Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion
motions and petitions for certification is the “officially
released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is
to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an
opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and
subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut
Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the
State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced
or distributed without the express written permission of
the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial
Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
JOSE ERIC RAMOS v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION
(AC 46912)
Suarez, Clark and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus
The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of murder, appealed fol-
lowing the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the habeas
court’s judgment denying his habeas petition. He claimed, inter alia, that
the court violated his statutory and constitutional right to habeas counsel
and his due process rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to
the United States constitution by conducting an inadequate canvass of him
before granting his motion to dismiss habeas counsel. Held:
The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner’s
petition for certification to appeal with respect to his unpreserved claim
that the court conducted an inadequate canvass, the petitioner having failed
to demonstrate that this claim was of constitutional magnitude alleging a
violation of a fundamental right, as there is no federal constitutional right to
counsel in a habeas proceeding, he failed to brief his procedural due process
claim pursuant to Mathews v. Eldridge (424 U.S. 319), and, to the extent
he intended to claim that the state constitution provides broader protection
than the federal constitution by guaranteeing a right to habeas counsel and
a corresponding right to an adequate canvass before permitting a petitioner
to proceed in a self-represented capacity, this court declined to address that
claim because he failed to provide an independent and sufficient analysis
of it in accordance with any of the factors set forth in State v. Geisler (222
Conn. 672).
The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for
certification to appeal with respect to the petitioner’s claim that the court
improperly concluded that his trial counsel was not ineffective, as the habeas
court did not have the opportunity to consider the claim in the context of
the petition for certification to appeal because the petitioner failed to raise
it in his petition and the claim did not relate to the court’s handling of the
habeas proceedings.
Argued October 9, 2025—officially released January 27, 2026
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Tolland, where the court, M. Murphy, J., granted
the petitioner’s motion to dismiss counsel; thereafter,
the case was tried to the court, Newson, J.; judgment
denying the petition; subsequently, the court, Newson,

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
J., denied the petition for certification to appeal, and
the petitioner appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.
Michael W. Brown, assigned counsel, with whom, on
the brief, was Abigail H. Mason, assigned counsel, for
the appellant (petitioner).
Nathan J. Buchok, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Paul Narducci, state’s attorney,
and Jo Anne Sulik, senior assistant state’s attorney, for
the appellee (respondent).
Opinion
CLARK, J. The petitioner, Jose Eric Ramos, appeals
following the denial of his petition for certification to
appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the
petitioner claims that the habeas court abused its discre-
tion when it denied his petition for certification to appeal
because the habeas court (1) violated his statutory and
constitutional right to habeas counsel and his due process
rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States constitution by conducting an inadequate
canvass of him before granting his motion to dismiss
counsel, and (2) improperly concluded that his trial
counsel was not ineffective. The respondent, the Com-
missioner of Correction, argues that the appeal should
be dismissed because (1) these claims were not included
in the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal,
and (2) the petitioner’s first claim fails under State v.
Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989),
as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120
A.3d 1188 (2015).1 We agree with the respondent and,
accordingly, dismiss the appeal.
1 The respondent also argues in the alternative that the habeas court
properly granted the petitioner’s motion to dismiss counsel and that the
habeas court correctly concluded that the petitioner failed to establish
his trial counsel was ineffective. Because we conclude that the appeal
must be dismissed for the reasons set forth herein, we do not address the
respondent’s arguments addressing the merits of the petitioner’s claims.

