26 CO 59, 24SC508 People v. Ceus, Madani

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE

June 29, 2026

2026 CO 59

No. 24SC508, People v. Ceus-Child Abuse Resulting in Death -Instructional
Error-Constitutional Harmless Error-Sufficiency of Evidence-"results in"
-But For Cause-Proximate Cause-§ 18-6-401(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025) -§ 18-6-
401(7)(a), C.R.S. (2025) -People v. Dunaway, 88 P.3d 619 (Colo. 2004) - People v.
Beverly, 2025 CO 18, | 28, 568 P.3d 398.

After the prosecution charged the defendant with two murder counts for
the deaths of two young girls, the jury returned guilty verdicts on the lesser
included offenses of child abuse resulting in death. The supreme court agreed to
review this case to consider whether (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury,
(2) any instructional error was constitutionally harmless, and (3) there was
sufficient evidence to support the two convictions.

Agreeing with the division, the supreme court first concludes that the trial
court should have either used special interrogatories to allow the jury to make
distinct findings on whether the child abuse resulted in death or drafted the
elemental instructions to require such findings.

<!-- PageBreak -->

But for three reasons, the supreme court parts ways with the division's
conclusion that the error was not constitutionally harmless. First, whether the girls
died as a result of the abuse they endured was never meaningfully disputed at
trial. Second, the jury instructions and the verdict forms clearly directed the jury
to determine whether Ceus had engaged in child abuse that resulted in the girls'
deaths. And third, the evidence that the child abuse resulted in the girls' deaths
was overwhelming.

Finally, like the division, the supreme court rejects the defendant's
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. Viewing the evidence as a whole and in the
light most favorable to the People, it is clear that it was both substantial and
sufficient to support her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, despite agreement with parts of the division's opinion, the
supreme court ultimately reverses the judgment and remands the case for
consideration of the defendant's remaining claims.

<!-- PageBreak -->

# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 59

Supreme Court Case No. 24SC508
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Case No. 20CA1360

Petitioner/Cross-Respondent:
The People of the State of Colorado,

V.

Respondent/Cross-Petitioner:

Madani Ceus.

Judgment Reversed
en banc
June 29, 2026

Attorneys for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent:

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General

Erin K. Grundy, First Assistant Attorney General

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner:

Megan A. Ring, Public Defender

Lisa Weisz, Deputy Public Defender

Denver, Colorado

<!-- PageBreak -->

JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE
BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined.

JUSTICE GABRIEL concurred in part and dissented in part.

<!-- PageBreak -->

JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11 "Certainly any one who has the power to make you believe absurdities has
the power to make you commit injustices." Voltaire, Miscellanies: On Absurdities
and Atrocities, in Les Philosophes: The Philosophers of the Enlightenment and
Modern Democracy 272, 277 (Norman L. Torrey ed., 1960). This evergreen
aphorism is on full display in this case. The defendant, Madani Ceus ("Ceus"),
variously known to her disciples as "Amma," "Yahweh," and other divine
epithets, preached that she was the creator of all things.

12 After years spent caravanning across the country, Ceus and her group
settled for several months on a farm outside Norwood, Colorado. While there,
two young girls - members of the group since its inception - were declared tainted
by Ceus and were exiled to a car on the far side of the property, fully exposed to
the intense summer heat. Ceus forbade anyone from giving the girls food or water
or interacting with them in any way. Isolated and ostracized, the children died in
the backseat of the car. Their bodies remained there for weeks until the deaths
were reported to the San Miguel County Sheriff's Office (the "Sheriff's Office").

13 The People brought charges against all adult members of the group. At
issue here is the viability of Ceus's convictions for child abuse resulting in
death-convictions based on jury verdicts. Our task today is to assess the
propriety of the jury instructions given by the court, the harm any instructional

<!-- PageBreak -->

error may have engendered, and whether the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to sustain the convictions.1

14 We conclude, as did a division of the court of appeals, that the trial court
erred in instructing the jury because it failed to require distinct findings on
whether the child abuse resulted in the girls' deaths. The court should have either
used special interrogatories allowing the jury to make those findings or drafted
the elemental instructions to require the jury to do so.

15
But we part ways with the division's conclusion that the error was not
constitutionally harmless. We do so for three reasons.

16
First, whether the girls died as a result of the abuse they endured was never
meaningfully disputed at trial. The core question was not how they died but who
bore responsibility for their deaths. This focus on who was responsible permeated
the trial- starting with opening statements, continuing with the evidence, and

1 We granted certiorari to review the following three issues:

1\. Whether the court of appeals erred by not considering the
instructions and trial as a whole in determining whether the jury
properly understood that it needed to find, and did find, the
sentence enhancer beyond a reasonable doubt.

2\. Whether the court of appeals erred by holding that any possible
error was reversible in light of the instructions, arguments, and
evidence all showing that the defendant's actions resulted in the
children's deaths.

3\. Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions.

<!-- PageBreak -->

ending with closing arguments. Ceus's own statements support the conclusion
that the abuse resulted in the girls' deaths.

17 Second, the jury instructions and the verdict forms clearly directed the jury
to determine whether Ceus had engaged in child abuse that resulted in the girls'
deaths. And the verdicts returned reflect that the jury found her guilty on both
counts of child abuse "[r]esulting in [d]eath."

18 Third, the evidence that the child abuse resulted in the girls' deaths was
formidable. Our thorough review of the trial record confirms that the through-line
from the abuse to the girls' deaths was unmistakable.

9 In our view, taken together, these considerations leave no reasonable
possibility that the instructional error affected the verdicts. Therefore, we see no
basis to question the verdicts' validity.

110 Finally, like the division, we reject Ceus's sufficiency-of-the-evidence
challenge. Viewing the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to the
People-as we must-it is clear that it was both substantial and sufficient to
support her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

111 Accordingly, despite our agreement with parts of the division's opinion, we
ultimately reverse its judgment and remand the case for consideration of Ceus's
remaining claims.

<!-- PageBreak -->

## I. Facts and Procedural History

### A. Overview

112 In the late summer of 2017, deputies with the Sheriff's Office responded to
a report of two deceased children on a property located outside Norwood,
Colorado. Upon arrival, deputies contacted-and subsequently arrested -four
adults: Ashford Nathaniel Archer ("Archer"); Ika Eden ("Eden"); Frederick
Alexander Blair ("Blair"); and Ceus. The scene bore the unmistakable marks of a
tragedy. A car held the bodies of two young girls: M.R., approximately ten years
old, and her sister, H.M., approximately eight years old. The responding deputies
quickly realized that the girls had died some weeks earlier and had remained in
the car; their bodies were desiccated, skeletonized in some areas, and partially
mummified.

113 The People charged Ceus with two counts of first degree murder - victim
under twelve ("murder") and two counts of child abuse resulting in death.2
Following nearly two years of pretrial litigation, Ceus proceeded to a jury trial,
with the two counts of child abuse resulting in death treated as lesser included
offenses of the two murder counts.

2 Archer, Eden, and Blair were also arrested and charged. Nashika Bramble
("Bramble"), the children's biological mother, was later arrested and charged as
well.

<!-- PageBreak -->

114 During the four-week trial, the jury heard testimony from nearly forty-five
witnesses and reviewed hundreds of exhibits. We recount the relevant facts and
procedural history next. Before doing so, however, a brief preliminary word is
warranted: Because we review for constitutional harmless error and Ceus
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, our recitation of the facts is deliberately
extensive,3 and, given the arguments advanced by the parties, our summary of the
procedural history is necessarily detailed as well.

## B. Origins and Early Developments

115 Around 2015, Ceus, Archer, Eden, and Bramble moved as a group from
Florida to an apartment in North Carolina; they had children-toddlers and
teenagers-in tow. Before the move, the group members shed their former
identities, burning personal effects such as photographs and identification
documents. Upon arrival, they discarded their clothing and dressed in white
gowns. But it wasn't just their wardrobe that changed. Ceus-possibly in
conjunction with Archer -imposed a strict diet on the group as a form of bodily
cleansing. The group was prohibited from consuming anything other than
coconuts, almonds, dates, and water. Piece by piece, the trappings of their past

3 The facts we set forth are those that a reasonable jury could have found from the
evidence presented at trial.

<!-- PageBreak -->

lives fell away as the group began engaging in communal activities of a spiritual
nature.

116 Ceus and Archer sat atop the group's hierarchy as social leaders, with Ceus
holding ultimate decision-making authority and Archer acting in a preaching
capacity. But it was Ceus who was primarily in charge, and the group began to
move in her orbit, shaping their lives around her authority.

117 After some weeks in the apartment, the group's food stores were exhausted,
and they went without food. No one took action to obtain more food, and the
group went hungry for a time. Although no physical restraints prevented
members from leaving, Ceus warned that doing so risked spiritual contamination.
Even so, a couple of the older children left the group during this time.

## C. Leaving North Carolina and Settling in Colorado

118 The group eventually left the North Carolina apartment and traveled the
country in two cars, surviving predominantly on the charity of friends and
strangers. Witnesses who encountered the group during this time testified that
Ceus and Archer were addressed as "Amma" and "Abba," respectively. One
witness recalled that a child asked Ceus for permission before sitting in a chair,
and that another member sought Ceus's permission to accept food, a quilt, and a
sleeping bag.

