2026 CO 19, 24SC537 Wadsworth Construction v. Regional Rail Partners

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
April 6, 2026

2026 CO 19

No. 24SC537, Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr. Co. v. Reg'l Rail Partners - Colorado
Public Works Act -Construction Law - Statutory Interpretation.

In this case arising from a subcontractor's filing of a verified statement of
claim under the Colorado Public Works Act, the supreme court granted certiorari
to consider whether (1) disputed or unliquidated amounts, including delay and
disruption damages, may lawfully be included in a verified statement of claim;
and (2) a party who files an excessive claim forfeits all its legal rights and remedies
for the amount claimed or only its statutory rights and remedies under the Act.

The court now concludes that disputed or unliquidated amounts may
lawfully be included in a verified statement of claim, provided that the amounts
otherwise fall within the statutory constraints of the Public Works Act. Further,
on the facts presented here, the court concludes the trial court did not err in finding
that Wadsworth's verified statement of claim was not excessive. Finally, the court
concludes that a claimant who files an excessive claim forfeits only the statutory

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rights and remedies created by the Public Works Act and not all rights and
remedies otherwise available at law.

Accordingly, the court reverses the judgment of the court of appeals
division below and remands this case to the division to allow it to address the
additional issues raised in Wadsworth's cross-appeal that it did not previously
address.

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# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 19

Supreme Court Case No. 24SC537
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Case No. 22CA2154

Petitioner:
Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction Company, LLC,

V.

Respondents:
Regional Rail Partners; Balfour Beatty Infrastructure, Inc .; Graham Contracting
Ltd .; Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America; Balfour Beatty, LLC;
and Graham Business Trust.

Judgment Reversed

en banc

April 6, 2026

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Berg Hill Greenleaf Ruscitti LLP

Giovanni M. Ruscitti

Rudy E. Verner

Jack P. Storti

Lawrence Myers

Boulder, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondents:

Martin Hild P.A.

Ll. Rhyddid Watkins

Aurora, Colorado

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Connelly Law, LLC
Sean Connelly
Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amici Curiae American Subcontractors Association, Inc. and the
Colorado Chapter of the American Subcontractors Association, Inc .:
Senn Fortis LLC
Mark D. Gruskin
Ashley C. VanTol
Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Associated General Contractors of Colorado and
Colorado Contractors Association:
Polsinelli PC
Stephen D. Gurr
Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Independent Electrical Contractors Rocky
Mountain:
Hassan & Cables, LLC
John L. Skari, Jr.
Boulder, Colorado

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE
SAMOUR, JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined.

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JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11 In this dispute arising from a subcontractor's filing of a verified statement
of claim under the Colorado Public Works Act, §§ 38-26-101 to -110, C.R.S. (2025),
we granted certiorari to consider whether (1) disputed or unliquidated amounts,
including delay and disruption damages, may lawfully be included in a verified
statement of claim; and (2) the penalty for filing an excessive claim under the Act
is a claimant's forfeiture of all of its legal rights and remedies for the amount
claimed, or only its statutory rights and remedies.1

12 We now conclude that disputed or unliquidated amounts may lawfully be
included in a verified statement of claim, provided that the amounts otherwise fall

1 Specifically, we granted certiorari to review the following issues:

1\. Whether a claimant who files an excessive verified statement of
claim under the Colorado Public Works Act, §§ 38-26-101 to -110,
C.R.S. (2024), forfeits both its statutory remedies and all other
available legal remedies or, as with an excessive lien claimant
under the General Mechanics' Lien Act, forfeits its statutory
remedies only.

2\. Whether a verified statement of claim under the Colorado Public
Works Act may lawfully include disputed amounts, such as
additional costs incurred by a subcontractor due to project delays
and disruptions, or whether such claims are limited to undisputed,
liquidated amounts.

In its briefing before us, petitioner Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction
Company, LLC ("Wadsworth") addressed these issues in reverse order, and
we will do the same.

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within the statutory constraints of the Public Works Act, and that, on the facts
presented, the trial court did not err in finding that Wadsworth's verified
statement of claim was not excessive. We further conclude that a claimant who
files an excessive claim forfeits only the statutory rights and remedies created by
the Public Works Act and not all rights and remedies otherwise available at law.

T3
Accordingly, we reverse the division's judgment and remand this case to
the division to allow it to address the additional issues raised in Wadsworth's
cross-appeal that the division did not previously address.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

14 In 2013, the Regional Transportation District ("RTD") contracted with
Regional Rail Partners to design and build the North Metro Rail Line public works
project between Thornton and Denver's Union Station. The primary contract for
this project was valued at over $343 million. Regional Rail then entered into a
subcontract with Wadsworth for work related to portions of the rail line. The
original subcontract price was $29 million, but, following change orders,
Wadsworth was to be paid over $60 million.

