conclude that the court did not
12
The defendant testified: ‘‘In 2017, I was still trying to grow my embroidery
business that I had started in 2012. But when I realized that wasn’t financially
viable, I pivoted and started tutoring and working with children who have
learning differences. And I additionally just took a second job as the director
of operations at a marking company.’’ She further testified that, in March,
2022, she was offered a full-time teaching position with an annual salary
of $60,000.
Page 20 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

22 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Hallock v. Hallock

take judicial notice of the employment opportunities
for an educator, but rather made a passing reference
in support of its determination, based on the relevant
statutory factors and evidence presented, that the
defendant had the ability to support herself following
the dissolution judgment and financial orders. We
emphasize that the court found that the duration of the
marriage, the absence of an intertwinement of their
assets, and the lack of the defendant’s contribution to
the plaintiff’s success did not warrant ‘‘seismic shifts
in the parties’ finances.’’ See, e.g., Mitchell v. Bogonos,
218 Conn. App. 59, 73, 290 A.3d 825 (2023) (applying
statutory factors, court concluded that marriage was
of short duration and defendant did not contribute to
acquisition, preservation, or appreciation of any of
plaintiff’s assets). Similarly, the court was not required
to make a finding of the defendant’s specific earning
capacity because it had determined that her financial
situation was not altered substantially by the marriage,
and her postdissolution employment opportunities,
based on her age and education, coupled with the finan-
cial orders, would provide sufficient support. For these
reasons, this claim must fail.
V
The defendant’s final claim is that the court improp-
erly discredited her testimony that the plaintiff’s con-
sumption of alcohol caused the marriage to end. Specifi-
cally, she argues that the court improperly rejected her
testimony regarding the plaintiff’s alcohol abuse and
its effects on the parties’ marriage due to the lack of
corroborating evidence.13 We are not persuaded.
13
The defendant also argues that the court’s trial management order lim-
iting each side to sixty minutes to present his or her case prevented her
from presenting additional evidence of the plaintiff’s excessive alcohol con-
sumption. On August 22, 2022, the court issued the following order: ‘‘The
parties will begin a remote trial in this matter on [October 24, 2022] at 2
p.m.. The plaintiff will have sixty minutes of time and the defendant will
have sixty minutes. The clock is running whenever a party or a party’s
witness is speaking, including cross-examination, objections, arguments,
etc. A party objecting to the court’s time allotment must file a written
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 21

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 23
Hallock v. Hallock

The defendant testified that, prior to the marriage,
the plaintiff refrained from drinking alcohol as a result
of the negative effects he had experienced and those
he had witnessed impacting other members of his fam-
ily. The defendant further testified that she suspected
that the plaintiff resumed consuming alcohol in Janu-
ary, 2019, and that he admitted to doing so in September,
2019. She stated that, during this time period, the plain-
tiff became ‘‘more irritable,’’ and would ‘‘go into a rage
and yell and scream . . . .’’ During the time period
objection on the docket.’’
As noted previously in this opinion, the abuse of discretion standard
applies to trial management issues. ‘‘A party adversely affected by a [trial]
court’s case management decision thus bears a formidable burden in seeking
reversal. . . . A trial court has the authority to manage cases before it as
is necessary. . . . Deference is afforded to the trial court in making case
management decisions because it is in a much better position to determine
the effect that a particular procedure will have on both parties. . . . The
case management authority is an inherent power necessarily vested in trial
courts to manage their own affairs in order to achieve the expeditious
disposition of cases. . . . The ability of trial judges to manage cases is
essential to judicial economy and justice.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Barnes v. Connecticut Podiatry Group, P.C., 195 Conn. App. 212, 228,
224 A.3d 916 (2020); see also Cinotti v. Divers, 151 Conn. App. 297, 304,
94 A.3d 1212, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 924, 100 A.3d 855 (2014).
Neither party filed a written objection to the court’s time allotment. Fur-
thermore, during the direct examination of the defendant, her counsel stated:
‘‘I think I’m going to finish in the allotted time, but I’m hoping that if I
need a little extra time for redirect the court might consider it.’’ The court
responded that it would evaluate this request on the basis of the nature of
the questions and whether they were material. At the conclusion of the
defendant’s testimony, the court asked: ‘‘Is there anything that you claim
is so material that should be allowed to inquire, assuming you’re out of time
. . . ?’’ The defendant’s counsel responded in the negative. Finally, after
the plaintiff’s rebuttal testimony, the court inquired if the defendant’s counsel
needed additional time because of ‘‘any question that you need to ask in
order to receive a fair hearing,’’ and she again replied in the negative.
‘‘It is well known that this court is not bound to consider a claim unless
it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. Practice
Book § 60-5. The requirement that [a] claim be raised distinctly means that
it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the court the precise
matter on which its decision is being asked. . . . The reason for the rule
is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been
raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court . . . to address the
claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the
trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Dessa, LLC v. Riddle, 223 Conn. App. 457, 464, 308 A.3d 1051 (2024); see
also Ochoa v. Behling, 221 Conn. App. 45, 50–51, 299 A.3d 1275 (2023).
The defendant specifically represented to the trial court that she did not
need additional time to present her case, and, therefore, she cannot now
Page 22 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