<!-- PageBreak -->

119 In the early summer of 2017, the group had a chance encounter with a
stranger named Blair outside a gas station near Grand Junction, Colorado. At the
time, members of the group were dressed in multicolored robes, and they
approached Blair to discuss spiritual matters. Little did the group and Blair know
that this crossroads moment would set them on a different trajectory.

120 Blair owned a seventeen-acre undeveloped farm outside Norwood.
Although he did not reside on his farm, he used it to cultivate vegetables and
marijuana. Within a day, Blair invited the group to stay on his property. Because
the farm lacked basic utilities, such as electricity and plumbing, and was also
devoid of permanent structures, the group bivouacked in cars, tents, and
makeshift shelters.

121 Upon their arrival at the farm, the group consisted of five adults,4 all of
whom remained deeply committed to their spiritual practices. Their beliefs
centered on past lives, dream interpretation, and preparation for an impending
apocalypse that Ceus had predicted would occur at the end of the summer.

122 By this time, Ceus was casting herself as an omniscient divine figure-the
"creator of the universe," "Yahweh," and "mother." Her authority had become
the axis around which daily life turned. She dictated the group's schedule and

4 The adults were Ceus, Archer, Eden, Bramble, and a teenager who had turned
eighteen while they were on the road. There were also four children in the group.

<!-- PageBreak -->

movements. And she used access to food as yet another spoke in the wheel of her
control - members could not accept even a simple gift of nourishment without first
asking for her approval, which she did not always grant. The group followed
Ceus's directives, convinced that unwavering obedience to her rules was the sole
passage to the "light bodies" she promised would secure their salvation.

123 Ceus typically prepared meals for the group and withheld food from those
she disfavored, particularly individuals she considered "impure" or insufficiently
committed to her spiritual regimen. She claimed that her "essence" infused the
food she prepared and insisted that those lacking spiritual dedication did not
deserve to partake of it.

124 Early in the group's time on the property, nonmembers were allowed to
visit, and members were occasionally given permission to leave for brief periods.
At one point, six members-including Ceus and Blair -traveled to Bridal Veil
Falls in Telluride for what Ceus described as a "sealing" ceremony. Participants
drank water from the waterfall and brought additional water back for the
members who had remained at the farm. Ceus, however, refused to give any
water to M.R., one of the young girls who had stayed behind, declaring her
"unsealed" and "impure." Around the same time, Ceus began referring to M.R.
as the demon Lilith, claiming she was Lilith's reincarnation and had harmed others

<!-- PageBreak -->

in a past life. This marked an inflection point in Ceus's treatment of M.R. and
presaged M.R.'s isolation from the group.

## D. Ostracizing M.R. and H.M. and the Consequences That Followed

125
Thereafter, Ceus gradually orchestrated the exclusion of M.R. and her sister,
H.M. After learning of Ceus's concerns about M.R.'s purported past life, Blair
sought and received permission to speak with M.R. Following that interaction,
however, Ceus regarded Blair with a chilled affect, pronouncing that he had been
contaminated by M.R.'s "dark matter" through his contact with her.

126 Ceus eventually exiled the two sisters from the group and ordered their
confinement in a car situated away from the group's living quarters. She further
decreed that neither child would be permitted to eat from the group's food.

127 As a result, Blair sought Ceus's permission to obtain food for the two girls
from elsewhere. Ceus allowed it, and Blair and Bramble, the girls' mother,
traveled to a food bank and then to a local grocery store. Upon their return,
however, Ceus declared the outside food "unclean" and "impure." When Blair
told her he had eaten bananas from the food bank, she claimed he had become
contaminated. Ceus then prohibited Blair from any future trips to obtain food and
forbade group members from leaving the farm altogether, warning that violating
this edict would contaminate them and cause their "souls [to] be harvested."

<!-- PageBreak -->

128 From that point forward, no adult member of the group provided food to
M.R. and H.M. Although the girls initially received water, those efforts ceased
after Ceus deemed Archer contaminated with "gray matter" because he had come
so close to them while siphoning gasoline from their vehicle. Ceus then forbade
anyone from approaching the girls. Thus, at Ceus's direction, the girls were left in
the car without food or water and without protection from the elements, including
the intense summer heat.

129 In the weeks following the girls' exile, the group continued its normal
routine-holding meetings, meditating, gathering water, and sharing meals.
Meanwhile, M.R. and H.M. remained isolated in the vehicle. No one approached
the car again until after their deaths.

130 Sometime after the girls' deaths, Bramble informed Blair that her daughters
had passed away. When Blair approached the car, he observed one girl's foot
hanging motionless outside the door. At Ceus's direction, Blair used a shovel to
push the foot back inside the vehicle. He then covered the car with a tarp and
sealed it with duct tape to contain the "stench of death." In the days that followed,
the group continued its daily activities without reporting the girls' deaths.

131 Ceus eventually deemed Bramble lacking in spiritual diligence and ordered
that she be denied food and water. Bramble, who was pregnant at the time, was
then banished from the group for her purported impurity and, like her daughters,

<!-- PageBreak -->

was confined in a vehicle.5 Ceus told the group that Bramble would either have
to leave the property or "die like [the girls]" did. Her exile lasted only several
days.

## E. Discovery of the Girls' Deaths and the Investigation That Followed

132 Near the end of the summer of 2017, the outside world finally breached the
group's isolation when Blair's father and a friend arrived at the farm to check on
Blair's well-being. Although initially hesitant, Blair eventually revealed that M.R.
and H.M. were dead and that their bodies were on the property, inside a vehicle
that was covered with a tarp.

133 Blair's father contacted the Sheriff's Office to report the deaths. Deputies
responded and discovered the severely decomposed remains of M.R. and H.M.
inside the car, surrounded by food wrappers and a swarm of flies. They arrested
Ceus, Blair, and the other adult members of the group who were there. Bramble
was not arrested at that time because she had left the farm a few days before law
enforcement responded.

134 Colorado Bureau of Investigation agents were called to the scene. That
evening, Agent John Zamora interviewed Ceus. When he asked Ceus how the

5 Similarly, sometime after the girls' ostracism, Ceus pronounced Blair's dog, Lion,
an "abomination" and banished him to his crate without food or water. Lion was
ultimately rescued.

<!-- PageBreak -->

girls died, Ceus responded, "I'm not aware of nobody killing them." Although
deputies found more than 100 pounds of food on the property, Ceus indicated that
the girls had "probably" died from a lack of food and water: "I think they died
from not eating or drinking. . .. It's not rocket science." When Agent Zamora
asked Ceus whether she was concerned that the girls were not receiving food or
water, she stated that she had "just shut it out."

135 M.R.'s and H.M.'s bodies had decomposed to the point of partial
mummification. Because of the advanced state of decomposition, the coroner and
medical examiner were unable to determine an exact cause of death and requested
additional testing from a laboratory in New Mexico. Both forensic pathologists
who examined the girls' remains classified the manner of death as "homicide."
Although the precise cause of death could not be conclusively determined - any
opportunity to pinpoint it having long since been lost to time and heat -the
possible causes of death were identified as starvation, dehydration, and
hyperthermia.

136 As mentioned, the People then charged Ceus. A jury later found her guilty
of the lesser included offense of child abuse resulting in death as to each child.6

6 In separate proceedings, Archer was convicted of child abuse resulting in death
and accessory to a crime, People v. Archer, 2022 COA 71, 1 1, 518 P.3d 1143, 1146-47,
and Bramble was convicted of murder, People v. Bramble, No. 19CA1965, 1 7
(Dec. 15, 2022). Blair, meanwhile, pleaded guilty to an accessory charge.

<!-- PageBreak -->

## F. The Jury Instructions and Verdict Forms

137 At trial, Ceus requested specialized unanimity instructions directed
specifically to causation. Her proposed instructions would have required the jury
to unanimously agree that she "committed the same act or acts" or "committed all
of the acts alleged" that "caused the death of" M.R. and H.M. (Emphasis added.)
The trial court rejected the tendered instructions and instead gave the model
unanimity instruction, which informed the jury that to convict Ceus of murder or
child abuse resulting in each death, it must either unanimously agree that she
committed the same act or acts, or unanimously agree that she committed all the
acts alleged. COLJI-Crim. E:11 (2025).

138 Ceus also proposed specialized interrogatories the jury would complete
only if it found her guilty of the lesser included offenses of child abuse resulting
in death. The tendered interrogatories would have required the jury to make
unanimity determinations in two categories: (1) which of the three statutory forms
of child abuse resulted in each child's death, and (2) whether Ceus acted
(a) knowingly or (b) recklessly in committing each offense. The trial court declined
to submit these interrogatories, reasoning that they would improperly require
jurors to "pick one" option in each category and were, in any event, unnecessary
in light of the unanimity instruction it planned to give.

<!-- PageBreak -->

139
On its own initiative, however, the court modified the model elemental
instruction for child abuse resulting in death by limiting it to those circumstances
in which the abuse results in death and not merely serious bodily injury:

The elements of the crime of [c]hild [a]buse [r]esulting in [d]eath
[knowingly or recklessly] are:

1\. That the defendant,

2\. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged,

3\. knowingly or recklessly,

4\. caused an injury to a child's life or health, or permitted a child to be
unreasonably placed in a situation that posed a threat of injury to the
child's life or health, or engaged in a continued pattern of conduct
that resulted in malnourishment, lack of proper medical care, cruel
punishment, mistreatment, or an accumulation of injuries that
ultimately resulted in the death of a child.