15 The project was impacted by a number of delays and disruptions that
significantly expanded both the project's timeline and associated costs.
Wadsworth hired an expert to undertake an analysis of the costs and damages that
Wadsworth had incurred due to these delays and disruptions. The expert

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subsequently delivered a report concluding that Regional Rail owed Wadsworth
approximately $12.4 million due to the "ongoing delays, disruptions and changes
incurred by it at the project."

16
6 Pursuant to section 38-26-107(1), C.R.S. (2025), of the Public Works Act,
Wadsworth filed a verified statement of claim with RTD. In this verified statement
of claim, Wadsworth alleged that Regional Rail owed it nearly $15.8 million for
the labor, materials, or other supplies that Wadsworth had provided in connection
with the project. Upon receipt of this verified statement of claim, Regional Rail
took issue with a contractual retention amount that it asserted was not yet owed.
Wadsworth then amended its verified statement of claim to remove this retention
amount, and the amendment reduced the claimed amount to approximately $12.8
million (comprising the $12.4 million from the expert report and additional
amounts that came due after the report was served).

17 In response to Wadsworth's amended verified statement of claim (for
convenience and consistency with the statutory language, we will hereafter refer
to the amended verified statement of claim as the "verified statement of claim"),
Regional Rail filed an ex parte petition in the Adams County District Court,
pursuant to section 38-26-108, C.R.S. (2025), to substitute a corporate surety bond
issued by Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America as security in place
of the verified statement of claim. In this petition, Regional Rail also requested

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that the court release the verified statement of claim. The court granted Regional
Rail's petition.

18 A few months later, Wadsworth initiated this action in the Denver District
Court. In its complaint, as subsequently amended, Wadsworth asserted a variety
of claims against defendants Regional Rail Partners, Balfour Beatty Infrastructure,
Inc., Graham Contracting Ltd., Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of
America, Balfour Beatty, LLC, and Graham Business Trust (collectively,
"Defendants") seeking unpaid costs. These claims included a common law claim
for breach of contract, a statutory claim for relief under the corporate surety
substitution bond, and a statutory claim for failure to pay construction funds. In
support of these claims, Wadsworth principally alleged that Regional Rail had
caused numerous project delays, all of which impacted Wadsworth's ability to
complete its work and caused Wadsworth to sustain additional costs.

19
Defendants answered, asserting a number of affirmative defenses as well as
counterclaims. As pertinent here, Defendants alleged that Wadsworth had
contributed to the delays underlying its asserted damages. Additionally,
Defendants raised as both an affirmative defense and as a counterclaim that
Wadsworth's verified statement of claim was excessive under section 38-26-110,
C.R.S. (2025), and that Wadsworth had thus forfeited all rights to the amounts
claimed in its verified statement of claim.

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110 The case proceeded to a ten-day bench trial, after which the trial court issued
extensive and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court
ultimately determined that Regional Rail had not established that Wadsworth's
verified statement of claim was excessive and that "there was a reasonable
possibility the amount [Wadsworth] sought in the [verified statement of claim]
was due." The trial court further found that Regional Rail had delayed and
disrupted Wadsworth's work. The court thus awarded Wadsworth over $3.7
million in damages, including delay and disruption damages, and over $1.9
million in unpaid construction funds, which were to be paid no later than ten days
after Regional Rail's receipt of such funds from RTD.

111 Regional Rail then appealed, arguing, as pertinent here, that the trial court
had erred in finding that Wadsworth's verified statement of claim was not
excessive and in thus concluding that Wadsworth's claims were not forfeited
under section 38-26-110. Wadsworth, in turn, cross-appealed, arguing, in
pertinent part, that the trial court had erred in (1) declining to award Wadsworth
prejudgment interest; (2) denying Wadsworth penalty interest under the Prompt
Payment Act; and (3) finding that Regional Rail did not owe final payment to
Wadsworth until after RTD had issued final payment to Regional Rail, as opposed
to after RTD had issued payment for Wadsworth's work.

