26CO28, 25SA254 - In Re People v. Bell (no oral arguments were held)

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
May 4, 2026

2026 CO 28

No. 25SA254, In re People v. Bell-Discovery -Postconviction Proceedings -
Due Process -CCJRA.

In this original proceeding under C.A.R. 21, the supreme court holds that,
although a defendant has no constitutional right to discovery in postconviction
cases, in some instances a postconviction court should order the prosecution to
provide duplicate pretrial discovery to the defense to protect an indigent
defendant's rights to due process and to the effective assistance of counsel. The
defendant must show that he may be entitled to postconviction relief based on
specific facts likely mentioned in pretrial discovery, which is unavailable to
postconviction counsel, and which would help the defendant substantiate his
allegations.

The supreme court therefore makes absolute the order to show cause,
reverses the district court's denial of defendant's motion to compel, and remands
the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 28

Supreme Court Case No. 25SA254
Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21
Jefferson County District Court Case No. 17CR2407
Honorable Ryan P. Loewer, Judge

In Re
Plaintiff:

The People of the State of Colorado,

V.
Defendant:
Keevin Bell, II.

Order Made Absolute
en banc
May 4, 2026

Attorneys for Plaintiff:
Alexis King, District Attorney, First Judicial District
Rebecca A. Adams, Senior Appellate Deputy District Attorney
Golden, Colorado

Attorneys for Defendant:
Lord Law Firm, LLC
Kathleen A. Lord
Denver, Colorado

Diamond Law LLC
Moorea E. Diamond
Westminster, Colorado

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Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado District Attorneys' Council:
John Walsh, District Attorney, Second Judicial District
Richard F. Lee, Senior Deputy District Attorney
Denver, Colorado

Thomas Raynes
Denver, Colorado

Attorney for Amicus Curiae Office of the Alternate Defense Counsel
Postconviction Unit:
Krista Schelhaas
Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE
MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE
SAMOUR, JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined.

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JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11 In this original proceeding, defendant Keevin Bell, II, asks us to clarify
whether a postconviction court has the authority to order duplicate discovery.
Bell's postconviction counsel-a different attorney than Bell's trial and appellate
counsel-sought from the prosecution a copy of reams of missing pretrial
discovery in Bell's case. The prosecution directed Bell's postconviction counsel to
request it under the Colorado Criminal Justice Records Act ("CCJRA"),
S§ 24-72-301 to -309, C.R.S. (2025). Instead, postconviction counsel moved the
district court for an order compelling disclosure, which the court denied based on
its belief that it lacked the authority to do otherwise.

12 We conclude that if an indigent defendant has shown that he may be entitled
to postconviction relief based on specific facts likely mentioned in pretrial
discovery, which is unavailable to postconviction counsel, and which would help
the defendant substantiate his allegations, the postconviction court should order
the prosecution to provide a free copy of the requested duplicate discovery to the
defendant.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

13 A jury convicted Bell of first degree murder, among other offenses, and the
court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Bell

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appealed, and a division of the court of appeals affirmed his convictions and
sentence. People v. Bell, No. 19CA767, 1 1 (June 2, 2022).

14 About two years later, Bell moved, pro se, for postconviction relief under
Crim. P. 35(c) and requested the appointment of counsel. The district court
appointed the Public Defender's Office, but due to a conflict of interest, alternate
defense counsel ("ADC") entered an appearance instead.

15 ADC sought a copy of the discovery from Bell's trial counsel but ultimately
received only about half of it. (ADC estimates she is missing about thirty-three
out of sixty-six discovery packets. "Discovery" in this context encompasses, for
example, a broad range of police reports, witness statements, photos, and forensic
test results. See, e.g., Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(1). It is the basic fund of information on
which charges are based and strategic decisions are made.) ADC requested a copy
of the missing packets from the prosecution and was told she needed to submit a
request through the CCJRA and pay the associated costs and fees.