(Emphasis added.) Cf. COLJI-Crim. 6-4:01 (2025) (ending the fourth element with
the following language: "that ultimately resulted in the death of a child or serious
bodily injury to a child" (emphasis added)).

140 Apparently because it had modified the fourth element, the court failed to
provide the companion special interrogatory requiring a distinct finding on
whether the abuse resulted in death - as opposed to serious bodily injury - as set
forth in the model jury instructions:

## 6-4:09.INT CHILD ABUSE -INTERROGATORY (DEATH)

If you find the defendant not guilty of child abuse, you should
disregard this instruction and sign the verdict form to indicate your
not guilty verdict.

<!-- PageBreak -->

If, however, you find the defendant guilty of child abuse, you should
sign the verdict form to indicate your finding of guilt, and answer the
following verdict question on the verdict form:

Did the child abuse result in death? (Answer "Yes" or "No")

The prosecution has the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the child abuse resulted in death.

....

COLJI-Crim. 6-4:09 (2025).

141 The verdict form given for each murder charge, which did not contain any
special interrogatories, allowed the jury to find Ceus not guilty of any crime or
guilty of either (1) murder or (2) the lesser included offense of child abuse resulting
in death. After the jury returned guilty verdicts on the two lesser included
offenses, the court sentenced Ceus to sixty-four years in the Department of
Corrections.

## G. Ceus's Appeal and the Parties' Cross-Petitions for Certiorari

142 Ceus appealed, raising a bevy of contentions. She argued, among other
things, that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the lesser included
offenses of child abuse resulting in death and that, in any event, the evidence was
insufficient to sustain those convictions. She also advanced several evidentiary
challenges, claimed that the child abuse statute was unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad, asserted that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on

<!-- PageBreak -->

independent intervening cause, and maintained that the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct during closing argument. Finally, she contended that the cumulative
effect of these errors required reversal.

143 The division took up these issues in turn. Beginning with the instructional
claim, it concluded that the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a special
interrogatory requiring a determination as to whether the People proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that the abuse of each child resulted in death. People v. Ceus,
No. 20CA1360, 1 13 (June 27, 2024). In the division's view, the absence of such
findings meant that the guilty verdicts supported only misdemeanor child abuse
convictions, which do not require proof that a death resulted. Id. at [ 24. The
division then considered whether the error was constitutionally harmless and held
that it was not, reasoning that "causation was the central disputed issue at trial."
Id. at 1 27.

144 But the division rejected Ceus's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Id. at 1 35. It likewise rejected her constitutional contentions. Id. at 11 42, 46, 50.
Finally, the division declined to reach her remaining claims, concluding that they
were effectively moot because they were directed at overturning the convictions
for child abuse resulting in death, which the division had already determined
could not stand. Id. at 11 52, 54.

<!-- PageBreak -->

T45
The division therefore remanded the case to the trial court with instructions
to allow the People to elect either to retry Ceus for child abuse resulting in death
as to each girl or to seek a judgment of conviction for misdemeanor child abuse on
each count. Id. at [ 28. Rather than make that election on remand, the People
sought our review. Ceus, in turn, cross-petitioned for review. We granted both
petitions for certiorari.

## II. Analysis

146 We turn first to the standards that serve as doctrinal markers orienting our
review. We then consider if the trial court erred by failing to require distinct
findings on whether the abuse resulted in M.R.'s and H.M.'s deaths. Because we
conclude that the court did err, we proceed to evaluate whether that error was
constitutionally harmless. We hold that it was. Finally, we shift our attention to
Ceus's cross-petition and reject her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting her convictions.

### A. Standards of Review

147 The Colorado Constitution grants the General Assembly the "power to
define criminal conduct and to establish the legal components of criminal
liability." Randolph v. People, 2025 CO 44, 1 12, 570 P.3d 1022, 1026 (quoting
Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo. 2000)). In keeping with a defendant's
constitutional right to the "presumption of innocence," a trial court must

<!-- PageBreak -->

"properly instruct the jury as to each element of the crime charged." Id. (citing
Garcia v. People, 2022 CO 6, 1 15, 503 P.3d 135, 140).

148 We review de novo whether an instruction accurately informed the jury of
the governing law. Garcia, T 16, 503 P.3d at 140. When an elemental jury
instruction is "provided in error" and the error is "properly preserved," the
applicable "reversal-determining standard is constitutional harmless error,"
which calls for reversal unless the prosecution establishes beyond a reasonable
doubt "that the error was harmless." Randolph, 1 15, 570 P.3d at 1026. We have
understood this standard to require reversal when "there is a reasonable
possibility" that the error "might have contributed to the conviction." Hagos v.
People, 2012 CO 63, 1 11, 288 P.3d 116, 119 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.

18, 24 (1967)). In assessing constitutional harmlessness, we consider the record as
a whole. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).

149 Jury instructions that fail to correctly define the elements of an offense,
thereby preventing the jury from determining whether the prosecution proved
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, are "constitutionally
deficient." Key v. People, 715 P.2d 319, 323 (Colo. 1986). Even so, the United States
Supreme Court has explained that "where a reviewing court concludes beyond a
reasonable doubt that the omitted [instructional] element was uncontested and
supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been

<!-- PageBreak -->

the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be
harmless."7 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 17 (1999). In the spirit of Neder's
framework, a division of the court of appeals has likewise recognized that the
"omission of an element" -and, "by extension the lesser error of failing to . . .
define an element" -may be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when "the
evidence relating to that element is overwhelming." People v. Grudznske,
2023 COA 36, 1 73, 533 P.3d 579, 595-96 (quoting People v. Draper, 2021 COA 120,
[ 40, 501 P.3d 262, 274); see also Key, 715 P.2d at 323 (noting that in evaluating for
constitutional harmlessness, a reviewing court considers whether the evidence on
a disputed issue is overwhelming). A review of the jury instructions as a whole
may also support a reviewing court's determination of constitutional
harmlessness.8 See Key, 715 P.2d at 323.

7 In the context of an unpreserved error, "we have refused to find plain error unless
a review of the entire record demonstrates a reasonable possibility that the
improper instruction contributed to the defendant's conviction." Espinoza v.
People, 712 P.2d 476, 478 (Colo. 1985). We have further explained that "[w]here an
element of a crime was not contested at trial, failure to instruct properly on that
issue generally does not constitute plain error." Id.

8 We recognize that we address here an instructional error involving a sentence
enhancer rather than an element. But, as pertinent here, sentence-enhancing
factors generally function much like elements: With exceptions not applicable
here, a defendant may not receive an enhanced sentence unless the prosecution
proves the relevant factor beyond a reasonable doubt. Armintrout v. People,
864 P.2d 576, 580 (Colo. 1993).

<!-- PageBreak -->

150 We also review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting a conviction. People v. Douglas, 2015 COA 155, 1 8, 412 P.3d
785, 788. Such a challenge requires us to determine whether the evidence
presented at trial, viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, is both substantial and sufficient to support the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo. 2005).
Although a conviction cannot rest on speculation or conjecture, it may be
supported by reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. People v. Donald,
2020 CO 24, 1 19, 461 P.3d 4, 7.

## B. The Trial Court Erred by Failing to Require Distinct Findings on Whether the Abuse Resulted in M.R.'s and H.M.'s Deaths

151
The People contend that the division erred in concluding that the trial court
should have required the jury to explicitly find that the child abuse resulted in
M.R.'s and H.M.'s deaths. We disagree.9

152 Section 18-6-401, C.R.S. (2025), the statute criminalizing child abuse,
differentiates between the actions or omissions that constitute child abuse, which

9 The People assert that Ceus did not preserve this issue because her objection at
trial was based solely on unanimity concerns. While the People's argument has
some force, we need not resolve the question. Because we ultimately conclude
that any error was constitutionally harmless, we assume without deciding that the
issue was properly preserved.

<!-- PageBreak -->

comprise the elements of the crime, and the result of the child abuse. Compare
§ 18-6-401(1)(a), with § 18-6-401(7). A person commits child abuse if the person

causes an injury to a child's life or health, or permits a child to be
unreasonably placed in a situation that poses a threat of injury to the
child's life or health, or engages in a continued pattern of conduct that
results in malnourishment, lack of proper medical care, cruel
punishment, mistreatment, or an accumulation of injuries that
ultimately results in the death of a child or serious bodily injury to a
child.

§ 18-6-401(1)(a).

153 Subsection (7) of the statute, in turn, specifies the level of the criminal
offense and its corresponding punishment, both of which vary based on the
defendant's culpable mental state and the result of the child abuse. But while the
culpable mental state is an element of the offense, the result of the child abuse-no
injury, injury, serious bodily injury, or death-functions only as a sentence
enhancer. See § 18-6-401(1)(a), (7)(a); People v. Robinson, 874 P.2d 453, 464 (Colo.
App. 1993) ("[T]he fact that a child victim dies is a sentence enhancement factor
and not an element of the crime of child abuse."); Armintrout v. People, 864 P.2d
576, 580 (Colo. 1993) ("[A] sentence enhancement provision is not an element of
the offense charged.").

