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Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction
CHRISTOPHER LISBOA v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION
(AC 47034)
Alvord, Suarez and Bear, Js.
Syllabus
The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of murder and assault
in the first degree, appealed following the denial of his petition for certifica-
tion to appeal from the habeas court’s judgment denying his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its
discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal. Held:
The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner’s
petition for certification to appeal, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate
that his underlying claims of error were debatable among jurists of reason,
that a court could have resolved the issues in a different manner, or that
the questions were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.
The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the peti-
tioner failed to demonstrate good cause to excuse the late filing of his
habeas petition pursuant to statute (§ 52-470), as the petitioner’s argument
essentially attacked the credibility determinations of the habeas court, and
this court does not second-guess such credibility determinations on appeal.
It would not have been an abuse of the habeas court’s discretion to deny
the petition for certification to appeal if the petitioner had included his
claim that the habeas court improperly denied his request to appoint counsel
for the good cause hearing, as this court could not conclude that the habeas
court’s failure to provide such counsel only for the limited purpose of the
good cause hearing was the type of egregious defect or ‘‘truly extraordinary
situation’’ warranting reversal under the plain error doctrine or that it threat-
ened the integrity of the judicial system or public confidence in the judicial
system such that this court was required to invoke its supervisory authority
over the administration of justice to guarantee a right to counsel at any
stage of a habeas proceeding.
Argued March 18—officially released October 28, 2025
Procedural History
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where
the court, Newson, J., dismissed the petition; thereafter,

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Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction
the court, Newson, J., denied the petition for certifica-
tion to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court.
Appeal dismissed.
Vishal K. Garg, for the appellant (petitioner).
Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Anne Mahoney, state’s
attorney, and Erin Stack, assistant state’s attorney, for
the appellee (respondent).
Opinion
SUAREZ, 	J. 	The 	petitioner, 	Christopher 	Lisboa,
appeals following the denial by the habeas court of his
petition for certification to appeal from the dismissal
of his third petition for a writ of habeas corpus as
untimely pursuant to General Statutes § 52-470. On
appeal, the petitioner claims that the court (1) abused
its discretion in denying his petition for certification
to appeal, (2) incorrectly concluded that he failed to
establish good cause within the meaning of § 52-470 (e)
for his late filed petition, and (3) improperly denied
his request for appointed counsel for the good cause
hearing. We dismiss the appeal.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to this appeal. Following a trial, the petitioner was
convicted of murder in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-54a and assault in the first degree in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1). On April 2, 2012, the
petitioner was sentenced to forty-eight years of incar-
ceration, followed by ten years of special parole. This
court affirmed the petitioner’s conviction on direct
appeal. See State v. Lisboa, 148 Conn. App. 769, 771,
85 A.3d 1244 (2014).
On November 15, 2013, the petitioner filed his first
habeas petition. The court appointed counsel and
scheduled trial for April 5, 2016, but the petitioner with-
drew this petition on December 8, 2015. On December

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Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction
31, 2015, the petitioner filed his second habeas petition.
The habeas court appointed different counsel, from the
Law Office of Christopher Duby, LLC, and scheduled
trial for March 16, 2023. The petitioner withdrew his
second petition on February 24, 2023, just weeks before
the start of trial.
On April 3, 2023, the petitioner filed his third habeas
petition, which is the operative petition in this appeal
(operative petition). The petitioner filed the operative
petition as a self-represented party and did not request
counsel when the present action was commenced. The
respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, subse-
quently filed a motion pursuant to § 52-470 for an order
to show cause as to why the operative petition should
not be dismissed as untimely because it was filed more
than five years after the judgment of conviction was
deemed final. The habeas court granted the respon-
dent’s motion and ordered that a hearing take place
by video conference. The petitioner requested counsel
‘‘only for this hearing’’ because of his ‘‘inability to fulfill
the mandates to the Connecticut guide to remote hear-
ing . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original.) The habeas court
denied his request, stating that ‘‘[t]here are no ‘limited
purpose’ appearances in habeas matters.’’
At the hearing on June 23, 2023, the self-represented
petitioner testified that the only reason he withdrew
his second habeas petition was on the advice of his
prior appointed counsel and that he was unaware of
any statutory time limit for filing a habeas petition. No
other witnesses testified at the hearing. 1 On August
14, 2023, the habeas court issued a memorandum of
1 The petitioner attached to his memorandum in opposition to the respon-
dent’s motion for order to show cause a letter from Attorney Christopher
Duby to the petitioner dated February 28, 2023, shortly after the withdrawal
of his second habeas petition. The letter was not introduced as an exhibit
during the good cause hearing, and the court did not make any findings
concerning this letter in its memorandum of decision.