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
The following facts and procedural history are rel-
evant to this appeal. On February 19, 2016, following
a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of murder in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. On April 29,
2016, the court sentenced the petitioner to a total effec-
tive sentence of sixty years of imprisonment. On direct
appeal, this court affirmed the judgment of conviction.
See State v. Ramos, 178 Conn. App. 400, 414, 175 A.3d
1265 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 1003, 176 A. 3d
1195 (2018), cert. denied, 585 U.S. 1007, 138 S. Ct.
2656, 201 L. Ed. 2d 1056 (2018).
On June 16, 2016, the petitioner commenced the
present habeas corpus action. The petitioner initially
requested the appointment of counsel, and the habeas
court appointed Kirschbaum Law Group as habeas coun-
sel. Kirschbaum Law Group appeared on behalf of the
petitioner on September 8, 2016, and, between that date
and March 4, 2021, filed several amended petitions on
the petitioner’s behalf.
On March 21, 2022, the petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss counsel in which he also requested that the court
order, inter alia, that the respondent allow him unlim-
ited access to his case files and telephone calls to enable
him to adequately represent himself. The habeas court,
M. Murphy, J., held a hearing on the motion on April
28, 2022. At the hearing, the petitioner explained that
he wanted to represent himself because his case was
being delayed due to assigned counsel’s lack of access
to and inability to communicate with him.2 The court
inquired as to whether the petitioner would have “enough
of resources to represent” himself. The petitioner main-
tained that he was “ready, willing and able” to represent
himself and had access to “all the legal material necessary
to proceed . . . .” The court informed the petitioner that
2 The April 28, 2022 hearing transcript indicates that the restrictions
the petitioner experienced attempting to access or communicate with
counsel were due to COVID-19 protocols within the facility where the
petitioner was incarcerated at the time.

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
there were going to be “limitations” put on his access to
the case file due to the “rules for safety and integrity”
at the Department of Correction. The petitioner, who
was appearing remotely before the court, repeatedly
interrupted the court to voice his objection to those
limitations and, to prevent further interruptions, the
court muted his microphone. The court then granted
the motion to dismiss counsel. Thereafter, the petitioner
was taken off mute, and the court asked the petitioner if
there were any further issues he wanted to address. The
petitioner thanked the court for granting his motion and
requested a ruling on his objection to the limitations.
The court overruled his objection and indicated that
it would issue a written order setting forth the param-
eters of the petitioner’s right to access materials neces-
sary to represent himself and that the petitioner could
file a motion objecting to the order after it was issued.
The court issued its written order on the motion to
dismiss counsel that same day, on April 28, 2022. The
written order specified that “the petitioner’s current
counsel shall send the petitioner’s case files to the Office
of the Chief Public Defender (OCPD). The OCPD may
share the now self-represented petitioner’s case file with
the petitioner in the following manner: Pursuant to . . .
Practice Book [§] 23-38 (b) and (c), the OCPD may provide
to the petitioner properly redacted copies of discovery
materials from the underlying criminal proceedings
and/or habeas matters, limited in the following manner.
Any discovery materials provided to the self-represented
petitioner from his underlying criminal file and/or habeas
matters shall be redacted by the entity providing the
files to the petitioner to eliminate personal identifica-
tion information regarding victims, witnesses, persons
giving statements, etc. See General Statutes § 54-86e.”
The order did not address the petitioner’s request for an
order requiring the respondent to give him unlimited
access to his case files and telephone calls. The petitioner

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
filed a written objection to the order on May 9, 2022,3
which the court subsequently denied.
The petitioner thereafter proceeded in a self-repre-
sented capacity. On May 4, 2022, the petitioner filed the
operative eighth amended petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, which included seven counts: (1) actual inno-
cence; (2) a violation of his due process rights as a result
of the state’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence;
(3) a violation of his due process rights as a result of
the state’s knowing presentation of false testimony;
(4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for a variety
of reasons; (5) a violation of his due process rights as a
result of the state’s failure to preserve evidence; (6) a
violation of the confrontation clause as a result of the
state’s failure to present an accuser at trial; and (7) a
violation of his right to equal protection and due process
as a result of the state’s and the trial court’s failure to
perfect jurisdiction, to advise him of his rights, and to
allow the petitioner to represent himself.
The habeas court, Newson, J., conducted a trial
over the course of three days on December 1, 2022,
and March 1 and May 10, 2023. On July 11, 2023,
the habeas court issued a memorandum of decision in
which it rendered judgment denying the petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in its entirety.4
Thereafter, on July 24, 2023, the petitioner filed a
petition for certification to appeal pursuant to General
3 In his written objection, the petitioner objected to the limitations
placed on his access to discovery materials. The habeas court treated
the petitioner’s objection as a motion to reargue/reconsider.
4 On July 26, 2016, the petitioner also filed a petition for a new trial
in which he represented himself. On January 10, 2022, the petitioner
filed a motion to consolidate his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
his petition for a new trial. The court, Oliver, J., denied that motion
but ordered that the cases could be tried together by agreement of the
parties. The July 11, 2023 memorandum of decision addressed both
the petition for a new trial and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The court, Newson, J., also denied the petitioner’s petition for a new
trial in that memorandum of decision. The petitioner appealed from
the denial of his petition for a new trial, and this court dismissed the
appeal because the petitioner failed to comply with the certification