154 As relevant here, when child abuse is committed knowingly or recklessly
and results in an injury less severe than "serious bodily injury," the offense is a
class 1 misdemeanor. § 18-6-401(7)(a)(V). By contrast, if the child abuse is

<!-- PageBreak -->

committed knowingly or recklessly and "results in death to the child," the offense
is a class 2 felony. § 18-6-401(7)(a)(I).

155 Subject to exceptions not applicable here, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and
proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 833 (2024); Caswell v.
People, 2023 CO 50, 138, 536 P.3d 323, 332. Thus, sentence-enhancing
factors -such as child abuse resulting in death - must generally be proved to the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Ramirez, 997 P.2d 1200, 1206 (Colo. App.
1999), aff'd by an equally divided court, 43 P.3d 611 (Colo. 2001) (mem.). It follows
that for Ceus to be properly convicted of class 2 felony child abuse, the People
were required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only the elements of child
abuse, but also the sentence enhancer in question - that the child abuse resulted in
death.

156 In this case, the trial court did not provide any special interrogatories
requiring the jury to explicitly find that the child abuse resulted in each girl's
death. Nor did the elemental instructions require such findings. Because the
People were required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the child abuse
resulted in the girls' deaths, we conclude that the trial court erred in instructing

<!-- PageBreak -->

the jury.10 To be clear, the jury did find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ceus
committed child abuse against the girls, which necessarily means that she bore
responsibility for their confinement in the car without food or water during the
intense summer heat for an extended period. The error lies in the court's failure
to require the jury to additionally determine whether that confinement resulted in
the girls' deaths.

157 But does that error require reversal? After all, "[a] defendant is entitled to
a fair trial, not a perfect trial." People v. Mills, 557 P.2d 1192, 1194 (Colo. 1976). We
take up that question now.

## C. The Error Was Constitutionally Harmless

158 Having concluded that the trial court erred, we must consider whether the
error was constitutionally harmless. If it was, we will not reverse.

159 The relevant inquiry is whether "there is a reasonable possibility that the
[error] might have contributed to the conviction." Hagos, 1 11, 288 P.3d at 119
(alteration in original) (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). Our meticulous vetting
of the entire trial record -including the parties' opening and closing statements,

10 Our model jury instructions for child abuse offer guidance on this very issue.
COLJI-Crim. 6-4:01 cmt. 3 (2025); COLJI-Crim. 6-4:09 cmt. 3 (2025) ("It is not
necessary to submit a special interrogatory asking the jury to determine whether
the child abuse resulted in death if the instruction defining the offense is drafted
in such a manner that, in order to find the defendant guilty, the jury necessarily
must find that the abuse resulted in death.").

<!-- PageBreak -->

the evidence introduced, and the instructions provided to the jury - leads us to
conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the instructional error
contributed to Ceus's convictions. See Garcia, 118, 503 P.3d at 140. That
determination rests on three grounds, considered together: (1) the proposition that
the child abuse resulted in the girls' deaths was not meaningfully contested at
trial;11 (2) the jury instructions and verdict forms repeatedly reminded the jury that
Ceus was accused of child abuse "[r]esulting in [d]eath"; and (3) the evidence that
the girls' deaths resulted from the abuse was overwhelming.

## 1. The Parties Did Not Meaningfully Dispute That the Child Abuse Resulted in the Girls' Deaths

160 To begin, the central disputed issue at trial was not how the girls died but,
rather pointedly, who was responsible for their deaths. Indeed, the trial's primary
theme was whether Ceus bore responsibility for the girls' confinement in the car
without food or water during the intense summer heat for an extended period, not
whether such confinement ultimately resulted in their deaths.

11 Although our case law in this area addresses instructional errors that were
uncontested at trial, Ceus did not meaningfully dispute whether the child
abuse-that is, the girls' confinement in the car-resulted in their deaths. We
hasten to emphasize, however, that we should not be understood as holding that
this ground alone suffices to support our determination that the error was
constitutionally harmless. Rather, we hold that the three grounds we have
identified, considered together, compel the conclusion that the error was
constitutionally harmless.

<!-- PageBreak -->

161 The People's case revolved around the theory that Ceus's authority and
control over the group, coupled with her ostracism of the girls, rendered her
responsible for their deaths. As the People emphasized in their opening statement,
the core question for the jury was whether "Ceus [was] responsible for the [girls']
deaths." The People's evidence likewise pivoted around Ceus's control, authority,
and decision-making, which allegedly culminated in the girls' deaths. In closing,
the People returned to this central narrative, arguing that Ceus had "consciously
disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [the girls] would die."

162 The defense, for its part, pushed back against any effort to place
responsibility for the girls' deaths on Ceus. It argued that she could not be
responsible because she was not the girls' mother, and that Bramble, as their
mother - or perhaps Blair, the owner of the farm - shouldered that responsibility.
Defense counsel underscored this point in opening statement, asserting that "[i]t
was [Bramble's] choice and her choice alone" to "abandon her girls." Distilled, the
defense's theory was that "Ceus's failure to help or force ... Bramble to take care
of her own children is not a crime." This framing carried through to closing
argument. Defense counsel began: "Bramble is the one who is responsible for the
death[s] of her two children." Continuing, counsel maintained that Ceus could
not be held responsible for child abuse through inaction or a failure to protect the
girls because she owed no legal duty to ensure their well-being. Thus, rather than

<!-- PageBreak -->

contend that the child abuse did not result in the girls' deaths, the defense insisted
that Ceus was not responsible for any child abuse in the first place.12

163 The division nevertheless concluded that "causation was the central
disputed issue at trial." Ceus, [ 27. But the division was mistaken in its
understanding of both the law and the record. We begin with the law before
turning to the record.

164 "[C]ausation," as the division understood the term, had no legal relevance
to the child abuse charges. Although the murder charges required proof that Ceus
"cause[d]" the girls' deaths, the child abuse charges did not; they required only
proof that the abuse "result[ed] in" their deaths. Compare § 18-3-102(1)(f), C.R.S.
(2025), with § 18-6-401(1)(a), (7)(a)(I).

165 Just last term, we clarified that "results in" and "proximate cause" are
statutory terms with distinct meanings. People v. Beverly, 2025 CO 18, 1 28,
568 P.3d 398, 405-06. We explained that when a criminal statute requires not only
conduct but also that the conduct caused a particular result, the prosecution must
prove both actual (or "but for") causation and legal (or "proximate") causation.
Id. at [ 24, 568 P.3d at 405. The former is "any cause 'but for' which the harm

12 Ceus pointed the finger at Bramble throughout the trial, and the jury was
informed of Bramble's murder convictions relating to the deaths of her children.
Even so, the jury found Ceus guilty of child abuse resulting in death.

<!-- PageBreak -->

would not have occurred," and the latter is "any 'cause which in natural and
probable sequence produced the claimed injury."" Id. (quoting Martinez v. People,
2024 CO 6M, [ 13, 542 P.3d 675, 679).

166 We further noted in Beverly that numerous federal cases interpret "results
from" in a criminal narcotics statute "as imposing only a but-for cause
requirement." Id. at [ 28, 568 P.3d at 406. In doing so, Beverly cited United
States v. Jeffries, 958 F.3d 517, 520 (6th Cir. 2020), which drew on a respected
dictionary to define "results": "A thing 'results' when it 'arises as an effect, issue,
or outcome .... "" (Quoting Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210-11 (2014),
which in turn quoted Results, 2 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary
(1993).)13 The Sixth Circuit therefore concluded in Jeffries that "[t]he proper
inquiry" was whether death arose as an effect, issue, or outcome of drug use, "not
whether death was a foreseeable result of the defendant's [distribution] violation."
958 F.3d at 520-21.

13 Other reputable dictionaries define "result" similarly. See, e.g., Result,
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
result [https://perma.cc/FE9S-NCR5] (stating that "result" means "to proceed or
arise as a consequence, effect, or conclusion"); Result, Cambridge English
Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/result
[https://perma.cc/C5TC-69KZ ] (defining "result" as "something that happens or
exists because of something else").

<!-- PageBreak -->

167 Applying the plain and ordinary meaning of "results" here, the People were
required to prove that the girls' deaths were an effect, outcome, or consequence of
the child abuse. More precisely, they had to establish that the deaths were an
effect, outcome, or consequence of the girls' confinement in the car without food
or water during the intense summer heat for an extended period.

168 Our decision in People v. Dunaway, 88 P.3d 619 (Colo. 2004)-a case
involving child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury-does not alter the
analysis. There, the defendant told the police that after shaking his girlfriend's
infant child two or three times, the child became quiet. Id. at 622. The People
pursued the first two statutory bases of liability under section 18-6-401(1)(a).
Dunaway, 88 P.3d at 622. Under the second, they alleged that the defendant
permitted the child to be unreasonably placed in a situation that posed a threat of
injury to the child's life or health. Id. at 625. We concluded that the record
supported a finding that this allegation was established because there was proof
that the defendant knowingly or recklessly failed to promptly seek treatment,
concealed the seriousness of the injury, and attempted to prevent the child from
receiving medical care. Id. at 626-27. But we nevertheless held that the evidence
was insufficient because the prosecution failed to show that the child abuse
"resulted in serious bodily injury to the child." Id. at 627. We explained that the
prosecution presented no expert testimony that the ninety-minute delay in

<!-- PageBreak -->

obtaining medical treatment aggravated the injury already present or resulted in
other serious bodily injury. Id.

