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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
TAMARIUS MANER v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION
(AC 47644)
Elgo, Moll and Suarez, Js.
Syllabus
The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of various crimes, includ-
ing felony murder, appealed following the granting of his petition for certifi-
cation to appeal from the habeas court’s judgment denying his petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly
denied his freestanding constitutional claim, which asserted that the police
had illegally obtained records containing his historical cell site location
information (CSLI) in violation of his rights under the fourth amendment
to the United States constitution. Held:
This court declined to review the petitioner’s claim that the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States (585 U.S. 296),
holding that the government must generally obtain a warrant supported by
probable cause before acquiring an individual’s CSLI, should be applied
retroactively, as the petitioner had expressly abandoned that claim.
This court declined to review the petitioner’s various unpreserved claims
related to the statute (§ 54-47aa) governing orders to compel disclosure of
or applications to a telecommunications carrier or provider for certain CSLI,
as he did not plead these claims in his petition for habeas corpus and, thus,
they were not decided by the habeas court.
This court concluded that, even if it is assumed that the petitioner’s CSLI
should have been excluded at his criminal trial, any error in its admission
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as that evidence was not critical
to the state’s case against the petitioner and, thus, did not contribute to or
substantially affect the jury’s verdict.
Argued May 27—officially released November 25, 2025
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Tolland and tried to the court, Bhatt, J.; judgment
denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the
granting 	of 	certification, 	appealed 	to 	this 	court.
Affirmed.

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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
Nicole Britt, assigned counsel, with whom, on the
brief, was Christopher Y. Duby, assigned counsel, for
the appellant (petitioner).
Timothy F. Costello, supervisory assistant state’s
attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt,
state’s attorney, Kelly Masi, senior assistant state’s
attorney, and Thai Chhay, assistant state’s attorney,
for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion
SUAREZ, J. The petitioner, Tamarius Maner, appeals,
following the granting of his petition for certification
to appeal, from the judgment of the habeas court deny-
ing his second amended petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. He claims on appeal, inter alia, that (1) the
court improperly denied his freestanding constitutional
claim, which asserted that the police had illegally
obtained records containing his historical cell site loca-
tion information (CSLI) in violation of his rights under
the fourth amendment to the United States constitution,
(2) the 2016 amendments to General Statutes § 54-47aa
contained in Public Acts 2016, No. 16-148, § 1 (2016
amendments), which require the police to obtain a war-
rant based on probable cause before obtaining histori-
cal CSLI, should apply retroactively in the present case,
(3) certain CSLI obtained by the police did not comply
with General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 54-47aa,1 and (4)
1 General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 54-47aa provides in relevant part:
‘‘(a) For the purposes of this section:
‘‘(1) ‘Basic subscriber information’ means: (A) Name, (B) address, (C)
local and long distance telephone connection records or records of session
times and durations, (D) length of service, including start date, and types
of services utilized, (E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber
number or identity, including any assigned Internet protocol address, and
(F) means and source of payment for such service, including any credit
card or bank account number;
‘‘(2) ‘Call-identifying information’ means dialing or signaling information
that identifies the origin, direction, destination or termination of each com-
munication generated or received by a subscriber or customer by means of
any equipment, facility or service of a telecommunications carrier

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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
the court incorrectly concluded that any error in the
admission of the petitioner’s CSLI was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. For the reasons that follow, we
reject the petitioner’s claims and, accordingly, affirm
the judgment of the court.
The 	following 	facts 	and 	procedural 	history, 	as
gleaned from the record and as previously set forth by
this court on the petitioner’s direct appeal, are relevant.
See State v. Maner, 147 Conn. App. 761, 83 A.3d 1182,
cert. denied, 311 Conn. 935, 88 A.3d 550 (2014). ‘‘On
October 26, 2008, Maria Guadalupe Orzuna-Sanchez,
who was dating the [petitioner], encountered Joseph
[Samaha]2 on a street corner in Waterbury. Orzuna-
* * *
‘‘(b) A law enforcement official may request an ex parte order from a
judge of the Superior Court to compel (1) a telecommunications carrier to
disclose call-identifying information pertaining to a subscriber or customer,
or (2) a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing
service to disclose basic subscriber information pertaining to a subscriber
or customer. The judge shall grant such order if the law enforcement official
states a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a crime has been or is being
committed or that exigent circumstances exist and such call-identifying or
basic subscriber information is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation. The order shall state upon its face the case number assigned
to such investigation, the date and time of issuance and the name of the
judge authorizing the order. The law enforcement official shall have any ex
parte order issued pursuant to this subsection signed by the authorizing judge
within forty-eight hours or not later than the next business day, whichever
is earlier. . . .’’
As stated previously, ‘‘[t]he statute has subsequently been amended to
clarify that a judge of the Superior Court must make a finding of probable
cause prior to issuing an order compelling a telecommunications carrier to
disclose the geo-location data associated with such subscriber’s or custom-
er’s call-identifying information . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Brown, 331 Conn. 258, 273 n.7, 202 A.3d 1003 (2019); see Public
Acts 2016, No. 16-148, § 1.
For clarity, following the practice of the parties, all references to the
‘‘2008 version’’ of § 54-47aa in this opinion are to the 2007 revision of the
statute, which was in effect at the time the police obtained the petitioner’s
CSLI in October, 2008.
2 Although this witness’ surname was spelled ‘‘Samaba’’ in this court’s
decision on direct appeal, the transcripts of the petitioner’s underlying crimi-

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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
Sanchez, [Samaha], the [petitioner], and another indi-
vidual went to the apartment of the victim, James Caf-
frey. Orzuna-Sanchez and [Samaha] smoked marijuana
while the [petitioner] spoke with the victim about pur-
chasing marijuana from him. The victim retrieved some
marijuana from his bedroom and sold the [petitioner]
seven grams. Later in the evening, the [petitioner]
announced that he had to leave in order to take a train
to return home to Bridgeport.
‘‘The victim lived with his girlfriend, Samantha Bright,
and a roommate, Ray Ramos, in a second floor apart-
ment. The victim’s mother lived in the first floor apart-
ment beneath the victim. At some point, the victim and
Bright went to sleep. Bright heard the doorbell ring
about 1:15 in the morning, and the victim went to the
door, turning on lights in the living room, kitchen and
hallway. Bright heard a brief conversation, followed by
a single gunshot. Before she could get out of the bed,
the [petitioner], wearing a khaki sweatshirt, and Calvin
Bennett,3 wearing a gray sweatshirt, appeared in the
doorway, and both were holding small black guns. Ben-
nett approached Bright, placed his gun to the back of
her head and asked where the money and marijuana
was. She indicated that it was in the top dresser drawer.
As the [petitioner] opened the drawer, the victim’s
mother, Emilia Caffrey, 4 who had come upstairs and
into the second floor apartment, began screaming. Caf-
frey saw her son face down on the floor and ‘full of
nal trial reveal that the witness spelled his name ‘‘Samaha.’’ The former
appears to have been a scrivener’s error.
3 ‘‘A three judge panel unanimously found Bennett guilty of felony murder,
home invasion and burglary in the first degree. State v. Bennett, 307 Conn.
758, 760, 59 A.3d 221 (2013). A majority of the panel found Bennett guilty
of aiding and abetting murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 and
53a-54a. Id. On appeal, our Supreme Court concluded that the evidence was
insufficient to support Bennett’s conviction of aiding and abetting murder.
Id., 760–61.’’ State v. Maner, supra, 147 Conn. App. 763 n.1.
4 For the sake of convenience, we refer in this opinion to James Caffrey
as the victim and to Emilia Caffrey by her surname.