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Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction
decision in which it dismissed the operative petition.
In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the
petitioner ‘‘offered very little in the way of explanation
other than, ‘I withdrew the prior matters on the advice
of counsel.’ ’’ The court further noted that the petitioner
‘‘provided no testimony on the particular circumstances
leading to the two prior withdrawals.’’ The court deter-
mined that ‘‘there [was] no evidence that there were
any external factors outside the petitioner’s control’’
that interfered with or prohibited the petitioner from
filing the present action prior to the statutory deadline.
Additionally, the court stated that the petitioner and
his counsel bore responsibility for the untimely filing
and that there were ‘‘no real reasons presented by the
petitioner for the delay, let alone any credible ones
. . . .’’ The court found that the petitioner’s prior with-
drawals were ‘‘ ‘strategic’ ’’ and made only for the pur-
pose of delay. The court concluded that the petitioner
failed to demonstrate good cause for the untimely filing
and dismissed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a timely petition for certi-
fication to appeal, which the court denied. This appeal
followed.
I
We first address the petitioner’s claim that the habeas
court abused its discretion in denying his petition for
certification to appeal. ‘‘Faced with the habeas court’s
denial of certification to appeal, a petitioner’s first bur-
den is to demonstrate that the habeas court’s ruling
constituted an abuse of discretion. . . . A petitioner
may establish an abuse of discretion by demonstrating
that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason
. . . [a] court could resolve the issues [in a different
manner] . . . or . . . the questions are adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further. . . . The
required determination may be made on the basis of
the record before the habeas court and applicable legal

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Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction
principles. 	. 	. 	. 	If the petitioner succeeds in sur-
mounting that hurdle, the petitioner must then demon-
strate that the judgment of the habeas court should be
reversed on its merits.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Crespo v.
Commissioner of Correction, 292 Conn. 804, 811, 975
A.2d 42 (2009); see also Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn.
608, 615–16, 646 A.2d 126 (1994) (adopting factors iden-
tified by United States Supreme Court in Lozada v.
Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 431–32, 111 S. Ct. 860, 112 L. Ed.
2d 956 (1991), as appropriate standard for determining
whether habeas court abused its discretion in denying
certification to appeal).
‘‘In determining whether the habeas court abused
its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for
certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of
the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether
the habeas court reasonably determined that the peti-
tioner’s appeal was frivolous. In other words, we review
the petitioner’s substantive claims for the purpose of
ascertaining whether those claims satisfy one or more
of the three criteria . . . adopted by [our Supreme
Court] for determining the propriety of the habeas
court’s denial of the petition for certification.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Villafane v. Commissioner
of Correction, 190 Conn. App. 566, 573, 211 A.3d 72,
cert. denied, 333 Conn. 902, 215 A.3d 160 (2019). For
the reasons set forth in this opinion, we conclude that
the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his underly-
ing claims of error are debatable among jurists of rea-
son, that the court could resolve the issues in a different
manner, or that the question is adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.
II
The petitioner claims that the habeas court incor-
rectly concluded that he failed to establish good cause