169 Today's decision hews closely to Dunaway. Consistent with Dunaway, we
hold that when the prosecution charges child abuse resulting in death as a class 2
felony, it is not sufficient to prove that the defendant knowingly or recklessly
committed child abuse; the prosecution must also prove that the abuse "result[ed]
in death to the child." § 18-6-401(7)(a)(I).

170 We recognize that, in a few instances in our Dunaway opinion, we used the
less precise phrase "causal connection" rather than "resulted in." Dunaway,
88 P.3d at 627-28. But all we meant was that there must be a link between the child
abuse and the result - the abuse must result in the child's injury or death. In other
words, the child abuse must be the but for cause of the resulting injury, and
conversely, the resulting injury must be the effect, outcome, or consequence of the
child abuse. Thus, we rejected the prosecution's assertion that mere evidence of
the defendant's delay in obtaining medical treatment for the child's serious injury
sufficed. Id. at 628. As we explained, this evidence didn't necessarily prove that
the delay "resulted in" serious bodily injury. Id.

171 Still, we nowhere suggested that the prosecution must prove that the
defendant proximately caused the child's injury or death. Nor could we have done
so, since such a requirement would have contravened the statute's plain language.

<!-- PageBreak -->

See § 18-6-401(7)(a)(I) (requiring proof that the child abuse "result[ed] in" the
child's death, not that the defendant proximately caused the child's death);
§ 18-6-401(7)(a)(III) (requiring proof that the child abuse "result[ed] in" the child's
serious bodily injury, not that the defendant proximately caused the child's serious
bodily injury); see also Beverly, 1 28, 568 P.3d at 405-06 (clarifying that "results in"
and "proximate cause" have different meanings). This is not after-the-fact
speculation about what our court meant in Dunaway; it's necessarily what the court
meant- based on the plain statutory language.

172 Here, the jury found that Ceus was responsible for the girls being confined
in the car without food or water during the intense summer heat for an extended
period. Unlike in Dunaway, however, the prosecution also proved the result of the
child abuse. More to the point, the prosecution established that the girls'
confinement in the car - the child abuse -resulted in their deaths. Yet the division
anchored its harmless error analysis in its belief that whether Ceus proximately
caused the girls' deaths was not only relevant to the child abuse resulting in death
convictions but was the preeminent issue in the case. Ceus, [ 27. This was error
as a matter of law.

173 Beyond this legal error, the division also misapprehended the record by
equating Ceus's argument that she wasn't responsible for the girls' deaths with an
argument that, regardless of who was responsible for confining the girls in the car,

<!-- PageBreak -->

the confinement didn't result in their deaths. What is readily apparent from the
record is that, to the extent the defense urged that Ceus was not responsible for
the girls' deaths, it was asserting that she bore no responsibility for the girls' well-being
at all -not that the girls' deaths, after they were confined in the car, did not result
from their having no food or water and being exposed to the intense summer heat
for an extended period. The real contested issue throughout the trial was the
culpable source of the child abuse, not the effect, outcome, or consequence of the child abuse.
This is a nuanced but important distinction-one the division overlooked. And
perhaps no evidence speaks louder on this score than Ceus's own words to law
enforcement: "I think they died from not eating or drinking . . . . It's not rocket
science." We are hard-pressed to treat the trial court's instructional error as
reversible when the question whether the confinement in the car resulted in the
girls' deaths was not meaningfully contested at trial.14

14 To be clear, we are not inferring that the abuse resulted in death from the proof
establishing the abuse itself, a proposition Dunaway expressly disavowed. 88 P.3d
at 627-28. To the contrary, as discussed below, overwhelming evidence at trial
established that the girls' deaths resulted from their confinement in the car. Rather
than meaningfully dispute that the girls died from starvation, dehydration, and
exposure-to quote Ceus, "It's not rocket science" -Ceus sought to lay
responsibility at Bramble's feet, a maneuver the jury clearly rejected.

<!-- PageBreak -->

## 2. The Jury Instructions and Verdict Forms Reinforce Our Conclusion

174 The jury instructions and verdict forms bolster our conclusion that there is
no reasonable possibility that the instructional error contributed to Ceus's
convictions. The trial court duly gave Ceus's tendered theory-of-defense
instruction, which asserted that "she is not guilty of first degree murder or child
abuse resulting in death, because she was not responsible for any children other
than her own." (Emphasis added.) The instruction went on to state that Ceus was
not responsible for "the death of any child," and that "[i]nstead, ... Bramble"
should be held accountable for " the death of her children through her own criminal
conduct." (Emphases added.) It concluded that Ceus "did not know or foresee
that . .. Bramble ... would kill her children," and that Ceus "had no duty to protect
[the girls] from their mother." (Emphasis added.)

175 More broadly, the jury instructions repeatedly framed the offense as "[c]hild
[a]buse resulting in [d]eath," referring to that full title no fewer than eleven times
and never to "child abuse" in isolation. (Emphasis added.) The jury was
specifically instructed that the prosecution bore the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt each element of "child abuse resulting in death." (Emphasis
added.)

176 Further, the jury was instructed to hold the prosecution to its burden of
proof when completing the verdict forms. Mindful of all those instructions, the

<!-- PageBreak -->

jury filled out each verdict form by selecting the box next to "child abuse resulting
in death." (Emphasis added.)

## 3. The Evidence Was Overwhelming

177 The evidence that the child abuse resulted in M.R.'s and H.M.'s deaths was
nothing short of overwhelming-this, too, buttresses our conclusion that the
instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Lay witness
testimony, expert testimony, and physical evidence converged to reveal a factual
portrait that left little room for doubt: The girls died from starvation, dehydration,
and hyperthermia, or a combination of those conditions. And the record contained
a mountain of evidence showing that those conditions resulted from the girls'
confinement in the car.

178 Here, again, we rely on what Ceus herself said: This is "not rocket science."
Ceus was right: This really isn't rocket science. The girls died after being confined
in the car without food or water during the intense summer heat for an extended
period. There was no evidence suggesting any other cause of death. The forensic
evidence confirmed as much. One of the pathologists opined that "[t]here was no
evidence of external trauma" on either girl, allowing him to rule out fractures,
major trauma, and similar causes. And while he acknowledged that advanced
decomposition made it impossible to rule out every conceivable alternative, he

<!-- PageBreak -->

opined that the most likely causes of death for both girls were starvation,
dehydration, and hyperthermia.

179 In sum, for the three reasons we have set forth, there is no reasonable
possibility that the instructional error affected the guilty verdicts. We therefore
conclude that the error was constitutionally harmless.

## D. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support the Jury's Verdicts Finding Ceus Guilty of Child Abuse Resulting in the Girls' Deaths

180 In her cross-petition, Ceus challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying her convictions for child abuse resulting in death. She relies on two
grounds to buoy her position. We take them in turn.

## 1. The Child Abuse Statute Did Not Require Proof of a Formal Caretaking Relationship; What Matters Is That Ceus Placed the Girls' Lives or Health at Risk

181
Consistent with her defense at trial, Ceus challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence on the ground that she lacked a formal caretaking relationship with M.R.
and H.M. But the child abuse statute does not allow a person to escape liability
simply because she is not the victim's parent, guardian, or other formal caretaker.
See People v. Arevalo, 725 P.2d 41, 48 (Colo. App. 1986) ("Every person has a duty
to refrain from any action which causes a child to be placed in a situation which
endangers the child's life and health."). To the contrary, the statute's reach is both
preventive and expansive, covering not only those who directly inflict harm on

<!-- PageBreak -->

children but also those who threaten-or even permit -such harm. Id. at 48-49;
see also People v. Archer, 2022 COA 71, TT 11-20, 518 P.3d 1143, 1148-49 (holding
that sufficient evidence supported the class 2 felony child abuse conviction of one
of Ceus's codefendants despite the absence of a familial relationship with M.R. and
H.M.); People v. Mann, 646 P.2d 352, 355-56 (Colo. 1982) (interpreting the child
abuse statute as encompassing both those who physically harm children and those
who allow another to do so). This stands in stark contrast to the murder statutory
provision under which Ceus was charged. See § 18-3-102(1)(f) (requiring proof
that the perpetrator was in a "position of trust" with respect to the victim).

182 The relevant question for the jury, therefore, was not whether Ceus owed a
legally recognized duty of care to the girls by virtue of her relationship to them, but
whether she engaged in conduct that placed their lives or health at risk. And the
prosecution presented substantial evidence that she did. A parade of
witnesses- group members and peripheral observers alike-described Ceus as
exercising extraordinary authority over nearly every aspect of the group's
existence. Having elevated herself to the status of a spiritual leader-or, in her
own view, a deity-Ceus dictated members' daily routines, controlled their
interactions with outsiders, directed their religious practices, and exerted
significant control over their access to the most fundamental item of sustenance:
food. That authority extended to the girls' mother.