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
Statutes § 52-470 (g). In his petition for certification to
appeal, the petitioner sought certification to pursue the
following claims on appeal: (1) the habeas court had a
conflict of interest that prevented it from being impar-
tial; (2) the habeas court lacked authority to adjudicate
his claims; (3) the habeas court was not the proper venue
for the habeas proceeding; (4) the habeas court dem-
onstrated undue bias/prejudice to him; (5) the habeas
court was practicing law from the bench; (6) the habeas
court’s continuous objections and interruptions violated
his constitutional rights; (7) the habeas court violated
his constitutional rights by preventing him from ask-
ing witnesses about reward money; (8) the habeas court
misrepresented the facts and evidence presented at trial
in its memorandum of decision; (9) the habeas court’s
denial of certain subpoenas violated his constitutional
rights; and (10) “[a]ll other issues that may become appar-
ent upon the review of the transcripts and/or questions
that arise.” The habeas court denied the petition for
certification to appeal on August 1, 2023. This appeal
followed.5 Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
On appeal, the petitioner raises two claims: (1) the
habeas court violated his statutory and constitutional
right to habeas counsel and to due process under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut
constitution by granting his motion to dismiss counsel
without adequately canvassing him, and (2) the court
improperly concluded that his trial counsel was not inef-
fective. The petitioner first argues that both of his claims
were properly preserved for appeal because they were
sufficiently raised in his petition for certification to
appeal.6 In addition, with respect to his first claim, the
requirements of General Statutes § 54-95 (a). See Ramos v. State, 236
Conn. App. 560, 561, A.3d 	(2025).
5 The petitioner requested and obtained the appointment of counsel
to represent him in this appeal.
6 Specifically, the petitioner points to the following grounds for appeal
outlined in his petition for certification: (4) “Did the trial court demon-
strate undue bias/prejudice to the petitioner?”; (6) “Was the petitioner’s
constitutional rights to: access of court and/or to petition for redress

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
petitioner argues in the alternative that, even if that
claim was not raised in his petition for certification, it is
reviewable under Golding because it relates to the habeas
court’s handling of the habeas proceedings. See Banks
v. Commissioner of Correction, 347 Conn. 335, 358,
297 A.3d 541 (2023) (holding that claims challenging
habeas court’s handling of habeas proceedings may be
reviewable under plain error doctrine or Golding even if
not included in petition for certification to appeal).7 The
respondent argues that the two claims are unreviewable
because they were not included in the petition for certi-
fication to appeal, and, thus, the petitioner cannot show
that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying
certification to appeal. The respondent further argues
of grievances and/or due process and/or equal protections of the law
violated by the trial court’s continuous objects and/or interruptions?”;
(7) “Was the petitioner’s constitutional rights to: due process; fair
trial; equal protections of the law; petition for redress of grievance,
etc. violated by the trial court’s orders/instructions that prevented
the petitioner from asking (a) witness(es) about reward money on direct
examination?”; (9) “Was the petitioner’s [constitutional rights to: due
process; fair trial; petition for redress of grievance; access of court;
effective assistance of counsel violated by the trial court’s denial of
the petitioner’s applications for specific subpoenas?”; (10) “All other
issues, that may become apparent upon the review of the transcripts,
and/or questions that arise.”
7 The petitioner did not allege or brief a claim of plain error in his prin-
cipal appellate brief. Neither his principal nor his reply brief sets forth
the legal analysis or our standard of review for determining whether
his claim satisfies the plain error doctrine. “[W]e will not review an
underlying claim for plain error unless the request for relief under that
doctrine has been adequately briefed. . . . A party claiming plain error
must engage in a separate analysis under that doctrine to demonstrate
that plain error has occurred under the circumstances of [the] case.
. . . Indeed, a mere conclusory assertion of plain error is insufficient
to allow this court to reach the merits of an unpreserved claim under
that doctrine.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carlson,
226 Conn. App. 514, 540, 318 A.3d 283, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 911,
324 A.3d 143 (2024). “[W] e will not consider arguments raised for the
first time in a reply brief.” State v. Toro, 172 Conn. App. 810, 820, 162
A.3d 63, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 905, 170 A.3d 2 (2017). We decline
to review the petitioner’s claim under the plain error doctrine because
he did not clearly allege plain error in his principal appellate brief and
because he failed to brief the issue adequately in either of the briefs he
filed with this court.