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Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction
for his untimely petition. On appeal, the petitioner
argues that the court applied an incorrect legal standard
by failing to consider ineffective assistance of counsel
as an external factor that could provide evidence of
good cause. The respondent argues that the habeas
court did not reject ‘‘out of hand’’ the concept that
ineffective assistance of counsel could constitute good
cause but, instead, considered the petitioner’s claim
and rejected it by finding that the petitioner presented
insufficient evidence to prove that his counsel was inef-
fective ‘‘to the degree necessary to constitute good
cause.’’ We agree with the respondent.
We begin by setting forth the applicable legal princi-
ples, including our standard of review. Section 52-470
(c) provides in relevant part that ‘‘there shall be a rebut-
table presumption that the filing of a petition challeng-
ing a judgment of conviction has been delayed without
good cause if such petition is filed after the later of the
following: (1) Five years after the date on which the
judgment of conviction is deemed to be a final judgment
due to the conclusion of appellate review or the expira-
tion of the time for seeking such review; [or] (2) October
1, 2017 . . . .’’ Pursuant to § 52-470 (e), ‘‘the court,
upon the request of the respondent, shall issue an order
to show cause why the petition should be permitted to
proceed,’’ and the petitioner or his counsel then ‘‘shall
have a meaningful opportunity to investigate the basis
for the delay and respond to the order. If, after such
opportunity, the court finds that the petitioner has not
demonstrated good cause for the delay, the court shall
dismiss the petition.’’
‘‘A habeas court’s determination of good cause under
§ 52-470 (e) is reviewed for abuse of discretion.’’ Rose
v. Commissioner of Correction, 348 Conn. 333, 343,
304 A.3d 431 (2023), citing Kelsey v. Commissioner of
Correction, 343 Conn. 424, 440, 274 A.3d 85 (2022).
‘‘[Our Supreme Court has] identified several factors that

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Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction
are relevant to the good cause determination under
§ 52-470 (e). These factors include, but are not limited
to: (1) whether external forces outside the control of
the petitioner had any bearing on the delay; (2) whether
and to what extent the petitioner or his counsel bears
any personal responsibility for any excuse proffered for
the untimely filing; (3) whether the reasons proffered
by the petitioner in support of a finding of good cause
are credible and are supported by evidence in the
record; and (4) how long after the expiration of the
filing deadline did the petitioner file the petition. . . .
No single factor is dispositive, and, in ascertaining
whether good cause exists, the habeas court must con-
sider all relevant factors in light of the totality of the
facts and circumstances presented.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Rose v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, supra, 343.
The subordinate factual findings on which a habeas
court relies to arrive at its good cause determination
are reviewed for clear error. Id. ‘‘A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the
record to support it . . . or when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 344. To the extent that the peti-
tioner claims that the court applied an incorrect legal
standard, it is subject to plenary review. See, e.g., State
v. Hughes, 341 Conn. 387, 414, 267 A.3d 81 (2021); State
v. Nichols, 234 Conn. App. 455, 468, 	A.3d 	(2025).
After the habeas court dismissed the operative peti-
tion in the present case, our Supreme Court issued its
decision in Rose. In Rose, the court addressed ‘‘the
extent to which the deficient performance of counsel
may constitute good cause under § 52-470 (e).’’ Rose v.
Commissioner of Correction, supra, 348 Conn. 347.
Specifically, the court addressed ‘‘whether prior habeas