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112 A division of the court of appeals subsequently reversed the trial court's
decision regarding Wadsworth's verified statement of claim. Ralph L. Wadsworth
Constr. Co. v. Reg'l Rail Partners, 2024 COA 78, 11 43, 68, 558 P.3d 641, 650, 653. In
so ruling, the division initially observed that it could discern no support in the

record for the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable possibility that
the sum claimed in the verified statement of claim was due. Id. at | 35, 558 P.3d
at 649. This was particularly true given (1) the substantial disparity between the
amount claimed and the amount proved at trial and (2) the lack of any discussion
regarding the evidence purportedly establishing that the amount claimed was for
labor, materials, sustenance, or other supplies and that it was due at the time
Wadsworth filed its verified statement of claim. Id. Indeed, in the division's view,
the record unequivocally established no reasonable possibility that the amount
claimed was due. Id. at 1 36, 558 P.3d at 649. In support of this conclusion, the
division observed that although Wadsworth's expert had testified regarding how
he had calculated the $12.4 million of the claimed amount, Wadsworth had
presented no evidence as to the basis for the remaining amount claimed. Id. The
division further observed that the bulk of the $12.4 million that Wadsworth had
itemized was for delays, disruptions, and other problems associated with the
project. Id. at | 37, 558 P.3d at 649. The division believed that these items included
amounts for lost profits, contractual markups, nonrental equipment costs, and

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"extended overhead" that did not fall within the types of costs covered by section
38-26-107(1). Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr. Co., 137, 558 P.3d at 649. And the
division noted that the parties were vigorously disputing who had caused the
delays, thus undermining any assertion that Wadsworth's unliquidated claim for
delay damages was "due" at the time Wadsworth filed its verified statement of
claim. Id. at 1 38, 558 P.3d at 649-50.

113 The question thus became whether Wadsworth knew that it had included
in its verified statement of claim amounts that did not fall within the statute. Id.
at 1 40, 558 P.3d at 650. The division concluded that the record unequivocally
established that it did. Id. In support of this determination, the division observed
that Wadsworth's president had acknowledged that the amount claimed included
amounts "in excess of the agreed to change orders" and purportedly included lost
profits. Id. at | 41, 558 P.3d at 650. Thus, in the division's view, by Wadsworth's
own admission, it knew that its claim included change orders that Wadsworth was
seeking but to which Regional Rail had not agreed, as well as unliquidated claims
for damages that Wadsworth had not yet proved. Id. at 1 42, 558 P.3d at 650.

114 The division thus concluded that, as a matter of law, the evidence
established that (1) Wadsworth's verified statement of claim was for an amount
greater than the amount due; (2) there was no reasonable possibility that the
amount claimed was due; and (3) Wadsworth knew this when it filed its verified

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statement of claim. Id. at [ 43, 558 P.3d at 650. Wadsworth's verified statement of
claim was therefore excessive, and, as a result, Wadsworth had forfeited its entire
claim. Id.

115 Accordingly, the division reversed the trial court's judgment "to the extent
it awarded Wadsworth any amount included in its amended verified statement of
claim." Id. at [ 68, 558 P.3d at 653. In light of this conclusion, the division did not
need to reach three of Wadsworth's issues on cross-appeal. Id. at | 61, 558 P.3d at
653.

116 Wadsworth then petitioned for certiorari review, and we granted its
petition.

## II. Analysis

117 We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review and principles
of statutory construction. We then apply these legal principles to determine
whether disputed or unliquidated amounts may be included in a verified
statement of claim. Concluding that they may be, we consider whether
Wadsworth's verified statement of claim constituted an excessive claim under the
Public Works Act. We end by addressing the proper construction of the Act's
forfeiture provision regarding excessive claims, section 38-26-110.

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## A. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Construction

118 We review questions of statutory construction de novo. People in Int. of
B.C.B., 2025 CO 28, 1 24, 569 P.3d 74, 79. When interpreting statutes, we seek to
determine and effectuate the legislature's intent. Id. In doing this, we apply words
and phrases in accordance with their plain and ordinary meanings, and we
consider the entire statutory scheme to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible
effect to all of its parts. Id. Moreover, we avoid constructions that would render
any statutory words or phrases superfluous or that would lead to illogical or
absurd results. Id.

119 In construing a statute, we respect the legislature's choice of language. Id.
at [ 25, 569 P.3d at 79. Accordingly, we may not add words to a statute or subtract
words from it. Id.

120 If the statutory language is unambiguous, then we will apply it as written
and need not resort to other rules of statutory construction. Id. at | 26, 569 P.3d at
79. If, however, a statute is ambiguous (i.e., reasonably susceptible of multiple
interpretations), then we may consider other tools of statutory interpretation,
including the consequences of a given construction, the goals to be achieved by
the statute, and the statute's legislative history. People v. Hudson, 2025 CO 52, 1 15,
576 P.3d 131, 134.