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
that, although the petitioner’s claim challenging the
adequacy of the habeas court’s canvass prior to granting
the petitioner’s request to dismiss counsel relates to the
habeas court’s handling of the habeas proceedings, it is
not a claim of constitutional magnitude that warrants
review under Golding.
We begin our analysis by setting forth the standard
of review and procedural requirements with which a
petitioner must comply to obtain appellate review when
a petition for certification has been denied. General Stat-
utes § 52-470 (g) provides: “No appeal from the judgment
rendered in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by or on
behalf of a person who has been convicted of a crime in
order to obtain such person’s release may be taken unless
the appellant, within ten days after the case is decided,
petitions the judge before whom the case was tried or, if
such judge is unavailable, a judge of the Superior Court
designated by the Chief Court Administrator, to certify
that a question is involved in the decision which ought
to be reviewed by the court having jurisdiction and the
judge so certifies.”
“In Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 187, 640 A.2d
601 (1994), [our Supreme Court] concluded that . . .
§ 52-470 [g] prevents a reviewing court from hearing
the merits of a habeas appeal following the denial of
certification to appeal unless the petitioner establishes
that the denial of certification constituted an abuse of
discretion by the habeas court. In Simms v. Warden, 230
Conn. 608, 615–16, 646 A.2d 126 (1994), [our Supreme
Court] incorporated the factors adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S.
430, 431–32, 111 S. Ct. 860, 112 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1991),
as the appropriate standard for determining whether the
habeas court abused its discretion in denying certification
to appeal. This standard requires the petitioner to dem-
onstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of
reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different
manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further. . . . A petitioner

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
who establishes an abuse of discretion through one of
the factors listed above must then demonstrate that the
judgment of the habeas court should be reversed on its
merits.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Kowalyshyn v. Commissioner of Correction,
155 Conn. App. 384, 388–89, 109 A.3d 963, cert. denied,
316 Conn. 909, 111 A.3d 883 (2015).
It is well established that, as a general matter, “[a]n
appellate court . . . reviews only the merits of the claims
specifically set forth in the petition for certification.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reese v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 219 Conn. App. 545, 549, 295 A.3d
513, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 906, 301 A.3d 1056 (2023).
“This court has declined to review issues in a petitioner’s
habeas appeal in situations where the habeas court denied
certification to appeal, and the issues on appeal had not
been raised in the petition for certification. . . . A habeas
petitioner cannot establish that the habeas court abused
its discretion in denying certification on issues that were
not raised in the petition for certification to appeal.”
(Citation omitted.) Kowalyshyn v. Commissioner of
Correction, supra, 155 Conn. App. 389; see also Fine
v. Commissioner of Correction, 163 Conn. App. 77, 82,
134 A.3d 682 (“when a petitioner does not raise a spe-
cific claim in the petition for certification to appeal, we
cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in
denying the petition for certification with respect to
that claim”), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 925, 133 A.3d 879
(2016); Blake v. Commissioner of Correction, 150 Conn.
App. 692, 697, 91 A.3d 535 (“[b]ecause it is impossible
to review an exercise of discretion that did not occur, we
are confined to reviewing only those issues which were
brought to the habeas court’s attention in the petition
for certification to appeal” (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 312 Conn. 923, 94 A.3d 1202
(2014); Campbell v. Commissioner of Correction, 132
Conn. App. 263, 267, 31 A.3d 1182 (2011) (review of
claims not raised in petition for certification to appeal