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Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction
counsel’s failure to advise a petitioner of the deadline
for filing a new petition following the withdrawal of a
pending petition may constitute good cause to justify a
late-filed petition under § 52-470 (c) and (e).’’ (Footnote
omitted.) Hankerson v. Commissioner of Correction,
223 Conn. App. 562, 567–68, 308 A.3d 1113 (2024). The
respondent in Rose argued that, under Kelsey, ‘‘the peti-
tioner must prove that external forces outside the con-
trol of both the petitioner and his habeas counsel caused
or contributed to the delayed filing of his habeas peti-
tion.’’ Rose v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 346.
The respondent further argued that ‘‘knowledge of the
time constraints imposed by § 52-470 (c) and (e) is
within the control of the petitioner and his habeas coun-
sel, and, therefore, ignorance of those time constraints
is insufficient to establish good cause under the statu-
tory scheme, regardless of whether that ignorance is
attributable to the lack of diligence of a self-represented
petitioner in pursuing his habeas claim or the deficient
performance of habeas counsel.’’ Id. The petitioner dis-
agreed, arguing that ‘‘actions of counsel that are ineffec-
tive [under the sixth amendment to the United States
constitution] cannot be imputed to the petitioner and,
therefore, that ineffective assistance of counsel consti-
tutes an external, objective factor sufficient to establish
good cause.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Our Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner and held
that ineffective assistance of counsel is an ‘‘external,
objective factor’’ that ‘‘may constitute good cause
. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 349.
The habeas court in the present case did not have
the benefit of Rose, which clarified ‘‘the fundamental
distinction between internal and external factors that
cause or contribute to a petitioner’s failure to comply
with a procedural rule.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Hankerson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
223 Conn. App. 569. The fact that the court’s decision

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Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction
predated Rose, however, does not require us to grant
the petitioner’s request for a new hearing. The court
grounded its decision on the fact that the petitioner
did not present sufficient evidence of good cause. This
court recently addressed a similar case in Franko v.
Commissioner of Correction, 230 Conn. App. 375, 329
A.3d 1028, cert. denied, 351 Conn. 914, 331 A.3d 1217
(2025). In Franko, this court affirmed the habeas court’s
conclusion that the petitioner failed to establish good
cause despite the petitioner’s allegation of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id., 384. The petitioner in that
case testified that his prior counsel was deficient by not
informing him before he withdrew his second habeas
petition that any subsequent petitions would be time
barred. Id., 381. The petitioner’s prior counsel, however,
testified at the good cause hearing that ‘‘he discussed
with the petitioner that the withdrawal of the second
habeas petition would subject any further habeas peti-
tions to a challenge under § 52-470 as untimely.’’ Id.,
378. The court credited counsel’s testimony and dis-
credited the petitioner’s testimony. Id., 381. This court
dismissed the appeal and concluded that the habeas
court’s holding that counsel ‘‘did advise the petitioner of
the consequences of withdrawing [his] second petition’’
was consistent with Rose. (Emphasis added.) Id., 383. In
so doing, this court noted that the petitioner’s argument
attacked the credibility determinations of the habeas
court, which we do not second-guess on appeal. Id.,
381–82.
Although our Supreme Court in Rose held that ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel may constitute evidence of
good cause, the petitioner still bears the burden of pro-
duction to demonstrate good cause. See Rose v. Com-
missioner of Correction, supra, 348 Conn. 349. ‘‘[C]oun-
sel’s failure to advise a petitioner of the deadline’’ does
not ‘‘necessarily [constitute] ineffective assistance of
counsel. . . . Such a determination is a fact specific