24 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Hallock v. Hallock

from September, 2019, until April, 2020, she claimed
that the plaintiff’s frequency and amount of alcohol
consumption increased to the point of daily use, which
caused her to move out of the marital home. She further
described his behavior as ‘‘erratic, volatile, controlling,
mean, unpredictable, unstable, [and] scary’’ and as neg-
atively impacting both her and her children. Ultimately,
she was ‘‘100 percent sure that the marriage broke down
due to [the plaintiff’s] drinking and his change in behav-
ior.’’
During his rebuttal testimony, the plaintiff denied
excessively consuming alcohol, and stated that he had
not been arrested for driving a motor vehicle under
the influence of alcohol or that alcohol consumption
affected his work performance. He further stated that
the defendant did not express concern regarding his
use of alcohol during the marriage.
In its memorandum of decision, the court stated: ‘‘It’s
worth noting that the court was unimpressed with [the
defendant’s] claim that drinking drove the marriage
onto the rocks. The evidence, uncorroborated by wit-
nesses, arrest records, treatment, or trouble at work,
didn’t have enough convincing force for the court to
give [the defendant] money for the troubles she claimed
it brought her. It was more convenient than convincing.’’
It is clear that the court rejected the defendant’s testi-
mony regarding the plaintiff’s increased alcohol use and
its effects on the marriage as not credible.
‘‘[I]n a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the
sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given specific testimony. . . . As such,
the trial court is free to accept or reject, in whole or
in part, the evidence presented by any witness, having
the opportunity to observe the witnesses and gauge
claim that the court’s management order prevented her from doing so.
Accordingly, we decline to review this argument.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 23

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 25
Hallock v. Hallock

their credibility.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Hebrand v. Hebrand, 216 Conn. App. 210, 223, 284 A.3d
702 (2022); see also L. K. v. K. K., 226 Conn. App. 279,
312, 318 A.3d 243 (2024) (where trial court is arbiter of
credibility, this court does not disturb findings made
on basis of credibility of witness, as credibility determi-
nation is unassailable on appeal). It is the privilege of
the trial court to adopt whatever testimony it reasonably
believes to be credible, and it is not the function of this
court to retry the facts or pass on the credibility of a
witness. See M.B. v. S.A., 194 Conn. App. 727, 735, 222
A.3d 551 (2019); see also Emerick v. Emerick, 170 Conn.
App. 368, 377, 154 A.3d 1069, cert. denied, 327 Conn.
922, 171 A.3d 60 (2017).
Contrary to the defendant’s appellate argument, the
court did not discredit her testimony regarding the
plaintiff’s purported alcohol abuse due to the lack of
additional corroborating evidence. Moreover, the court,
as the arbiter of credibility and finder of fact, did not
credit the defendant’s testimony as to this issue. Rather,
the court merely pointed out that she had not presented
any additional corroborating evidence. We emphasize
that ‘‘[i]t is the sole province of the trial court to weigh
and interpret the evidence before it and to pass on the
credibility of the witnesses. . . . It has the advantage
of viewing and assessing the demeanor, attitude and
credibility of the witnesses and is therefore better
equipped than we to assess the circumstances sur-
rounding the dissolution action.’’ (Emphasis omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Zahringer v. Zah-
ringer, 124 Conn. App. 672, 679–80, 6 A.3d 141 (2010).
For these reasons, we reject the defendant’s claim that
the court improperly discredited her claim that the
plaintiff’s consumption of alcohol caused the dissolu-
tion of the marriage.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.