16 ADC then moved the court to compel the prosecution to disclose the
requested materials. The court denied the motion. Relying on our holdings in
People v. Silva-Jaquez, 2025 CO 11, 564 P.3d 650, and People v. Owens, 2014 CO 58M,
330 P.3d 1027, the district court concluded:

It is only death penalty proceedings, in which defense seeks
disclosure from the prosecution, that implicate the due process clause
and permit a court to rely on this constitutional provision to compel
discovery of constitutionally material information favorable to

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defendant. Absent some rule, statute, or constitutional provision, a
court does not have "inherent authority" to order discovery in
postconviction proceedings.

(Citation omitted.) The court then concluded that Silva-Jaquez "leaves no room . . .
to be able to find that [Bell] ... has a constitutional right to postconviction
discovery."

17 Bell petitioned this court for an order to show cause under C.A.R. 21, which
we granted.1

## II. Analysis

18 We begin by explaining our jurisdiction to hear this case and the applicable
standard of review. We then discuss the statutes and rules that govern pretrial
discovery and postconviction review in Colorado, and we consider whether those
sources or any constitutional rights give defendants a right to duplicate discovery

1 The issues presented by the petitioner in this original proceeding are as follows:

1\. Does a postconviction court have authority to order the
prosecution to provide the defense with a copy of Trial Discovery
(i.e., a duplicate of the same Rule 16 discovery previously
disclosed to trial counsel) when this information is necessary to
safeguard the defendant's constitutional rights to due process of
law and effective assistance of counsel?

2\. Does People v. Silva-Jaquez, 2025 CO 11, [564 P.3d 650,] lend any
support to the Postconviction Court's broad pronouncement that,
outside of a death penalty proceeding, a district court has no
constitutional authority to order the prosecution to produce
postconviction discovery?

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in postconviction proceedings. Finally, we consider and reject the prosecution's
argument that postconviction counsel must resort to the CCJRA to obtain a copy
of pretrial discovery.

## A. Original Jurisdiction

19 Relief under C.A.R. 21 "is extraordinary in nature and is a matter wholly
within" our discretion. C.A.R. 21(a)(2). "Such relief will be granted only when no
other adequate remedy is available," id., and, for example, when the "'petition
raises "issues of significant public importance that we have not yet considered,"""
Silva-Jaquez, 1 11, 564 P.3d at 653 (quoting People v. Kilgore, 2020 CO 6, 1 8, 455 P.3d
746, 748).

110 We choose to exercise our discretion here because the issue presents a matter
of statewide concern: Procedures and standards for postconviction discovery vary
dramatically from one judicial district to the next. See id. at [ 16, 564 P.3d at 653.
By weighing in here, we advance the public's interest in the uniform
administration of justice. See id. at 1 44, 564 P.3d at 657.

## B. Standard of Review

111 Although we generally review a district court's criminal discovery orders
for an abuse of discretion, id. at [ 18, 564 P.3d at 654, the questions presented here
require us to consider whether a postconviction court has the authority to order

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the prosecution to provide the defense with a copy of pretrial discovery, which is
a question of law. Therefore, our review is de novo. Id.

## C. Postconviction Discovery

112 There is no explicit constitutional right to discovery in criminal cases or to
postconviction review; any such rights have been created by rule and statute.
People v. Castorena, 2026 CO 2, 1 14, 582 P.3d 459, 464; see also People v. Wiedemer,
852 P.2d 424, 438 (Colo. 1993). And because "courts have 'no freestanding
authority to grant criminal discovery beyond what is authorized by the
Constitution, the rules, or by statute,"" Castorena, [ 14, 582 P.3d at 464 (quoting
Silva-Jaquez, 1 19, 564 P.3d at 654), we consider each source of law to determine
whether a court's authority to order discovery extends to postconviction
proceedings.