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Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction
inquiry that depends on a number of factors . . . .’’
(Citation omitted.) Hankerson v. Commissioner of Cor-
rection, supra, 223 Conn. App. 569–70.
In the present case, the petitioner’s sole explanation
for the delay was that his ‘‘prior counsel failed to advise
him of the possible implications of § 52-470.’’ 2 Prior
counsel did not testify. The court rejected the petition-
er’s evidence, finding that ‘‘there were no real reasons
presented by the petitioner for the delay, let alone any
credible ones . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) See Franko v.
Commissioner of Correction, supra, 230 Conn. App.
381. It is well settled that ‘‘we do not second-guess
on appeal the credibility determinations of the habeas
court.’’ Id.; see also, e.g., Ayuso v. Commissioner of
Correction, 216 Conn. App. 234, 235, 284 A.3d 1013
(2022) (‘‘[i]t is simply not the role of this court on appeal
to second-guess credibility determinations made by the
habeas court’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
habeas court found that the petitioner ‘‘offered very
little in the way of explanation other than, ‘I withdrew
the prior matters on the advice of counsel.’ ’’ 3 The court
further noted that ‘‘[t]he petitioner’s criminal trial and
sentencing concluded eleven years ago. He has since
2 In his brief to this court, the petitioner relies on the February 28, 2023
letter from Attorney Duby to the petitioner as evidence that he was given
improper advice concerning his ability to file a new petition. See footnote
1 of this opinion. A court acting as a trier of fact may not consider exhibits
not in evidence. See Sharp Electronics Corp. v. Solaire Development, LLC,
156 Conn. App. 17, 31 n.8, 111 A.3d 533 (2015).
3 The petitioner includes in the appendix of his principal appellate brief
a letter that he submitted to the habeas court in March, 2023, after he
withdrew his second petition. In the letter, he claimed that Attorney Christo-
pher Duby ‘‘coerced [him] into signing the paper to withdraw [his prior]
habeas [petition].’’ The letter was returned to him because it was not a
proper pleading. The petitioner did not make any allegation of coercion
during the good cause hearing. We do not consider any evidence that was
not included in the parties’ submissions to the habeas court. See, e.g., Dushay
v. Southern Connecticut Hockey League, LLC, 234 Conn. App. 609, 612 n.3,
A.3d 	(2025).

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Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction
that time, first in 2013 and then in 2016, filed habeas
petitions and then within a stone’s throw from trial in
each case has engaged in what this court refers [to] as
‘strategic withdrawals.’ ’’ Lastly, the court found that
the petitioner did not introduce any evidence that there
were any external factors that prevented him from
knowing and complying with the statutory time limita-
tion. Applying the Kelsey factors, the court concluded
that the petitioner’s ‘‘ ‘strategic’ ’’ delay was ‘‘exactly
what . . . § 52-470 was designed to moderate.’’ See
Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 343
Conn. 434 (legislative intent of good cause provision in
§ 52-470 is to ‘‘[avert] frivolous habeas petitions and
appeals’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that the petitioner failed
to demonstrate good cause.
III
Finally, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
improperly denied his request for appointed counsel
at his good cause hearing. Specifically, the petitioner
argues that General Statutes § 51-296 4 entitled him to
appointed counsel in connection with his good cause
hearing because a good cause hearing is a ‘‘ ‘proceed-
ing’ ’’ within the meaning of that statute. 5 The petitioner
did not raise this claim in his petition for certification
4 General Statutes § 51-296 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘In any criminal
action, in any habeas corpus proceeding arising from a criminal matter, in
any extradition proceeding, or in any delinquency matter, the court before
which the matter is pending shall, if it determines after investigation by the
public defender or his office that a defendant is indigent as defined under
this chapter, designate a public defender, assistant public defender or deputy
assistant public defender to represent such indigent defendant . . . .’’
5 The petitioner argues in his reply brief to this court that the issue before
us is not whether he has a constitutional right to appointed counsel under
these circumstances, but whether ‘‘there is a statutory right to sequential
representation in habeas corpus (i.e., civil) cases.’’ (Emphasis omitted.)