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
would “amount to an ambuscade of the [habeas] judge”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
This court has addressed on several occasions the issue
of whether a petitioner has sufficiently raised a claim in
a petition for certification. In Reese v. Commissioner of
Correction, supra, 219 Conn. App. 545, this court held
that a general allegation “in the petition for certification
that the court erred in denying [the] habeas petition and
that the petitioner may raise other issues upon a review
of the record”; id., 551; did not suffice to raise a specific
claim in the petition for certification to appeal, and, thus,
that we could not “conclude that the court abused discre-
tion that it was never asked to exercise.” Id., 552. The
court further clarified that the relevant consideration
is not whether the “habeas court may have considered
and exercised its discretion with respect to rulings it
made during the habeas trial” but, rather, whether the
court had an “opportunity to consider those issues in
the context of a petition for certification to appeal . . .
.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 551. Thus,
raising or litigating issues in the habeas trial is insuf-
ficient to satisfy the requirement that such issues must
be raised in the petition for certification to appeal.
In Schuler v. Commissioner of Correction, 200 Conn.
App. 602, 611–12, 238 A.3d 835 (2020), cert. denied, 336
Conn. 905, 243 A.3d 1180 (2021), this court determined
that it could not review the merits of an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim because, even though that claim
was the only claim raised in the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, the petition for certification to appeal did
not state the grounds upon which the petitioner intended
to appeal. The court explained that, “in the absence of
any stated grounds on which the petitioner proposed to
appeal, the habeas court was left to speculate as to what
issue or issues the petitioner might have sought to raise
on appeal . . . [and] could only guess whether [the peti-
tioner] intended to challenge on appeal the court’s denial
of the sole claim alleged in his petition . . . or, instead,
rulings on evidentiary claims or . . . pretrial motions.”

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id.; see also Mitchell v. Commissioner of Correction, 68
Conn. App. 1, 7, 790 A.2d 463 (declining to review claim
when allegation that “ ‘[t]he court erred in denying the
petition’” did not “apprise the court” of basis on which
petitioner was seeking certification to appeal), cert.
denied, 260 Conn. 903, 793 A.2d 1089 (2002).
Applying these principles to the present case, we con-
clude that the petitioner failed to raise either of the
claims he seeks to pursue on appeal in his petition for
certification. The petitioner asserted ten claims in his
petition for certification to appeal. None of them reason-
ably can be construed as a claim that the habeas court
improperly granted the petitioner’s request to dismiss
counsel without performing an adequate canvass of the
petitioner or that the habeas court improperly concluded
that the petitioner’s trial counsel was not ineffective.
Moreover, although the two issues on appeal may have
arisen or been considered by the court during the habeas
proceedings, the court did not have the opportunity to
consider them in the context of the petition for certifica-
tion to appeal. “It would constitute an ambuscade of the
[habeas] court for this court to review issues that were
never considered by the habeas court in denying the peti-
tion for certification.” Kowalyshyn v. Commissioner of
Correction, supra, 155 Conn. App. 391. Additionally,
as was the case in Reese, the petition’s mere assertion
that the petitioner may raise other issues upon review
of the record did not provide the habeas court an oppor-
tunity to exercise its discretion to assess the viability of
the claims that the petitioner now raises on appeal. See
Reese v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 219 Conn.
App. 551. Accordingly, and in the absence of any claim
that the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel is nevertheless reviewable under Banks,
we conclude that the petitioner has failed to establish