<!-- PageBreak -->

183 Significantly, witnesses testified that, while wielding this extraordinary
power, Ceus banished the girls to the car, declared one of them "impure," forbade
them from eating the group's food, prohibited members from leaving the property
to obtain alternative food, instructed members to avoid the car for fear of
contamination, and, after the girls died, directed that the vehicle be covered with
a tarp. This conduct brought Ceus squarely within the ambit of the child abuse
statute, regardless of whether she occupied a formal caretaking role with respect
to the girls. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and drawing
every reasonable inference in its favor, this evidence was more than sufficient to
support her convictions.

## 2. There Was Sufficient Evidence to Establish that Ceus Acted Knowingly or Recklessly

184 The People were required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ceus
acted either "knowingly" or "recklessly." Ceus claims they failed to do so. We
disagree.

185 The child abuse statute directs the factfinder to assess the defendant's
mental state by examining "the nature of the offender's conduct in relation to the
child or to the circumstances under which the act or omission occurred." People v.
Deskins, 927 P.2d 368, 371 (Colo. 1996). Thus, in a case like this one, the statute
does not require proof that the defendant specifically intended or foresaw the
result of the abuse-death. See id. That approach is consistent with the statute's

<!-- PageBreak -->

"results in" requirement, which does not demand traditional proximate-cause
foreseeability.

186 We have already concluded that the evidence showing the child abuse
resulted in the girls' deaths was as decisive as it was abundant. And viewing now
the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and affording them the
benefit of every reasonable inference-as the law requires-we hold that the
record contains ample evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that
Ceus acted knowingly or recklessly.

187 Our case law provides the framework for assessing the requisite culpable
mental state under the statutory provisions defining child abuse resulting in death.
A defendant acts knowingly when she possesses a "general awareness of the
abusive nature of [her] conduct in relation to the child" or an awareness of the
circumstances under which she acted against the child's well-being. Dunaway,
88 P.3d at 625 (quoting People v. Noble, 635 P.2d 203, 210 (Colo. 1981)). Recklessness
is less demanding. See Deskins, 927 P.2d at 373 ("[T]he awareness required for
reckless child abuse is simply the risk that one's conduct could result in an injury
to a child's life or health."). A defendant acts recklessly when she consciously
disregards "a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that, under the circumstances, a
particular act or omission would constitute child abuse. Lybarger v. People,
807 P.2d 570, 575 (Colo. 1991). Whether a risk is substantial and unjustifiable

<!-- PageBreak -->

depends on both the likelihood and the magnitude of the harm involved. People v.
Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 220 (Colo. 2000). And because death represents the gravest
possible harm, even conduct creating a relatively slight risk of death may satisfy
that standard. Id.

188 The question for us, therefore, is whether the prosecution presented
sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that Ceus was aware of, or consciously
disregarded, circumstances posing a substantial and unjustifiable risk to the girls'
health or safety, and that the danger she was aware of or consciously disregarded
ultimately resulted in their deaths. We join our colleagues in the division in
concluding that the evidence comfortably met that standard. We need not repeat
here our earlier account of the compelling evidence of the hold Ceus exercised over
the group, including the girls' mother. Suffice it to say that a rational jury could
reasonably infer from the witnesses' testimony that Ceus either knew, or
consciously disregarded, that the group members were devoted to her authority
and would comply with her directives to leave the girls confined in the car without
food or water during the intense summer heat for an extended period.

189 And the evidence of Ceus's culpable mental state did not end there. The
jury watched the video recording of her post-arrest interview. She acknowledged
to law enforcement that the girls likely died because they were "not eating or
drinking." When asked whether she was concerned that the girls were not

<!-- PageBreak -->

receiving food or water, Ceus admitted that she simply "shut it out." A rational
jury could interpret these statements as admissions that she was aware of the grave
danger confronting the girls and deliberately chose to ignore it.

190 Considered together, the evidence was abundantly sufficient for a rational
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ceus acted knowingly or, at the very
least, recklessly.

## III. Conclusion

191 For the foregoing reasons, although we agree with portions of the division's
opinion, we ultimately reverse its judgment. We therefore remand the case for the
division to consider the remaining claims raised by Ceus.
JUSTICE GABRIEL concurred in part and dissented in part.

<!-- PageBreak -->

JUSTICE GABRIEL, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

192 I agree with the majority's conclusion that, viewing the evidence as a whole
and in the light most favorable to the People, the evidence was substantial and
sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find Madani Ceus guilty of child abuse.
Maj. op. 11 10, 80-90. I further agree with the majority's conclusion that the
instructions on the child abuse charges erroneously failed to advise the jury that it
needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ceus's alleged child abuse resulted
in the victims' deaths. Id. at 11 4, 46, 51-56. I do not, however, agree with the
majority's ultimate determination that the instructional error in this case was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 11 5, 46, 58-79.

193 In my view, contrary to the People's assertion, Ceus preserved her assertion
of instructional error by (1) submitting a special interrogatory that would have
required the jury to make the finding that she claims the given instructions omitted
and (2) citing the applicable case law and pattern jury instruction requiring such a
finding. In addition, I believe that the division below correctly concluded that the
jury was not properly instructed and did not make the requisite finding of
causation. Finally, because Ceus's entire defense was that her conduct did not
cause the victims' deaths, I cannot perceive how the absence of an instruction and
a jury finding of the requisite causation can be said to be harmless at all, much less
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

<!-- PageBreak -->

194 Accordingly, I would affirm the division's judgment. I therefore
respectfully concur in part with and dissent in part from the majority's opinion.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

195 The majority sufficiently sets forth the facts of this tragic case, and I need
not repeat those facts. Instead, I will principally limit my factual recitation to the
procedural issues that are relevant to my analysis.

196 The People charged Ceus with two counts of first degree murder and two
counts of child abuse resulting in death. The case proceeded to trial, and Ceus's
principal defense was that she did not cause the victims' deaths. To the contrary,
she argued that the victims' mother, who was separately convicted of two counts
of first degree murder, was responsible.

197 At trial, before the jury instruction conference, Ceus's counsel tendered to
the court a packet of draft proposed jury instructions. Although the packet did
not include an elemental instruction for child abuse resulting in death, it included
a single page, entitled, "Lesser Included Offenses," that said, "COLJI-Crim. E:14,
COLJI-Crim. 6-4:01, § 18-6-401(1)(a), (7)(a)(I)[, C.R.S. (2025)], Friend v. People, [2018
CO 90,] 429 P.3d 1191 ... (child abuse resulting in death is a lesser included offense
of first degree murder of a child by one in a position of trust [sic]." Section
18-6-401(7)(a)(I), which Ceus cited, establishes the required element of causation,
and Friend, 1 38, 429 P.3d at 1197, recites the elements of child abuse resulting in

<!-- PageBreak -->

death and notes as an element of that offense that the child abuse resulted in a
child's death.

198 In addition, Ceus's counsel tendered two special interrogatories, one for
each count of child abuse, that provided, in pertinent part:

You should only complete this instruction if you find the defendant
guilty of child abuse resulting in death of [the victim]. If you do not
find the defendant guilty of child abuse resulting in death of [the
victim], you should disregard this instruction.

If, however, you find the defendant guilty of child abuse resulting in
death of [the victim], you should sign the verdict form to indicate
your finding of guilt, and answer the following two verdict questions:

1\. Did the death of [the victim] result from (check one):

The defendant knowingly or recklessly causing an injury to the
child's life or health that resulted in the death of the child, or

The defendant knowingly or recklessly permitting the child to be
unreasonably placed in a situation that posed a threat of injury to the
child's life or health, that resulted in the death of the child, or

_ The defendant knowingly or recklessly engaging in a continued
pattern of conduct that resulted in malnourishment, lack of proper
medical care, cruel punishment, mistreatment, or an accumulation of
injuries, that ultimately resulted in the death of the child?

2\. Did the defendant commit this crime (check one) [sic]

Knowingly, or

Recklessly?

The prosecution has the burden to prove each numbered condition
beyond a reasonable doubt.

<!-- PageBreak -->

199
The court refused this tendered special interrogatory and instead instructed
the jury on the elements of child abuse resulting in death, in pertinent part, as
follows:

The elements of the crime of Child Abuse Resulting in Death
[knowingly or recklessly] are:

1\. That the defendant,

2\. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged,

3\. knowingly or recklessly,

4\. caused an injury to a child's life or health, or permitted a child to
be unreasonably placed in a situation that posed a threat of injury
to the child's life or health, or engaged in a continued pattern of
conduct that resulted in malnourishment, lack of proper medical
care, cruel punishment, mistreatment, or an accumulation of
injuries that ultimately resulted in the death of a child.

1100 The court did not instruct the jury that it was required to find that any child
abuse committed by Ceus resulted in or caused the victims' deaths. Nor did the
court provide a special interrogatory requiring the jury to make such a finding.
And the verdict form provided by the court did not require the jury to make that
finding. Instead, the verdict form gave the jury the option of finding Ceus not
guilty of both first degree murder and child abuse resulting in death or finding her
guilty of either "Murder in the First Degree ([Victim])" or "Child Abuse Resulting
in Death [knowingly or recklessly] ([Victim])."