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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
blood.’ The [petitioner] and Bennett exited the bedroom
and the [petitioner] shot at Caffrey, who fell to the floor.
‘‘Francis 	Brevetti, 	a 	Waterbury 	police 	officer,
received a call from the police dispatch of possible
gunshots fired at the victim’s apartment. After he
arrived at the scene, Brevetti turned the victim over
and observed a bullet wound in the victim’s head and
a spent .45 caliber casing. . . . The victim later died,
and it was determined that the cause of death was a
gunshot wound to the head.’’ (Footnotes added; foot-
note in original.) Id., 763–64.
The police interviewed several individuals who were
at the victim’s residence on October 26, 2008. As a result
of those interviews, the police identified the petitioner
as a person of interest. The police interviewed the peti-
tioner on October 27, 2008. During that interview, the
petitioner admitted that he was at the victim’s residence
on October 26, 2008, and that he purchased marijuana
from the victim. He initially asserted that he was in
Bridgeport at the time of the shooting. During that inter-
view, the police obtained the petitioner’s CSLI without
an ex parte order, citing exigent circumstances. 5 The
petitioner’s CSLI revealed that his cell phone was in
Waterbury at the time of the shooting, rather than
Bridgeport. On October 28, 2008, the police obtained
an ex parte order to obtain the petitioner’s CSLI on
the ground that they had a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that a crime had been or was being commit-
ted.
5 The petitioner also claims on appeal that the police illegally obtained
his CSLI on October 27, 2008, without an ex parte order, on the ground that
there were no exigent circumstances present. The petitioner concedes that
the ‘‘October 28, 2008 [CSLI was] an independent source of this information.’’
We need not address this claim in light of our dispositive conclusions that
(1) the petitioner cannot succeed in his challenge to the admission of the
CSLI obtained on October 28, 2008, and (2) any error in the admission of
the petitioner’s CSLI was harmless.

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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
The 	petitioner 	subsequently 	was 	arrested 	and
charged with, inter alia, felony murder in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-54c, home invasion in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) (1), burglary in the
first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101
(a) (3), and attempt to commit assault in the first degree
in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and
53a-59 (a) (5). State v. Maner, supra, 147 Conn. App.
762. Attorneys Dennis Harrigan and Leslie Cavanaugh
represented the petitioner at trial.
At trial, Bright and Caffrey testified as witnesses on
behalf of the state. Bright and Caffrey testified that,
on October 29, 2008, they identified the petitioner in
photographic arrays prepared by the Waterbury Police
Department. They also each identified the petitioner
in court.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found the petitioner
guilty of felony murder, home invasion, burglary in the
first degree, and attempt to commit assault in the first
degree. Id., 764. The jury failed to reach a verdict with
respect to a charge of murder, which the court subse-
quently dismissed. Id. The court sentenced the peti-
tioner to seventy years of incarceration. Id. The peti-
tioner appealed from the judgment of conviction, which
was affirmed by this court. Id., 762–63.
On direct appeal, this court held that, although the
trial court improperly admitted into evidence a firearm
that was found in Bennett’s residence, as well as testi-
mony related to that firearm, any error was harmless.
Id., 764–65. This court noted that the jury heard testi-
mony that the petitioner had been in the victim’s apart-
ment the day before the shooting. Id., 774. In addition
to the petitioner’s CSLI, which established that his cell
phone was in Waterbury around the time of the shoot-
ing, this court stated that the jury heard ‘‘Latisha

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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
Caban’s 6 statement to the police, admitted pursuant to
State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753, 513 A.2d 86, cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598
(1986).7 Caban stated that the [petitioner] had told her
that he was going to Waterbury to ‘take some weed.’
She further stated that he returned to Bridgeport at
approximately 2 a.m., and he told her that ‘it wasn’t
good, nothing happened and not to ask any questions.’ ’’
(Footnotes added.) State v. Maner, supra, 147 Conn.
App. 775. This court also noted that the jury heard from
‘‘Earl Cornish, a jailhouse informant, who testified that
the [petitioner] previously had admitted to participating
in the shooting of the victim.’’ Id., 774–75. This court
concluded that, ‘‘[o]n the basis of the weight of the
evidence . . . we cannot conclude that the verdict was
substantially swayed by the improper admission of the
firearm into evidence.’’ Id., 775.
The petitioner commenced this action by filing a self-
represented petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 2016.
On December 21, 2022, the petitioner filed a second
amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus (operative
petition), which is the subject of this appeal. The opera-
tive petition contained three counts. Only the third
count, in which the petitioner alleged a freestanding
violation of his fourth amendment rights, 8 is relevant
to this appeal. With respect to this claim, the petitioner
6 Caban testified that the petitioner was ‘‘like a brother’’ to her.
7 ‘‘In Whelan, [our Supreme Court] adopted a hearsay exception allowing
the substantive use of prior written inconsistent statements, signed by the
declarant, who has personal knowledge of the facts stated, when the declar-
ant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination. This rule has also
been codified [at] § 8-5 (1) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, which
incorporates all of the developments and clarifications of the Whelan rule
that have occurred since Whelan was decided.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Sayles, 348 Conn. 669, 688 n.11, 310 A.3d 929 (2024).
8 ‘‘In habeas corpus proceedings, courts often describe constitutional
claims that are not tethered to a petitioner’s sixth amendment right to
counsel as ‘freestanding.’ ’’ McCarthy v. Commissioner of Correction, 192
Conn. App. 797, 810 n.8, 218 A.3d 638 (2019).

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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
alleged that his conviction and incarceration are illegal
‘‘because they were obtained in violation of his state
and federal constitutional rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures as outlined in article first, § 7, of
the . . . Connecticut [constitution] and the [fourth and
fourteenth] amendments to the 	. 	. 	. 	United States
[constitution] 	. 	. 	. 	.’’ Specifically, the petitioner
alleged that, on October 27 and 28, 2008, the police
illegally obtained his CSLI without a warrant and that
there were not any applicable exceptions to the warrant
requirements of the state and federal constitutions. The
respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, filed a
return either denying or leaving the petitioner to his
proof as to the material allegations of his operative
habeas petition. Additionally, as to count three, the
respondent asserted procedural default as a special
defense. The petitioner filed a reply denying the respon-
dent’s special defense.
A trial on the petitioner’s operative habeas petition
was held on November 20 and December 6, 2023. Sev-
eral exhibits were admitted, and the court heard testi-
mony from the petitioner’s legal expert witness, Attor-
ney Frank Riccio, as well as Harrigan. With respect to
the admission of the petitioner’s CSLI, Harrigan testified
that he had filed a motion to preclude the CSLI before
trial but ultimately did not pursue that motion. Harrigan
testified that the defense strategy was to argue that
the petitioner’s CSLI only established his location in
Waterbury, rather than at the crime scene itself. Both
parties subsequently filed posttrial briefs.
On March 26, 2024, the habeas court issued a memo-
randum of decision denying the operative petition. 9 As
to the petitioner’s fourth amendment claim, the court
9 The court rejected the petitioner’s remaining claims of ineffective assis-
tance of his criminal trial counsel and ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. The petitioner has not challenged those aspects of the court’s deci-
sion.