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying
his petition for certification to appeal that claim.
With respect to the petitioner’s first claim of error
concerning the adequacy of the habeas court’s canvass at
the time it granted his motion to dismiss habeas counsel,
the petitioner argues, in the alternative, that if we con-
clude that he failed to raise that claim in his petition for
certification to appeal, that claim is still reviewable under
Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 347 Conn.
335. Specifically, the petitioner argues that this claim
is reviewable because it challenges the habeas court’s
handling of the habeas proceeding itself and because it
is of constitutional magnitude implicating his federal
constitutional right to due process under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States constitu-
tion and his state constitutional rights under article
first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution.
In support of this argument, the petitioner presents
a single analysis for both his state and federal consti-
tutional claims. He argues that, because Connecticut
law extends to a habeas petitioner a right to competent
counsel which is, in effect, the same right that a defen-
dant has in a criminal prosecution, the constitutional
right to an adequate canvass that is required in order to
safeguard a criminal defendant’s sixth amendment right
to counsel and self-representation “must” also apply to a
habeas petitioner seeking to proceed in a self-represented
capacity. The respondent argues that the claim is not
reviewable under Golding because “a habeas petitioner
has no constitutional right to counsel in a habeas proceed-
ing.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) We conclude
that the petitioner’s claim fails under the second prong
of Golding because he has failed to demonstrate that his
claim is of constitutional magnitude.
In Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 347
Conn. 335, our Supreme Court held that Ҥ 52-470 (g)
does not restrict [a reviewing court’s] authority to review
unpreserved claims under the plain error doctrine or
Golding following a habeas court’s denial of a petition for

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
certification to appeal, so long as the appellants’ claims
challenge the habeas court’s handling of the habeas pro-
ceeding itself and the appellant fulfills his or her burden
of establishing that the unpreserved claims involve issues
that are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court
could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that
the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement
to proceed further.” 8 (Emphasis omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Id., 350. “In other words, the
appellant must demonstrate that the unpreserved and
uncertified claims are nonfrivolous, which we define as
raising a colorable claim of plain error or the violation of
a constitutional right due to the actions or omissions of
the habeas court. Only if the appellant succeeds in sur-
mounting that hurdle will the appellate court review the
appellant’s unpreserved claims on the merits.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 350–51; see also Bosque
v. Commissioner of Correction, 347 Conn. 377, 379,
297 A.3d 981 (2023) (“unpreserved claims challeng-
ing the habeas court’s handling of the habeas proceed-
ing itself are reviewable under the plain error doctrine
and Golding, despite the failure to include those claims
in the petition for certification to appeal, if the appel-
lant can demonstrate that the claims are nonfrivolous
because they involve issues that are debatable among
jurists of reason; that a court could resolve [them in a
different manner]; or that [they] are adequate to deserve
8 In Banks, our Supreme Court emphasized “that a petitioner raising
an unpreserved claim that was not included in the petition for certifica-
tion to appeal under the plain error doctrine or Golding must fulfill the
burden of establishing that the habeas court’s denial of the petition for
certification to appeal was an abuse of its discretion under the [Simms
v. Warden, supra, 230 Conn. 616] criteria.” Banks v. Commissioner of
Correction, supra, 347 Conn. 358. Our Supreme Court noted, however,
that “[t]he more accurate inquiry . . . is whether it would have been an
abuse of discretion to deny the petition for certification to appeal if the
unpreserved issue had been included in the petition for certification.”
(Emphasis in original.) Id., 358 n.13.