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to appeal.6 The petitioner nonetheless argues that this
claim is subject to review under the plain error rule
because he has a statutory right to counsel, and that
right is fundamental. Alternatively, he argues that this
court should invoke its supervisory authority over the
administration of justice. We conclude that it would
not have been an abuse of the habeas court’s discretion
to deny the petition for certification to appeal if this
issue had been included therein and decline to exercise
our supervisory authority.
In Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, 347 Conn.
335, 297 A.3d 541 (2023), our Supreme Court held that
‘‘unpreserved claims challenging the habeas court’s
handling of the habeas proceeding are reviewable under
the plain error doctrine and [State v. Golding, 213 Conn.
233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re
Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015)],
despite the petitioner’s failure to include such claims
in the petition for certification to appeal denied by
the habeas court, if the petitioner can demonstrate,
consistent with [the criteria set forth in Simms v. War-
den, supra, 230 Conn. 615–16], that the unpreserved
claims involve issues that are debatable among jurists
of reason, could be resolved in a different manner, or
deserve encouragement to proceed further.’’ Banks v.
Commissioner of Correction, supra, 359–60. The appel-
lant must demonstrate that the ‘‘unpreserved and uncer-
tified claims are nonfrivolous, which we define as rais-
ing a colorable claim of plain error or the violation of
6 In addition to the good cause issue; see part II of this opinion; the
petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal listed summarily ‘‘any and
all errors or claims that may become evident upon review of the record,
evidence, and/or transcript of proceeding’’ as issues for appeal. Such broad
language is insufficient to place properly the petitioner’s third claim before
this court. See Reese v. Commissioner of Correction, 219 Conn. App. 545,
551, 295 A.3d 513 (‘‘merely alleging in the petition for certification that the
court erred in denying his habeas petition and that the petitioner may raise
other issues upon a review of the record did not give the court the opportu-
nity to exercise its discretion’’), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 906, 301 A.3d
1056 (2023).

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a constitutional right due to the actions or omissions
of the habeas court. Only if the appellant succeeds in
surmounting that hurdle will the appellate court review
the appellant’s unpreserved claims on the merits.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 350–51. A peti-
tioner may fulfill this burden in two ways: ‘‘First, the
petitioner may strictly comply with the two part show-
ing required by Simms . . . and expressly argue spe-
cific reasons why the habeas court abused its discretion
in denying certification. Second, the petitioner may
expressly allege that his [or her] argument on the merits
demonstrates an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., 359.
‘‘It is well known that the plain error doctrine, codi-
fied at Practice Book § 60-5, is an extraordinary remedy
used by appellate courts to rectify errors committed at
trial that, although unpreserved [and nonconstitutional
in nature], are of such monumental proportion that they
threaten to erode our system of justice and work a
serious and manifest injustice on the aggrieved party.
[T]he plain error doctrine . . . is not . . . a rule of
reviewability. It is a rule of reversibility . . . reserved
for truly extraordinary situations [in which] the exis-
tence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness
and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial
proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Kyle A., 212 Conn. App. 239, 258–59, 274 A.3d 896
(2022), aff’d, 348 Conn. 437, 307 A.3d 249 (2024). To
establish plain error, the petitioner must establish that
‘‘(1) there was an obvious and readily discernable error,
and (2) that error was so harmful or prejudicial that it
resulted in manifest injustice.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Kyle A., 348 Conn. 437, 446,
307 A.3d 249 (2024).
In the present case, the petitioner argues that § 51-
296 gives him a right to appointed counsel only for his
good cause hearing because his good cause hearing is

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a ‘‘habeas corpus proceeding arising from a criminal
matter . . . .’’ General Statutes § 51-296 (a). The peti-
tioner cites to dictionaries, case law, and common
phrases to support his argument that the term ‘‘proceed-
ing’’ can mean a stage of a proceeding, as opposed to
the proceeding as a whole. Although the petitioner cites
to Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines the term ‘‘pro-
ceeding’’ as ‘‘[a]n act or step that is part of a larger
action,’’ that term is also defined in that same dictionary
as ‘‘[t]he regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit,
including all acts and events between the time of com-
mencement and the entry of judgment.’’ (Emphasis
added.) Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019) p. 1457.
The petitioner has not pointed to a single case, statute,
or rule of practice in which representation only for a
discrete hearing was allowed as a matter of right in a
habeas proceeding. Practice Book § 3-8 (b) provides
that an attorney may enter a ‘‘limited appearance’’ for
a specific issue in any civil case, but only ‘‘with leave
of court . . . .’’7 Practice Book § 25-6A provides that
a party may be self-represented and employ counsel
without prior court approval, but only in certain family
matters. There is no rule of practice that specifically
permits limited purpose appearances or hybrid repre-
sentation in habeas proceedings without court consent.
If the judges of the Superior Court had intended to
create an express right to counsel for specific proceed-
ings in habeas matters in our rules of practice, they
would have explicitly said so.
The petitioner has presented at best a novel argument
with respect to his claimed right to counsel for a limited
purpose in habeas cases. We cannot conclude that the
court’s failure to provide such counsel only for the good
cause hearing was the type of egregious defect or ‘‘truly
extraordinary situation’’ warranting reversal under the
7 ‘‘It is well established that ‘[h]abeas corpus is a civil proceeding.’ ’’ Clue
v. Commissioner of Correction, 353 Conn. 97, 106, 340 A.3d 1102 (2025).