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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
rejected the petitioner’s argument that the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States,
585 U.S. 296, 310, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507
(2018), in which the Supreme Court held that an individ-
ual has a ‘‘legitimate expectation of privacy in the record
of his physical movements as captured through [CSLI],’’
and, therefore, that ‘‘the [g]overnment must generally
obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before
acquiring [CSLI]’’; id., 316; required the police to obtain
a warrant based on probable cause to obtain his CSLI.
The court noted that, although the petitioner relied on
our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Brown, 331
Conn. 258, 261–66, 202 A.3d 1003 (2019), in which the
court, applying Carpenter, held that certain ex parte
orders issued in 2010 were obtained illegally, that case
was distinguishable because the present case was a
collateral postconviction proceeding. Therefore, the
court stated that it must determine whether Carpenter
applies retroactively to the petitioner’s case and then
decide ‘‘whether any violation of the fourth amendment
or § 54-47aa requires that his convictions be vacated.’’
The court concluded that Carpenter should not be
applied retroactively, reasoning that Carpenter announced
a new procedural rule that was not watershed.
The court also concluded that, even if it were to agree
that the ex parte orders were illegally obtained, there
was ample other evidence to support the conviction
without the petitioner’s CSLI. The court stated: ‘‘Bright
and Caffrey testified and identified [the petitioner] as
one of the individuals with [a] gun. Caffrey identified
[the petitioner] as the individual who shot at her. Bright
testified that [the petitioner] had been at the [victim’s]
house earlier that day and that was corroborated by
the testimony of Orzuna-Sanchez and [Samaha], includ-
ing the fact that [the petitioner] had been interested in
purchasing some quantity of marijuana from the victim.
The jury also heard from the jailhouse witness Cornish,

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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
who testified that [the petitioner] confessed to him that
he had gone to rob the victim and shot him in the face.’’
Finally, the court rejected the petitioner’s argument
that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine would have
resulted in the suppression of all of the evidence
obtained as a result of the petitioner’s CSLI, including
Bennett’s identity, Bennett’s CSLI, and the weapon
found in Bennett’s residence. The court concluded that,
assuming arguendo that the reach of the exclusionary
rule was ‘‘as far as the [petitioner] alleges,’’ there was
still ample independent evidence to sustain the petition-
er’s conviction. The court stated that the petitioner was
noted to be a ‘‘person of interest when the police identi-
fied all of the individuals who had been in the victim’s
apartment earlier in the day and spoke to all of them.
Thus, [the petitioner’s] identity was revealed to officers
through their interviews of Samaha and Orzuna-San-
chez, not through CSLI . . . .’’ Accordingly, the court
concluded that there was not any reasonable likelihood
of a different outcome and, therefore, the petitioner
could not establish harm arising from the introduction
of his CSLI.
The court granted the petition for certification to
appeal. This appeal followed. Additional facts and pro-
cedural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
The petitioner first claims that the habeas court
improperly 	rejected 	his freestanding 	constitutional
claim, which asserted that the police had illegally
obtained his CSLI in violation of his fourth amendment
rights. 10 As to the CSLI obtained by the police on Octo-
ber 28, 2008, the petitioner asserts that, ‘‘[b]ecause Con-
necticut does not recognize the good faith exception
10 The petitioner cites to article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution,
together with the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution,
in count three of the operative petition, which alleges a fourth amendment
violation. We do not read the operative petition as alleging a separate state
constitutional claim. In the petitioner’s brief to this court, within his argu-

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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
to the exclusionary rule and either Carpenter or . . .
§ 54-47aa 	applies 	retroactively, 	the 	police 	illegally
obtained [his] CSLI . . . .’’ 11
We conclude that the petitioner has abandoned any
claim that Carpenter should be applied retroactively. In
Carpenter, the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the state conducts a ‘‘search under the [f]ourth
[a]mendment when it accesses historical cell phone
records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the
user’s past movements.’’ Carpenter v. United States,
supra, 585 U.S. 300. As stated previously in this opinion,
the Supreme Court answered that question in the affir-
mative and held that ‘‘an individual maintains a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical
movements as captured through CSLI.’’ Id., 310. Accord-
ingly, the state ‘‘must generally obtain a warrant sup-
ported 	by 	probable 	cause 	before 	acquiring 	such
records.’’ Id., 316. The Supreme Court reasoned that,
‘‘[p]rior to the digital age, law enforcement might have
pursued a suspect for a brief search, but doing so for
any extended period of time was difficult and costly
and therefore rarely undertaken,’’ and that cell phone
tracking presented ‘‘even greater privacy concerns than
the GPS monitoring of a vehicle . . . . [A] cell phone—
almost a feature of human anatomy . . . tracks nearly
ment that the police violated his fourth amendment rights, the petitioner
dedicates one page to ‘‘state law,’’ in which he cites to article first, § 7, of
the Connecticut constitution, § 54-47aa, and State v. Brown, supra, 331 Conn.
258. The petitioner, however, did not brief a separate state constitutional
claim in accordance with State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684–86, 610 A.2d
1225 (1992), or argue that the state constitution provides him greater protec-
tion than does the federal constitution. We therefore limit our review of the
petitioner’s claim to the federal constitution. See, e.g., Young v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 219 Conn. App. 171, 183–84 n.7, 294 A.3d 29, cert.
denied, 347 Conn. 905, 297 A.3d 567 (2023).
11 We need not address the respondent’s argument that the court should
have found the petitioner’s freestanding fourth amendment claim to be
procedurally defaulted, in light of our conclusion that the petitioner con-
ceded that Carpenter should not apply retroactively in the present case.

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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
exactly the movements of its owner. While individuals
regularly leave their vehicles, they compulsively carry
cell phones with them all the time. A cell phone faith-
fully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares
and into private residences, doctor’s offices, political
headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.
. . . Accordingly, when the [g]overnment tracks the
location of a cell phone it achieves near perfect surveil-
lance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the
phone’s user.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 310–12.
In the present case, the petitioner’s counsel conceded
at oral argument before this court that Carpenter
‘‘should not apply retroactively because it is a proce-
dural rule.’’ ‘‘Concessions made during oral argument
may be properly considered by the appellate courts in
rendering their decision.’’ In re David P., 154 Conn.
App. 508, 516, 105 A.3d 960 (2014), cert. denied, 315
Conn. 922, 107 A.3d 959 (2015); see also Greenwich
Retail, LLC v. Greenwich, 233 Conn. App. 78, 82 n.4,
340 A.3d 463 (declining to address claim that counsel
acknowledged at oral argument before this court was
not claim of error), cert. granted, 353 Conn. 913, 344
A.3d 154 (2025). The petitioner further concedes in his
principal appellate brief that ‘‘[t]his court is unlikely
to find that the Carpenter case applies retroactively’’
because the rule announced in Carpenter is likely a
procedural rule that is ‘‘unlikely to be considered a
watershed rule’’ and is unlikely to fall under the new
exception announced by our Supreme Court in Tatum
v. Commissioner of Correction, 349 Conn. 733, 753, 322
A.3d 299 (2024), pursuant to which a new constitutional
rule of criminal procedure may be applied retroactively
if it was developed as a result of developments in sci-
ence that improve the accuracy of the conviction, and
the petitioner ‘‘advocated for the rule in the direct pro-
ceedings or in an earlier habeas petition.’’ Accordingly,

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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
as the petitioner has expressly abandoned any claim
that Carpenter should apply retroactively, we decline
to address that issue on appeal.
II
We next address whether the petitioner failed to
plead and preserve his claims related to § 54-47aa. The
petitioner claims that (1) the 2016 amendments to § 54-
47aa should be applied retroactively, and (2) the police
did not comply with the 2008 version of § 54-47aa when
they obtained his CSLI on October 28, 2008. The respon-
dent counters that this court should not reach the merits
of these claims because the petitioner did not include
them in his operative petition. We agree with the respon-
dent that these claims are not reviewable because they
were not pleaded in the operative petition and were
not decided by the habeas court.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant. At the habeas trial, Riccio testified that a
reasonably competent criminal defense attorney would
file a motion to suppress historical CSLI obtained with-
out probable cause in the absence of a warrant or exi-
gent circumstances. On direct examination, the peti-
tioner’s counsel questioned Riccio regarding § 54-47aa,
and the following colloquy occurred:
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Have you ever handled
a case in which [the] police sought an ex parte order
from a cell phone provider to disclose cell site informa-
tion for a client?
‘‘[The Witness]: Yes.
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: And, to your knowledge,
is this process controlled by statute?
‘‘[The Witness]: It is now. Yes.
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: What is your understand-
ing regarding that process under the statute?