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121 Finally, we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly
erroneous. French v. Centura Health Corp., 2022 CO 20, 1 24, 509 P.3d 443, 449.
Accordingly, we will not overturn a trial court's factual findings unless they are
unsupported by the record. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC v. Woodbridge Condo. Ass'n, 2021
CO 56, 1 17, 489 P.3d 735, 740-41.

## B. Disputed or Unliquidated Amounts

122 We begin by addressing Wadsworth's contention that the plain language of
section 38-26-107 of the Public Works Act allows a verified statement of claim to
contain disputed or unliquidated amounts, including delay and disruption
damages. To the extent that disputed or unliquidated amounts, including delay
and disruption damages, fall within the limitations set forth in sections 38-26-107
and 38-26-110, we agree.

123 The Public Works Act creates a remedy designed to protect suppliers of
labor and materials for public works projects because the benefits of the Colorado
Mechanics' Lien Act do not apply to projects constructed by governmental
agencies. W. Metal Lath, a Div. of Triton Grp., Ltd. v. Acoustical & Constr. Supply,
Inc., 851 P.2d 875, 877 (Colo. 1993). In particular, section 38-26-107 establishes the
right of a contractor or subcontractor on a public works project to file a verified
statement of claim that operates as a lien against retained contract funds. W. Metal
Lath, 851 P.2d at 877.

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T24
Section 38-26-107(1) provides, in pertinent part:

Any person ... that has furnished labor, materials, sustenance, or
other supplies used or consumed by a contractor or his or her
subcontractor in or about the performance of the work contracted to
be done or that supplies laborers, rental machinery, tools, or
equipment to the extent used in the prosecution of the work whose
claim therefor has not been paid by the contractor or the
subcontractor may, at any time up to and including the time of final
settlement for the work contracted to be done, file with the board,
officer, person, or other contracting body by whom the contract was
awarded a verified statement of the amount due and unpaid on
account of the claim.

125
Upon the filing of such a claim, the public entity must withhold from all
payments to its contractor sufficient funds to ensure the payment of such claims
until the claims have been paid or the claims, as filed, have been withdrawn.
§ 38-26-107(2).

126 Pursuant to the above-quoted statutory language, a contractor or
subcontractor may file a verified statement of claim for a broad category of unpaid
costs related to the scope of contracted work, namely, "labor, materials,
sustenance, or other supplies" or the provision of any "laborers, rental machinery,
tools, or equipment." § 38-26-107(1). Thus, the plain language of section 38-26-107
provides that unpaid costs that fall within these categories and that were "used in
the prosecution of the work" may be included in a verified statement of claim. Id.
127 Section 38-26-110 places additional restrictions on a claimant's right to file
such a claim. Under that section, a claimant will forfeit certain rights and remedies

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if its verified statement of claim is excessive. Section 38-26-110(1) thus provides,
in pertinent part:

Any person who files a verified statement of a claim or asserts a claim
against a principal or surety that has furnished a bond under this
article for an amount greater than the amount due without a
reasonable possibility that the amount claimed is due and with the
knowledge that the amount claimed is greater than the amount due,
and that fact is demonstrated in any proceedings under this article,
shall forfeit all rights to the amount claimed .. . .

128 To prove that a verified statement of claim is excessive, a challenging party
must therefore demonstrate that, at the time of filing, (1) the claim was for an
amount greater than the amount due; (2) there is no reasonable possibility that the
amount claimed was due; and (3) the claimant knew that the amount claimed was
greater than the amount due. Id .; cf. E.B. Roberts Constr. Co. v. Concrete Contractors,
Inc., 704 P.2d 859, 864 (Colo. 1985) (noting that when determining whether a lien
is excessive under the Mechanics' Lien Act, "the matter must be viewed in light of
the information available to the lien claimant at the time of filing the lien
statement").

129 In sum, when read together, sections 38-26-107 and 38-26-110 allow
contractors and subcontractors to file a verified statement of claim for any unpaid
costs for labor, materials, sustenance, rental machinery, tools, equipment, or other
supplies used in the provision of the contracted work, as long as there was either
a reasonable possibility at the time of filing that the amount claimed was due or

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the claimant did not know at the time of filing that the amount claimed was greater
than the amount due. Nowhere, however, does the statutory language prohibit a
claimant from including disputed or unliquidated amounts in a verified statement
of claim. Nor do we perceive any inconsistency in recognizing that an amount
may be disputed or not yet determined and still have a reasonable possibility of
being due.