## 1. Statutes and Rules

113 Crim. P. 16 is the primary source of a Colorado trial court's authority to
order discovery in criminal cases. However, it expressly applies only before trial
and therefore doesn't apply to postconviction proceedings. Crim. P. 16 (governing
"Discovery and Procedure Before Trial"); see, e.g., Silva-Jaquez, 1 23, 564 P.3d at
654.

[14 Postconviction proceedings are generally governed by Crim. P. 35 and
section 18-1-410, C.R.S. (2025). But neither the statute nor the rule provides for

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discovery in postconviction proceedings. See Silva-Jaquez, 1 24, 564 P.3d at 655.
We've previously determined that "[s]uch silence creates a limitation, not an
opportunity." Id. at [ 26, 564 P.3d at 655; see also People v. Thompson, 2020 COA
117, T 32, 485 P.3d 566, 572 ("Had the supreme court intended to allow ...
discovery in connection with a Crim. P. 35(c) motion, it easily could have said so.
It did not.").

115 Despite the general absence of a right to discovery in postconviction
proceedings, there are a few exceptions.

116 First, defendants convicted of felony offenses have a narrow statutory right
to postconviction discovery related to DNA evidence. These defendants may
apply "for DNA testing concerning the[ir] conviction and sentence." § 18-1-412(1),
C.R.S. (2025); see also § 18-1-411(3.3), C.R.S. (2025).

117 Second, we've recognized a defendant's right to postconviction discovery in
death penalty cases. See Owens, TT 1-2, 330 P.3d at 1028-29. But that right is
expressly provided for in the rules and statutes governing the unitary review
process, a process that applies exclusively to death penalty cases. Id. at | 14,
330 P.3d at 1031; Crim. P. 32.2; §§ 16-12-201 to -210, C.R.S. (2025). Therefore, this

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limited right to postconviction discovery doesn't extend to non-death penalty
cases.2 See Silva-Jaquez, TT 36-38, 564 P.3d at 656.

118 Beyond these express provisions, there is no statute or rule authorizing a
court to order postconviction discovery. See id. at TT 20, 26, 564 P.3d at 654-55.
And although "trial courts possess 'the inherent authority to manage their dockets
through scheduling orders' addressing the endorsement of witnesses and other
timely disclosures," id. at 1 7, 564 P.3d at 652 (quoting Owens, 1 16, 330 P.3d at
1032), courts may not rely on this "inherent authority to order discovery in a
postconviction proceeding," id. at 1 3, 564 P.3d at 652.

119 But that is not the end of the inquiry. We've observed that there may be
circumstances when "a defendant's constitutional rights . . . require the prosecution
to disclose certain information in a postconviction proceeding," and so a court may
order discovery to protect those rights. Id. at [ 20, 564 P.3d at 654. Ultimately, the
judiciary has a duty "to uphold the constitution in all judicial proceedings."
People v. Germany, 674 P.2d 345, 350 (Colo. 1983). We therefore turn our attention
to whether any of Bell's constitutional rights are implicated here.

2 Colorado abolished the death penalty in 2020 for offenses committed on or after
July 1, 2020. Ch. 61, secs. 1, 10, §§ 16-11-901, 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V.5)(A), 2020 Colo.
Sess. Laws 204, 204, 209-10.

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## 2. Constitutional Rights

120 When a state creates a right by statute or rule, the accompanying procedures
must comport with a defendant's constitutional rights, including the right to due
process. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985); Hoang v. People, 2014 CO 27, 1 39,
323 P.3d 780, 788; see also Dist. Att'y's Off. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68 (2009) (A "state-
created right can, in some circumstances, beget yet other rights to procedures
essential to the realization of the parent right." (quoting Conn. Bd. of Pardons v.
Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 463 (1981))).

## a. Effective Assistance of Counsel

121 In Colorado, there is no constitutional right to postconviction counsel, but
Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV) and (V) authorize a postconviction court to appoint counsel
if the court concludes that the defendant's postconviction motion has arguable
merit. See Townsell v. People, 2026 CO 11M, 1 24, 585 P.3d 838, 843.