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‘‘[The Witness]: Under § 54-47aa—
‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: Your Honor, at this
point I would object . . . . He’s testifying about the
current statute. It just doesn’t seem relevant as to what
happened back then.
‘‘The Court: You want to respond to that?
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Your Honor, first of all,
we’re making the argument that it’s retroactive. Second
of all, we’re also asking about the 2008 statute.’’
The petitioner’s counsel proceeded to question Riccio
concerning the differences between the statutory lan-
guage of the 2008 version of § 54-47aa, as opposed to
after the 2016 amendments. The petitioner’s counsel
also questioned Riccio concerning Carpenter, and Ric-
cio testified that he was not aware of any court that
had applied that decision retroactively.
‘‘Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding. . . . Our rules
of practice require a party, as a prerequisite to appellate
review, to distinctly raise its claim before the trial court.
See Practice Book § 5-2 ([a]ny party intending to raise
any question of law which may be the subject of an
appeal must . . . state the question distinctly to the
judicial authority); Practice Book § 60-5 ([t]he court
shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was
distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the
trial). When a party fails to do so, the judicial authority
is under no obligation to decide the question. Practice
Book § 5-2. Accordingly, Connecticut’s appellate courts
will not review a claim unless it was distinctly raised
at trial.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Correction, 211
Conn. App. 632, 654–55, 273 A.3d 252, cert. denied, 343
Conn. 922, 275 A.3d 212 (2022).
‘‘[T]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question
of law for the court . . . . The modern trend, which

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is followed in Connecticut, is to construe pleadings
broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and tech-
nically. . . . Although essential allegations may not be
supplied by conjecture or remote implication . . . the
complaint must be read in its entirety in such a way as
to give effect to the pleading with reference to the
general theory upon which it proceeded, and do sub-
stantial justice between the parties. . . . As long as the
pleadings provide sufficient notice of the facts claimed
and the issues to be tried and do not surprise or preju-
dice the opposing party, we will not conclude that the
complaint is insufficient to allow recovery.’’ (Footnote
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carpenter
v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 834, 842, 878
A.2d 1088 (2005). Practice Book § 23-22 provides in
relevant part: ‘‘A petition for a writ of habeas corpus
. . . shall state: (1) the specific facts upon which each
specific claim of illegal confinement is based . . . .’’
‘‘It is well settled that [t]he petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is essentially a pleading and, as such, it
should conform generally to a complaint in a civil
action. . . . The principle that a [petitioner] may rely
only upon what he has alleged is basic. . . . It is funda-
mental in our law that the right of a [petitioner] to
recover is limited to the allegations of his complaint.
. . . While the habeas court has considerable discre-
tion to frame a remedy that is commensurate with the
scope of the established constitutional violations . . .
it does not have the discretion to look beyond the plead-
ings and trial evidence to decide claims not raised. . . .
This court is not bound to consider claimed errors
unless it appears on the record that the question was
distinctly raised . . . and was ruled upon and decided
by the court adversely to the [petitioner’s] claim. . . .
This court is not compelled to consider issues neither
alleged in the habeas petition nor considered at the
habeas proceeding . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks

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omitted.) Davis v. Commissioner of Correction, 160
Conn. App. 444, 451, 124 A.3d 992, cert. denied, 319
Conn. 957, 125 A.3d 1012 (2015).
In the present case, the petitioner did not allege in
the operative petition that the 2016 amendments to § 54-
47aa should apply retroactively or that the police did
not comply with the 2008 version of § 54-47aa when it
obtained his CSLI on October 28, 2008. The sole refer-
ence in the operative petition to § 54-47aa was in the
statement of facts, in which the petitioner alleged that,
‘‘[o]n October 28, 2008, the police prepared an ex parte
order per [§ 54-47aa] to obtain the petitioner’s [CSLI]
. . . .’’ Count three, however, the sole count at issue in
this appeal, alleged only a fourth amendment violation.
As noted previously, at the habeas trial, the petition-
er’s counsel questioned Riccio concerning § 54-47aa. In
response to an objection by the respondent’s counsel,
the petitioner’s counsel stated: ‘‘We’re making the argu-
ment that [§ 54-47aa is] retroactive. Second of all, we’re
also asking about the 2008 statute.’’ Counsel, however,
questioned Riccio only concerning the retroactivity of
Carpenter. Although the petitioner’s counsel ques-
tioned Riccio as to the differences between the 2008
version of § 54-47aa and the 2016 amendments, he did
not question Riccio, the petitioner’s legal expert wit-
ness, as to whether the 2016 amendments should apply
retroactively or whether the legislature intended to
include historical CSLI in the 2008 version of § 54-47aa.
Therefore, in addition to not being raised in the opera-
tive petition, the petitioner’s statutory claims were not
developed during evidence at the habeas trial.
The first time any claim relating to § 54-47aa was
meaningfully raised was in the petitioner’s posttrial
brief. We have repeatedly stated that ‘‘[c]laims raised
for the first time in posttrial briefs are not reviewable
by the habeas court or by this court on appeal.’’ (Internal

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quotation marks omitted.) Antwon W. v. Commissioner
of Correction, 172 Conn. App. 843, 877, 163 A.3d 1223,
cert. denied, 326 Conn. 909, 164 A.3d 680 (2017); see
also, e.g., Santos v. Commissioner of Correction, 176
Conn. App. 788, 791 n.2, 171 A.3d 1091 (rejecting peti-
tioner’s argument that claim was preserved because it
was argued in posttrial brief), cert. denied, 327 Conn.
977, 174 A.3d 800 (2017).
The court, therefore, was not obligated to consider
the petitioner’s statutory grounds for challenging the
admission of his CSLI, and this court is not required to
do so on appeal. See, e.g., Davis v. Commissioner of
Correction, supra, 160 Conn. App. 454 n.7 (declining to
review claim raised for first time in posttrial brief);
Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 129 Conn.
App. 188, 198, 19 A.3d 705 (‘‘[a] reviewing court will
not consider claims not raised in the habeas petition
or decided by the habeas court’’), cert. denied, 303
Conn. 901, 31 A.3d 1177 (2011). Therefore, the court
properly did not address the petitioner’s statutory
claims in its memorandum of decision.
We are not persuaded by the petitioner’s arguments
to the contrary. The petitioner argues that the operative
petition alleges that ‘‘the police illegally obtained [his]
historical [CSLI] on October 27 and 28, 2008, without
a warrant and that no warrant exception, under either
state or federal law, applied.’’ The petitioner further
argues that ‘‘[t]he fact that [he] explicitly included that
the search violated state law inevitably involves § 54-
47aa as it is the controlling state statute on obtaining
CSLI.’’ (Emphasis altered.) We conclude that the peti-
tioner’s arguments constitute an impermissible attempt
to 	conflate 	his 	statutory 	claims, 	which 	were 	not
pleaded, with his fourth amendment claim, which was
pleaded. Count three of the operative petition is titled
‘‘fourth amendment violation.’’ A plain reading of the
operative petition demonstrates that it does not state