130 In reaching this conclusion, we respectfully disagree with the division's
contrary interpretation.

131 The division stated that section 38-26-110 bars a person "from claiming an
amount 'greater than the amount due,"" Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr. Co., 1 27,
558 P.3d at 648 (quoting section 38-26-110(1)), but this oversimplifies the statutory
command. That a claimed amount is greater than the amount due is not alone
sufficient to establish that the claim is excessive. For example, a subcontractor
could file a claim for an amount ultimately determined not to be due, but if the
subcontractor did not know that the amount claimed was greater than what was
due at the time it filed its verified statement of claim, then the claim would not be
excessive under section 38-26-110. Cf. E.B. Roberts Constr. Co., 704 P.2d at 864
(upholding a trial court's finding that a lien was not excessive at the time it was
filed, even though the court ultimately awarded less than the lien claimed, because
the evidence was sufficient to allow the court to conclude that the claimants had

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used the information available at the time of filing and selected a valuation method
that, although abandoned at trial, was reasonable under the circumstances);
Galiant Homes, LLC v. Herlik, 2025 COA 3, 1 34, 565 P.3d 1109, 1118 (construing
parallel language under the Mechanics' Lien Act and reaching the same
conclusion).

132 We likewise are unpersuaded by the division's view that the statutory term
"due" necessarily excludes disputed claims. Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr. Co., 11 27,
38, 558 P.3d at 648, 649-50. To reach its conclusion, the division relied on Byerly v.
Bank of Colorado, 2013 COA 35, 411 P.3d 732, Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr. Co., 1 27,
558 P.3d at 648, but that case is distinguishable. Byerly concerned a mechanic's lien
for amounts allegedly due under a contract that premised a developer's duty to
pay a contractor on a number of conditions precedent. Byerly, 11 6-7, 36, 411 P.3d
at 734, 738. In that case, however, the contractor knew that the conditions
precedent had not been satisfied at the time the contractor filed its lien, but the
contractor filed the lien anyway. Id. at TT 37-38, 411 P.3d at 739. In these
circumstances, the division concluded that there was no reasonable possibility that
the lien amount was due at the time the contractor filed the lien and that the
contractor had knowingly filed a lien for an amount greater than the amount then
due. Id. at 1 40, 411 P.3d at 739. Accordingly, the division determined that the
contractor had filed an excessive lien. Id. at [ 43, 411 P.3d at 740.

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133 A dispute concerning the amount that is owed under a contract, which is
the question before us here, is not the same as a scenario in which contracted
amounts are premised on conditions precedent and the contractor knows that the
conditions have not been satisfied. A disputed or unliquidated amount seeks to
clarify what, if anything, is due. Conditions precedent, in contrast, address when
an amount is due. Thus, a disputed or unliquidated amount may still be "due"
even if it is yet undetermined.

134 Lastly, we note that reading section 38-26-110 to prohibit a verified
statement of claim from including any disputed amounts, as the division did,
would conflict with the very purpose of the statute. The Public Works Act was
enacted by the Colorado General Assembly "to protect contractors who supply
labor and materials to public works projects." City of Westminster v. Brannan

Sand & Gravel Co., 940 P.2d 393, 395 (Colo. 1997) (emphasis added). Moreover, "[a]

substantial source of disputes in construction projects is nonpayment of those
persons who provide material and labor to the project." 1C Stephen A. Hess,
Colorado Practice Series: Methods of Practice § 56:1, Westlaw (7th ed. database
updated June 2025). Accordingly, the Public Works Act created remedies for
claimants like Wadsworth who have claims for nonpayment arising from the
provision of labor and materials on a public works project, even if those claims are
disputed. See W. Metal Lath, 851 P.2d at 877 (listing the remedies created for

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contractors and subcontractors on public works projects, including section
38-26-107's "right to establish a lien against retained contract funds").

135 On this point, we note that the division itself appears to have acknowledged
that section 38-26-107 provides a remedy regarding disputed amounts.
Specifically, in its opinion, the division observed that when a public entity receives
a verified statement of claim, the entity "must withhold from any payments to the
contractor the amount claimed by the subcontractor until any disputes between the
contractor and subcontractor are resolved." Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr. Co., 1 18,
558 P.3d at 647 (emphasis added).

136 For these reasons, we conclude that, as long as the amounts claimed to be
due constitute labor, materials, sustenance, rental machinery, tools, equipment, or
other supplies used in the prosecution of the work, disputed or unliquidated
amounts may be included in a verified statement of claim. The question thus
becomes whether delay and disruption damages fall within the foregoing
statutory categories. We turn next to that question.