<!-- PageBreak -->

1101 The jury found Ceus guilty of child abuse resulting in death as to both
victims, and the trial court subsequently sentenced her to sixty-four years in
prison.

1102 Ceus appealed, arguing, as pertinent here, that the trial court had reversibly
erred by failing to instruct the jury completely on the crime of child abuse resulting
in death. People v. Ceus, No. 20CA1360, 1 13 (June 27, 2024). Specifically, she
asserted that the trial court had erred by declining to provide the jury with a
special interrogatory requiring it to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the child
abuse resulted in the victims' deaths. Id.

1103 In a unanimous, unpublished decision, the division agreed with this
argument and reversed Ceus's child abuse conviction. Id. at 11 13-28, 56. In so
concluding, the division initially opined that Ceus had preserved her contention
of instructional error by objecting to the child abuse instructions and submitting
her own instructions, including a special interrogatory related to the causation
requirement. Id. at | 19.

1104 The division next determined that neither the jury instructions nor the
verdict forms provided by the court required the jury to find that Ceus's conduct
resulted in the victims' deaths. Id. at [] 20-26. Specifically, the division opined
that, although the trial court had properly instructed the jury on the elements of
child abuse and the three alternative ways of committing that crime under section

<!-- PageBreak -->

18-6-401(1)(a), the court never instructed the jury that it was required to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the child abuse resulted in death, as required to
elevate the offense to a class 2 felony under section 18-6-401(7)(a)(I). Id. at 1 25.
The division thus agreed with Ceus that the jury had convicted her only of
misdemeanor, not felony, child abuse. Id.

1105 In so concluding, the division rejected the People's argument that the
elemental instruction that the trial court had provided sufficiently required the
jury to determine that Ceus's child abuse resulted in the victims' deaths. Id. at
1 24. To the contrary, the elemental instruction set forth the three alternative ways
of committing child abuse and nothing more. Id. On this point, the division
observed that in People v. Dunaway, 88 P.3d 619, 627 (Colo. 2004), we had "soundly
rejected" an argument that proof of the act element under subsection (1)(a)
"necessarily proves"" the injury element under subsection (7)(a). Ceus, 1 25
(quoting Dunaway, 88 P.3d at 627). The division further rejected the People's
contention that the title of the elemental instruction (i.e., "child abuse resulting in
death") was sufficient to sustain a felony child abuse conviction. Id. at [ 26. In the
division's view, nothing in the title required the jury to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Ceus's abuse resulted in the victims' deaths. Id. Nor did the verdict
form or any interrogatory require such a finding. Id.

<!-- PageBreak -->

1106 Finally, the division disagreed with the People's contention that the
foregoing error was constitutionally harmless. Id. at | 27. The division observed
that the issue of causation was "the central disputed issue at trial" and that Ceus
had defended on the theory that the victims' mother had caused their deaths. Id.
Accordingly, without an instruction requiring the jury to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Ceus's abuse resulted in the victims' deaths, the division could not
conclude that the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
1107 In light of the foregoing, the division determined that reversal was required
and that, on remand, the People could elect to try Ceus again for felony child abuse
or could ask the trial court to enter a judgment of conviction on misdemeanor child
abuse. Id. at | 28.

1108 The People then petitioned for certiorari review, and we granted their
petition.

## II. Analysis

1109 I begin by discussing the applicable standard of review. I then address, in
turn, the questions of preservation, instructional error, and constitutional harmless
error.

### A. Standard of Review

1110 Trial courts must correctly instruct the jury on the applicable law, although
they have discretion as to the style and form of the instructions. People in Int. of

<!-- PageBreak -->

J.G., 2016 CO 39, 1 33, 370 P.3d 1151, 1161. We review jury instructions de novo to
determine whether the instructions, considered as a whole, correctly informed the
jury as to the pertinent law. Id.

## B. Preservation

1111 We and divisions of our court of appeals have long and consistently
maintained that by tendering an instruction that accurately states the law, a party
preserves for appellate review a claim of instructional error relating to that
tendered instruction. See, e.g., Thomas v. People, 820 P.2d 656, 659 (Colo. 1991);
People v. Ridgeway, 2013 COA 17, 1 10, 307 P.3d 126, 128. This is so even if the party
does not then object or otherwise raise the issue during a jury instruction
conference. People v. Tardif, 2017 COA 136, 1 10, 433 P.3d 60, 64.

1112 Here, in light of this settled case law, Ceus clearly preserved the issue now
before us by (1) submitting a special interrogatory that would have required the
jury to make the finding that she claims the given instructions omitted and
(2) citing the applicable case law and pattern jury instruction requiring such a
finding.

1113 I am not persuaded otherwise by the People's argument to the contrary. In
asserting that Ceus did not give the trial court an opportunity to address the
question, the People ignore the above-cited case law and, in essence, assert that
Ceus was required to do more than cite the applicable law and tender an

<!-- PageBreak -->

interrogatory that addressed the precise issue now before us. For the reasons that
I have stated, Ceus had no obligation to do more than she did.

1114 Having thus determined that Ceus preserved for appellate review her
assertion of instructional error, I turn to the merits of that question.

## C. Instructional Error

1115 Section 18-6-401 provides, in pertinent part:

(1)(a) A person commits child abuse if such person causes an injury
to a child's life or health, or permits a child to be unreasonably placed
in a situation that poses a threat of injury to the child's life or health,
or engages in a continued pattern of conduct that results in
malnourishment, lack of proper medical care, cruel punishment,
mistreatment, or an accumulation of injuries that ultimately results in
the death of a child or serious bodily injury to a child.

....

(7)(a) Where death or injury results, the following shall apply:

(I) When a person acts knowingly or recklessly and the child abuse
results in death to the child, it is a class 2 felony except as provided in
paragraph (c) of this subsection (7).

1116 We construed the requirements of this statute over two decades ago in
Dunaway, 88 P.3d at 627-28. There, we concluded that the child abuse statute
"specifically links subsection (7)(a) to subsection (1)(a) and plainly requires a
causal connection between the two." Id. at 628. And we made clear that the
abusive act described in subsection (1)(a) must "result[] in" the injury described in
subsection (7)(a), thereby equating the statutory term "results in" with the
requirement of a causal connection. Id. at 627. In so concluding, we expressly

<!-- PageBreak -->

rejected the People's request that we infer proof of the injury element of subsection
(7)(a) from proof relating to subsection (1)(a). Id. at 627. We observed that "the
legislature specifically contemplated and provided for those situations where the
prosecution establishes proof of section 18.6-401(1)(a) but without a resulting
injury." Id. (noting that subsection (7)(b) provides for the scenario in which no
death or injury resulted). We thus opined that "no reasonable interpretation of
subsection (1)(a) would lead to the conclusion that proof of [the injury required by
subsection (7)(a)] is made or inferred through proof of the conduct listed in
subsection (1)(a)." Id. at 627-28.

1117 We reiterated these requirements over a decade later when, in Friend, 1 38,
429 P.3d at 1197, we recited the elements of child abuse resulting in death and
expressly noted that the fact that the child abuse resulted in the child's death is a
separate element of the offense.

1118 Consistent with the foregoing, at the time of Ceus's trial, the Colorado
model criminal jury instructions provided both an elemental instruction and a
special interrogatory requiring the jury to find the injury element of
subsection (7)(a) beyond a reasonable doubt.

1119 Specifically, the model elemental instruction for "Child Abuse (Knowingly
or Recklessly)" provided, in pertinent part:

The elements of the crime of child abuse (knowingly or recklessly)
are:

<!-- PageBreak -->

1\. That the defendant,

2\. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged,

3\. knowingly or recklessly,

4\. caused an injury to a child's life or health, or permitted a child to
be unreasonably placed in a situation that posed a threat of injury
to the child's life or health, or engaged in a continued pattern of
conduct that resulted in malnourishment, lack of proper medical
care, cruel punishment, mistreatment, or an accumulation of
injuries that ultimately resulted in the death of a child or serious
bodily injury to a child.

COLJI-Crim. 6-4:01 (2018).

1120 The special interrogatory titled, "Child Abuse-Interrogatory (Death)," in
turn, provided, in pertinent part:

If ... you find the defendant guilty of child abuse, you should sign
the verdict form to indicate your finding of guilt, and answer the
following verdict question on the verdict form:

Did the child abuse result in death? (Answer "Yes" or "No")

The prosecution has the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the child abuse resulted in death.

COLJI-Crim. 6-4:09.INT (2018).

1121 This model interrogatory, however, contained a comment that provided:

It is not necessary to submit a special interrogatory asking the jury to
determine whether the child abuse resulted in death if the instruction
defining the offense is drafted in such a manner that, in order to find
the defendant guilty, the jury necessarily must find that the abuse
resulted in death.

Id. at cmt. 3.

<!-- PageBreak -->

1122 Here, as noted above, the trial court gave an elemental instruction that
advised the jury on the three alternative ways of committing child abuse. It never
instructed the jury, however, regarding the injury element set forth in section
18.6-401(7)(a)(I). Nor did it, either in the elemental instruction, a special
interrogatory, or a verdict form, require the jury to find that the People had proved
that injury element beyond a reasonable doubt, as the law indisputably demands.
Thus, the People were never required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt - and
the jury was never required to find-the causal connection between section
18.6-401(1)(a) and section 18.6-401(7)(a)(I) that we made clear in both Dunaway,
88 P.3d at 628, and Friend, 1 38, 429 P.3d at 1197, was required to sustain a felony
child abuse conviction.