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any claim that the 2016 amendments should apply retro-
actively or that the police failed to comply with the
2008 version of § 54-47aa when they obtained his CSLI
on October 28, 2008.12 Instead, the petitioner alleged
that his conviction was illegally obtained ‘‘in violation
of his state and federal constitutional rights . . . as
outlined in article first, § 7, of the . . . Connecticut
[constitution] and the [fourth amendment] to the . . .
United States [constitution] . . . .’’ Therefore, to the
extent that the operative petition referred to state law,
those references were only to the Connecticut constitu-
tion. Moreover, as stated previously, we do not read
the operative petition as alleging a separate state consti-
tutional claim. See footnote 10 of this opinion.
The petitioner does not cite to any authority support-
ing his argument that his statutory claims are ‘‘inevita-
bly’’ included in his fourth amendment claim. As to his
claim that the 2016 amendments to § 54-47aa should
apply retroactively, we note that the retroactivity princi-
ples applicable to state statutes and to new constitu-
tional procedural rules involve wholly distinct analytical
frameworks. Compare, e.g., Tatum v. Commissioner of
Correction, supra, 349 Conn. 752–53 (constitutional
analysis), with State v. Bischoff, 337 Conn. 739, 746–47,
258 A.3d 14 (2021) (statutory analysis). Similarly, the
petitioner’s claim that the police did not comply with
the 2008 version of § 54-47aa when they obtained his
CSLI on October 28, 2008, is markedly different from his
fourth amendment claim. As reflected in the petitioner’s
own brief, an analysis of that statutory claim would
require an exploration of legislative intent, specifically,
12 We note that count one of the operative petition, which alleged ineffec-
tive assistance of criminal trial counsel, claimed that the police illegally
obtained his CSLI on October 27, 2008, in the absence of exigent circum-
stances or an ex parte order. That count, however, is not before us on appeal.
Furthermore, as previously stated, we need not address the petitioner’s
claim relating to the CSLI obtained on October 27, 2008. See footnote 5 of
this opinion.

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whether the legislature intended for the 2008 version
of § 54-47aa to include historical CSLI, as opposed to
an evaluation of Carpenter and its progeny, as well as
other applicable fourth amendment principles.
Accordingly, the petitioner’s statutory grounds for
challenging the admission of his CSLI constituted sepa-
rate claims, which should have been pleaded, rather
than subsidiary ‘‘arguments’’ in support of his fourth
amendment claim. See, e.g., Jobe v. Commissioner of
Correction, 334 Conn. 636, 644 n.2, 224 A.3d 147 (2020)
(‘‘[a] claim is an entirely new legal issue, whereas, [g]en-
erally speaking, an argument is a point or line of reason-
ing made in support of or in opposition to a particular
claim’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also,
e.g., Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction, 294
Conn. 165, 204, 982 A.2d 620 (2009) (declining to review
constitutional claims that could not ‘‘fairly be construed
as subsumed within or inextricably intertwined with
the statutory claim [the petitioner] raised before the
trial court’’).
Furthermore, the petitioner’s arguments conflict with
our case law and our rules of practice. Practice Book
§ 23-22 provides in relevant part that a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus shall state ‘‘the specific facts
upon which each specific claim of illegal confinement
is based . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Practice Book § 10-
3 (a) also provides in relevant part: ‘‘When a claim made
in a complaint . . . or other pleading is grounded on
a statute, the statute shall be specifically identified by
its number.’’ See, e.g., Kennynick, LLC v. Standard
Petroleum Co., 222 Conn. App. 234, 243 n.7, 305 A.3d
632 (2023) (declining to consider statutory claim that
plaintiff did not allege in complaint pursuant to § 10-3
(a)); see also Ross v. Commissioner of Correction, 217
Conn. App. 286, 324, 288 A.3d 1055 (‘‘a memorandum
of law is not a proper vehicle for supplementing the
factual allegations in a complaint . . . and we do not

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believe that a different rule should pertain to habeas
petitions’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert.
denied, 346 Conn. 915, 290 A.3d 374 (2023). ‘‘It is well
settled that this court will not review statutory claims
that are raised for the first time on appeal.’’ State v.
Smith, 255 Conn. 830, 843, 769 A.2d 698 (2001). We do
not see any reason to depart from these well established
principles in the present case.
We also reject the petitioner’s arguments that the
respondent waived the right to challenge the reviewabil-
ity of his statutory claims. First, the petitioner argues
that the respondent ‘‘never filed a motion for a more
specific statement’’ to express any ‘‘confusion as to the
basis of the petitioner’s fourth amendment claim.’’ The
petitioner, however, does not offer any convincing rea-
son as to why the respondent should have had any
confusion concerning his fourth amendment claim. As
stated previously, the operative petition did not present
any claims that (1) the 2016 amendments to § 54-47aa
should apply retroactively, and (2) the police did not
comply with the 2008 version of § 54-47aa when they
obtained his CSLI on October 28, 2008. Similarly,
although the petitioner argues that the respondent
agreed to mark a copy of the 2008 version of § 54-
47aa as an exhibit at the habeas trial, the fact that the
respondent agreed to the admission of the exhibit—in
the present case, a statute that speaks for itself—does
not constitute an affirmative waiver by the respondent
of any claim that the petitioner’s statutory claims were
not properly raised. We similarly disagree that the fact
that the respondent responded to the petitioner’s statu-
tory claims in his posttrial brief precludes the respon-
dent from disputing the reviewability of those claims on
appeal, particularly when the petitioner did not develop
those claims during evidence. In any event, such claims
would still be unpreserved even though they were
addressed in the parties’ posttrial briefs because ‘‘the

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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
petitioner did not distinctly raise [them] in his habeas
petition, nor did the habeas court specifically rule on
[them] in its memorandum of decision.’’ Giattino v.
Commissioner of Correction, 169 Conn. App. 566, 582,
152 A.3d 558 (2016).
Furthermore, 	to 	the 	extent 	that 	the 	petitioner
believed he had, in fact, raised any claims that the court
improperly failed to address, ‘‘the petitioner did not
seek an articulation of the court’s decision . . . .’’ Gon-
zalez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 211 Conn.
App. 657; see also, e.g., Davis v. Commissioner of Cor-
rection, supra, 160 Conn. App. 456 (‘‘to the extent that
the habeas court construed the petitioner’s allegations
in a way that the petitioner deems inaccurate or incom-
plete, the failure of the petitioner to clarify for the
habeas court his allegations is fatal to his claim’’). 13 We
therefore decline to review the petitioner’s unpreserved
statutory claims.
III
Finally, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
incorrectly concluded that any error in the admission
of his CSLI was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Specifically, the petitioner contends that the respon-
dent cannot establish that any error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the petitioner
concedes that he was a person of interest at the time
of his initial interview with the police, he emphasizes
that George Tirado of the Waterbury Police Department
testified that the petitioner’s CSLI had a ‘‘ ‘huge’ ’’
impact on the investigation because that was the only
evidence that ‘‘definitively proved’’ that he had traveled
13 We further note that, although the habeas court granted the petition
for certification to appeal, the petitioner also did not raise any claim regard-
ing § 54-47aa in the petition for certification to appeal; rather, he alleged,
inter alia, that ‘‘the habeas court erred in finding that there was no fourth
amendment and/or state constitutional violation . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
to Waterbury from Bridgeport around the time of the
shooting. The petitioner also argues that, without his
CSLI, there was not any indisputable evidence tying
him to Bennett the night of the shooting. The petitioner
further points to the lack of forensic evidence, such as
fingerprints or DNA, directly placing him at the scene.
Finally, the petitioner attacks the credibility of the eye-
witnesses and other witnesses’ testimony presented by
the state.
The respondent counters that the court correctly con-
cluded that the evidence of the petitioner’s guilt was
‘‘exceedingly strong,’’ even without his CSLI. 14 The
respondent points to (1) the testimony from Bright,
Orzuna-Sanchez, and Samaha, who testified that the
petitioner was at the victim’s apartment on the after-
noon before the shooting, (2) the eyewitness identifica-
tions of the petitioner by Caffrey and Bright, (3) Caban’s
statement to the police, and (4) Cornish’s testimony
that the petitioner made inculpatory statements that he
shot the victim, as independent evidence of the petition-
er’s guilt. Having reviewed the record in this case, we
are convinced that, even assuming the petitioner’s CSLI
should have been excluded, any error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
We begin with the applicable standard of review. ‘‘It
is well settled that constitutional search and seizure
violations are not structural improprieties requiring
reversal, but rather, are subject to harmless error analy-
sis.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arm-
adore, 338 Conn. 407, 437, 258 A.3d 601 (2021). ‘‘[T]he
test for determining whether a constitutional [error] is
harmless . . . is whether it appears beyond a reason-
able doubt that the [error] complained of did not con-
tribute to the verdict obtained. . . . If the evidence
14 The court stated that, ‘‘even if [it] were to agree that Carpenter applied
to [the petitioner] and that the ex parte orders were illegal . . . [he] cannot
obtain relief because only the CSLI would be suppressed and there was
ample other evidence to convict him . . . .’’