137 Beginning, as we must, with the statutory language, we note that the text of
the pertinent statutory sections neither expressly nor implicitly precludes a claim
for delay and disruption damages. §§ 38-26-107(1), 38-26-110(1). Accordingly,
applying the plain language of these provisions, we conclude that delay and
disruption damages may be included in a verified statement of claim. Such

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claimed damages must, however, fall within the strictures of section 38-26-107 and
not otherwise violate the limitations set forth in section 38-26-110. Thus, delay and
disruption damages may be included as long as they constitute claims for labor,
materials, sustenance, rental machinery, tools, equipment, or other supplies used
or consumed by a contractor or subcontractor in the performance or prosecution
of the contracted work. See also Hess, supra, at § 56:29 (noting that, if a contracting
party has negligently caused delay in contract performance, then a contractor may
recover damages for "increased impact costs of labor, materials, equipment ...
and other costs attributable to the project delay"); 6 Philip L. Bruner & Patrick J.
O'Connor, Jr., Bruner & O'Connor on Construction Law § 15:106, Westlaw (database
updated Jan. 2026) (noting that disruption damages are concerned with
"unanticipated compensable increases in costs incurred to perform any given
work activity or activities" resulting from a "loss of efficiency" on a project);
W. Stephen Dale & Robert M. D'Onofrio, Construction Schedule Delays §§ 4:1,
4:7-4:10, 4:12, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2025) (detailing common types of
delay damages, including additional costs for labor, materials, and equipment,
and also observing that project disruptions, as distinct from delays, can lead to
"increased labor and equipment costs due to the lack of productivity").

138 Because the statute mandates that amounts claimed must be related to costs
used in the performance or prosecution of a project's work, however, purely

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consequential damages related to delays or disruptions, such as damages for lost
profits or idle time, do not fall within the pertinent statutory restrictions and thus
may not be included. See § 38-26-107(1); cf. In re Regan, 151 P.3d 1281, 1285 (Colo.
2007) (opining, based on similar language in the Mechanics' Lien Act, that "those
who have a lien are laborers and material suppliers who have added value to [the]
property"); Tabor v. Armstrong, 12 P. 157, 160 (Colo. 1886) (noting that under the
Mechanics' Lien Act, a landowner's liability is limited to those cases in which a
lien is claimed for "labor actually performed" on a building and "materials
actually furnished therefor" and that the claimant's demand for payment must
derive from the actual performance of the work).

139 Here, we acknowledge that the expert report that Wadsworth filed in
support of its verified statement of claim did not always expressly state that the
claimed amounts constituted costs associated with labor, materials, or other
statutorily identified categories. The trial court, however, reviewed Wadsworth's
verified statement of claim and found that there was a reasonable possibility that
the amount sought was due under the statute. Inherent in this finding is that the
amounts included did not otherwise contravene the statutory requirements of
section 38-26-107. Because we cannot say that the trial court's finding in this
regard was unsupported by evidence in the record, we must defer to it. French,
1 24, 509 P.3d at 449; Lo Viento Blanco, 1 17, 489 P.3d at 740-41. Accordingly, we

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will not disturb the trial court's finding that Wadsworth's verified statement of
claim was not excessive due to its inclusion of delay and disruption damages.

140 In so concluding, we are unpersuaded by Regional Rail's contention that
Wadsworth's claim included lost profits, idle time, or other unrecoverable costs.
After a thorough review of the evidence, the trial court did not make any findings
that would support the argument that Wadsworth's claims consisted of
unrecoverable consequential damages. Moreover, the damages that the trial court
ultimately awarded Wadsworth consisted of delay damages, lost productivity
damages, specific issue damages, and unpaid contract balances. For the reasons
set forth above, each of these items can properly constitute costs for labor,
materials, sustenance, rental machinery, tools, equipment, or other supplies used
in the performance or prosecution of the project, and none necessarily comprise
unrecoverable consequential damages.

141 Accordingly, we conclude that under the Public Works Act, disputed or
unliquidated amounts, including delay and disruption damages, may be included
in a verified statement of claim, provided that they constitute labor, materials,
sustenance, rental machinery, tools, equipment, or other supplies used in the
performance or prosecution of the project and are not otherwise excessive under
section 38-26-110. We thus further conclude that the division erred in finding that
Wadsworth's verified statement of claim was excessive as a matter of law.

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## C. Penalty for Excessive Claims

142 We next address Wadsworth's contention that the division erred in
concluding that a claimant who violates section 38-26-110 by filing an excessive
verified statement of claim forfeits any and all rights and legal remedies to the
amounts claimed. Again, we agree.