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
encouragement to proceed further” (emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted)).
“In Golding, our Supreme Court held that a [peti-
tioner] can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not
preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions
are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged
claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magni-
tude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3)
the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . .
deprived the [petitioner] of a fair trial; and (4) if subject
to harmless error analysis, the [respondent] has failed to
demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional
violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any
one of these conditions, the [petitioner’s] claim will fail.
The appellate tribunal is free, therefore, to respond to the
[petitioner’s] claim by focusing on whichever condition is
most relevant in the particular circumstances.” (Empha-
sis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Banks
v. Commissioner of Correction, 225 Conn. App. 234,
248–49, 314 A.3d 1052, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 922, 321
A.3d 1130 (2024). An affirmative request is not required
to obtain review pursuant to Golding. State v. Elson,
311 Conn. 726, 754–55, 91 A.3d 862 (2014). Rather,
to obtain Golding review, the petitioner must “present
a record that is [adequate] for review and affirmatively
[demonstrate] that his claim is indeed a violation of a
fundamental constitutional right.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 755. For the following reasons, we
conclude that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate
that his claim is of a constitutional magnitude alleging
the violation of a fundamental right.
First, there is no federal constitutional right to habeas
counsel. Although “[t]he sixth amendment to the United
States constitution guarantees a criminal defendant fac-
ing incarceration the right to assistance of counsel for
his defense”; State v. Cushard, 328 Conn. 558, 566, 181
A.3d 74 (2018); and “a corresponding right to decline
the assistance of counsel and instead represent himself”;
id., 567; it is well established that “there is no [federal]

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
constitutional right to counsel in habeas proceedings .
. . .” Morgan v. Commissioner of Correction, 87 Conn.
App. 126, 132, 866 A.2d 649 (2005). Although “General
Statutes § 51-2969 . . . creates a statutory right to counsel
. . . for an indigent defendant . . . in any habeas corpus
proceeding arising from a criminal matter”; (emphasis in
original; footnote added; internal quotation marks omit-
ted) id.; that right is derived from statute. See Lozada v.
Warden, 223 Conn. 834, 838, 613 A.2d 818 (1992) (“[t]he
right to effective assistance of [habeas] counsel is predi-
cated on the statutory right to habeas counsel pursuant
to . . . § 51-296”). Moreover, although, in Lozada, our
Supreme Court held that the statutory right to counsel in
habeas proceedings pursuant to § 51-296 also guarantees
habeas petitioners the right to effective assistance of
counsel; id., 838–39; the court also specifically noted that
a petitioner “possesses no federal constitutional right to
counsel in a habeas corpus proceeding.” Id., 839 n.8; see
also Harris v. United States, 367 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir.
2004) (“a habeas petitioner has no constitutional right to
counsel in his habeas proceeding”). Rather, “the [s]ixth
[a]mendment [to the United States constitution] only
applies to a defendant’s trial and first appeal as of right,
not to appeals afforded on a discretionary basis, collat-
eral proceedings, or civil proceedings . . . .” (Emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Small v.
State, 101 Conn. App. 213, 219, 920 A.2d 1024 (2007),
appeal dismissed, 290 Conn. 128, 962 A.2d 80, cert.
denied, 558 U.S. 842, 130 S. Ct. 102, 175 L. Ed. 2d 68
(2009).10 Cf. Peeler v. Commissioner of Correction, 170
Conn. App. 654, 672 n.11, 155 A.3d 772 (emphasizing
that right to self-representation in habeas proceeding is
9 General Statutes § 51-296 (a) provides in relevant part: “In any
criminal action, in any habeas corpus proceeding arising from a criminal
matter, in any extradition proceeding, or in any delinquency matter,
the court before which the matter is pending shall, if it determines
after investigation by the public defender or his office that a defendant
is indigent as defined under this chapter, designate a public defender,
assistant public defender or deputy assistant public defender to repre-
sent such indigent defendant . . . .”
10 See, e.g., Duperry v. Solnit, 261 Conn. 309, 318, 803 A.2d 287
(2002) (habeas corpus proceeding is collateral proceeding).