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may have had a tendency to influence the judgment of
the jury, it cannot be considered harmless. . . . That
determination must be made in light of the entire record
[including the strength of the state’s case without the
evidence admitted in error]. . . . Additional factors
that we have considered in determining whether an
error is harmless in a particular case include the impor-
tance of the challenged evidence to the prosecution’s
case, whether it is cumulative, the extent of cross-exam-
ination permitted, and the presence or absence of cor-
roborating or contradicting evidence or testimony. . . .
In other words, we [must be] satisfied beyond a reason-
able doubt that the result would be the same without
the admission of the assumedly improper evidence.
. . . This inquiry is an objective one and requires us
to consider the quality and quantity of both the inadmis-
sible evidence and the admissible evidence that remains
to support the verdict of the jury. . . . [T]he [harmless
error] inquiry cannot be merely whether there was
enough [evidence] to support the result, apart from
. . . the error. . . . [R]ather, [the inquiry is] . . .
whether the error itself had substantial influence [on
the jury]. If so . . . the conviction cannot stand.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Correa, 353 Conn. 338, 373–74, 341 A.3d 910 (2025).
We conclude that, independent of his CSLI, as well
as the evidence that the petitioner argues should have
been excluded as a result, the state presented over-
whelming evidence that the petitioner committed felony
murder, home invasion, burglary in the first degree and
attempt to commit assault in the first degree. 15 First,
the jury heard evidence that, the day preceding the
shooting, 	the 	petitioner 	was 	identified 	by 	Bright,
15 As this court previously concluded that the trial court improperly admit-
ted the evidence of the firearm found in Bennett’s apartment, and testimony
related to that firearm; State v. Maner, supra, 147 Conn. App. 764–65; we
do not consider that evidence in our analysis.

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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
Orzuna-Sanchez, and Samaha as having been present
in the victim’s apartment. As to motive, this court pre-
viously noted that the jury ‘‘heard testimony that the
[petitioner] had been in the victim’s apartment and pur-
chased marijuana from the victim the day before the
shooting. As a result of this transaction, he knew that
the victim kept his supply of marijuana in the bedroom.’’
(Footnote omitted.) State v. Maner, supra, 147 Conn.
App. 774. Moreover, two eyewitnesses, Bright and Caf-
frey, both of whom were at the victim’s residence at
the time of the shooting, each identified the petitioner
in a photographic array and testified for the state at
trial. Bright and Caffrey also identified the petitioner
in court.
We are not persuaded by the petitioner’s argument
that the admission of his CSLI constituted harmful error
because, without his CSLI, there was not any ‘‘indisput-
able evidence that Bennett was with the petitioner the
night of the shooting.’’ First, we agree with the habeas
court that, even assuming that all the evidence relating
to Bennett—including Bennett’s identity, his CSLI, and
the weapon found in his residence—should have been
suppressed under the exclusionary rule, ‘‘there was
ample independent evidence . . . that implicated the
[petitioner].’’ The petitioner argues that the CSLI was
critical because it was the ‘‘only definitive evidence’’
that placed him in Waterbury at the time of the shooting.
We do not agree. The state introduced ample additional
evidence that the petitioner was in Waterbury at the
time of the shooting. As stated previously, Bright and
Caffrey identified the petitioner in photographic arrays
and in court. Although neither witnessed the shooting
itself, both were at the victim’s residence at the time
and saw the petitioner shortly after the shooting
occurred. This court previously noted that Bright testi-
fied that, ‘‘when the victim went to see who was at the
door at approximately 1:15 a.m., he turned on lights in

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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
their apartment as he walked from the bedroom.’’ State
v. Maner, supra, 147 Conn. App. 774. Bright overheard
a brief conversation and then a gunshot. Id. She testified
that ‘‘two men, each holding a small black gun, entered
the bedroom. A few days later, she recognized the [peti-
tioner] in a photographic array as the man wearing the
tan sweatshirt who looked in the dresser for money
and marijuana.’’ 16 Id.
Caffrey testified that she, too, heard a ‘‘crackling
sound and a thump’’ and proceeded upstairs to the
victim’s apartment, where she discovered the victim on
the ground, ‘‘full of blood,’’ after which time she began
screaming. Caffrey then observed the two men, and
testified that one of the men, whom she later identified
as the petitioner, fired his gun at her but missed. See
State v. Maner, supra, 147 Conn. App. 774. Caffrey testi-
fied that the petitioner was a dark-skinned Black male
and was wearing a tan hoodie.17
Furthermore, the jury had before it a copy of Caban’s
redacted statement to the police, in which she related
that the petitioner had informed her that he was ‘‘going
to the liquor store and he had to take care of something
while he was out.’’ Caban stated that, when the peti-
tioner left the house, he took a BB gun with him. Caban
then told the police that the petitioner left for approxi-
mately fifteen minutes, returned, and then told her he
was ‘‘going back to Waterbury to take care of something
and take some weed,’’ and twice stated, ‘‘[D]on’t worry
about it.’’ Caban stated that, approximately twenty
minutes after the petitioner left, he called her and asked
16 Officer Frank Brevetti of the Waterbury Police Department testified that
he responded to the scene and spoke to Bright. He noted that she had
described the petitioner and Bennett to him as two Black males with
‘‘large builds.’’
17 Orzuna-Sanchez also testified that, when the petitioner left the victim’s
apartment, she recalled that he was wearing a tan hoodie, jeans, and tan
Timberland boots.

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Maner v. Commissioner of Correction
what exit to take to get to Orzuna-Sanchez’ house in
Waterbury. Caban then indicated that, at approximately
2 a.m., the petitioner returned home and was ‘‘real ner-
vous.’’ Caban stated that the petitioner told her, ‘‘[I]t
wasn’t good, nothing happened and don’t ask any ques-
tions.’’ Thus, even without his CSLI, the state presented
ample independent evidence from which the jury rea-
sonably could have concluded that the petitioner was
in Waterbury at the time of the shooting.
This court previously concluded that, even though
the trial court had improperly admitted into evidence
a firearm found in Bennett’s apartment and testimony
related to that firearm, any error was not harmful. State
v. Maner, supra, 147 Conn. App. 764–65. In so conclud-
ing, this court relied on the eyewitness testimony of
Bright and Caffrey, the petitioner’s CSLI, Cornish’s testi-
mony, and Caban’s statement to the police. Id., 774–75;
see also, e.g., State v. Bonner, 290 Conn. 468, 501, 964
A.2d 73 (2009) (there was overwhelming weight of evi-
dence when two eyewitnesses saw defendant point gun
at victim’s car at time of shooting and state presented
testimony of jailhouse informant that defendant con-
fessed to fatally shooting victim). We are not persuaded
by the petitioner’s argument that, because this court
previously relied on his CSLI in concluding that the
trial court’s error in admitting the firearm evidence
was harmless, ‘‘this court cannot claim to have a fair
assurance that the error did not substantially affect the
verdict when the record shows that two impermissible
pieces of evidence were used to convict the petitioner.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court cited to
the petitioner’s CSLI as one piece of evidence out of
many in concluding that the admission of the firearm
evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Maner, supra, 774–75. Thus, this court’s prior
decision on direct appeal does not preclude our conclu-
sion on collateral review that any error relating to the
petitioner’s CSLI was also harmless.