122 If appointed, postconviction counsel is constitutionally obligated to provide
effective assistance. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16; People v.
Breaman, 939 P.2d 1348, 1351-52 (Colo. 1997). Just like trial and appellate counsel,
postconviction counsel must provide assistance that is at least "minimally
effective" and "of sufficient quality to ensure that the process itself is
fundamentally fair."" Silva v. People, 156 P.3d 1164, 1169 (Colo. 2007) (quoting
People v. Valdez, 789 P.2d 406, 410 (Colo. 1990)); see also Strickland v. Washington,

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466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (providing the two-prong test a defendant must meet to
establish that counsel was ineffective); § 21-1-104, C.R.S. (2025) (explaining the
duties of a public defender in representing indigent clients). Whether counsel
provided effective assistance is measured by a standard of objective
reasonableness. Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 76 (Colo. 2003).

123 Under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V), if the court appoints postconviction counsel,
counsel must then respond to that order by indicating whether they will enter an
appearance on behalf of the defendant or whether they have any conflicts,
requesting any additional time needed to investigate, and adding any claims that
they determine have arguable merit. See § 21-2-104, C.R.S. (2025); Townsell, 1 24,
585 P.3d at 843. To satisfy these requirements in a constitutionally compliant
manner, postconviction counsel may need to review all the pretrial discovery. See
Ardolino, 69 P.3d at 77; see also Crim. P. 35(c)(3). Depending on the nature of the
defendant's allegations, it could be objectively unreasonable not to. See Fisher v.
Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1296 (10th Cir. 2002); Ardolino, 69 P.3d at 76.

T24 Thus, under some circumstances, the intersection of the limited state-
created right to postconviction counsel and a defendant's constitutional right to
such counsel's effective assistance may authorize a court to order the prosecution
to copy and disclose pretrial discovery to the defendant even in postconviction
proceedings. To hold otherwise-that is, to flatly prohibit such orders -would

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elevate administrative ease for district attorneys over the effectiveness of
postconviction counsel in fulfilling their assigned role in a system that our state
government created.

## b. Due Process

125 Due process also looms large here. The Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution "imposes procedural limitations on a State's power to take
away protected entitlements," Osborne, 557 U.S. at 67, but it doesn't dictate what
form those procedures must take, id. at 69; accord Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.
551, 559 (1987). See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; see also Colo. Const. art. II, § 25. And
in the postconviction context, due process simply ensures that the procedures
governing a state-created right don't "'offend[] some principle of justice so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,' or
'transgress[] any recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation."
Osborne, 557 U.S. at 69 (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446, 448 (1992)).

126 One of these fundamental principles is that all defendants are entitled to the
same system of justice regardless of wealth. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19
(1956); Jurgevich v. Dist. Ct., 907 P.2d 565, 567 (Colo. 1995). Accordingly, when the
state creates a right, "[t]he State cannot adopt procedures which leave .. . indigent
defendants merely a 'meaningless ritual' while others in better economic
circumstances have a 'meaningful appeal."" Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)

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(quoting Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963)); see also Smith v. Bennett,
365 U.S. 708, 713 (1961) ("When an equivalent right is granted by a State, financial
hurdles must not be permitted to condition its exercise."); People v. Nord, 790 P.2d
311, 315 (Colo. 1990) ("The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment are implicated when a state creates 'differences in access
to the instruments needed to vindicate legal rights' on the basis of the 'financial
condition [sic] of the defendant."" (quoting Roberts v. La Vallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967)
(per curiam))).