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
“nonconstitutional right to self-representation” (empha-
sis omitted)), cert. denied, 325 Conn. 901, 157 A.3d
1146 (2017).
During oral argument before this court, the petitioner
argued, for the first time, that the habeas court’s alleged
inadequate canvass violated his right to procedural
due process pursuant to the framework established by
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893,
47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). In Mathews, the United States
Supreme Court “established a three-prong balancing test
to determine what safeguards the federal constitution
requires to satisfy procedural due process.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Frauenglass & Associates,
LLC v. Enagbare, 149 Conn. App. 103, 110, 88 A.3d
1246, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 927, 101 A.3d 273 (2014).
The petitioner, however, did not clearly raise and did not
brief any such claim in his principal appellate brief or
his reply brief. Indeed, the petitioner’s briefs make no
mention at all of Mathews and fail to engage in anything
resembling the three part balancing test that decision
requires in order to determine whether a party’s federal
right to procedural due process has been violated. As a
result, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to brief
a procedural due process claim and therefore cannot dem-
onstrate that his claim is of constitutional magnitude.
See Hornish v. Suffield, 234 Conn. App. 85, 95 n.6, 343
A.3d 516, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 920, 345 A.3d 809
(2025) (finding federal due process claim inadequately
briefed where plaintiffs failed to “apply the traditional
three part balancing test set forth in Mathews” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Lastly, to the extent that the petitioner intended to
claim that article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitu-
tion provides broader protection than the federal con-
stitution by guaranteeing a right to habeas counsel and
a corresponding right to an adequate canvass before
permitting a petitioner to proceed in a self-represented
capacity, we decline to address any such claim because the
petitioner failed to provide an independent and sufficient

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
analysis of it in accordance with any of the factors set
forth in State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684–86, 610
A.2d 1225 (1992).11 The petitioner’s brief provides no
analysis of the text or history of the state constitution,
related Connecticut precedents, or persuasive precedents
from federal or state courts. Instead, the petitioner
merely cites to the provision of the state constitution
upon which he purports to rely and asserts in a conclusory
fashion that because there is a statutory right to habeas
counsel that includes a right to competent counsel, his
right to an adequate canvass before proceeding in a self-
represented capacity is protected under both the state
and federal constitutions.
It is the established precedent of this court not to
review state constitutional claims in the absence of an
independent and adequate analysis. See Barros v. Bar-
ros, 309 Conn. 499, 507 n.9, 72 A.3d 367 (2013) (“we
will not entertain a state constitutional claim unless the
defendant has provided an independent analysis under
the particular provisions of the state constitution at
issue” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Grif-
fin, 217 Conn. App. 358, 363 n.3, 288 A.3d 653 (“[T]o
the extent that the defendant has attempted to advance
such a state constitutional claim on appeal, he has not
adequately briefed it pursuant to the strictures of State
v. Geisler, [supra, 222 Conn. 684–85]. Accordingly, even
if raised, we deem it abandoned.”), cert. denied, 346
Conn. 917, 290 A.3d 799 (2023); Peeler v. Commissioner
11 “In construing the Connecticut constitution to determine whether it
provides our citizens with greater protections than the federal constitu-
tion, we employ a multifactor approach that we first adopted in [Geisler].
The factors that we consider are (1) the text of the relevant constitu-
tional provisions; (2) related Connecticut precedents; (3) persuasive
federal precedents; (4) persuasive precedents of other state courts; (5)
historical insights into the intent of [the] constitutional [framers]; and
(6) contemporary understandings of applicable economic and sociologi-
cal norms [otherwise described as public policies].” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Haynes, 352 Conn. 236, 245–46, 336 A.3d
1139 (2025). “The Geisler analysis applies to cases in which the state
constitution has no federal analogue, as well as those in which the claim
is that the state constitution provides greater protection than does the
federal constitution.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 247.

Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction
of Correction, supra, 170 Conn. App. 671 n.9 (“The peti-
tioner asks this court to recognize a constitutional right
to self-representation at a habeas trial pursuant to article
first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution . . . . We decline
to address this claim because the petitioner failed to pro-
vide an independent analysis of it under the Connecticut
constitution.”). Because the petitioner has failed to brief
a state constitutional claim, any such claim is deemed
abandoned. As a result, he cannot demonstrate that his
claim is of constitutional magnitude under the second
prong of Golding on the basis of such a claim.
Accordingly, because the petitioner’s first claim was
not raised in his petition for certification and is not
reviewable under Golding pursuant to Banks and because
his second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was
not raised in his petition for certification and does not
relate to the habeas court’s handling of the habeas pro-
ceedings, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to
demonstrate that the habeas court abused its discretion
when it denied his petition for certification to appeal.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.