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The petitioner further argues that the CSLI was
important because of the lack of DNA or other forensic
evidence directly linking him to the scene. The CSLI in
the present case, however, did not pinpoint the peti-
tioner at the scene but, rather, revealed that his cell
phone was located in Waterbury. This fact was relied
on during defense counsel’s closing argument when he
stated that ‘‘[t]hose cell towers reached two to ten miles
away from each other . . . [it] just give[s] you a real
relative area.’’ As the petitioner’s counsel testified at
the habeas trial, ‘‘when they were talking [about] Water-
bury, we indicated that [this] basically was a three mile
circle and they didn’t have, at that time, the location—
the ability to locate what direction the phone was ping-
ing from. . . . So, you know, our argument was that
[the CSLI] didn’t . . . necessarily put him at [the vic-
tim’s residence].’’ Moreover, although it is true that the
petitioner’s DNA was not recovered at the scene, ‘‘[i]t
is well established . . . that a lack of physical evidence
does not necessarily equate to a weak case.’’ State v.
Ayala, 333 Conn. 225, 236, 215 A.3d 116 (2019); see,
e.g., id. (concluding that, although physical evidence
linking defendant to murder would have made state’s
case stronger, unchallenged testimonial evidence of
witnesses demonstrated defendant’s guilt); see also,
e.g., State v. Fauci, 282 Conn. 23, 53, 917 A.2d 978 (2007)
(concluding that state’s case was strong on basis of
witness testimony despite lack of physical evidence
linking defendant to crime).
We are also not persuaded by the petitioner’s chal-
lenges to the credibility of the state’s witnesses. First,
the petitioner questions the identifications of the peti-
tioner made by Bright and Caffrey. Specifically, the
petitioner notes that there were discrepancies in the
witnesses’ physical descriptions of him. 18 The petitioner
18 During his closing argument, defense counsel focused on Bright’s and
Caffrey’s descriptions of the petitioner’s height as ‘‘about five ten,’’ stating,
‘‘You saw [the petitioner] several times. He’s not five ten, not even close.’’

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also argues that ‘‘[b]oth [Caffrey and Bright] indicated
that they had only observed the men responsible for
a few seconds, in a dark apartment, under incredibly
stressful circumstances.’’ The weight of that evidence,
however, including any discrepancies or infirmities
regarding the identification evidence, was customary
grist for the jury mill. ‘‘Any uncertainty on the witness’
part goes toward the weight of the evidence . . . [t]he
weaknesses of identifications can be explored on cross-
examination and during counsel’s final arguments to
the jury. . . . Juries are not so susceptible that they
cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification
testimony that has some questionable feature.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ortiz, 252 Conn.
533, 556, 747 A.2d 487 (2000); see also, e.g., State v.
McLaurin, 352 Conn. 500, 526, 337 A.3d 1039 (2025)
(witness’ fear in and of itself does not ‘‘render an identi-
fication unreliable’’); State v. McCarthy, 105 Conn. App.
596, 604, 939 A.2d 1195 (2008) (‘‘[w]hen determining
whether a witness had sufficient time to observe a
defendant to ensure a reliable identification . . . a
good hard look will pass muster even if it occurs during
a fleeting glance . . . a view of even a few seconds
may be sufficient for a witness to make an identification
. . . it is for the trier of fact to determine the weight to
be given that identification’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The petitioner also noted that, at his criminal trial,
the jury heard the petitioner’s expert witness, Stephen
Penrod, a professor of psychology, testify concerning
how various factors, including ‘‘stress, weapon focus,
On rebuttal, the prosecutor countered that the evidenced showed that Bright
first saw the petitioner when she was ‘‘on the floor . . . looking up,’’ indicat-
ing that the petitioner may have appeared taller to Bright from her vantage
point than he actually was. The prosecutor argued further that, with respect
to the photographic arrays, Bright and Caffrey were only shown a face, and,
therefore, the issue of the petitioner’s height was not a ‘‘big issue.’’

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effects 	of 	cross-racial 	identifications, 	unconscious
transference, suggestible police practices, memory,
confidence, and accuracy impact identifications.’’ 19 The
petitioner 	relies 	on 	that 	testimony 	on 	appeal 	in
attempting to discredit Bright’s and Caffrey’s identifica-
tions of him. Having heard that expert testimony, how-
ever, it was for the jury to accept or reject that evidence.
See, e.g., State v. LeRoya M., 340 Conn. 590, 615, 264
A.3d 983 (2021) (‘‘[t]he [fact finder] is free to accept or
reject each expert’s opinion in whole or in part’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
The petitioner also challenges the weight of Caban’s
statement to the police, which was admitted into evi-
dence under Whelan, on the ground that Caban had an
imperfect memory. First, defense counsel did not object
to the admission of Caban’s redacted statement. Fur-
thermore, the jury heard testimony revealing Caban’s
memory deficits,20 and the trial court determined that
Caban was not incompetent to testify. Specifically, the
court stated: ‘‘While I do believe that this witness may
have some memory issues, I do not believe that those
memory issues are of such a nature that would make
her incompetent to be a witness.’’ To the extent that
the jury heard evidence that Caban had an imperfect
memory, that issue was an issue of credibility and
weight for it to determine. See, e.g., State v. Jacques,
353 Conn. 122, 157, 340 A.3d 1073 (2025) (noting that
courts have suggested that ‘‘memory loss, whether gen-
uine or feigned, medical or otherwise, is an issue of
credibility and weight for the jury’’).
19 On appeal to this court, the petitioner has not challenged the identifica-
tion procedures used by the Waterbury Police Department in conducting
the photographic arrays as being unduly suggestive or otherwise improper.
20 Caban testified on direct examination by the prosecutor that she ‘‘[has]
a bad memory,’’ stemming from a medical history of seizures, and that, as
of the time of her testimony at the petitioner’s criminal trial, she did not
recall where she was at the time of the shooting.

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Finally, the petitioner argues that the record shows
that Cornish was a ‘‘self-interested felon . . . .’’ 21 First,
defense counsel cross-examined Cornish concerning
his motivations for testifying against the petitioner,
namely, the fact that he was offered the opportunity to
pursue a sentence modification in exchange for his
testimony. Furthermore, although the petitioner argues
that Cornish had admitted that he had reviewed the
petitioner’s warrant when they shared a cell, the jury,
by virtue of defense counsel’s cross-examination, was
made aware of this fact and was free to credit his
testimony. We also agree with the respondent that Cor-
nish’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence.
Specifically, (1) Cornish’s testimony that the petitioner
told him that he shot at Caffrey was corroborated by
her own testimony, (2) his testimony that the petitioner
told him he had cleaned blood off his shoes was consis-
tent with the victim’s injuries,22 and (3) his testimony
that the petitioner claimed to have used a .45 caliber
firearm during the shooting was consistent with shell
21 ‘‘Cornish testified: ‘[The petitioner] told me that he was looking for
some marijuana. The girl that he was messing with out in Waterbury said
she knew somebody who has some marijuana. They went to the kid’s house,
sold him some marijuana. He asked the kid if he could get some weight,
meaning more, like bigger amounts. The kid said yes. And he decided he
was going to rob him. So, he went back to Bridgeport, where he’s from,
tried to get a gun, ended up getting a gun from somebody he referred to as
his neighbor, at first. Then he told me the kid’s name was Cal. They went
back together and robbed the kid—well, knocked on the door, shot him—
rang the doorbell, shot him in the face and then robbed him.’ ’’ State v.
Maner, supra, 147 Conn. App. 775 n.9.
Cornish also stated: ‘‘I guess, on the way back out, [Caffrey] was there.
And he said she started flipping out. So he shot at her and ran out [of] the
house.’’ Cornish further testified that, ‘‘I think [the petitioner] said the police
took his shoes, but they wouldn’t be able to find the blood on the shoes
because of some cleaner he used at his job or something like that.’’ Lucinda
Lopes Phelan, a forensic science examiner, noted that she examined a pair
of Timberland boots, and they tested negative on her screening test for blood.
22 Caffrey testified that when she encountered the victim, there was ‘‘blood
all over the place . . . .’’