127 As discussed, Colorado has created a right to postconviction review in
certain circumstances. And a defendant is entitled to a meaningful opportunity to
challenge the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. See Wiedemer,
852 P.2d at 441 (noting "the overriding concern enunciated in Germany that a
defendant have the meaningful opportunity required by due process to challenge
his conviction"); Dooly v. People, 2013 CO 34, 1 6, 302 P.3d 259, 262 ("[A] criminal
defendant ha[s] an absolute right to challenge the effectiveness of his trial counsel
by postconviction review .... "). So, Griffin's holding that access to justice not be
determined by one's financial situation applies to postconviction proceedings. See
Smith, 365 U.S. at 713-14 (applying Griffin to state habeas filing fees). Relatedly,
we discourage defendants from raising ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on
direct appeal, preferring that such allegations be made in postconviction

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proceedings with a fully developed factual record. See Ardolino, 69 P.3d at 77;
People v. Thomas, 867 P.2d 880, 886 (Colo. 1994). Postconviction proceedings are
often a defendant's best-and sometimes only-opportunity for meaningful
review of any ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. See Ardolino, 69 P.3d at 77.
128 But this doesn't mean postconviction defendants are entitled to the full
panoply of rights they had at trial. See Jurgevich, 907 P.2d at 567. Due process
doesn't require "absolute equality or precisely equal advantages" in all contexts.
United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 324 (1976) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973)). It requires only that indigent defendants
have "an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly." Ross, 417 U.S. at
612.

129 And although a postconviction court may deny a defendant's motion
without appointing counsel and without a hearing if it concludes "the motion,
files, and record in the case clearly establish that the allegations presented in the
defendant's motion are without merit and do not warrant postconviction relief,"
Ardolino, 69 P.3d at 77, if the court concludes the motion has arguable merit and
appoints counsel, the court must ensure that the defendant's constitutional rights
are protected, cf. Hoang, 1 39, 323 P.3d at 788 (holding, in relevant part, that
"[a]lthough no federal constitutional right to an appeal exists, when a state creates

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appellate courts as an integral part of the adjudication of guilt or innocence,
appellate procedures must comport with the United States Constitution").

130 Accordingly, the state doesn't violate a defendant's right to due process by
requiring an indigent defendant to do more than simply assert the fact of
indigency and a desire to look for errors. See Jurgevich, 907 P.2d at 567 ("A
defendant does not have a constitutional right to a free transcript to search for
errors to raise in a collateral attack."); Carr v. Dist. Ct., 402 P.2d 182, 183 (Colo.
1965). Nor is an indigent defendant entitled to discovery based on bare assertions
of error. Cf. Jurgevich, 907 P.2d at 568 ("Merely because a transcript might be of
benefit to a defendant does not mean that he is constitutionally entitled to one.");
MacCollom, 426 U.S. at 327. Although a defendant with the financial means to pay
for copies is free to spend his money to pursue frivolous claims, the state isn't
obligated to subsidize that pursuit. See Jurgevich, 907 P.2d at 567; see also Ross,
417 U.S. at 616 ("The duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate the legal
arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing
effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an
adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly .. . . ").

131 Rather, an indigent defendant must show that "he may be entitled to relief
under Crim. P. 35(c) ... and that the record might contain specific facts that would
substantiate alleged errors." Jurgevich, 907 P.2d at 567 (citation omitted); see also

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MacCollom, 426 U.S. at 326. This requires a defendant to assert specific errors,
along with specific facts. See Snavely v. Shannon, 511 P.2d 905, 907 (Colo. 1973);
Carr, 402 P.2d at 183; see also Ruark v. Gunter, 958 F.2d 318, 319 (10th Cir. 1992).
132 We therefore conclude that, if an indigent defendant meets these
requirements, a postconviction court should order the prosecution to disclose
Crim. P. 16 discovery materials to protect the defendant's due process rights.