143 As discussed above, section 38-26-110(1) provides that if a claimant violates
the statute and files an excessive claim, then the claimant "shall forfeit all rights to
the amount claimed and shall be liable ... in an amount equal to all costs and all
attorney fees reasonably incurred." Defendants contend that the plain language
of this statute requires a claimant's forfeiture of any and all rights and remedies to
the amount claimed, including both statutorily created rights and other legal
avenues of relief. Wadsworth, in contrast, asserts that the forfeiture of "all rights
to the amount claimed," when read within the context of the entire statutory
scheme, means that a claimant who is found to have filed an excessive claim
forfeits only the statutory rights and remedies afforded by the Public Works Act.

144 As an initial matter, we conclude that the statute is reasonably susceptible
of the interpretations proffered by both Defendants and Wadsworth. As
Defendants assert, "all rights to the amount claimed" could reasonably be
construed to refer to any and all rights afforded under the law to the amounts
claimed to be due in the verified statement of claim. As Wadsworth contends,

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however, "all rights" could also reasonably be construed to mean any and all
rights afforded by the Public Works Act. Accordingly, we conclude that the
statutory language is ambiguous, see Hudson, 115, 576 P.3d at 134, and we
therefore turn to other tools of statutory construction to discern the legislature's
intent.

145 We begin with legislative history. As noted above, the Public Works Act
was enacted to provide similar remedies for those who supply labor and materials
to public works projects as the remedies provided by the Mechanics' Lien Act for
those who supply labor and materials to private works projects. See South-Way
Constr. Co. v. Adams City Serv., 458 P.2d 250, 251 (Colo. 1969) (noting that because
the benefits of the Colorado Mechanics' Lien Act do not apply to projects
constructed by governmental agencies, "a remedy similar to our mechanic's [sic]
lien statute was provided by the legislature for the protection of those furnishing
supplies or material for such projects," and that the Public Works Act "stands in
lieu of the mechanic's [sic] lien statute"). Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to
look to case law construing the corresponding language of the Mechanics' Lien
Act for guidance as to the legislature's intent here.

146 Section 38-22-128, C.R.S. (2025), of the Mechanics' Lien Act provides that a
person who files an excessive lien "shall forfeit all rights to such lien." We have
construed this language to mean that a claimant who files an excessive lien forfeits

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only mechanics' lien rights and remedies, nothing more. See E.B. Roberts Constr.
Co., 704 P.2d at 863-64.

147 Section 38-26-110's legislative history confirms the legislature's intent to
mirror these restrictions. At both Senate and House committee hearings on the
then-proposed legislation, proponents consistently characterized section
38-26-110 as establishing the same limitations on claims under the Public Works
Act as existed for liens under the Mechanics' Lien Act. See, e.g., Hearing on S.B. 070
before the S. Bus. Affs. & Lab. Comm., 64th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Jan. 27, 2003)
(statement of bill sponsor Senator Doug Lamborn that "Senate Bill 70 will give to
public works projects the same requirements that are now found in our laws
concerning private works projects" and testimony of John Bachmann, a
representative from the Colorado Contractors Association, that section 38-26-110
is "exactly the same provision that's imposed upon an overstating claimant under
the general Mechanics' Lien statute"); Hearing on S.B. 070 before the H. Bus.
Affs. & Lab. Comm., 64th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Mar. 11, 2003) (statement of bill
sponsor Representative Bob Mccluskey stating that the penalty created by section
38-26-110 "highlights what we've done in the Mechanics' Lien already").

148 The intent to mirror the Mechanics' Lien Act's penalty provision is further
supported by the legislation's title, "An Act Concerning Payment Procedures for
a Public Works Construction Project, and, in Connection Therewith, Creating

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Requirements for Contractors' Bonds that Are Consistent with Existing Mechanics"
Liens Requirements Applicable to Private Projects." Ch. 254, sec. 2, § 38-26-110, 2003
Colo. Sess. Laws 1690, 1690-92 (emphases added); see also Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d
807, 811 (Colo. 2004) (noting that although a statute's title is not dispositive of
legislative intent, it can serve as a useful aid in construing a statute).

149 In sum, the legislative history of section 38-26-110 suggests a legislative
intent that the scope of the forfeiture under the Public Works Act would mirror
the scope of the forfeiture under the Mechanics' Lien Act and that, therefore, a
claimant who files an excessive verified statement of claim forfeits only the
statutory rights and remedies afforded by the statute.