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casings recovered at the scene.23 See, e.g., State v.
Sayles, 348 Conn. 669, 691, 310 A.3d 929 (2024) (‘‘what
may be qualitatively weak evidence—especially stand-
ing alone—may grow in strength considerably when
viewed in context’’), citing State v. Maner, supra, 147
Conn. App. 780–81.
Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury to weigh
Cornish’s testimony critically, stating that it ‘‘must look
with particular care at the testimony of an informant
and scrutinize it very carefully before you accept it.’’
See Birch v. Commissioner of Correction, 334 Conn.
37, 66, 219 A.3d 353 (2019) (‘‘the trial court should
instruct the jury that the informant’s testimony must
be reviewed with particular scrutiny and weighed . . .
with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary
witness’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). We pre-
sume that the jury followed that instruction. See, e.g.,
State v. Parris, 352 Conn. 652, 682, 338 A.3d 1139 (2025)
(‘‘jurors are presumed to follow the instructions given
by the judge’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Although it is true that Cornish was given the right to
argue for a sentence modification, Cornish testified that
the state did not make him any promises as to whether
a sentence modification would be granted by the sen-
tencing court. Thus, the jury, ‘‘properly instructed on
informant testimony, was free to accept and credit [Cor-
nish’s] testimony, despite his status as a jailhouse infor-
mant.’’ State v. Franklin, 175 Conn. App. 22, 35 n.14,
166 A.3d 24, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 961, 172 A.3d 801
(2017). As with the other witnesses, defense counsel
23 Cornish testified that the petitioner told him that he used a .45 caliber
firearm during the shooting. Two shell casings were recovered at the scene
and were determined to have been fired from the same gun. Maria DiVirgilio
Torre, a crime scene technician at the Waterbury Police Department, testified
that ‘‘[t]here was a spent .45 caliber casing on the rug . . . .’’ A firearms
and toolmark examiner testified that, although he was not certain of the
caliber of the recovered casings, ‘‘[i]t was a larger caliber. I think I put down
over .38.’’

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was given ample opportunity to cross-examine Cornish
to expose infirmities in his testimony. See, e.g., State
v. Correa, supra, 353 Conn. 380 (noting extent of cross-
examination as part of harmless error analysis).
Finally, we also consider the parties’ closing argu-
ments to ‘‘determine the evidence’s centrality to the
factual issues.’’ Id., 381. Specifically, ‘‘we analyze the
degree of the parties’ emphasis and reliance on the
improperly admitted evidence [as] indicative of its
importance to the jury’s verdict.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id. The prosecutor began his closing
argument by stating, ‘‘Let’s talk about what the only
issue is in this case. Who did it?’’ The prosecutor pro-
ceeded to argue that the petitioner was a guest in the
victim’s apartment earlier in the day and that he had
conversations about purchasing marijuana with the vic-
tim. The prosecutor did assert that the petitioner’s CSLI
revealed, contrary to his initial claim to the police that
he had remained in Bridgeport that night, that he had,
instead, returned to Waterbury. After summarizing that
evidence, however, the prosecutor spent the bulk of
the rest of his argument on the identification evidence
presented by the state. Specifically, the prosecutor
argued that Caffrey was ‘‘absolutely certain’’ that the
petitioner was in the apartment. The prosecutor noted
that, when Caffrey was shown the photographic array,
she identified the petitioner as, ‘‘[w]ithout question,
without a moment’s hesitation, the man who shot at
[her].’’ The prosecutor stated: ‘‘Why is this important?
Because the defense and I know what this case is about,
about identification.’’
Defense counsel argued in closing that the CSLI ‘‘just
gives you a relative area,’’ and conceded that, ‘‘yes, [the
petitioner] and . . . Bennett were both in the Water-
bury area.’’ Defense counsel focused the remainder of
his closing argument on disputing the credibility of the
state’s witnesses, particularly that of Bright and Caffrey,

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and the fact that there was not any physical evidence
linking the petitioner to the scene, such as fingerprints,
DNA, or clothing. He also relied on Penrod’s testimony
in order to discredit the identification evidence. During
his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor concluded his
argument by emphasizing the eyewitness identification
evidence, stating: ‘‘[T]he state submits to you that there
is no reasonable possibility that this happened any other
way than the way the evidence came in. That . . . Caf-
frey . . . got it right. That, when . . . Bright saw those
people come into her room and saw [the petitioner]
with a gun, the man in the khaki colored T-shirt, she
got it right. . . . And that, when they came to court
and look[ed] at [the petitioner] and pointed at him and
said, yes, that’s the man that was in the kitchen, they
got it right. And there is nothing you’ve heard to tell
you that they got it wrong. Dr. Penrod can talk about
a lot of things, but he can’t tell you that. And, if you
look at all of the corroboration that’s in this case, all
of the different factors, all the different evidence before
you, there is no possible doubt that we have proved this
case beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ Thus, the petitioner’s
CSLI, although relied on by the prosecutor, was not ‘‘so
outsized or critical that we can conclude that this factor
would be dispositive in our determination of whether
the evidence contributed to the jury’s verdict.’’ State v.
Correa, supra, 353 Conn. 382; see also State v. Sayles,
supra, 348 Conn. 698 (‘‘our case law establishes that a
prosecutor’s reliance on illegally obtained evidence in
closing arguments . . . is not dispositive’’).
Viewed in context, the prosecutor’s focus in closing
was on the identification evidence, whereas the evi-
dence relating to the petitioner’s CSLI was used by the
prosecutor to corroborate the witnesses’ identifications
of 	the 	petitioner. 	Accordingly, 	we 	conclude 	that,
although the CSLI was important evidence, it was not
critical to the state’s case. See, e.g., State v. Correa,

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supra, 353 Conn. 382 (concluding that improper admis-
sion of evidence of cell phone’s contents was harmless,
reasoning that, ‘‘[a]lthough the cell phone evidence may
have been important, it was not critical to the state’s
case against the defendant’’). Rather, it was cumulative
of independent evidence—namely, the testimony of the
eyewitnesses, as well as the evidence from Caban and
Cornish—that placed the petitioner in Waterbury at the
time of the shooting. See, e.g., State v. Armadore, supra,
338 Conn. 450 (‘‘[b]ecause the admission of the defen-
dant’s historical CSLI was cumulative of other evidence
establishing that the defendant was near [the scene] at
the time of the shooting, and because the state pre-
sented other significant evidence of guilt, we conclude
that the admission of these records was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt’’); State v. Smith, 156 Conn.
App. 537, 567, 113 A.3d 103 (concluding that, ‘‘[a]lthough
clearly persuasive, the CSLI’’ presented was merely
cumulative of ‘‘mountain of additional evidence adduced
at trial to establish the defendant’s guilt’’), cert. denied,
317 Conn. 910, 115 A.3d 1106 (2015).
Therefore, we conclude that the evidence against the
petitioner, ‘‘viewed cumulatively and in context, was
strong, independent of the . . . [CSLI].’’ State v. Cor-
rea, supra, 353 Conn. 382. Although the CSLI evidence
may have been important, it was not critical to the
state’s case against the petitioner. See, e.g., id. Accord-
ingly, we are not persuaded that, even assuming the
petitioner’s CSLI was improperly admitted, that evi-
dence contributed to or substantially affected the jury’s
verdict.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.