## 3. Application

133 Here, Bell asserted seven claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
including, among others, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate
Bell's assertion of voluntary intoxication and also for failing to assert the defense
that, because of that intoxication, Bell lacked the specific intent necessary to
commit first degree murder. See Ardolino, 69 P.3d at 76 ("[S]trategic choices made
after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that
reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.").
Bell also asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate
evidence from the crime scene, which showed signs of tampering based on the
unusual placement of the shell casing on the victim's body. See Fisher, 282 F.3d at
1296 (concluding that "[a] decision not to investigate cannot be deemed reasonable
if it is uninformed"). Bell believes that such investigation might have produced
evidence to corroborate his version of events and thus his defense. Additionally,

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Bell alleged that trial counsel failed to tell him that the prosecution had offered a
plea deal even though Bell had told counsel he was interested in accepting a plea
in lieu of going to trial. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 168 (2012). These
assertions contain specific allegations of ineffectiveness and specific facts that
might be supported by the requested discovery.

134 Moreover, before asking the court to order the disclosure, postconviction
counsel made a good-faith effort to obtain a complete copy of discovery from Bell's
trial attorneys, who claimed to possess only about half of the discovery. Bell's
postconviction counsel then requested the missing packets from the prosecution.
The prosecution has never argued they can't provide the packets because they
don't have them.

135 Under these circumstances, we conclude that the postconviction court has
the authority to order discovery and that it erred by concluding otherwise. See
Osborne, 557 U.S. at 69; cf. Jurgevich, 907 P.2d at 567-68 (concluding the defendant
wasn't entitled to a free transcript because he had failed to allege specific facts that
would entitle him to postconviction relief and instead sought the transcript merely
to discover potential errors).

## D. The CCJRA

136 The prosecution argues that, to obtain a copy of pretrial discovery,
postconviction counsel should submit a CCJRA request and pay the requisite fees

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rather than seeking a court order to compel disclosure. By following this
procedure, they argue, the district attorney's office will be compensated for the
cost of finding and copying those materials.

137 The CCJRA provides for public inspection of criminal justice agency
records. Under the statute, with some exceptions not applicable here,

all criminal justice records, at the discretion of the official custodian,
may be open for inspection by any person at reasonable times, . .. and
the official custodian of any such records may make such rules and
regulations with reference to the inspection of such records as are
reasonably necessary for the protection of such records and the
prevention of unnecessary interference with the regular discharge of
the duties of the custodian or his office.

§ 24-72-304(1), C.R.S. (2025). "Criminal justice agencies may assess reasonable
fees ... for the search, retrieval, and redaction of criminal justice records
requested," § 24-72-306(1), C.R.S. (2025), except that any fee provisions "shall not
apply to discovery materials that a criminal justice agency is required to provide
in a criminal case pursuant to [Crim. P. 16]," § 24-72-306(3).

138 A copy of pretrial discovery obtained pursuant to a CCJRA request,
however, will not always satisfy postconviction counsel's duty to provide effective
assistance because the CCJRA's plain language grants the custodian of the records
requested discretion to disclose all, some, or none of those records, and any
records disclosed are subject to redaction. § 24-72-304(1), (4), (4.5); § 24-72-305,
C.R.S. (2025); see also Harris v. Denver Post Corp., 123 P.3d 1166, 1174 (Colo. 2005)

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(explaining the scope of limitations on a custodian's discretion). Thus, despite the
CCJRA's general preference for disclosure, see Freedom Colo. Info., Inc. v. El Paso
Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 196 P.3d 892, 899 (Colo. 2008), postconviction counsel would
have no guarantee that a full, unredacted copy of pretrial discovery would be
provided pursuant to a CCJRA request. And although the prosecution stated in
their response brief that they don't redact records requested under the CCJRA by
postconviction counsel, they represent but one judicial district in the state. Other
districts are free to create different policies.

139 Accordingly, we conclude that postconviction counsel need not resort to the
CCJRA to obtain a copy of constitutionally essential pretrial discovery.

## III. Conclusion

140 Therefore, we make the order to show cause absolute, reverse the district
court's denial of Bell's motion to compel disclosure, and remand the case to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The district
court should evaluate whether Bell has alleged specific errors and specific facts in
the requested discovery that would substantiate those errors. If the court finds
that he has, then it should order the prosecution to disclose the discovery.