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Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction
plain error doctrine. (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Orlando F., 233 Conn. App. 1, 37, 338 A.3d
379, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 903, 341 A.3d 957 (2025);
see, e.g., id., 36 (holding that trial court did not commit
plain error in failing to provide jury with instruction
that it was not required to give); see also, e.g., State v.
Kyle A., supra, 348 Conn. 447–48 (trial court did not
commit plain error in failing to give jury instruction
that was deemed discretionary in nature). Thus, the
petitioner has not demonstrated that his underlying
claim of error is debatable among jurists of reason, that
a court could resolve the issues in a different manner,
or that the question is adequate to deserve encourage-
ment to proceed further. Accordingly, it would not have
been an abuse of the habeas court’s discretion to deny
the petition for certification to appeal if this issue had
been included therein. See Banks v. Commissioner of
Correction, 225 Conn. App. 234, 254, 314 A.3d 1052,
cert. denied, 349 Conn. 922, 321 A.3d 1130 (2024).
In the alternative, the petitioner requests that this
court exercise its supervisory authority over the admin-
istration of justice to review his claim and to guarantee
a right to counsel at any stage of a habeas proceeding.
‘‘It is well settled that [a]ppellate courts possess an
inherent supervisory authority over the administration
of justice.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
James K., 209 Conn. App. 441, 481, 267 A.3d 858 (2021),
aff’d, 347 Conn. 648, 299 A.3d 243 (2023). Although
Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 347 Conn.
335, did not discuss the ability of a reviewing court to
use its supervisory authority for claims not included in
the petition for certification to appeal, previously ‘‘we
have rejected any arbitrary and categorical limitations
on our use of our supervisory authority.’’ State v. Sim-
mons, 188 Conn. App. 813, 846, 205 A.3d 569 (2019).
Assuming that we may exercise our supervisory author-
ity in these circumstances, we conclude that the present
case does not warrant its use.

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Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction
Supervisory authority is an extraordinary remedy that
should be used sparingly. See State v. Edwards, 314
Conn. 465, 498, 102 A.3d 52 (2014). Such powers should
‘‘be invoked only when circumstances are such that
the issue at hand, while not rising to the level of a
constitutional violation, is nonetheless of utmost seri-
ousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial
but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system
as a whole.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 765, 91 A.3d 862 (2014). Thus,
we are more likely to invoke our supervisory powers
when there is a ‘‘pervasive and significant problem . . .
or when the conduct or violation at issue is offensive
to the sound administration of justice . . . .’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Jacques, 353 Conn. 122, 160, 340 A.3d 1073 (2025).
We decline to exercise our supervisory authority in
the present case. We cannot conclude that the court’s
denial of the petitioner’s request to have counsel
appointed for the limited purpose of the good cause
hearing threatens either the integrity of the judicial
system or public confidence in the judicial system. As
discussed previously in this opinion, the petitioner has
not established that he is entitled to the specific form
of limited representation that he seeks. The circum-
stances in the present case are not so extraordinary
as to require this court to invoke our rarely invoked
supervisory authority.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.