1123 In my view, as the division below concluded, this constituted clear
instructional error. The prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt all of the elements of child abuse as charged, including both that the abuse
was committed in one of the three ways set forth in section 18-6-401(1)(a) and that
this abuse, when committed knowingly or recklessly, resulted in the death of a
child under section 18.6-401(7)(a)(I). The jury was not instructed that it was
required to find the latter, nor did it make any such finding.

1124 In so concluding, I am not persuaded by the People's argument that the
instructions given and the verdict form provided were adequate because they

<!-- PageBreak -->

consistently referred to "Child Abuse Resulting in Death." In advancing this
argument, the People rely on the title of the charge and assert that we can infer the
requisite section 18.6-401(7)(a)(I) finding from a section 18.6-401(1)(a) finding.
These arguments, however, fail.

1125 Regarding the elemental instruction, the instruction itself demonstrates why
relying on the title of the charge is insufficient. As noted above, in the elemental
instruction provided by the court, the court described the charge as "Child Abuse
Resulting in Death" but then instructed on all three alternative ways of committing
child abuse, the first two of which did not require the death of a child.
Accordingly, if the jurors followed the instructions that they were given, which we
presume they did, People v. McKeel, 246 P.3d 638, 641 (Colo. 2010), then they could
have convicted Ceus of "child abuse resulting in death" based on findings that
Ceus's conduct caused injury to the victims' life or health or permitted the victims
to be unreasonably placed in a situation that posed a threat of injury to the child's
life or health, neither of which required a finding that the abuse resulted in death.
See § 18.6-401(1)(a).

1126 The "mere presence" instruction does not alter this conclusion, as the People
contend. That instruction advised the jury only that it could not convict Ceus of
either of the charged offenses unless the prosecution proved all of the elements of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. For the reasons just stated, such an

<!-- PageBreak -->

instruction, whether alone or in combination with the other instructions given, did
not advise the jury that, to convict Ceus of the felony child abuse charges, it was
required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ceus's abusive conduct resulted
in the victims' deaths.

1127 Lastly, as to the People's assertion that we can infer a section
18-6-401(7)(a)(I) finding from a section 18.6-401(1)(a) finding, we expressly rejected
the same contention in Dunaway, 88 P.3d at 627-28.

1128 For these reasons, like the majority and the division below, I would conclude
that the jury instructions on the charge of felony child abuse were erroneous
because they did not advise the jury on the injury element of the crime and did not
require the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ceus's abuse resulted in
the victims' deaths.

1129 The question thus becomes whether this error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, as the majority concludes. Maj. op. 11 5, 46, 58-79. I turn to
that issue next.

## D. Constitutional Harmless Error

1130 When a trial court misinstructs a jury on the elements of an offense, either
by omitting or misdescribing that element, and the error was preserved for our
review, we review the error for constitutional harmless error. Griego v. People,
19 P.3d 1, 8 (Colo. 2001); Ridgeway, 1 9, 307 P.3d at 127; see also Hagos v. People, 2012

<!-- PageBreak -->

CO 63, 1 11, 288 P.3d 116, 119 (noting that we review trial errors of constitutional
dimension that were properly preserved for review for constitutional harmless
error). Under this standard, we must reverse unless we can conclude that the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Hagos, 1 11, 288 P.3d at 119. Thus, we
will reverse if there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the
conviction. Id.

1131 Once a constitutional error is established, the burden of establishing that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt rests with the People. Id.

1132 Here, Ceus's entire defense was that she did not cause the deaths of the
victims but rather their mother did. In these circumstances, unlike the majority, I
perceive no basis on which to conclude that the error in this case was harmless,
much less that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

1133 On this point, I am not persuaded by the majority's suggestion that the jury
necessarily found that Ceus's abusive conduct resulted in the victims' deaths
because the instructions given and the verdict form provided consistently referred
to "Child Abuse Resulting in Death." Maj. op. 11 59, 74-76. To reach this
conclusion, the majority makes the same mistakes that the People make.
Specifically, the majority overlooks the fact that the instructions and verdict form
advised the jury on all three alternative ways of committing child abuse, the first
two of which did not require the death of a child. Thus, the instructions and

<!-- PageBreak -->

verdict form allowed the jury to convict Ceus of "child abuse resulting in death"
without finding that any abuse that she committed resulted in the victims' deaths.
In addition, by eliminating the requirement that the People prove a causal
connection between the abusive act described in section 18.6-401(1)(a) and the
injury element described in section 18.6-401(7)(a)(I), Maj. op. 11 63-73, the
majority's rationale effectively infers a subsection (7)(a)(I) finding from a
subsection (1)(a) finding. Again, however, we rejected precisely such an analysis
over two decades ago in Dunaway.

1134 I likewise am unpersuaded by the majority's view that the evidence here
was overwhelming. Maj. op. 11 59, 77-78. To the contrary, although I agree with
the majority that, viewing the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable
to the People, the evidence was substantial and sufficient to support a child abuse
conviction, that is not the test in the context of determining whether an error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, as noted above, we consider
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the
conviction. Hagos, [ 11, 288 P.3d at 119.

1135 Here, substantial evidence at trial, which the majority largely ignores, raised
a legitimate question as to whether Ceus's alleged abusive conduct (as opposed to
that of the victims' mother, who was convicted of first degree murder in the
victims' deaths) was the cause of those deaths. Thus, for example, evidence

<!-- PageBreak -->

produced at trial indicated that (1) the victims' mother had a history of abusing
and neglecting them; (2) Ceus moved away from the victims two weeks before
they died and did not see them again thereafter; (3) the last time Ceus saw the
victims, they were healthy and well; (4) others brought the victims food and water
in the interim; (5) at no point did Ceus preclude the victims' mother from
providing them with food and water; (6) the food pantry on the site where the
victims lived had food that was available to them, and the victims' mother knew
how to cook food on site; and (7) a grocery store and free food bank were within a
fifteen-minute walk from the site at which the victims and their mother were
living. Such evidence, if believed, would have allowed a properly instructed jury
to conclude that the victims' mother, and not Ceus, had caused their deaths.

1136 To overcome this obstacle, the majority asserts that the statute required the
prosecution to prove only that the abuse "resulted in" the victims' deaths and that
no causal connection between Ceus's conduct and the victims' deaths was
required or even relevant. Maj. op. 11 63-73. And having stated this premise, the
majority goes on to say that whether the victims died as a result of abuse was not
disputed at trial, thus allegedly supporting the majority's view that the
instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 11 6, 59-60.
But the majority's premise is wrong, and therefore, its conclusion is, as well.
Specifically, although the majority begins from the premise that "resulted in"

<!-- PageBreak -->

requires no causal connection to the victims' deaths, in Dunaway, 88 P.3d at 628,
we said precisely the opposite. Indeed, as noted above, in Dunaway, we expressly
equated the concepts of "resulted in" and "causal connection." Id. at 627-28
(noting that the People were required to prove that the defendant's actions under
section 18.6-401(1)(a) "resulted in" the requisite injury under section 18.6-401(7)(a)
and that the statute plainly required a "causal connection" between the two
subsections).

1137 Although the majority acknowledges that this is what we said, it proceeds
to opine as to what "we meant," namely, that to obtain a conviction under the
statute, the People must establish only but for causation. Maj. op. 1 70. The words
"but for causation," however, appear nowhere in our opinion in Dunaway, and I
believe it is far more appropriate to rely on what our precedent actually says than
to rely on speculation-decades after the fact and without supporting
evidence-as to what our predecessors meant (particularly when that speculation
differs from what they said). For these reasons, I do not agree that the majority's
decision today "hews closely to Dunaway," as the majority claims. Maj. op. 1 69.
To the contrary, I believe that the majority's opinion is inconsistent with that
longstanding precedent.

1138 Accordingly, I would conclude that the instructional error committed by the
trial court was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and, like the division

<!-- PageBreak -->

below, I would further conclude that Ceus's child abuse conviction must be
reversed.

## III. Conclusion

1139 The facts of this case are obviously tragic, and the need to do justice for the
innocent victims here is strong and indisputable. But that undeniable goal cannot
justify our ignoring decades of settled precedent or diminishing Ceus's
constitutional rights.

1140 For the reasons discussed above, I would conclude that, viewing the
evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to the People, the evidence
was substantial and sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find Ceus guilty of
child abuse. I would further conclude, however, that (1) Ceus properly preserved
the instructional error issue that is now before us; (2) the trial court erred in not
instructing the jury that it needed to find that Ceus's abusive conduct resulted in
the victims' deaths and in not providing a special interrogatory or verdict form
requiring such a finding; and (3) this instructional error was not harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. Like the division below, I would therefore reverse Ceus's
child abuse conviction and remand this case to the trial court with instructions
that, on remand, the People may elect to retry Ceus for felony child abuse or ask
the trial court to enter a judgment of conviction on misdemeanor child abuse.

<!-- PageBreak -->

1141 Accordingly, I would affirm the division's judgment and therefore
respectfully concur in part with and dissent in part from the majority's opinion in
this case.