150 Consistent with this conclusion, the legislative history further emphasizes
the legislature's intent in section 38-26-110 to deter claimants from filing claims
under the statute in bad faith, just as the Mechanics' Lien statute has historically
been understood. Compare Hearing on S.B. 070 before the S. Bus. Affs. & Lab.
Comm., 64th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Jan. 27, 2003) (Bill sponsor Senator Doug
Lamborn noting that section 38-26-110 "would just make it less likely that a
subcontractor would inflate or overstate a claim because the penalties would be a
little more stringent on that kind of bad faith action"), with Honnen Equip. Co. v.
Never Summer Backhoe Serv., Inc., 261 P.3d 507, 512 (Colo. App. 2011) (construing
the purpose of the Mechanics' Lien Act's excessive claim provision as intending to

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"punish[] and deter[] those who knowingly or deceptively claim amounts that are
not due"); cf. Barnes v. Colo. Springs & C. C. D. Ry. Co., 94 P. 570, 573 (Colo. 1908)
(concluding that under the Mechanics' Lien Act, a claim of a lien for nonlienable
articles "will not vitiate the claim, if it was not willfully false"). The legislature
thus signaled its intent in the Public Works Act to provide contractors and
subcontractors on public works projects with expanded protections under the law
by means of statutory remedies while establishing guardrails to prevent claims
made in bad faith.

151 We are not persuaded otherwise by Defendants' reliance on the differences
between the language used in the Mechanics' Lien Act, which, as noted above,
provides that a claimant who files an excessive lien forfeits "all rights to such lien,"
§ 38-22-128 (emphasis added), and the language used in the Public Works Act,
which provides that a claimant who files an excessive claim forfeits "all rights to
the amount claimed," § 38-26-110(1) (emphasis added). The different language was
necessary because a mechanic's lien cannot be filed against a public property and
thus the Mechanics' Lien Act cannot apply to public works projects. See City of
Westminster, 940 P.2d at 395-96; W. Metal Lath, 851 P.2d at 877. Accordingly, the
legislature substituted "the amount claimed" (a reference to the verified statement
of claim) for "such lien" (referring to the corresponding lien under the Mechanics'
Lien Act). We perceive no intent, however, to undermine the legislative goal of

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creating statutory remedies for contractors and subcontractors on public works
projects that parallel those available to contractors and subcontractors on private
projects, including the right to file a verified statement of claim that mirrors a
mechanic's lien established by the Mechanics' Lien Act. Nor do we perceive
anything in the legislative history to suggest that the legislature intended to alter
the scope of the statutory forfeiture.

152 The goals that the legislature sought to achieve by enacting the Public Works
Act further support our determination that the statutory forfeiture in section
38-26-110 is limited solely to the statutory rights and remedies available under that
Act. As noted above, the Public Works Act was enacted to protect suppliers of
labor and materials for public works projects by providing them with statutory
remedies for amounts due and unpaid. W. Metal Lath, 851 P.2d at 877. To construe
section 38-26-110 to punish contractors and subcontractors by stripping them of
any and all avenues of relief would be contrary to this statutory purpose and
undermine the legislative goals of the statute.

153 Finally, as noted above, we must construe statutes to avoid illogical and
absurd results. B.C.B., 1 24, 569 P.3d at 79. Interpreting section 38-26-110 as
Defendants suggest would lead to just such results. Rather than discouraging
claimants from filing excessive claims in bad faith, claimants would likely be
deterred from exercising their statutory remedies at all, lest they risk losing all

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avenues for being made whole. Reading section 38-26-110 as requiring forfeiture
of only statutory rights and remedies available under the Public Works Act thus
better supports the legislature's intent and the purposes of that Act. Under such a
construction, claimants will properly be deterred from filing excessive claims, but
without the fear of losing all opportunity for recovery based on what might turn
out to be the erroneous exercise of their statutory rights and remedies.

154 Accordingly, we conclude that section 38-26-110's penalty for excessive
claims is a claimant's forfeiture only of its statutory rights and remedies under the
Public Works Act.

## III. Conclusion

155 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that disputed or unliquidated
amounts, including delay and disruption damages, may lawfully be included in a
verified statement of claim, provided that the claimed amounts otherwise fall
within the statutory constraints of the Public Works Act. Thus, disputed or
unliquidated amounts may lawfully be included when the claimed amounts
represent labor, materials, sustenance, rental machinery, tools, equipment, or
other supplies used in the prosecution of the work, and the inclusion of such
amounts does not constitute an excessive claim under section 38-26-110. Applying
that determination to the facts presented here, we further conclude that the trial
court did not clearly err in finding that Wadsworth's verified statement of claim

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was not excessive. Finally, we conclude that a claimant who files an excessive
claim pursuant to section 38-26-110 of the Public Works Act forfeits only the
statutory rights and remedies created by the Act and not all rights and remedies
otherwise available at law.

156 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the division below and remand
this case to the division with instructions to consider the additional issues that
Wadsworth raised in its cross-appeal below and that the division did not address.